├── Execution ├── SuspiciousMMC.kql ├── MicrosoftWorkflowCompiler.kql ├── WMISBMExec.KQL ├── MSHTAExecutions.KQL ├── PSexecNamedPipe.KQL ├── DismLinuxSubsystem.KQL ├── DiscordDriveby.KQL ├── EmailAttachmentExecuted.kql ├── CSCSuspiciousExecutions.kql ├── gpresult.kql ├── MusciFolderExecution.KQL ├── MaliciousNamedPipes.KQL ├── SuspiciousServiceInstalled ├── OfficeSmartScreen.KQL ├── Winexe │ ├── ServinceInstall.KQL │ └── NamedPipeDetection.KQL ├── WebdavExecution.kql ├── OneNoteZeroday.kql ├── PowershellSuspiciousStrings.kql ├── WebDavTempFiles.KQL ├── PowershellDLLexecutions.KQL ├── SuspiciousMSC.KQL ├── PowershellV2Downgrade.KQL ├── SuccesfullExploitationofPDFreaders.kql ├── SuspiciousPDQDeployRunnerChild.KQL ├── Suspicious CLFS Driver Load.md ├── NodeJSSuspiciousExecutions.md ├── LatrodectusFileCreation.md ├── UnsginedExecutionsfromuserdirectories.md └── PodContainerexec.md ├── Exfiltration ├── Anydesk │ └── Readme ├── ExportMailbox.KQL ├── FreeSSLProviders.KQL ├── SimonThatamC2Putty.KQL ├── RemoteAdminCerts.KQL ├── Rclone │ ├── Rcloneconfigfile.kql │ ├── RcloneFileProperties.kql │ └── RcloneMSThreatReport.kql └── BlackSuitbublupexfil.md ├── MacOS ├── chainbreaker.kql ├── tempexecutions.kql ├── osascriptpassword.kql ├── libraryexecutions.kql ├── CredentialAccessBuiltin.KQL ├── NetworkSetupProxy.KQL ├── useraddedtolocaladmin ├── SQlite3TCC.KQL ├── copytmptousers.kql └── PasswordStores.KQL ├── Privilege Escalation ├── UAC │ ├── Clipup.kql │ ├── sdcltUAC.kql │ ├── ChangePKSLUITampering.kql │ └── DLLhostUAC.kql ├── Getsystem.kql ├── applicationshimming.kql ├── GetsystemelevationCSmetasploit.md ├── PrintspoolerElevation.kql └── CVE-2024-35250.md ├── RedCanaryReport2024 ├── Tarfilexecutions.kql ├── YellowCockatooPowershellPersistence ├── PossibleMaliciousBrowserExtensionLoaded.kql ├── WscriptInternetConnection.KQL ├── SmashjackerAppinitDLLmodifcation.KQL ├── SecretsdumpExecution.KQL └── ChromeloaderRegistryValueLargeSizeGeneric.kql ├── C2 ├── GoSimpleTunnel.KQL ├── SuspiciousNSLookup.kql ├── CertReq.KQL ├── PlinkTunnelingForwarding.kql ├── CSSacricialProcesses.KQL ├── FreeSSL.KQL ├── C2IntelFeedsIPs.KQL ├── C2IntelFeedsdomain.KQL ├── Telegraminfostealers.kql ├── SliverPSexec.kql ├── CloudflaredArgoTunnelDNS.md ├── sshtunneltoexternalhost.md ├── MaliciousJA3Fingerprint.kql ├── devtunnel │ ├── DevTunnelFileEvents.md │ ├── Devtunnelcodetunneling.md │ ├── DevTunnelnetworkdetection.md │ └── DevtunnelRegistry.md ├── PowerShellPossibleC2Connection.md └── GoogleSheetsC2Query.md ├── WindowsAPIDetections ├── Readme.md ├── SetThreadContextRemoteApiCallQuery.md ├── NtMapViewOfSectionDetectionRule.md ├── QueueUserApcRemoteApiCallDetectionRule.md └── GetAsyncKeyStateApiCallQuery.md ├── Defense Evasion ├── Rundllwithoutcommandline.KQL ├── DefenderLocalOverride.kql ├── DefenderExclusion.KQL ├── Vssadmindelete.kql ├── ADSRootProcessCreation.kql ├── ADSrootDirectoryFileCreation.kql ├── CoralRaiderMSHTAPowershell.KQL ├── EventLogTamperingRegistry.md ├── EDRSandblast.md ├── rnpkeysDllHijack.md └── Peaklightinfection.md ├── Credential Access ├── Msbuild.kql ├── RegSamDumping.kql ├── SBMNTLM.kql ├── NTDSDump.kql ├── NTDSdumpwbadmin.md └── NTDSFileCreateModify.md ├── Exploit └── SuspiciousMSIExecRRobin.KQL ├── Persistence ├── ServiceCreationRATools.KQL ├── ServiceCreationIDE.KQL ├── ServiceCreation.KQL ├── WMIEventConsumer.KQL ├── ForestBlizzardCustomProtocolHandler.kql ├── rustdeskexecution.md └── SuspiciousRunMRUentries.md ├── Misc&reporting └── InternetFacingDevices.KQL ├── Collection ├── WinrarEncryption.kql ├── BloodHoundGeneratedfiles.kql ├── PowerShellKeyLogging.kql ├── VeeamPSQLDump.md ├── AdfindDetection.md └── DataStagingFileZillaPsFTPWinscp.md ├── Initial Acccess ├── ISOIMGMount.KQL ├── MacroTrustrecords.kql ├── SuspiciousSQLChildren.KQL └── BumbleeBeeInitiailaccess.md ├── Discovery ├── RundllSuspicious.KQL ├── EnumerationShortperiod.kql └── DNSZoneExport.md ├── Sentinel ├── Apt29.kql ├── DeviceLogonEvents │ └── BurteForceSingleIPmultipledestinationswithin10minutes.md └── MFA │ └── MFASuspicious.md ├── ASRDetections ├── AsrUntrustedUsbProcessAuditedDetectionRule.md ├── AsrOfficeProcessInjectionAuditedQuery.md ├── AsrWebShellOnServerAuditedQuery.md ├── AsrOfficeMacroWin32ApiCallsAuditedDetecitonRule.md ├── AsrAdobeReaderChildProcessAuditedDetectionRule.md ├── AsrVulnerableSignedDriverAuditedQuery.md ├── AsrExecutableEmailContentAuditedDetectionRule.md ├── AsrOfficeChildProcessAuditedQuery.md ├── AsrPsexecWmiChildProcessAuditedQuery.md ├── AsrUntrustedExecutableAuditedQuery.md ├── AsrLsassCredentialTheftAuditedQuery.md └── Readme.md ├── Linux ├── ChattrImmutableRemoval.md ├── XclipExecutions.kql ├── Getcapdetection.md ├── PtraceDetected.md ├── SudoersFileEnumeration.md ├── BPFKprobe.md ├── ShadowPasswdcopytosuspiciouslocation.md ├── Base64Shebang.md ├── DoasConfFileCreation.md ├── Sudoers.dFileCreation.md ├── ShadowFileModified.md ├── Linuxwebshell.md ├── ectprofilesuspiciousscripts.md ├── TripleCrosseBPFRootkit.md └── CryptoMiningDetection.kql ├── Lateral Movement └── 7ZToSMBshare.md ├── Malja3fingerpints ├── README.md └── LICENSE /Execution/SuspiciousMMC.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | 2 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Exfiltration/Anydesk/Readme: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | README.MD 2 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /MacOS/chainbreaker.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | DeviceFileEvents 5 | | where FolderPath contains @"/private/var/db/SystemKey" 6 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Privilege Escalation/UAC/Clipup.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | Query: 3 | DeviceProcessEvents 4 | | where FileName ==@"Clipup.exe" 5 | References: 6 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /MacOS/tempexecutions.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | union DeviceProcessEvents 2 | | where Timestamp >= ago(7d) 3 | | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "/tmp/" 4 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Execution/MicrosoftWorkflowCompiler.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | Query: 3 | DeviceProcessEvents 4 | | where ProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName == @"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe" 5 | 6 | References: 7 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /MacOS/osascriptpassword.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | 5 | DeviceProcessEvents 6 | | where ProcessCommandLine has_all ("osascript", "dialog", "password") 7 | 8 | References: 9 | 10 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /RedCanaryReport2024/Tarfilexecutions.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | DeviceProcessEvents | where ProcessCommandLine has_all ('tar', ' -xvf', ' -C')| where InitiatingProcessParentFileName != @"Cisco WebEx Start" 2 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /RedCanaryReport2024/YellowCockatooPowershellPersistence: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | DeviceFileEvents 2 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName contains "powershell.exe" 3 | and FolderPath contains @"programs\startup" 4 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Privilege Escalation/Getsystem.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | 5 | DeviceProcessEvents 6 | | where FileName ==@"cmd.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_all ( "echo", "pipe") 7 | 8 | References: 9 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /C2/GoSimpleTunnel.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | DeviceProcessEvents 5 | | where ProcessCommandLine matches regex "\\-(?i)[f,l]\\=.*:\\/\\/" 6 | 7 | References: 8 | https://github.com/ginuerzh/gost 9 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Execution/WMISBMExec.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | DeviceProcessEvents 5 | | where FileName == @"cmd.exe" and ProcessCommandLine contains @"2>" and ProcessCommandLine contains @"$" 6 | References: 7 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Privilege Escalation/UAC/sdcltUAC.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | DeviceProcessEvents 2 | | where (FileName ==@"sdclt.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName == @"sdclt.exe") and ProcessCommandLine contains "kickoffelev" 3 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /RedCanaryReport2024/PossibleMaliciousBrowserExtensionLoaded.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | DeviceProcessEvents 2 | | where FileName has_any('chrome.exe','msedge.exe') 3 | and ProcessCommandLine contains "--load-extension" 4 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /RedCanaryReport2024/WscriptInternetConnection.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | DeviceNetworkEvents 2 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName contains "wscript.exe"| where RemoteIPType == @"Public" | where RemoteUrl !endswith @".entrust.net" 3 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /C2/SuspiciousNSLookup.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | DeviceProcessEvents 5 | | where FileName contains "nslookup" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("-querytype", "qt", "q", "-type=*") 6 | Refernces: 7 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /MacOS/libraryexecutions.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | 5 | union DeviceProcessEvents 6 | | where Timestamp >= ago(7d) 7 | | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains @"/Library/Scripts" 8 | 9 | References: 10 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /RedCanaryReport2024/SmashjackerAppinitDLLmodifcation.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | DeviceProcessEvents 2 | | where ProcessVersionInfoFileDescription 3 | contains "Registry Console Tool" and ProcessCommandLine contains "AppInit_DLLs" 4 | 5 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /RedCanaryReport2024/SecretsdumpExecution.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | DeviceImageLoadEvents 2 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName contains "svchost.exe" and FileName contains "regsvc.dll" | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine != @"svchost.exe -k LocalService" 3 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /WindowsAPIDetections/Readme.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | 2 | 3 | # List all Available Windows API telemtry 4 | ``` 5 | DeviceEvents 6 | | where ActionType contains "ApiCall" 7 | | summarize count() by ActionType 8 | | project ActionType 9 | ``` 10 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Execution/MSHTAExecutions.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | DeviceProcessEvents 5 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName contains "mshta.exe" 6 | and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("javascript", "about" , "vbscript", "http", "ftp") 7 | Refernces: 8 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Execution/PSexecNamedPipe.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | DeviceEvents 5 | | where ActionType contains "pipe" 6 | | extend parsed = parse_json(AdditionalFields) 7 | | where parsed.PipeName contains "psexesvc" 8 | References: 9 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Privilege Escalation/UAC/ChangePKSLUITampering.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Query: 2 | DeviceProcessEvents 3 | | where InitiatingProcessParentFileName =~ "slui.exe" 4 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "changepk.exe" 5 | | where ProcessIntegrityLevel == "High" 6 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /C2/CertReq.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | DeviceProcessEvents 5 | | where (FileName contains "CertReq.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName contains "CertReq.exe") and ProcessCommandLine contains "Post" 6 | References: 7 | 8 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Execution/DismLinuxSubsystem.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | DeviceProcessEvents 5 | | where FileName contains "Dism.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName == @"dism" | where ProcessCommandLine contains "Subsystem" 6 | Refernces: 7 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Exfiltration/ExportMailbox.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | Query: 3 | DeviceProcessEvents 4 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("*MailboxExportRequest*", "*-Mailbox*-ContentFilter*") 5 | References: 6 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /RedCanaryReport2024/ChromeloaderRegistryValueLargeSizeGeneric.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | DeviceRegistryEvents | where RegistryValueType =~ 'String' | where RegistryValueName != @"OnboardingInfo" 2 | | where strlen(RegistryValueData) > 5000 3 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName != @"mssense.exe" 4 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Defense Evasion/Rundllwithoutcommandline.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | DeviceProcessEvents 5 | | where FileName == "rundll32.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName == @"RUNDLL32.EXE"| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex "^$" 6 | 7 | References: 8 | 9 | Notes: 10 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Credential Access/Msbuild.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | Query: 3 | DeviceProcessEvents 4 | | where ProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName contains "msbuild.exe" 5 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName != @"devenv.exe" and InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName != "MSBuild.exe" 6 | 7 | References: 8 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Defense Evasion/DefenderLocalOverride.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | DeviceRegistryEvents 5 | | where ActionType == @"RegistryValueSet" 6 | | where RegistryKey == @"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\TemporaryPaths" 7 | 8 | 9 | References: 10 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /C2/PlinkTunnelingForwarding.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | DeviceProcessEvents 5 | | where ProcessCommandLine contains "*:" and ProcessCommandLine has_any("-L","-P", "-R", "-pw", "-ssh")| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath != @"/bin/bash" and FolderPath != @"/bin/bash" 6 | 7 | References: 8 | 9 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Exploit/SuspiciousMSIExecRRobin.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | DeviceProcessEvents | where FileName == "msiexec.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ('http:','https:') and not(ProcessCommandLine has_any('.exe','.msi')) | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ('/q', '-q','-quiet','/quiet','/qn','-qn') 5 | 6 | Reference 7 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Credential Access/RegSamDumping.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | Query 3 | DeviceProcessEvents 4 | | where ProcessVersionInfoFileDescription == @"Registry Console Tool" 5 | | where ProcessCommandLine contains "save" or ProcessCommandLine contains "export" 6 | | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("sam","security","system") 7 | References 8 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /C2/CSSacricialProcesses.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | 5 | DeviceProcessEvents 6 | | where FileName has_any ("rundll32.exe","werfault.exe", "searchprotocolhost.exe", "gpupdate.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "svchost.exe", "msiexec.exe") 7 | | where ProcessCommandLine matches regex "^$" 8 | 9 | 10 | References: 11 | 12 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Execution/DiscordDriveby.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | 5 | DeviceFileEvents 6 | | where isnotempty(FileOriginUrl) 7 | | where FileOriginUrl contains "cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/" or FileOriginReferrerUrl contains "cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/" | where FileName contains "pass" 8 | 9 | 10 | References: 11 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Persistence/ServiceCreationRATools.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | Query: 3 | DeviceEvents 4 | | where ActionType == 'ServiceInstalled' 5 | | extend parsed = parse_json(AdditionalFields) 6 | | where parsed.ServiceName has_any ("screenconnect","Radmin", "Splashtop", "Atera", "AmmyyAdmin", "jumpcloud", "GoToAssist", "anydesk") 7 | References: 8 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Execution/EmailAttachmentExecuted.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | EmailAttachmentInfo 5 | | where isnotempty(SHA256) 6 | |join ( 7 | DeviceProcessEvents 8 | | project DeviceName,FileName, SHA256 9 | ) on SHA256 10 | | project Timestamp, DeviceName , FileName, SHA256, SenderFromAddress, RecipientEmailAddress 11 | 12 | References: 13 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Persistence/ServiceCreationIDE.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | Query: 3 | IdentityDirectoryEvents 4 | | where ActionType contains "Service creation" 5 | | extend parsed = parse_json(AdditionalFields) 6 | | where parsed.ServiceCommand has_any ('comspec', 'btobto', 'psexe', 'powershell', 'cmd', 'systemroot' 'admin$') 7 | 8 | References: 9 | 10 | False positives: 11 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /MacOS/CredentialAccessBuiltin.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | DeviceProcessEvents 5 | | where FileName has_any ("defaults","mkpassdb") and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("ShadowHashData", "dump") 6 | References: 7 | https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/e9baebc2bc18f90ae16501613cd9521a16a38ad7/rules/macos/credential_access_dumping_hashes_bi_cmds.toml 8 | 9 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Execution/CSCSuspiciousExecutions.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags 2 | Query: 3 | DeviceProcessEvents 4 | | where ProcessVersionInfoFileDescription == @"Visual C# Command Line Compiler" 5 | | where InitiatingProcessParentFileName == @"cmd.exe" | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine !contains @"google\mFit" | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine !contains @"[Elam]::InstallWdBoot" 6 | Rerences: 7 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /MacOS/NetworkSetupProxy.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | DeviceProcessEvents 5 | | where FileName == @"networksetup" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("setwebproxy","setsecurewebproxy","setautoproxyurl") 6 | 7 | References: 8 | https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/e9baebc2bc18f90ae16501613cd9521a16a38ad7/rules/macos/credential_access_mitm_localhost_webproxy.toml 9 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Misc&reporting/InternetFacingDevices.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | 4 | Query: 5 | 6 | DeviceInfo 7 | | where IsInternetFacing 8 | | extend parsed = parse_json(AdditionalFields) 9 | | where isnotempty(parsed.InternetFacingPublicScannedIp) 10 | | project DeviceName, parsed.InternetFacingLocalIp, parsed.InternetFacingPublicScannedIp 11 | 12 | 13 | References 14 | 15 | 16 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /MacOS/useraddedtolocaladmin: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | DeviceProcessEvents 5 | | where FileName has_any ("dscl", "dseditgroup") 6 | | where ProcessCommandLine contains "admin" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("-a","-append") 7 | | where InitiatingProcessParentFileName != @"jamf" | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine !contains @"com.jamfsoftware" 8 | 9 | References: 10 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Collection/WinrarEncryption.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | DeviceProcessEvents 5 | | where ((FileName == @"rar.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName == @"WinRAR" ) and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("-hp*", "-p*", "-dw", "-tb", "-ta", "/hp*", "/p*", "/dw", "/tb", "/ta")) or (FileName in("7z.exe", "7za.exe") and ProcessCommandLine has_any("-p*", "-sdel") ) 6 | 7 | References: 8 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Initial Acccess/ISOIMGMount.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | name: Initial Access, ISO/IMG File Mounted 2 | description: Detects the mounting of an img file which could indicate a spearphishing attachment 3 | references: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/ 4 | tags: Initial Access, T1566 5 | search_query: 6 | (DeviceFileEvents 7 | | where FileName endswith ".iso.lnk" or FileName endswith ".img.lnk") 8 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Privilege Escalation/UAC/DLLhostUAC.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | DeviceProcessEvents 5 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "dllhost.exe" 6 | | where ProcessIntegrityLevel == "High" 7 | | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("E9495B87-D950-4AB5-87A5-FF6D70BF3E90", "3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7", "D2E7041B-2927-42fb-8E9F-7CE93B6DC937") 8 | 9 | References: 10 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /C2/FreeSSL.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | DeviceNetworkEvents 5 | | where RemoteUrl has_any ("letsencrypt.org", "sslforfree.com", "zerossl.com", "freessl.org") 6 | | where InitiatingProcessFolderPath !startswith @"c:\program files" | where InitiatingProcessParentFileName != @"SenseIR.exe" and InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName != @"Windows ACME Simple (WACS)" 7 | References: 8 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Execution/gpresult.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | Query: 3 | DeviceProcessEvents 4 | | where FileName has_any("gpresult.exe","gprslt.exe") | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("/z", "/v", "/r", "/x") and InitiatingProcessCommandLine !contains "Connect-ExchangeServer" 5 | //(process.name: "gpresult.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "gprslt.exe") and process.args: ("/z", "/v", "/r", "/x") 6 | References: 7 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /MacOS/SQlite3TCC.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | DeviceProcessEvents 5 | | where FileName contains "sqlite" and ProcessCommandLine contains "com.apple.TCC/TCC.db" 6 | 7 | Reference: 8 | https://www.loobins.io/binaries/sqlite3/ 9 | https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/e9baebc2bc18f90ae16501613cd9521a16a38ad7/rules/macos/defense_evasion_privacy_controls_tcc_database_modification.toml 10 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Discovery/RundllSuspicious.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | DeviceProcessEvents 5 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName contains "rundll" or InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName == @"rundll" 6 | | where FileName has_any ("cmd.exe","powershell", "powershell_ise") and InitiatingProcessCommandLine !contains @"zzzzInvokeManagedCustomActionOutOfProc" 7 | References: 8 | 9 | 10 | Notes: 11 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Execution/MusciFolderExecution.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | DeviceFileEvents 5 | | where ActionType == @"FileCreated" and FolderPath contains "music" and FolderPath contains "users" and FileName endswith ".exe" 6 | and InitiatingProcessAccountName != @"system" and InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName != @"Parallels International GmbH" 7 | | invoke FileProfile() 8 | | where GlobalPrevalence <= 10 9 | References: 10 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Defense Evasion/DefenderExclusion.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | Query: 3 | DeviceRegistryEvents 4 | | where RegistryKey contains @"windows defender\exclusions" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine != @"svchost.exe -k GPSvcGroup" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine != @"svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine != @"msiexec.exe /V" and InitiatingProcessAccountName != @"system" 5 | | where InitiatingProcessParentId != 0 6 | References 7 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /C2/C2IntelFeedsIPs.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | DeviceNetworkEvents 5 | | where RemoteIPType == "Public" 6 | | where RemoteIP in ((externaldata(IP: string ) [@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/drb-ra/C2IntelFeeds/master/feeds/IPC2s-30day.csv"] 7 | with (format=csv, ignoreFirstRecord=true) | distinct IP 8 | )) 9 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName !in ("Google Chrome Helper","chrome.exe","firefox.exe","msedge.exe","opera.exe") 10 | 11 | References: 12 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /C2/C2IntelFeedsdomain.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | DeviceNetworkEvents 2 | | where RemoteIPType == "Public" 3 | | where InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName !in ("Sophos Anti-Virus","Google Chrome","Microsoft Edge","Firefox") 4 | | where RemoteUrl has_any ((externaldata(domain: string, ioc: string) [@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/drb-ra/C2IntelFeeds/master/feeds/domainC2s-30day.csv"] 5 | with (format=csv, ignoreFirstRecord=true) | where ioc contains_cs "C2 Domain" | distinct domain)) 6 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Exfiltration/FreeSSLProviders.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | Query: 3 | DeviceNetworkEvents 4 | | where RemoteUrl has_any ("letsencrypt.org", "sslforfree.com", "zerossl.com", "freessl.org") 5 | | where InitiatingProcessFolderPath !startswith @"c:\program files" | where InitiatingProcessParentFileName != @"SenseIR.exe" and InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName != @"Windows ACME Simple (WACS)" and InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName != @"Wouter Tinus and many others" 6 | References: 7 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Credential Access/SBMNTLM.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | name: Credential Access, NTLM stealing Over SMB 2 | description: Outgoing Traffic to the internet which might indicate NTLM stealing 3 | references: 4 | tags: Credential Access, 5 | search_query: 6 | (DeviceNetworkEvents 7 | | where ActionType == @"ConnectionSuccess" 8 | | where (RemotePort==445 or RemotePort == 135)and RemoteIPType == @"Public" and InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName != @"VMware, Inc." and RemoteUrl !contains "google" 9 | ) 10 | Notes: 11 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Credential Access/NTDSDump.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | DeviceFileEvents 5 | | where (InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("Cmd.Exe", "PowerShell.EXE", "XCOPY.EXE") and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any("copy", "xcopy", "Copy-Item", "move", "cp", "mv")) or InitiatingProcessFileName contains "esentutl.exe" 6 | | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any("ntds.dit", "SAM", "HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy", "system32/config/SAM") 7 | | where InitiatingProcessParentFileName != @"SenseIR.exe" 8 | 9 | 10 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Defense Evasion/Vssadmindelete.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | name: Defense Evasion, Indicators Shadow Copy Deletion 2 | description: Shadow Copies deletion using Vssadmin or Wmic 3 | references: https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment 4 | tags: Defense Evasion, T1490,T1070 5 | search_query: 6 | (DeviceProcessEvents 7 | | where FileName has_any ("vssadmin.exe","wmic.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "shadow" and ProcessCommandLine contains "delete") 8 | ) 9 | Notes: 10 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Persistence/ServiceCreation.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | 5 | DeviceProcessEvents 6 | | where ProcessVersionInfoFileDescription == @"Service Control Manager Configuration Tool" and InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName != "Cisco Systems, Inc." 7 | and ProcessCommandLine contains "path" 8 | | where InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName != @"Microsoft® Azure® AD Connect" 9 | 10 | 11 | References: 12 | 13 | False positives: 14 | This rule might generate false positives exclude the most noisy onces 15 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Execution/MaliciousNamedPipes.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query://This need a bit of fixing 4 | let badPipeNames = pack_array('psexesvc','paexec','remcom'); 5 | DeviceEvents 6 | | where ActionType == "NamedPipeEvent" 7 | | extend ParsedFields=parse_json(AdditionalFields) 8 | //| where ParsedFields.FileOperation == "File created" 9 | //tolower(tostring(split(FileName,'\\')[-1])) 10 | | extend foo = tolower(tostring(split(ParsedFields.PipeName,'\\')[-1])) 11 | | project foo, ParsedFields.PipeName 12 | | where foo in(badPipeNames) 13 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Execution/SuspiciousServiceInstalled: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | DeviceEvents 5 | | where ActionType == "ServiceInstalled" 6 | | where FolderPath !contains "C:\\ProgramData" and FolderPath !contains "C:\\Windows" and FolderPath !contains "C:\\Program File" and FolderPath !contains "\\systemroot\\" and FolderPath !contains "%systemroot%" 7 | | where InitiatingProcessFolderPath !contains "C:\\ProgramData" and InitiatingProcessFolderPath !contains "C:\\Program File" and InitiatingProcessFolderPath !contains "C:\\Windows" 8 | References: 9 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Exfiltration/SimonThatamC2Putty.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | name: C2 Simon Tatham tools reaching the internet 2 | index_type: events 3 | description: Detects the usage of tools signed by Simon Tatham such as putty.exe that reaches the internet. 4 | references: n/a 5 | tags: c2 6 | search_query: 7 | let certificates = 8 | DeviceFileCertificateInfo 9 | | where Signer has_any ('simon') 10 | | distinct SHA1 11 | ; 12 | DeviceNetworkEvents 13 | | where InitiatingProcessSHA1 in~ (certificates) and RemoteIPType == "Public" 14 | 15 | on_hit: alert 16 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Execution/OfficeSmartScreen.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | DeviceEvents 5 | | where ActionType == "SmartScreenAppWarning" //where ActionType == 'SmartScreenUserOverride' for when users ignored the warning and proceeded to execute the file 6 | | extend data = parse_json(AdditionalFields) 7 | | extend Experience = parse_json(data).Experience 8 | | where FileName !in () //Exclusions by filename goes here 9 | | project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, Experience, InitiatingProcessAccountUpn, DeviceId, ReportId 10 | 11 | References 12 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Persistence/WMIEventConsumer.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | 5 | DeviceEvents | where ActionType == 'WmiBindEventFilterToConsumer' 6 | | where AdditionalFields !contains "SCM Event Log Filter" and AdditionalFields !contains "CCM_PolicyReplicationConsumer" 7 | | extend parsed = parse_json(AdditionalFields) 8 | | where parsed.Namespace == @"//./root/subscription" and parsed.PossibleCause !contains @"Win32_Processor" and parsed.Ess != @"DellCommandPowerManagerAlertEventFilter" and parsed.Ess != @"DellCommandPowerManagerPolicyChangeEventFilter" 9 | 10 | References: 11 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /C2/Telegraminfostealers.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | DeviceNetworkEvents 5 | | where RemoteUrl contains "api.telegram.org" 6 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName !in ("chrome.exe","Telegram.exe","firefox.exe","msedge.exe","slack.exe","OUTLOOK.EXE","brave.exe","Postman.exe") 7 | | where InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription != @"Opera Internet Browser" 8 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName != @"Google Chrome Helper" 9 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName != @"Opera Helper" 10 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName != @"com.apple.WebKit.Networking" 11 | 12 | Rferences: 13 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Initial Acccess/MacroTrustrecords.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | name: Initial Access, Indicators of Macro document enabled/trusted by user 2 | description: Detects users enabling a macro based file which could indicate a spearphishing attachment 3 | references: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/,https://az4n6.blogspot.com/2016/02/more-on-trust-records-macros-and.html 4 | tags: Initial Access, T1566.001 5 | search_query: 6 | (DeviceRegistryEvents 7 | | where RegistryKey contains "TrustRecords") 8 | Notes: 9 | This will alert on some legit users, you need to modify it to have proper exclusions 10 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Execution/Winexe/ServinceInstall.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | 2 | name: Execution, Indicators of usage of winexe for lateral movement 3 | description: Detects service install of winexe remote admion tool 4 | references: https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0191/,https://community.netwitness.com/t5/netwitness-community-blog/detecting-lateral-movement-in-rsa-netwitness-winexe/ba-p/520480 5 | tags: Execution, S0191 6 | search_query: 7 | (DeviceEvents 8 | | where ActionType == 'ServiceInstalled' 9 | | extend parsed = parse_json(AdditionalFields) 10 | | where parsed.ServiceName has ("winexesvc") 11 | Notes: 12 | 13 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Execution/WebdavExecution.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Suspicious File Execution From a WebDav Share. this was tested in my environment you can exclude based on yours 2 | Tags: 3 | - attack.execution 4 | 5 | Query: 6 | DeviceProcessEvents 7 | | where ProcessCommandLine contains "DavWWWRoot" | where InitiatingProcessFileName != @"AcroRd32.exe" 8 | | where ProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName != @"VISIO.EXE" 9 | 10 | References 11 | https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cmd_net_use_and_exec_combo.yml 12 | https://micahbabinski.medium.com/search-ms-webdav-and-chill-99c5b23ac462 13 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Execution/OneNoteZeroday.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | Query: 3 | DeviceProcessEvents 4 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName contains "onenote" and FileName !in ("crashpad_handler.exe", "conhost.exe","MSOSYNC.EXE","msedge.exe","msedgewebview2.exe","chrome.exe","firefox.exe","opera.exe","brave.exe","iexplore.exe","WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE","AcroRd32.exe","Acrobat.exe","ONENOTEM.exe","OUTLOOK.exe","ai.exe","Teams.exe","notepad.exe","protocolhandler.exe","ONENOTE.EXE","splwow64.exe") 5 | | where FileName != @"ONENOTEM.EXE" and FolderPath != @"/usr/bin/codesign" and FolderPath != @"C:\Windows\System32\DWWIN.EXE" 6 | References: 7 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Execution/Winexe/NamedPipeDetection.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | name: Execution, Indicators of usage of winexe for lateral movement 2 | description: Detects usage of winexe through named pipe creation 3 | references: https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0191/,https://community.netwitness.com/t5/netwitness-community-blog/detecting-lateral-movement-in-rsa-netwitness-winexe/ba-p/520480 4 | tags: Execution, S0191 5 | search_query: 6 | (DeviceEvents 7 | | where ActionType == "NamedPipeEvent" 8 | | extend ParsedFields=parse_json(AdditionalFields) 9 | | where ParsedFields.FileOperation == "File created" 10 | | where ParsedFields.PipeName has_any ("ahexec", "wmcex") 11 | Notes: 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Sentinel/Apt29.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | References:https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/08/02/midnight-blizzard-conducts-targeted-social-engineering-over-microsoft-teams/ 2 | Use this Sentinel queries to hunt for apt29 teams phishing activity 3 | 4 | OfficeActivity 5 | | where UserId has_any ("msonlineservicesteam","mlcrosoftaccounts","msftonlineservices","msonlineteam","msftservice","noreplyteam","accounteam","teamsprotection","identityverification","msftprotection","accountsverification","azuresecuritycenter") 6 | 7 | OfficeActivity 8 | | where UserId endswith @"onmicrosoft.com" and UserId !endswith @"Yourdomain.onmicrosoft.com" 9 | 10 | Filter for false positives 11 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Execution/PowershellSuspiciousStrings.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | DeviceProcessEvents 5 | | where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") 6 | | where ProcessCommandLine has_any("Net.WebClient","DownloadFile","Invoke-WebRequest", "Invoke-Shellcode", "http","IEX","BitsTransfer","mpcmdrun.exe","downloadstring","Invoke-Expression","Invoke","-e","[System.Convert]::FromBase64String()", "-en","-noni", "-nop", "mimikatz") 7 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName != @"CcmExec.exe" | where InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName != @"Slack Technologies Inc." | where InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription != @"Snow Inventory Agent for Windows" 8 | 9 | References: 10 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /MacOS/copytmptousers.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | 5 | union DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents 6 | | where Timestamp >= ago(7d) 7 | | where FileName == "cp" 8 | and ProcessCommandLine contains "Users" 9 | and ProcessCommandLine contains "tmp" 10 | and FileName != "vpndownloader" 11 | and ProcessCommandLine !contains "generic/kernel/drivers/regulator/userspace-consumer.ko" 12 | and ProcessCommandLine != "/bin/cp /Library/Preferences/SystemConfiguration/preferences.plist /Library/Preferences/SystemConfiguration/preferences.plist.old" 13 | and InitiatingProcessCommandLine !contains "Google Chrome.app/Contents/Frameworks/Google Chrome Framework.framework" 14 | 15 | 16 | Resoruces: 17 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Execution/WebDavTempFiles.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | - attack.initial_access 3 | - attack.execution 4 | Query: 5 | DeviceFileEvents 6 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName contains "rundll32.exe" | where FolderPath contains "TfsStore" /* you could change it to InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName contains "rundll"*/ 7 | | where FileName endswith ".vbs" or FileName endswith'.ps1' or FileName endswith '.lnk' or FileName endswith '.zip' or FileName endswith'.ico' or FileName endswith '.bat' 8 | 9 | 10 | References: 11 | https://www.trellix.com/en-us/about/newsroom/stories/research/beyond-file-search-a-novel-method.html 12 | https://micahbabinski.medium.com/search-ms-webdav-and-chill-99c5b23ac462 13 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Privilege Escalation/applicationshimming.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | name: Privilege Escalation, Persistence T1546.011 Application shimming via sdbinst.exe 2 | description: Detects the usage of the utility sdbinst.exe that can set registry key for application shimming. 3 | references: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/011/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html 4 | tags: privilege_escalation, persistence, t1546.011 5 | search_query: 6 | (DeviceProcessEvents 7 | | where ProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName =~ "sdbinst.exe" 8 | | where not(ProcessCommandLine has_all ("-m","-bg")) | where ProcessCommandLine != @"""sdbinst.exe"" -mm" 9 | | where ProcessCommandLine !contains "iisexpressshim.sdb") 10 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /ASRDetections/AsrUntrustedUsbProcessAuditedDetectionRule.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | ## Rule: Detection of untrusted processe running for USB by ASR 2 | 3 | ### Description 4 | This query detects events where an untrusted USB process has been audited by the Advanced Security Audit Policy (ASR). 5 | 6 | - [Microsoft documentation on ASR](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings) 7 | 8 | ### Detection Logic 9 | Monitors `DeviceEvents` for occurrences where the `ActionType` is `"AsrUntrustedUsbProcessAudited"`. 10 | 11 | ### Tags 12 | - ASR 13 | - USB 14 | - Auditing 15 | 16 | ### Search Query 17 | ```kql 18 | DeviceEvents 19 | | where ActionType == "AsrUntrustedUsbProcessAudited" 20 | ``` 21 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Execution/PowershellDLLexecutions.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Queries: 4 | DeviceImageLoadEvents 5 | | where FileName contains "system.management.automation" 6 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName != @"powershell.exe" 7 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName != @"monitoringhost.exe" 8 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName != @"mscorsvw.exe" 9 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName != @"wa_3rd_party_host_32.exe" 10 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName != @"lenovo.modern.imcontroller.pluginhost.companionapp.exe" 11 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName != @"sdiagnhost.exe" 12 | | where InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any ("temp", "users") 13 | 14 | References: 15 | 16 | Notes: 17 | This will be false positives prone 18 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Collection/BloodHoundGeneratedfiles.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | 2 | name: Collection, Indicators of bloodhound usage within the environment 3 | description: Detects file dropped by BloodHound/SharpHound that contains AD information 4 | references: https://academy.hackthebox.com/course/preview/active-directory-bloodhound/bloodhound--data-collection 5 | tags: Collection, t1087.001 6 | search_query: 7 | (DeviceFileEvents 8 | | where FileName contains "users.json" or FileName contains "*computers.json" or FileName contains "*groups.json" or FileName contains "*ous.json" or FileName contains "*domains.json" or FileName contains "bloodhound" or FileName contains "gpos.json" | where FileName != @"bloodhound.js"| where FileName != @"bloodhoundDropdown.js" 9 | ) 10 | Notes: 11 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /ASRDetections/AsrOfficeProcessInjectionAuditedQuery.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | ## Rule: Detection of Process Injection from Office apps throug ASR 2 | 3 | ### Description 4 | This query detects events where an office process injection has been audited by the Advanced Security Audit Policy (ASR). 5 | 6 | - [Microsoft documentation on ASR](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings) 7 | 8 | ### Detection Logic 9 | Monitors `DeviceEvents` for occurrences where the `ActionType` is `"AsrOfficeProcessInjectionAudited"`. 10 | 11 | ### Tags 12 | - ASR 13 | - Office 14 | - Process Injection 15 | - Auditing 16 | 17 | ### Search Query 18 | ```kql 19 | DeviceEvents 20 | | where ActionType == "AsrOfficeProcessInjectionAudited" 21 | ``` 22 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Defense Evasion/ADSRootProcessCreation.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule Documentation: Defense Evasion - Root Directory ADS Creation (Windows) 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | Detects attempts to create Alternate Data Streams (ADS) in root directories of Windows drives. 5 | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/anatomy-of-alpha-spider-ransomware/ 6 | https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/6150f222b2ce2a26e0874e96ab31479b1e4283a4/rules/windows/defense_evasion_root_dir_ads_creation.toml 7 | 8 | ## Detection Logic 9 | - Filters `DeviceProcessEvents` for events related 10 | - Specifically looks for events where the ProcessCommandLine matches of ADS process 11 | 12 | ## Tags 13 | - Defense Evasion 14 | 15 | ## Search Query 16 | ```kql 17 | DeviceProcessEvents 18 | | where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)^[A-Z]:\\:.+" 19 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Exfiltration/RemoteAdminCerts.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | name: Exfiltration, Ransomware Remote Admin Tools 2 | description: Detects existence of common ransomware tools used by threat groups 3 | references: 4 | tags: Exfiltration 5 | search_query: ( 6 | let certificates = 7 | DeviceFileCertificateInfo 8 | | where Signer has_any ('Ammyy','Atera Networks', 'Barracuda Networks', 'CONTINUUM MANAGED', 'ScreenConnect', 'DameWare Development', 'Datto Inc', 'Kaseya', 'Level Software, Inc','MSPBytes', 'N-Able Technologies', 'netsupport', 'ninjarmm', 9 | 'Bravura Software LLC', 'Panorama9', 'pcvisit software ag', 'MMSoft Design', 'famatech', 'idrive', 'Remote Utilities', 'Krämer IT Solutions GmbH', 'Splashtop', 'Nanosystems S.R.L.', 'Servably, Inc.', 'AmidaWare', 'Duc Fabulous') 10 | | distinct SHA1 11 | ; 12 | DeviceProcessEvents 13 | | where SHA1 in~ (certificates) ) 14 | on_hit: alert 15 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Execution/SuspiciousMSC.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule Documentation: Suspicious Microsoft Common Console file Execution 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | Detects Microsoft Management Console (MMC) Microsoft Common Console file Execution 5 | https://www.genians.co.kr/blog/threat_intelligence/facebook 6 | 7 | ## Detection Logic 8 | - Filters `DeviceProcessEvents` for MMC executions containing "mmc" and ".msc". 9 | - Excludes processes from `C:\Windows\system32\`. 10 | - Filters out "vbc.exe" and "WerFault.exe". 11 | 12 | ## Tags 13 | - Execution Monitoring 14 | - Privilege Escalation 15 | 16 | ## Search Query 17 | ```kql 18 | DeviceProcessEvents 19 | | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all ("mmc", @".msc") 20 | | where not(InitiatingProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)[A-Za-z]:\\Windows\\system32\\.*") 21 | | where ProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName !in ("vbc.exe", "WerFault.exe") 22 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Execution/PowershellV2Downgrade.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | name: Execution, Potential PowerShell Downgrade Attack 2 | description: Detects PowerShell downgrade attack through commandline analysis 3 | references: https://detection.fyi/sigmahq/sigma/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_downgrade_attack 4 | tags: Execution, T1059.001 5 | search_query: 6 | (DeviceProcessEvents 7 | | where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") 8 | | where ProcessCommandLine has "-v 2" 9 | or ProcessCommandLine has "-v 2.0" 10 | or ProcessCommandLine has "-version 2" 11 | or ProcessCommandLine has "-versi 2" 12 | or ProcessCommandLine has "-vers 2" 13 | or ProcessCommandLine has "-ver 2" 14 | or ProcessCommandLine has "-ve 2" 15 | or ProcessCommandLine has "-ve 2" 16 | or ProcessCommandLine has "-version 2.0"| where InitiatingProcessFileName != "MonitoringHost.exe") 17 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /ASRDetections/AsrWebShellOnServerAuditedQuery.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | ## Rule : Web shell Detection on exchange servers with ASR 2 | 3 | ### Description 4 | This query detects events where a web shell on a server has been audited by the Advanced Security Audit Policy (ASR). Web shells are malicious scripts that enable remote administration on web servers, often used by attackers for persistent access and to execute arbitrary commands. 5 | 6 | - [Microsoft documentation on ASR](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings) 7 | 8 | ### Detection Logic 9 | Monitors `DeviceEvents` for occurrences where the `ActionType` is `'AsrWebShellOnServerAudited'`. 10 | 11 | ### Tags 12 | - ASR 13 | - Web Shell 14 | - Server Security 15 | - Auditing 16 | 17 | ### Search Query 18 | ```kql 19 | DeviceEvents 20 | | where ActionType == 'AsrWebShellOnServerAudited' 21 | ``` 22 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /C2/SliverPSexec.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule Documentation: Registry Value Set for Sliver Implant Psexec execution 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | Detects registry value sets associated with the Sliver implant. 5 | https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/08/24/looking-for-the-sliver-lining-hunting-for-emerging-command-and-control-frameworks/ 6 | 7 | ## Detection Logic 8 | - Filters `DeviceRegistryEvents` for actions where a registry value is set (`RegistryValueSet`). 9 | - Looks for specific registry value name and data combinations: 10 | - `DisplayName` with value `Sliver`. 11 | - `Description` with value `Sliver implant`. 12 | 13 | ## Tags 14 | - Persistence 15 | - Command and Control 16 | 17 | ## Search Query 18 | ```kql 19 | DeviceRegistryEvents 20 | | where ActionType == 'RegistryValueSet' 21 | | where (RegistryValueName == 'DisplayName' and RegistryValueData == 'Sliver') 22 | or (RegistryValueName == 'Description' and RegistryValueData == 'Sliver implant') 23 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Defense Evasion/ADSrootDirectoryFileCreation.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule Documentation: Defense Evasion - Root Directory ADS Creation (Windows) 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | Detects attempts to create Alternate Data Streams (ADS) in root directories of Windows drives. 5 | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/anatomy-of-alpha-spider-ransomware/ 6 | https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/6150f222b2ce2a26e0874e96ab31479b1e4283a4/rules/windows/defense_evasion_root_dir_ads_creation.toml 7 | 8 | ## Detection Logic 9 | - Filters `DeviceFileEvents` for events related to file creation. 10 | - Specifically looks for events where the folder path matches the pattern of a root directory on a Windows drive and contains a colon (`:`) followed by a dollar sign (`$`) to indicate an ADS creation attempt. 11 | 12 | ## Tags 13 | - Defense Evasion 14 | 15 | ## Search Query 16 | ```kql 17 | DeviceFileEvents 18 | | where ActionType == "FileCreated" 19 | | where FolderPath matches regex @"(?i)^[A-Z]:\\:.+" 20 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Discovery/EnumerationShortperiod.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | Query: 3 | DeviceProcessEvents 4 | | where InitiatingProcessParentFileName =~ "cmd.exe" and FileName in ( "tasklist.exe","arp.exe", "at.exe", "attrib.exe", "dsquery.exe", "hostname.exe", "ipconfig.exe", "mimikatz.exe", "nbtstat.exe", "net.exe", "netsh.exe", "nslookup.exe", "ping.exe", "quser.exe", "qwinsta.exe", "reg.exe", "runas.exe", "schtasks.exe", "ssh.exe", "systeminfo.exe", "taskkill.exe", "telnet.exe", "tracert.exe", "wscript.exe", "xcopy.exe", "pscp.exe", "copy.exe", "robocopy.exe", "certutil.exe", "vssadmin.exe", "wevtutil.exe", "psexec.exe", "bcedit.exe", "wbadmin.exe", "icacls.exe", "diskpart.exe") 5 | and InitiatingProcessParentFileName != @"services.exe" 6 | | summarize (Timestamp, ReportId)=arg_max(Timestamp, ReportId),DiscoveryCommands = dcount(ProcessCommandLine), make_set(InitiatingProcessFileName), make_set(FileName), make_set(ProcessCommandLine) by DeviceId, DeviceName, bin(Timestamp, 30m) 7 | | where DiscoveryCommands >= 3 8 | References: 9 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Execution/SuccesfullExploitationofPDFreaders.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | DeviceProcessEvents 5 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName in ("AcroRd32.exe","Acrobat.exe","FoxitPhantomPDF.exe","FoxitReader.exe") 6 | and FileName in ("arp.exe", "dsquery.exe", "dsget.exe", "gpresult.exe", "hostname.exe", "ipconfig.exe", "nbtstat.exe", "net.exe", "net1.exe", "netsh.exe", "netstat.exe", "nltest.exe", "ping.exe", "qprocess.exe", "quser.exe", "qwinsta.exe", "reg.exe", "sc.exe", "systeminfo.exe", "tasklist.exe", "tracert.exe", 7 | "whoami.exe", "bginfo.exe", "cdb.exe", "cmstp.exe", "csi.exe", "dnx.exe", "fsi.exe", "ieexec.exe", "iexpress.exe", "installutil.exe", "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "msbuild.exe", "mshta.exe", 8 | "msxsl.exe", "odbcconf.exe", "rcsi.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "xwizard.exe", "atbroker.exe","forfiles.exe", "schtasks.exe", "regasm.exe", "regsvcs.exe", "cmd.exe", "cscript.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "wmic.exe", "wscript.exe", "bitsadmin.exe", "certutil.exe", "ftp.exe") 9 | References: 10 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Exfiltration/Rclone/Rcloneconfigfile.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule Documentation: Detection of rclone Usage in File Events 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies file events related to the usage of the rclone tool. Rclone is a legitimate command-line program used for syncing files and directories to and from various cloud storage providers. However, its usage in certain contexts may indicate potential data exfiltration or unauthorized file operations if used maliciously. 5 | 6 | ## Detection Logic 7 | - Monitors `DeviceFileEvents` for events where: 8 | - The `FolderPath` contains the string "rclone\", and 9 | - The `InitiatingProcessParentFileName` does not equal "Install WD Discovery". 10 | 11 | ## Tags 12 | - File Events 13 | - Data Exfiltration 14 | - Unauthorized File Operations 15 | - Cloud Storage 16 | - rclone 17 | - Suspicious Activity 18 | 19 | ## Search Query 20 | ```kql 21 | DeviceFileEvents 22 | | where FolderPath contains @"rclone\" and InitiatingProcessParentFileName != @"Install WD Discovery" 23 | 24 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Linux/ChattrImmutableRemoval.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Immutable Attribute Removal Detection 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | Detects the use of the `chattr` command with the `-i` flag, which is used to remove the immutable attribute from files on Linux systems. The immutable attribute prevents a file from being modified or deleted, and its removal could indicate an attempt to tamper with critical system files or logs. 5 | 6 | - Source: [Sigma rule for detecting immutable attribute removal](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/0bb6f0c0d75ae3e1c37f9ab77d68f20cdb32ecd3/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_chattr_immutable_removal.yml) 7 | 8 | ## Detection Logic 9 | - Monitors process events where the `chattr` command is used with the `-i` flag, indicating an attempt to remove the immutable attribute from a file. 10 | 11 | ## Tags 12 | - Immutable Attribute 13 | - File Tampering 14 | - Process Events 15 | - Linux 16 | 17 | ## Search Query 18 | ```kql 19 | DeviceProcessEvents 20 | | where ProcessCommandLine has_all ("chattr", "-i") 21 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Collection/PowerShellKeyLogging.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | name: Collection, Indicators of Keylogging through powershell 2 | description: Powershell might be used to intercept user's type keystrokes 3 | references: https://detection.fyi/sigmahq/sigma/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_keylogging/ 4 | tags: Collection, T1056.001 5 | search_query: 6 | (DeviceEvents 7 | | where ActionType contains "PowerShellCommand" 8 | | extend parsed = parse_json(AdditionalFields) 9 | | where parsed.Command contains "GetAsyncKeyState" or parsed.Command contains "NtUserGetAsyncKeyState" or parsed.Command contains "GetKeyboardState" or parsed.Command contains "Get-Keystrokes" or parsed.Command contains"SetWindowsHook" or parsed.Command contains "NtUserSetWindowsHook" 10 | or parsed.Command contains "GetWindowText" or parsed.Command contains "GetForegroundWindow" 11 | | where InitiatingProcessParentFileName !in ("MicrosoftDependencyAgent.exe","slack.exe","MonitoringHost.exe","Slack.exe") 12 | | where InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName != @"Microsoft Monitoring Agent" 13 | ) 14 | Notes: 15 | 16 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Exfiltration/Rclone/RcloneFileProperties.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule Documentation: Detection of rclone or Rsync Process Activity 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies activity related to the execution of the rclone tool or processes associated with Rsync. Both rclone and Rsync are legitimate tools commonly used for file synchronization and transfer. However, their presence or activity may also indicate potential data exfiltration or unauthorized file transfers if used maliciously. 5 | 6 | ## Detection Logic 7 | - Monitors `DeviceProcessEvents` for processes where: 8 | - The `ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName` contains "rclone", or 9 | - The `FileName` contains "rclone", or 10 | - The `ProcessVersionInfoFileDescription` contains "Rsync". 11 | 12 | ## Tags 13 | - Execution 14 | - File Transfer 15 | - Data Exfiltration 16 | - Rsync 17 | - rclone 18 | - Suspicious Activity 19 | 20 | ## Search Query 21 | ```kql 22 | DeviceProcessEvents 23 | | where ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName contains "rclone" or FileName contains "rclone" 24 | or ProcessVersionInfoFileDescription contains "Rsync" 25 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Linux/XclipExecutions.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Clipboard Data Collection via xclip 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | Detects the use of the `xclip` command to access clipboard data. The `xclip` utility is used to manipulate the X11 clipboard, and its usage with specific flags can indicate attempts to capture clipboard contents, which may include sensitive information such as passwords or other confidential data. 5 | 6 | - Source: [Sigma rule for detecting clipboard collection](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/0bb6f0c0d75ae3e1c37f9ab77d68f20cdb32ecd3/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_clipboard_collection.yml) 7 | 8 | ## Detection Logic 9 | - Monitors process events where the executed file name contains `xclip`. 10 | - Filters for instances where the process command line includes the terms `sel` and `clip`, indicating an attempt to access or manipulate clipboard data. 11 | 12 | ## Tags 13 | - Clipboard Collection 14 | - xclip 15 | - Process Events 16 | - Linux 17 | 18 | ## Search Query 19 | ```kql 20 | DeviceProcessEvents 21 | | where FileName contains "xclip" and ProcessCommandLine has_all("sel", "clip") 22 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Initial Acccess/SuspiciousSQLChildren.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | let suspiciousprocesses = pack_array ("cmd.exe","powershell","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","bginfo.exe",'bash.exe''bitsadmin.exe','cmd.exe','netstat.exe','nltest.exe','ping.exe', 'powershell.exe','pwsh.exe','regsvr32.exe','rundll32.exe','sh.exe','systeminfo.exe','tasklist.exe','wsl.exe'); 5 | DeviceProcessEvents 6 | | where Timestamp >= ago(30d) 7 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("sqlservr.exe", "sqlagent.exe", "sqlps.exe", "launchpad.exe") 8 | | where ProcessCommandLine has_any (suspiciousprocesses) and ProcessCommandLine !contains @"MSSQL13.SQL1\MSSQL\Files\Scripts\" 9 | | where ProcessCommandLine != @"""cmd.exe"" /c rename C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\NetworkService\HaImportDatabaseName.mdf HaDatabaseName.mdf" 10 | | where ProcessCommandLine != @"""cmd.exe"" /c rename C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\NetworkService\HaImportDatabaseName_log.ldf HaDatabaseName_log.ldf" 11 | 12 | 13 | References: 14 | https://detection.fyi/sigmahq/sigma/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_mssql_susp_child_process/ 15 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /ASRDetections/AsrOfficeMacroWin32ApiCallsAuditedDetecitonRule.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Detection of Office Macro Win32 API Calls Audited 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies audited events where Office Macros make Win32 API calls. Monitoring for such API calls is crucial because macros can be used to execute malicious code on the system. Malicious actors often exploit Office macros to run unauthorized scripts or binaries by leveraging Win32 API calls, which can lead to system compromise or data exfiltration. 5 | 6 | This rule monitors for audited actions related to Office macros making Win32 API calls, helping to identify potentially malicious macros that could compromise the system. 7 | 8 | ## Detection Logic 9 | - Monitors `DeviceEvents` for events where: 10 | - The `ActionType` is "AsrOfficeMacroWin32ApiCallsAudited". 11 | 12 | ## Tags 13 | - Office Security 14 | - Macro Security 15 | - Win32 API Calls 16 | - Malware 17 | - Suspicious Activity 18 | 19 | ## Search Query 20 | ```kql 21 | DeviceEvents 22 | | where ActionType == "AsrOfficeMacroWin32ApiCallsAudited" 23 | ``` 24 | ## Note 25 | Exclude trusted file names as this might get noisy 26 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Linux/Getcapdetection.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Capability Discovery via getcap 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | Detects the use of the `getcap` command, which is used to query the capabilities of executables on Linux systems. Capabilities can grant elevated privileges to executables, and discovering these capabilities can be part of an attacker's reconnaissance phase. This detection specifically excludes instances where `getcap` is run by the `vmtoolsd` service. 5 | 6 | - Source: [Sigma rule for detecting capability discovery](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/0bb6f0c0d75ae3e1c37f9ab77d68f20cdb32ecd3/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_capa_discovery.yml) 7 | 8 | ## Detection Logic 9 | - Monitors for process events where the executed file name is `getcap`. 10 | - Excludes events where the initiating process folder path is `/usr/bin/vmtoolsd`, which is typically a legitimate use case associated with VMware Tools. 11 | 12 | ## Tags 13 | - Capability Discovery 14 | - getcap 15 | - Process Events 16 | - Linux 17 | 18 | ## Search Query 19 | ```kql 20 | DeviceProcessEvents 21 | | where FileName == "getcap" and InitiatingProcessFolderPath != "/usr/bin/vmtoolsd" 22 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Exfiltration/Rclone/RcloneMSThreatReport.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | DeviceProcessEvents | where ProcessVersionInfoProductName has "rclone" | where ( ProcessCommandLine has_all ("rclone", "lsd", "remote:", @"ftp:", "mega", "--config", "--auto-confirm") ) or ( ProcessCommandLine has "--multi-thread-streams" and ProcessCommandLine has_all ('copy', 'config', 'create', 'lsd', 'remote', 'mega', 'user', 'pass', @'--config', @'--progress', @'--no-check-certificate', @'--ignore-existing', @'--auto-confirm', @'--multi-thread-streams', @'--transfers', @'ftp:', @'remote:') ) or (ProcessCommandLine has @"\\") or ( ProcessCommandLine has_all (@"max-age", @"stats-one-line", @"ignore-existing", @"drive-chunk-size", @"transfers", @"include", @"checkers")) or ( ProcessCommandLine has @"*.{xls,xlsx,doc,docx,pdf}") | where not (FolderPath has "chocolatey") 4 | 5 | References: 6 | Microsoft Threat Intel Report titled Data exfiltration using Rclone and other data synchronization tools 7 | https://github.com/mbabinski/Sigma-Rules/blob/2f12b713e8e51dc2c84fdf8c4c4d714999b6e382/2022_BlackCat_Ransomware/win_susp_process_blackcat_exfiltration.yml#L3 8 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Linux/PtraceDetected.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule: Detection of Ptrace System Call (PTraceDetected) 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies the usage of the `ptrace` system call on Linux systems. The `ptrace` system call is used by debuggers and other programs to observe and control the execution of another process. While `ptrace` is a legitimate tool, it can also be misused by attackers for various malicious activities such as process injection, code execution, and obtaining sensitive information from other processes. 5 | 6 | This rule monitors for events where the `ptrace` system call is detected. Unauthorized use of `ptrace` can indicate attempts to hijack or manipulate running processes. 7 | 8 | - [MITRE ATT&CK Technique T1055.008: Process Injection - Ptrace System Calls](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008/) 9 | 10 | ## Detection Logic 11 | - Monitors `DeviceEvents` for events where: 12 | - The `ActionType` is "PTraceDetected". 13 | 14 | ## Tags 15 | - Process Injection 16 | - ptrace 17 | - Linux Security 18 | - Suspicious Activity 19 | - MITRE T1055.008 20 | 21 | ## Search Query 22 | ```kql 23 | DeviceEvents 24 | | where ActionType == "PTraceDetected" 25 | 26 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Linux/SudoersFileEnumeration.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Sudoers File Access Detection 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | Detects attempts to read the `sudoers` file using common text viewing and searching commands. The `sudoers` file controls user privileges and its unauthorized access may indicate attempts to gain elevated privileges or gather sensitive information about system configurations. 5 | 6 | - Source: [Sigma rule for detecting access to sudoers file](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/0bb6f0c0d75ae3e1c37f9ab77d68f20cdb32ecd3/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_cat_sudoers.yml) 7 | 8 | ## Detection Logic 9 | - Monitors process events where the executed file name is one of the following text viewing and searching commands: `cat`, `grep`, `head`, `tail`, `more`. 10 | - Filters for instances where the process command line contains the term `sudoers`, indicating an attempt to access the sudoers file. 11 | 12 | ## Tags 13 | - Sudoers File Access 14 | - Privilege Escalation 15 | - Process Events 16 | - Linux 17 | 18 | ## Search Query 19 | ```kql 20 | DeviceProcessEvents 21 | | where FileName in ('cat', 'grep', 'head', 'tail', 'more') 22 | | where ProcessCommandLine contains "sudoers" 23 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /ASRDetections/AsrAdobeReaderChildProcessAuditedDetectionRule.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Detection of Adobe Reader Child Processes throug ASR 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies child processes spawned by Adobe Reader that have been audited by Advanced Security Rules (ASR). Monitoring for child processes created by Adobe Reader is important because malicious actors can exploit vulnerabilities or use malicious PDFs to launch additional processes, executing malicious payloads. This rule focuses on identifying potentially suspicious activities initiated by Adobe Reader, providing early detection of possible threats. 5 | 6 | This rule helps identify and audit unusual child processes initiated by Adobe Reader, serving as an early warning for potential malicious activities. 7 | 8 | ## Detection Logic 9 | - Monitors `DeviceEvents` for events where: 10 | - The `ActionType` is "AsrAdobeReaderChildProcessAudited". 11 | 12 | ## Tags 13 | - Adobe Reader 14 | - Child Processes 15 | - PDF Security 16 | - Malware 17 | - Advanced Security Rules (ASR) 18 | - Suspicious Activity 19 | 20 | ## Search Query 21 | ```kql 22 | DeviceEvents 23 | | where ActionType == "AsrAdobeReaderChildProcessAudited" 24 | ``` 25 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /ASRDetections/AsrVulnerableSignedDriverAuditedQuery.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | ## Rule: Detect loading for Vulnerable devices using ASR 2 | 3 | ### Description 4 | This query detects events where a vulnerable signed driver has been audited by the Advanced Security Audit Policy (ASR), excluding specific processes such as "HP Touchpoint Analytics Client" and "ASUSTeK Computer Inc.". 5 | 6 | - [Microsoft documentation on ASR](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings) 7 | 8 | ### Detection Logic 9 | Monitors `DeviceEvents` for occurrences where: 10 | - `ActionType` is `"AsrVulnerableSignedDriverAudited"` 11 | - Excludes entries where `InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription` is `"HP Touchpoint Analytics Client"` 12 | - Excludes entries where `InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName` is `"ASUSTeK Computer Inc."` 13 | 14 | ### Tags 15 | - ASR 16 | - Driver Security 17 | - Auditing 18 | 19 | ### Search Query 20 | ```kql 21 | DeviceEvents 22 | | where ActionType == "AsrVulnerableSignedDriverAudited" 23 | | where InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription != "HP Touchpoint Analytics Client" 24 | | where InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName != "ASUSTeK Computer Inc." 25 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Linux/BPFKprobe.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : BPF and Kprobe Tracing Detection 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | Detects the use of BPF (Berkeley Packet Filter) and kprobes with potentially unsafe or enabled tracing configurations. These tools are powerful for system monitoring and debugging but can also be misused for malicious purposes, such as extracting sensitive information or manipulating system behavior. 5 | 6 | - Source: [Sigma rule for detecting BPF and kprobe tracing](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/0bb6f0c0d75ae3e1c37f9ab77d68f20cdb32ecd3/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_bpf_kprob_tracing_enabled.yml) 7 | 8 | ## Detection Logic 9 | - Monitors process command lines for specific patterns indicating the use of BPF and kprobes with potentially risky configurations: 10 | - `bpftrace` with the `--unsafe` flag, which allows BPF trace scripts to perform potentially unsafe operations. 11 | - `kprobes` with `enable`, indicating kprobe tracing is enabled. 12 | 13 | ## Tags 14 | - BPF 15 | - Kprobes 16 | - Tracing Detection 17 | - Process Events 18 | - Linux 19 | 20 | ## Search Query 21 | ```kql 22 | DeviceProcessEvents 23 | | where ProcessCommandLine has_all ("bpftrace", "--unsafe") or ProcessCommandLine has_all ("kprobes", "enable") 24 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /ASRDetections/AsrExecutableEmailContentAuditedDetectionRule.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule :Detection of Executable Email Content Using AsrExecutableEmailContentAudited ASR rule 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies audited events where executable content in emails is detected, excluding files with a ".js" extension. Monitoring for executable email content is essential to identify potential phishing or malware delivery attempts via email. JavaScript files are common vectors for malicious content, but this rule focuses on other executable files that could indicate an attempt to bypass email security measures. 5 | 6 | This rule monitors for audited actions related to executable content in email attachments, helping to identify potentially malicious files that could compromise the system. 7 | 8 | ## Detection Logic 9 | - Monitors `DeviceEvents` for events where: 10 | - The `ActionType` is "AsrExecutableEmailContentAudited". 11 | - The `FileName` does not end with ".js". 12 | 13 | ## Tags 14 | - Email Security 15 | - Executable Content 16 | - Phishing 17 | - Malware 18 | - Suspicious Activity 19 | 20 | ## Search Query 21 | ```kql 22 | DeviceEvents 23 | | where ActionType == "AsrExecutableEmailContentAudited" 24 | | where FileName !endswith ".js" 25 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Linux/ShadowPasswdcopytosuspiciouslocation.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Sensitive File Copy to /tmp Directory 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | Detects attempts to copy sensitive system files, such as `shadow` and `passwd`, to the `/tmp` directory using the `cp` command. These files contain critical information about user accounts and passwords, and copying them to a temporary directory may indicate malicious intent to exfiltrate or manipulate sensitive data. 5 | 6 | - Source: [Sigma rule for detecting copying of sensitive files to /tmp](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/0bb6f0c0d75ae3e1c37f9ab77d68f20cdb32ecd3/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_cp_passwd_or_shadow_tmp.yml) 7 | 8 | ## Detection Logic 9 | - Monitors process events where the executed file name is `cp`. 10 | - Filters for instances where the process command line contains `/tmp` and includes either `shadow` or `passwd`, indicating an attempt to copy these sensitive files to the `/tmp` directory. 11 | 12 | ## Tags 13 | - Sensitive File Copy 14 | - Shadow File 15 | - Passwd File 16 | - Process Events 17 | - Linux 18 | 19 | ## Search Query 20 | ```kql 21 | DeviceProcessEvents 22 | | where FileName == "cp" and ProcessCommandLine contains "/tmp" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("shadow", "passwd") 23 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Linux/Base64Shebang.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule: Base64 Encoded Shebang Detection 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | Identifies potential malicious scripts by detecting processes with Base64 encoded shebang lines in their command lines. Shebang lines are typically used to specify the script interpreter, and encoding them in Base64 can indicate attempts to obfuscate malicious activity. 5 | 6 | - Source: [Sigma rule for detecting Base64 encoded shebang lines in Linux](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/0bb6f0c0d75ae3e1c37f9ab77d68f20cdb32ecd3/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_base64_shebang_cli.yml) 7 | 8 | ## Detection Logic 9 | - Monitors process command lines for Base64 encoded shebang lines, which are indicative of script obfuscation. Specifically, it looks for: 10 | - `IyEvYmluL2Jhc2` (Base64 for `#!/bin/bash`) 11 | - `IyEvYmluL2Rhc2` (Base64 for `#!/bin/dash`) 12 | - `IyEvYmluL3pza` (Base64 for `#!/bin/zsh`) 13 | - `IyEvYmluL2Zpc2;IyEvYmluL3No` (Base64 for `#!/bin/fish` and `#!/bin/sh`) 14 | 15 | ## Tags 16 | - Base64 Encoding 17 | - Shebang Detection 18 | - Process Events 19 | - Linux 20 | 21 | ## Search Query 22 | ```kql 23 | DeviceProcessEvents 24 | | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("IyEvYmluL2Jhc2", "IyEvYmluL2Rhc2", "IyEvYmluL3pza", "IyEvYmluL2Zpc2;IyEvYmluL3No") 25 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Linux/DoasConfFileCreation.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule: Detection of Unauthorized Creation of doas.conf File 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies attempts to create the `doas.conf` file on Linux systems. The `doas.conf` file is used by the `doas` command to provide a minimalistic alternative to `sudo` for privilege escalation. Unauthorized creation of this file could indicate malicious activity, such as an attempt to configure `doas` settings to gain elevated privileges. 5 | 6 | This rule monitors for the creation of the `doas.conf` file, which is not typically created during standard operations. The presence of this file may indicate an attempt to set up unauthorized privilege escalation on the system. 7 | 8 | - [Detection Rule: Creation of Suspicious doas.conf File](https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/f6343e86-6e09-11ec-9376-acde48001122/) 9 | 10 | ## Detection Logic 11 | - Monitors `DeviceFileEvents` for events where: 12 | - The `ActionType` is "FileCreated", and 13 | - The `FileName` ends with "doas.conf". 14 | 15 | ## Tags 16 | - File Events 17 | - Privilege Escalation 18 | - doas 19 | - Linux Security 20 | - Suspicious Activity 21 | 22 | ## Search Query 23 | ```kql 24 | DeviceFileEvents 25 | | where ActionType == "FileCreated" 26 | | where FileName endswith "doas.conf" 27 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Persistence/ForestBlizzardCustomProtocolHandler.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule Documentation: Suspicious Registry Modification for Custom Protocol Handler (Windows) 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule aims to identify suspicious registry modifications associated with custom protocol handlers on Windows systems. Forest Blizzard, a threat actor group, has been known to utilize such techniques for persistence or to facilitate their malicious activities. Monitoring for these registry changes can help detect and mitigate potential threats. 5 | 6 | - [Detection.FYI on Registry Set for APT Forest Blizzard Custom Protocol Handler](https://detection.fyi/sigmahq/sigma/emerging-threats/2024/ta/forest-blizzard/registry_set_apt_forest_blizzard_custom_protocol_handler/) 7 | 8 | ## Detection Logic 9 | - Monitors `DeviceRegistryEvents` for registry value set actions. 10 | - Filters for registry keys associated with custom protocol handlers, particularly those modified or created by the threat actor group. 11 | 12 | ## Tags 13 | - Persistence 14 | - Custom Protocol Handler 15 | - APT Forest Blizzard 16 | 17 | ## Search Query 18 | ```kql 19 | DeviceRegistryEvents 20 | | where ActionType == "RegistryValueSet" 21 | | where RegistryKey contains "\\Classes\\PROTOCOLS\\Handler" 22 | | where RegistryKey endswith "rogue" 23 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /ASRDetections/AsrOfficeChildProcessAuditedQuery.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Detection of Office Child Processes Through ASR 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies child processes spawned by Microsoft Office applications that have been audited by Advanced Security Rules (ASR), excluding `onedrive.exe`. Monitoring for child processes created by Office applications is crucial because malicious actors often use Office macros to launch additional processes to execute malicious payloads. By excluding known and trusted processes like OneDrive, this rule focuses on identifying potentially suspicious activities that could compromise the system. 5 | 6 | This rule helps identify and audit unusual child processes initiated by Office applications, providing an early warning for potential malicious activities. 7 | 8 | ## Detection Logic 9 | - Monitors `DeviceEvents` for events where: 10 | - The `ActionType` is "AsrOfficeChildProcessAudited". 11 | - The `FileName` is not "onedrive.exe". 12 | 13 | ## Tags 14 | - Office Security 15 | - Child Processes 16 | - Macro Security 17 | - Malware 18 | - Advanced Security Rules (ASR) 19 | - Suspicious Activity 20 | 21 | ## Search Query 22 | ```kql 23 | DeviceEvents 24 | | where ActionType == "AsrOfficeChildProcessAudited" 25 | | where FileName != "onedrive.exe" 26 | ``` 27 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Defense Evasion/CoralRaiderMSHTAPowershell.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule Documentation: Defense Evasion - PowerShell CoralRaider PSChildName MSHTA Execution (Windows) 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | Detects the usage of PowerShell with the `PSChildName` command, which may indicate suspicious activity or attempts at defense evasion. This technique has been observed in the activity of suspected CoralRaider, which uses various information stealers as detailed in the article. 5 | - [Talos Intelligence Blog on CoralRaider](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/suspected-coralraider-continues-to-expand-victimology-using-three-information-stealers/) 6 | 7 | ## Detection Logic 8 | - Filters `DeviceProcessEvents` for events where the original file name is `PowerShell.EXE`. 9 | - Specifically looks for instances where the `ProcessCommandLine` contains the string `PSChildName`. 10 | 11 | ## Tags 12 | - Defense Evasion 13 | 14 | ## Search Query 15 | ```kql 16 | DeviceProcessEvents 17 | | where ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName == @"PowerShell.EXE" 18 | | where ProcessCommandLine contains "PSChildName" 19 | 20 | - Another query from device events which does the same 21 | DeviceEvents 22 | | where ActionType == @"PowerShellCommand" | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "PSChildName" 23 | 24 | ## Notes 25 | "gp -pa" can also be used to hunt for the same 26 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /ASRDetections/AsrPsexecWmiChildProcessAuditedQuery.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Detection of PsExec and WMI Child Processes Through ASR 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies child processes created by PsExec and WMI that have been audited or bypassed by Advanced Security Rules (ASR), excluding `shutdown.exe`. Monitoring PsExec and WMI child processes is critical because they are commonly used by attackers to execute commands and scripts remotely. These tools are often leveraged for lateral movement and executing malicious payloads on target systems. 5 | 6 | This rule helps identify suspicious activity involving PsExec and WMI, excluding legitimate use cases such as system shutdown operations. 7 | 8 | ## Detection Logic 9 | - Monitors `DeviceEvents` for events where: 10 | - The `ActionType` starts with "AsrPsexecWmiChildProcessAudited" or "AsrPsexecWmiChildProcessWarnBypassed". 11 | - The `FileName` is not "shutdown.exe". 12 | 13 | ## Tags 14 | - PsExec 15 | - WMI 16 | - Remote Execution 17 | - Lateral Movement 18 | - Advanced Security Rules (ASR) 19 | - Suspicious Activity 20 | 21 | ## Search Query 22 | ```kql 23 | DeviceEvents 24 | | where ActionType startswith "AsrPsexecWmiChildProcessAudited" or ActionType startswith "AsrPsexecWmiChildProcessWarnBypassed" 25 | | where FileName != "shutdown.exe" 26 | ``` 27 | # Notes 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Persistence/rustdeskexecution.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule: RustDesk Remote Access Tool usage 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | Detects installation or use of remote access tools like RustDesk on servers or privileged endpoints where such tools are not authorized. Attackers often install legitimate remote tools to maintain remote access and bypass controls. 5 | 6 | - **Source:** The DFIR Report — From Bing Search to Ransomware: Bumblebee and AdaptixC2 Deliver Akira (Aug 05, 2025) 7 | 8 | ## Detection Logic 9 | - Monitor for installer execution of `rustdesk.exe`/`rustdesk-service` or creation of persistent services related to RustDesk. 10 | - Alert when remote access tools are installed on domain controllers, file servers, or admin workstations. 11 | - Correlate with SSH tunneling, scheduled tasks, or service creation. 12 | 13 | ## Tags 14 | - Persistence 15 | - Remote Access 16 | - MITRE ATT&CK: T1219 (Remote Access Tools), T1543 (Create or Modify System Process) 17 | 18 | ## Search Query 19 | ```kql 20 | DeviceProcessEvents 21 | | where FileName has_any ("rustdesk.exe","rustdesk-service.exe","rustdesk") 22 | | join kind=leftouter ( 23 | DeviceImageLoadEvents 24 | | where FolderPath has "Program Files" or FolderPath has "ProgramData" 25 | ) on DeviceId 26 | | project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, FolderPath, ReportId 27 | ``` 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /MacOS/PasswordStores.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | Tags: 2 | 3 | Query: 4 | DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceInfo 5 | | where OSPlatform == "macOS" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("/Users/*/Library/Application Support/Google/Chrome/Default/Login Data", "/Users/*/Library/Application Support/Google/Chrome/Default/Cookies", "/Users/*/Library/Cookies*", 6 | "/Users/*/Library/Application Support/Firefox/Profiles/*.default/cookies.sqlite", "/Users/*/Library/Application Support/Firefox/Profiles/*.default/key*.db", 7 | "/Users/*/Library/Application Support/Firefox/Profiles/*.default/logins.json", "Login Data","Cookies.binarycookies", "key4.db", "key3.db", "logins.json", "cookies.sqlite") 8 | 9 | ChatGPT generated Query: 10 | DeviceProcessEvents 11 | | where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(.*\/Users\/[^/]+\/Library\/Application Support\/Google\/Chrome\/Default\/Login Data|.*\/Users\/[^/]+\/Library\/Application Support\/Google\/Chrome\/Default\/Cookies|.*\/Users\/[^/]+\/Library\/Cookies.*|.*\/Users\/[^/]+\/Library\/Application Support\/Firefox\/Profiles\/.*\.default\/cookies\.sqlite|.*\/Users\/[^/]+\/Library\/Application Support\/Firefox\/Profiles\/.*\.default\/key.*\.db|.*\/Users\/[^/]+\/Library\/Application Support\/Firefox\/Profiles\/.*\.default\/logins\.json|Login Data|Cookies\.binarycookies|key4\.db|key3\.db|logins\.json|cookies\.sqlite)" 12 | 13 | 14 | References: 15 | 16 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Linux/Sudoers.dFileCreation.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule: Detection of Unauthorized Creation of Files in /etc/sudoers.d/ 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies attempts to create files in the `/etc/sudoers.d/` directory on Linux systems. The `/etc/sudoers.d/` directory is used to include additional sudoers configuration files. Unauthorized creation of files in this directory could indicate an attempt to escalate privileges or gain unauthorized access by adding malicious sudoers configurations. 5 | 6 | This rule monitors for file creation events in the `/etc/sudoers.d/` directory. Such activity is not typically seen during standard operations and may indicate malicious intent to modify sudo privileges. 7 | 8 | - [Sigma Rule: Persistence via Sudoers File](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/0bb6f0c0d75ae3e1c37f9ab77d68f20cdb32ecd3/rules/linux/file_event/file_event_lnx_persistence_sudoers_files.yml) 9 | 10 | ## Detection Logic 11 | - Monitors `DeviceFileEvents` for events where: 12 | - The `ActionType` is "FileCreated", and 13 | - The `FolderPath` contains `/etc/sudoers.d/`. 14 | 15 | ## Tags 16 | - File Events 17 | - Privilege Escalation 18 | - sudoers 19 | - Linux Security 20 | - Suspicious Activity 21 | 22 | ## Search Query 23 | ```kql 24 | DeviceFileEvents 25 | | where ActionType == "FileCreated" 26 | | where FolderPath contains "/etc/sudoers.d/" 27 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Linux/ShadowFileModified.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule: Detection of Unauthorized Renaming of /etc/shadow 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies attempts to rename the `/etc/shadow` file on Linux systems. The `/etc/shadow` file contains hashed passwords for user accounts and should never be renamed during normal operations. Unauthorized renaming of this file could indicate malicious activity, such as an attempt to hide unauthorized changes to user passwords. 5 | 6 | This rule monitors for Linux shadow file modifications. These modifications are indicative of a potential password change or user addition event. Threat actors may attempt to create new users or change the password of a user account to maintain access to a system. 7 | 8 | - [Elastic Detection Rule on Persistence via User Password Change](https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/linux/persistence_user_password_change.toml) 9 | 10 | ## Detection Logic 11 | - Monitors `DeviceFileEvents` for events where: 12 | - The `ActionType` contains "FileRenamed", and 13 | - The `FileName` is `/etc/shadow`. 14 | 15 | ## Tags 16 | - File Events 17 | - Persistence 18 | - User Password Change 19 | - /etc/shadow 20 | - Linux Security 21 | - Suspicious Activity 22 | 23 | ## Search Query 24 | ```kql 25 | DeviceFileEvents 26 | | where ActionType contains "FileRenamed" 27 | | where FileName == @"/etc/shadow" 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Execution/SuspiciousPDQDeployRunnerChild.KQL: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule Documentation: Suspicious Child Processes of PDQ Deploy Runner (Windows) 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies suspicious child processes spawned by the `PDQDeployRunner.exe` process. PDQ Deploy is a legitimate software deployment tool, but it can be misused by attackers to execute malicious payloads. This rule monitors for unusual child processes that may indicate malicious activity. 5 | 6 | - [Detection.FYI on Suspicious Child Processes of PDQ Deploy Runner](https://detection.fyi/sigmahq/sigma/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pdqdeploy_runner_susp_children/) 7 | 8 | ## Detection Logic 9 | - Monitors `DeviceProcessEvents` for child processes spawned by `PDQDeployRunner.exe`. 10 | - Identifies unusual or suspicious processes that are not commonly associated with legitimate PDQ Deploy activities. 11 | 12 | ## Tags 13 | - Execution 14 | - Process Creation 15 | - PDQ Deploy 16 | - Suspicious Activity 17 | 18 | ## Search Query 19 | ```kql 20 | DeviceProcessEvents 21 | | where InitiatingProcessParentFileName contains "PDQDeployRunner" 22 | | where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "cmd.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "schtasks.exe", "taskkill.exe", "at.exe", "wmic.exe", "bitsadmin.exe") 23 | 24 | Notes: 25 | Exclude trusted processes within your network 26 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /C2/CloudflaredArgoTunnelDNS.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Detection of Cloudflared Argo Tunnel Communication 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies network communication to **Cloudflared Argo Tunnel services**, specifically targeting `trycloudflare` and `argotunnel.com` domains. Cloudflared is a legitimate tool used to securely tunnel traffic through Cloudflare's network, often for web applications and remote access. However, adversaries can **abuse Argo Tunnels to bypass network security controls**, establish covert communication channels, and exfiltrate data without detection. 5 | 6 | This rule helps detect potential misuse of Cloudflared tunneling services by monitoring outbound DNS queries to `trycloudflare` and `argotunnel.com`. 7 | 8 | - [Sigma Rule: DNS Query for Cloudflared Communication](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/dns_query/dns_query_win_cloudflared_communication.yml) 9 | 10 | ## Detection Logic 11 | - Monitors `DeviceNetworkEvents` for DNS queries or network requests where: 12 | - The `RemoteUrl` contains `"trycloudflare"` or `"argotunnel.com"`. 13 | 14 | ## Tags 15 | - Cloudflare Argo Tunneling 16 | - DNS Query Monitoring 17 | - Suspicious Network Traffic 18 | - Covert Communication 19 | - Data Exfiltration 20 | 21 | ## Search Query 22 | ```kql 23 | DeviceNetworkEvents 24 | | where RemoteUrl has_any ("trycloudflare", "argotunnel.com") 25 | ``` 26 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Credential Access/NTDSdumpwbadmin.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : NTDS.dit Dump via wbadmin.exe Abuse 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | Detects abuse of Windows Backup (`wbadmin.exe`) to export sensitive Active Directory artifacts such as `NTDS.dit`, `SYSTEM`, and `SECURITY` hives. Attackers may use `wbadmin start backup` with `-include` flags targeting these files to extract account hashes and secrets. 5 | 6 | - **Source:** The DFIR Report — From Bing Search to Ransomware: Bumblebee and AdaptixC2 Deliver Akira (Aug 05, 2025) 7 | 8 | ## Detection Logic 9 | - Alert on `wbadmin.exe` or backup tools invoked with `-include` parameters referencing `C:\Windows\NTDS\ntds.dit` or `C:\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM` or `SECURITY`. 10 | - Correlate backup target paths that point to remote shares or user-writable locations. 11 | - Flag when such operations are initiated by non-admin or unexpected service accounts. 12 | 13 | ## Tags 14 | - Credential Access 15 | - Discovery 16 | - MITRE ATT&CK: T1003 (OS Credential Dumping) 17 | 18 | ## Search Query 19 | ```kql 20 | DeviceProcessEvents 21 | | where FileName =~ "wbadmin.exe" or ProcessCommandLine contains "wbadmin" 22 | | where ProcessCommandLine contains "ntds.dit" or ProcessCommandLine contains "config\\SYSTEM" or ProcessCommandLine contains "config\\SECURITY" 23 | | project Timestamp,DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, ProcessCommandLine, ReportId 24 | ``` 25 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /WindowsAPIDetections/SetThreadContextRemoteApiCallQuery.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Detection of SetThreadContext Remote API Call 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies suspicious usage of the `SetThreadContext` function for remote API calls. The `SetThreadContext` function is used to modify the context of a specified thread, which can be leveraged by malicious actors to inject code into another process's address space. This technique allows attackers to execute arbitrary code within the context of another process, potentially leading to unauthorized actions or evasion of security controls. According to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this technique falls under "Process Injection: Thread Execution Hijacking" (T1055.003). 5 | 6 | This rule helps detect and audit suspicious usage of `SetThreadContext`, providing an early warning for potential malicious activities involving process injection. 7 | 8 | - [MITRE ATT&CK: Thread Execution Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/003/) 9 | 10 | ## Detection Logic 11 | - Monitors `DeviceEvents` for events where: 12 | - The `ActionType` is "SetThreadContextRemoteApiCall". 13 | 14 | ## Tags 15 | - Process Injection 16 | - SetThreadContext 17 | - Remote API Call 18 | - MITRE ATT&CK T1055.003 19 | - Suspicious Activity 20 | 21 | ## Search Query 22 | ```kql 23 | DeviceEvents 24 | | where ActionType == "SetThreadContextRemoteApiCall" 25 | ``` 26 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Privilege Escalation/GetsystemelevationCSmetasploit.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Detection of cmd.exe Echo Pipe Commands 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies suspicious usage of the `cmd.exe` process executing commands that involve `echo` combined with a pipe (`|`). Attackers often use such techniques during post-exploitation to gain elevated privileges or to manipulate data streams on compromised systems. This method is associated with various offensive security activities, including the well-known `getsystem` technique for privilege escalation. 5 | 6 | Monitoring command-line activities that combine `echo` and piping is important for detecting attempts to modify or redirect output, potentially aiding in data exfiltration or system tampering. 7 | 8 | - [Red Canary: Detecting Getsystem and Offensive Security Techniques](https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-detection/getsystem-offsec/) 9 | 10 | ## Detection Logic 11 | - Monitors `DeviceProcessEvents` for events where: 12 | - The `FileName` is `cmd.exe`, and 13 | - The `ProcessCommandLine` contains both `"echo"` and `"pipe"` operations. 14 | 15 | ## Tags 16 | - cmd.exe Monitoring 17 | - Privilege Escalation 18 | - Offensive Security Tools 19 | - Suspicious Command-Line Activity 20 | - Threat Detection 21 | 22 | ## Search Query 23 | ```kql 24 | DeviceProcessEvents 25 | | where FileName == @"cmd.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_all("echo", "pipe") 26 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Exfiltration/BlackSuitbublupexfil.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Detection of Data Exfiltration to Bublup.com 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies potential **data exfiltration** attempts by monitoring network connections to `bublup.com`, a legitimate file sharing and storage platform that has been **abused by threat actors**, including the **BlackSuit ransomware group**. During documented intrusions, adversaries used this service to upload exfiltrated data, often as part of double extortion campaigns. 5 | 6 | Connections to `bublup.com` may be uncommon in enterprise environments. When observed—especially outside known business workflows—they may represent staging or exfiltration activity in the later stages of an attack. 7 | 8 | - [The DFIR Report: Fake Zoom Ends in BlackSuit Ransomware](https://thedfirreport.com/2025/03/31/fake-zoom-ends-in-blacksuit-ransomware/) 9 | - [Unit 42: BlackSuit Ransomware – Ignoble Scorpius](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-assessment-blacksuit-ransomware-ignoble-scorpius/) 10 | 11 | ## Detection Logic 12 | - Monitors `DeviceNetworkEvents` where: 13 | - The `RemoteUrl` contains `"bublup.com"`. 14 | 15 | ## Tags 16 | - Data Exfiltration 17 | - Cloud Abuse 18 | - Bublup 19 | - BlackSuit Ransomware 20 | - Post-Exploitation 21 | - Suspicious Network Activity 22 | 23 | ## Search Query 24 | ```kql 25 | DeviceNetworkEvents 26 | | where RemoteUrl contains "bublup.com" 27 | ``` 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Collection/VeeamPSQLDump.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Credential Dump from Veeam PostgreSQL Database 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | Detects suspicious use of PostgreSQL client tools or SQL queries that extract credentials or configuration data from backup product databases (e.g., Veeam). Attackers may query Veeam's PostgreSQL database to obtain stored credentials for targets or backup repositories. 5 | 6 | - **Source:** The DFIR Report — From Bing Search to Ransomware: Bumblebee and AdaptixC2 Deliver Akira (Aug 05, 2025) 7 | 8 | ## Detection Logic 9 | - Alert on `psql.exe` or `psql` commandline usage, especially with queries referencing tables that contain credentials or configuration (e.g., `credentials`, `backup`, `repository`). 10 | - Correlate with local database service connections or dumps to files. 11 | - Flag when database queries are run by non-database admins or from atypical hosts. 12 | 13 | ## Tags 14 | - Credential Access 15 | - Data Exfiltration 16 | - MITRE ATT&CK: T1005 (Data from Local System), T1537 (Transfer Data to Cloud Account) 17 | 18 | ## Search Query 19 | ```kql 20 | DeviceProcessEvents 21 | | where FileName =~ "psql.exe" or ProcessCommandLine contains "psql " 22 | | where ProcessCommandLine contains "Veeam" or ProcessCommandLine has_all ("SELECT","username","credentials") or ProcessCommandLine contains "COPY" 23 | | project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, ProcessCommandLine, ReportId 24 | ``` 25 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /C2/sshtunneltoexternalhost.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule Documentation: SSH Reverse Tunnel Established to External Host 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | Detects SSH reverse tunneling or remote port forwarding to external hosts, which attackers use to create persistent command-and-control channels or pivot through an internal host to external infrastructure. 5 | 6 | - **Source:** The DFIR Report — From Bing Search to Ransomware: Bumblebee and AdaptixC2 Deliver Akira (Aug 05, 2025) 7 | 8 | ## Detection Logic 9 | - Monitor outbound `ssh` process creation with remote forwarding flags (`-R`, `-L`) or unusual port numbers. 10 | - Alert on internal hosts initiating SSH connections to external IPs with remote port binds (e.g., `ssh -R *:10400`). 11 | - Correlate with newly installed remote access tools or suspicious user accounts. 12 | 13 | ## Tags 14 | - Command and Control 15 | - Lateral Movement 16 | - MITRE ATT&CK: T1572 (Protocol Tunneling), T1040 (Network Sniffing) 17 | 18 | ## Search Query 19 | ```kql 20 | DeviceProcessEvents 21 | | where FileName =~ "ssh.exe" or ProcessCommandLine contains "ssh " 22 | | where ProcessCommandLine contains "-R" or ProcessCommandLine contains "-L" or ProcessCommandLine contains "RemoteForward" 23 | | project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, ProcessCommandLine, ReportId 24 | ``` 25 | 26 | ## Note 27 | This rule is very noisy and will generate a lot of alerts it needs to be adjusted to remove any legitimate behavior 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /C2/MaliciousJA3Fingerprint.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule Documentation: Detection of Malicious JA3 Fingerprints in SSL Connections 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies SSL connections inspected by Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) that match known malicious JA3 fingerprints. JA3 fingerprints are used to identify SSL/TLS clients based on their SSL/TLS handshake. Monitoring for these fingerprints can help detect potentially malicious activity, such as command and control (C2) communications. 5 | 6 | ## Detection Logic 7 | - Monitors `DeviceNetworkEvents` for events where the `ActionType` contains "SslConnectionInspected". 8 | - Parses the `AdditionalFields` column as JSON to extract the `ja3` fingerprint. 9 | - Compares the extracted `ja3` fingerprint against a list of known malicious JA3 fingerprints sourced from an external dataset. 10 | 11 | ## Tags 12 | - Network Monitoring 13 | - SSL/TLS Inspection 14 | - JA3 Fingerprinting 15 | - Malicious Activity 16 | - Command and Control (C2) 17 | - Suspicious Activity 18 | 19 | ## Search Query 20 | ```kql 21 | DeviceNetworkEvents 22 | | where ActionType contains "SslConnectionInspected" 23 | | extend parsed = parse_json(AdditionalFields) 24 | | where parsed.ja3 in (externaldata(Ja3Hash: string) [@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/0xAnalyst/DefenderATPQueries/main/Malja3fingerpints"]) 25 | 26 | 27 | # filter noise by removing internal IPs and internal domain certificates by parsed.subject or remvoe private IPs by where not (ipv4_is_private(RemoteIP)) 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Linux/Linuxwebshell.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule: Linux Webshell Indicators 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | Detects potential webshell activity by monitoring process events where suspicious processes associated with web servers and common system administration tools are executed. 5 | 6 | - Source: [Sigma rule for Linux webshell detection](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/0bb6f0c0d75ae3e1c37f9ab77d68f20cdb32ecd3/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_webshell_detection.yml) 7 | 8 | ## Detection Logic 9 | - Filters events to include process executions where: 10 | - Initiating process filenames include common web server executables (`httpd`, `lighttpd`, `nginx`, `apache2`, `node`, `caddy`). 11 | - Executed file names include common system administration tools (`whoami`, `ifconfig`, `ip`, `uname`, `cat`, `crontab`, `hostname`, `iptables`, `netstat`, `pwd`, `route`). 12 | - Excludes events where: 13 | - The initiating process filename is `calico-node`. 14 | - The process command line includes `cat /proc/cpuinfo`. 15 | 16 | ## Tags 17 | - Webshell Detection 18 | - Process Events 19 | - Linux 20 | 21 | ## Search Query 22 | ```kql 23 | DeviceProcessEvents 24 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("httpd", "lighttpd", "nginx", "apache2", "node", "caddy") 25 | | where FileName has_any ("whoami", "ifconfig", "ip", "uname", "cat", "crontab", "hostname", "iptables", "netstat", "pwd", "route") 26 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName !contains "calico-node" 27 | | where ProcessCommandLine !contains "cat /proc/cpuinfo" 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Linux/ectprofilesuspiciousscripts.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule: Detection of Suspicious Shell Scripts in Profile Directory 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies suspicious shell scripts located in the `/etc/profile.d/` directory on Linux systems. Shell scripts in this directory are typically used to configure the environment for all users on the system. The presence of unusual or unauthorized shell scripts may indicate persistence attempts by attackers, aiming to execute malicious code during user logins or system startup. 5 | 6 | This rule monitors for the creation or modification of shell scripts in the `/etc/profile.d/` directory, excluding scripts initiated by the `platform-python3.6` process, which is generally considered benign. 7 | 8 | - [Sigma Rule: Suspicious Shell Script in Profile Directory](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/0bb6f0c0d75ae3e1c37f9ab77d68f20cdb32ecd3/rules/linux/file_event/file_event_lnx_susp_shell_script_under_profile_directory.yml) 9 | 10 | ## Detection Logic 11 | - Monitors `DeviceFileEvents` for events where: 12 | - The `FileName` ends with ".sh", ".zsh", or ".csh". 13 | - The `InitiatingProcessFileName` is not "platform-python3.6". 14 | - The `FolderPath` contains "/etc/profile.d/". 15 | 16 | ## Tags 17 | - File Events 18 | - Persistence 19 | - Shell Script 20 | - Profile Directory 21 | - Linux Security 22 | - Suspicious Activity 23 | 24 | ## Search Query 25 | ```kql 26 | DeviceFileEvents 27 | | where FileName endswith ".sh" or FileName endswith ".zsh" or FileName endswith ". 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Privilege Escalation/PrintspoolerElevation.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule Documentation: Potential Privilege Escalation via CVE-2022-38028 (Windows) 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies potential privilege escalation attempts on Windows systems via CVE-2022-38028. This vulnerability allows attackers to escalate privileges by exploiting specific processes and file paths. Monitoring for these patterns can help detect malicious activities aiming to exploit this CVE. 5 | - [Microsoft analyzing forest blizzards] (https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/04/22/analyzing-forest-blizzards-custom-post-compromise-tool-for-exploiting-cve-2022-38028-to-obtain-credentials/) 6 | - [Elastic Security Guide on CVE-2022-38028](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/potential-privilege-escalation-via-cve-2022-38028.html) 7 | 8 | ## Detection Logic 9 | - Monitors `DeviceFileEvents` for file creation events in specific directories associated with the CVE. 10 | - Filters for JavaScript files created in these directories, excluding those initiated by the legitimate `drvinst.exe` process. 11 | 12 | ## Tags 13 | - Privilege Escalation 14 | - CVE-2022-38028 15 | 16 | ## Search Query 17 | ```kql 18 | DeviceFileEvents 19 | | where ActionType == "FileCreated" 20 | | where FolderPath startswith "C:\\Windows\\System32\\DriverStore\\FileRepository\\" or FolderPath startswith "C:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\amd64_microsoft-windows-printing-printtopdf" 21 | | where FileName endswith ".js" or FileName == "MPDW-constraints.js" 22 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName != "drvinst.exe" 23 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Linux/TripleCrosseBPFRootkit.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule: Detection of Suspicious File Creation Related to TripleCrosse eBPF Backdoor 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies the creation of suspicious files named "ebpfbackdoor" or "rootlog" on Linux systems. These files are associated with malicious activities, such as the installation of rootkits or backdoors. The creation of such files can indicate an attempt to establish persistence or hide unauthorized activities on the system. 5 | 6 | This rule monitors for the creation of files with names indicative of known malicious tools, focusing on files that are not typically present in legitimate environments. 7 | 8 | - [Sigma Rule: TripleCross Rootkit Lock File](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/0bb6f0c0d75ae3e1c37f9ab77d68f20cdb32ecd3/rules/linux/file_event/file_event_lnx_triple_cross_rootkit_lock_file.yml) 9 | - [Sigma Rule: TripleCross Rootkit Persistence](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/0bb6f0c0d75ae3e1c37f9ab77d68f20cdb32ecd3/rules/linux/file_event/file_event_lnx_triple_cross_rootkit_persistence.yml) 10 | 11 | ## Detection Logic 12 | - Monitors `DeviceFileEvents` for events where: 13 | - The `ActionType` is "FileCreated". 14 | - The `FileName` contains "ebpfbackdoor" or "rootlog". 15 | 16 | ## Tags 17 | - File Events 18 | - Persistence 19 | - Rootkit 20 | - eBPF Backdoor 21 | - Linux Security 22 | - Suspicious Activity 23 | 24 | ## Search Query 25 | ```kql 26 | DeviceFileEvents 27 | | where ActionType == "FileCreated" 28 | | where FileName contains "ebpfbackdoor" or FileName contains "rootlog" 29 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /WindowsAPIDetections/NtMapViewOfSectionDetectionRule.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Detection of NtMapViewOfSection Remote API Call 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies suspicious usage of the `NtMapViewOfSection` function for remote API calls. The `NtMapViewOfSection` function allows a process to map a view of a section into its address space, which can be used for legitimate purposes but can also be exploited by malicious actors for process injection. This technique is often used to execute arbitrary code within the context of another process, potentially leading to unauthorized actions or evasion of security controls. According to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this technique is categorized under "Process Injection" (T1055). 5 | 6 | This rule helps detect and audit suspicious usage of `NtMapViewOfSection`, providing an early warning for potential malicious activities involving process injection. 7 | 8 | - [MITRE ATT&CK: Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/) 9 | 10 | ## Detection Logic 11 | - Monitors `DeviceEvents` for events where: 12 | - The `ActionType` includes "NtMapViewOfSectionRemoteApiCall". 13 | - The `FileName` is not "firefox.exe". 14 | - The `FileName` is not "MicrosoftEdgeCP.exe". 15 | 16 | ## Tags 17 | - Process Injection 18 | - NtMapViewOfSection 19 | - Remote API Call 20 | - MITRE ATT&CK T1055 21 | - Suspicious Activity 22 | 23 | ## Search Query 24 | ```kql 25 | DeviceEvents 26 | | where ActionType has_any('NtMapViewOfSectionRemoteApiCall') 27 | | where FileName != "firefox.exe" and FileName != "MicrosoftEdgeCP.exe" 28 | ``` 29 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /C2/devtunnel/DevTunnelFileEvents.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Detection of Suspicious File Events Involving DevTunnels 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule monitors for suspicious file operations involving folders named "DevTunnels." DevTunnels are a feature used in Visual Studio for creating secure tunnels for remote connections, commonly utilized for remote debugging or development. Any unusual file activities within this folder could signal potential misuse or unauthorized operations by malicious actors attempting to establish or maintain persistence on the system. 5 | 6 | This rule specifically excludes known legitimate software, such as Dell Display Manager 2, from triggering false positives. Monitoring DevTunnels for unexpected file activity can help detect potential threat actors utilizing this feature for lateral movement or remote access. 7 | 8 | - [Related SigmaHQ Rule for DevTunnels Monitoring](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/ab2fb3642611988012a1ee79b056e2f3068059aa/rules/windows/dns_query/dns_query_win_devtunnels_communication.yml) 9 | 10 | ## Detection Logic 11 | - Monitors `DeviceFileEvents` for events where: 12 | - The `FolderPath` contains "DevTunnels", and 13 | - Excludes legitimate software such as Dell Display Manager 2. 14 | 15 | ## Tags 16 | - File Events 17 | - DevTunnels Monitoring 18 | - Suspicious File Access 19 | - Visual Studio Security 20 | - Threat Detection 21 | 22 | ## Search Query 23 | ```kql 24 | DeviceFileEvents 25 | | where FolderPath has "DevTunnels" 26 | //exclude Dell Display Manager | where InitiatingProcessFileName != "DellDisplayManager.exe" 27 | ``` 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Execution/Suspicious CLFS Driver Load.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule: Suspicious CLFS Driver Load 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies suspicious loading of the CLFS driver, which may indicate an attempt to inject or manipulate kernel modules for malicious purposes. The CLFS (Common Log File System) driver, normally located in a trusted system directory, is a critical component for managing log files in Windows. When this driver is loaded from an unexpected location or in an unusual context, it can be an indicator of kernel-level compromise or persistence mechanisms employed by adversaries. 5 | 6 | Monitoring image load events for the CLFS driver can provide early detection of such exploitation attempts, enabling rapid investigation and remediation. 7 | 8 | - [Sigma Rule: Image Load CLFS Load](https://detection.fyi/sigmahq/sigma/windows/image_load/image_load_clfs_load/) 9 | 10 | ## Detection Logic 11 | - Monitors `DeviceImageLoadEvents` for events where the loaded image corresponds to the CLFS driver (e.g., `clfs.sys`). 12 | - Flags events that deviate from normal, trusted behavior for the CLFS driver load (e.g., loading from non-standard directories). 13 | 14 | ## Tags 15 | - Windows Security 16 | - Image Load Events 17 | - Suspicious Driver Load 18 | - Kernel Module Manipulation 19 | - Persistence 20 | - CLFS 21 | - CVE-2024-38196 22 | 23 | ## Search Query 24 | ```kql 25 | DeviceImageLoadEvents 26 | | where FileName endswith "clfs.sys" 27 | | where not( FolderPath startswith @"C:\Windows\System32\drivers\" ) 28 | ``` 29 | ## Exclusions 30 | you might need to exclude legit path's in your enviroment 31 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Execution/NodeJSSuspiciousExecutions.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Suspicious Node.js Process Execution with PowerShell 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies suspicious executions of `node.exe` that include potentially malicious command-line arguments. Attackers often use Node.js (`node.exe`) to execute system commands, including PowerShell, to gain unauthorized access, execute malicious scripts, or establish persistence on a compromised system. 5 | 6 | By monitoring Node.js processes with command-line arguments containing HTTP-related operations (`http`), child process creation functions (`spawn`, `execSync`), JavaScript constants (`const`), and PowerShell execution, this rule helps detect potential exploitation, malware execution, or unauthorized command execution. 7 | 8 | ## Detection Logic 9 | - **Monitors `DeviceProcessEvents`** for processes where: 10 | - The `FileName` contains `"node.exe"`, and 11 | - The `ProcessCommandLine` contains all of the following indicators: 12 | - `"http"` (indicating potential external network connections) 13 | - `"spawn"` or `"execSync"` (indicating child process creation) 14 | - `"const"` (a JavaScript keyword commonly used in malicious scripts) 15 | - `"powershell"` (indicating potential command execution via PowerShell) 16 | 17 | ## Tags 18 | - Node.js Execution 19 | - PowerShell Execution 20 | - Suspicious Command Execution 21 | - Process Monitoring 22 | - Code Execution via Node.js 23 | 24 | ## Search Query 25 | ```kql 26 | DeviceProcessEvents 27 | | where FileName contains "node.exe" 28 | | where ProcessCommandLine has_all ("http", "spawn", "execSync", "const", "powershell") 29 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /ASRDetections/AsrUntrustedExecutableAuditedQuery.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Detection of Untrusted Executables in User Folders 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies untrusted executables within user directories that have been audited by Advanced Security Rules (ASR). Monitoring for untrusted executables is crucial because they can indicate the presence of malware or unauthorized software introduced into the system by malicious actors. This rule helps identify newly observed, globally rare executables within user folders that might have been introduced through various attack vectors. 5 | 6 | This rule monitors for audited actions related to untrusted executables in user directories, focusing on files that are new and have low global prevalence. 7 | 8 | ## Detection Logic 9 | - Monitors `DeviceEvents` for events where: 10 | - The `ActionType` is "AsrUntrustedExecutableAudited". 11 | - The `FolderPath` contains "users". 12 | - The file has been seen globally within the last 3 days and has a global prevalence of less than or equal to 1. 13 | 14 | ## Tags 15 | - Untrusted Executables 16 | - User Directories 17 | - Malware 18 | - Suspicious Activity 19 | - Advanced Security Rules (ASR) 20 | 21 | ## Search Query 22 | ```kql 23 | DeviceEvents 24 | | where FolderPath contains "users" and ActionType == "AsrUntrustedExecutableAudited" 25 | | project Timestamp, ReportId, DeviceId, ProcessCommandLine, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessSHA1, InitiatingProcessFileName, SHA1 26 | | invoke FileProfile("SHA1") 27 | | where GlobalFirstSeen > ago(3d) and GlobalPrevalence <= 1 28 | ``` 29 | ## Notes 30 | This needs a bit of fine tunning to be enabled as a detection rule 31 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Credential Access/NTDSFileCreateModify.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : NTDS.DIT File Creation or Copy Activity 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection identifies instances where the **NTDS.dit** file — the Active Directory database file containing credential and identity data — is **created or copied** on a Windows system. 5 | Such activity is highly suspicious, as attackers often attempt to copy or extract this file to obtain password hashes and authentication data from a domain controller. 6 | 7 | Legitimate access to `NTDS.dit` is typically restricted to the **Active Directory process (LSASS)** and backup utilities running under **SYSTEM context**. Therefore, detection of file creation or copy events targeting this file outside expected system paths may indicate credential theft or **Active Directory database exfiltration** attempts. 8 | 9 | - Reference: [MITRE ATT&CK – T1003.003: OS Credential Dumping: NTDS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/003/) 10 | 11 | ## Detection Logic 12 | - Monitors **DeviceFileEvents** for actions related to `ntds.dit`. 13 | - Flags when a file named `ntds.dit` is **created** or **copied**. 14 | - Common sources of this behavior in attacks include: 15 | - Use of tools such as **ntdsutil**, **esentutl**, or **copy** commands. 16 | - Shadow copy or Volume Snapshot Service (VSS) abuse to access the file. 17 | 18 | ## Tags 19 | - MITRE ATT&CK: T1003.003 (OS Credential Dumping: NTDS) 20 | - Category: Credential Access 21 | - Platform: Windows 22 | - Data Source: DeviceFileEvents 23 | - Severity: High 24 | 25 | ## Search Query 26 | ```kql 27 | DeviceFileEvents 28 | | where FileName =~ "ntds.dit" 29 | | where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileCopied") 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /C2/devtunnel/Devtunnelcodetunneling.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Visual Studio Code Tunnel Abuse Detection 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies suspicious use of the "tunnel" feature within Visual Studio Code (VSCode) that could indicate malicious activity or abuse. Attackers may leverage VSCode's tunnel functionality to establish unauthorized connections and bypass network restrictions. The rule monitors for command lines associated with tunnel creation, host setup, and allowing anonymous access. Malicious actors can exploit these functionalities to exfiltrate data or maintain persistence in a network. 5 | 6 | This method has been observed in espionage campaigns such as **Stately Taurus**, which targeted organizations in Southeast Asia, highlighting the growing abuse of legitimate tools like VSCode in advanced attacks. 7 | 8 | - [Stately Taurus Campaign by Unit42](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/stately-taurus-abuses-vscode-southeast-asian-espionage/) 9 | 10 | ## Detection Logic 11 | - Monitors `DeviceProcessEvents` where: 12 | - The `ProcessVersionInfoProductName` is "Visual Studio Code" and the `ProcessCommandLine` contains "tunnel". 13 | - The `ProcessCommandLine` includes: 14 | - "host" and "allow-anonymous" 15 | - "port" and "create" with a `-p` flag for specifying ports 16 | 17 | ## Tags 18 | - Process Execution 19 | - Tunneling 20 | - DevTunnels 21 | - Visual Studio Code 22 | - Espionage 23 | 24 | ## Search Query 25 | ```kql 26 | DeviceProcessEvents 27 | | where (ProcessVersionInfoProductName == @"Visual Studio Code" and ProcessCommandLine contains "tunnel" ) 28 | or ProcessCommandLine has_all ("host", "allow-anonymous") 29 | or ProcessCommandLine has_all ("port", "create", "-p") 30 | ``` 31 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Lateral Movement/7ZToSMBshare.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Detection of 7-Zip Archiving to SMB Admin Shares 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies suspicious usage of **7-Zip** (`7z.exe`, `7za.exe`, `7zr.exe`) to interact with administrative SMB shares such as **C$**, **Admin$**, or **IPC$**. Attackers may use **7-Zip** to compress and archive files before exfiltrating data via network shares. This technique is commonly associated with **lateral movement** and **data exfiltration** in targeted attacks. 5 | 6 | In many environments, legitimate use of **7-Zip** does not involve direct interaction with administrative network shares. Therefore, monitoring this behavior can help detect potential misuse by adversaries attempting to stage or exfiltrate data. 7 | 8 | - [Splunk Research: 7-Zip Archive Created in SMB Share](https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/01d29b48-ff6f-11eb-b81e-acde48001123/) 9 | 10 | ## Detection Logic 11 | - **Monitors `DeviceProcessEvents`** where: 12 | - The `FileName` or `ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName` matches: 13 | - `"7z.exe"` 14 | - `"7za.exe"` 15 | - `"7zr.exe"` 16 | - The `ProcessCommandLine` contains: 17 | - `"\\C$\\"` (Admin Share) 18 | - `"\\Admin$\\"` (Administrative Access) 19 | - `"\\IPC$\\"` (Inter-Process Communication Share) 20 | 21 | ## Tags 22 | - Data Exfiltration 23 | - Lateral Movement 24 | - SMB Share Monitoring 25 | - Suspicious File Archiving 26 | - Windows Security 27 | 28 | ## Search Query 29 | ```kql 30 | DeviceProcessEvents 31 | | where FileName in ("7z.exe", "7za.exe", "7zr.exe") 32 | or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName in ("7z.exe", "7za.exe", "7zr.exe") 33 | | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("\\C$\\", "\\Admin$\\", "\\IPC$\\") 34 | ``` 35 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Defense Evasion/EventLogTamperingRegistry.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Windows Event Log Access Tampering Via Registry modification 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies attempts to modify Windows registry keys associated with the Event Log service and its channels, specifically targeting keys that end with "CustomSD" or "ChannelAccess". Adversaries may alter these registry settings to disable or manipulate event logging, hindering forensic investigations and enabling persistence or further malicious activity. 5 | 6 | By flagging registry value set actions on these keys, this rule helps detect efforts to tamper with Windows Event Log security descriptors, which is a common tactic used to evade detection. 7 | 8 | - [Sigma Rule: Registry Set Disable Windows Event Log Access](https://detection.fyi/sigmahq/sigma/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_disable_windows_event_log_access/) 9 | 10 | ## Detection Logic 11 | - **Monitored Events:** 12 | The rule monitors `DeviceRegistryEvents` for actions where: 13 | - The `RegistryKey` contains "EventLog" or "Channels". 14 | - The `ActionType` is "RegistryValueSet". 15 | - **Suspicious Activity:** 16 | Flags events where the `RegistryKey` ends with either "CustomSD" or "ChannelAccess", which may indicate an attempt to alter the security descriptors for event logging. 17 | 18 | ## Tags 19 | - Registry Modification 20 | - Event Log Tampering 21 | - Windows Security 22 | - Persistence 23 | - Evasion 24 | - Malicious Activity 25 | 26 | ## Search Query 27 | ```kql 28 | DeviceRegistryEvents 29 | | where RegistryKey has_any ("EventLog", "Channels") and ActionType == "RegistryValueSet" 30 | | where RegistryKey endswith "CustomSD" or RegistryKey endswith "ChannelAccess" 31 | ``` 32 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Linux/CryptoMiningDetection.kql: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Crypto Mining Detection 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | Detects potential cryptocurrency mining activities by monitoring process command lines for common indicators associated with mining software. Cryptocurrency mining on compromised systems can lead to degraded performance, increased power consumption, and potential hardware damage. 5 | 6 | - Source: [Sigma rule for detecting cryptocurrency mining](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/0bb6f0c0d75ae3e1c37f9ab77d68f20cdb32ecd3/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_crypto_mining.yml) 7 | 8 | ## Detection Logic 9 | - Monitors process events for command lines containing common parameters and commands used by cryptocurrency mining software, such as: 10 | - `--cpu-priority=` 11 | - `--donate-level=0` 12 | - `-o pool.` 13 | - `--nicehash` 14 | - `--algo=rx/0` 15 | - `stratum+tcp://` 16 | - `stratum+udp://` 17 | - `sh -c /sbin/modprobe msr allow_writes=on` 18 | - Encoded strings associated with mining configurations and commands. 19 | 20 | ## Tags 21 | - Cryptocurrency Mining 22 | - Process Events 23 | - Linux 24 | 25 | ## Search Query 26 | ```kql 27 | DeviceProcessEvents 28 | | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ( 29 | "--cpu-priority=", 30 | "--donate-level=0", 31 | " -o pool.", 32 | " --nicehash", 33 | " --algo=rx/0 ", 34 | "stratum+tcp://", 35 | "stratum+udp://", 36 | "sh -c /sbin/modprobe msr allow_writes=on", 37 | "LS1kb25hdGUtbGV2ZWw9", 38 | "0tZG9uYXRlLWxldmVsP", 39 | "tLWRvbmF0ZS1sZXZlbD", 40 | "c3RyYXR1bSt0Y3A6Ly", 41 | "N0cmF0dW0rdGNwOi8v", 42 | "zdHJhdHVtK3RjcDovL", 43 | "c3RyYXR1bSt1ZHA6Ly", 44 | "N0cmF0dW0rdWRwOi8v", 45 | "zdHJhdHVtK3VkcDovL" 46 | ) 47 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Collection/AdfindDetection.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Detection of ADFind Command Usage 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies suspicious use of `ADFind`, a command-line Active Directory query tool commonly leveraged by attackers for reconnaissance. Adversaries may use ADFind to extract valuable Active Directory data, such as domain information, user and group lists, or trust relationships. Monitoring for specific patterns in process command lines can help detect unauthorized ADFind activities and provide early warning of potential lateral movement or privilege escalation attempts. 5 | 6 | This rule monitors for the execution of ADFind commands, especially those containing sensitive keywords such as `"objectcategory"`, `"domainlist"`, `"adinfo"`, `"trustdmp"`, and others that indicate potential misuse for domain enumeration or privilege escalation. 7 | 8 | - [Elastic Security: AdFind Command Activity](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/adfind-command-activity.html) 9 | 10 | ## Detection Logic 11 | - Monitors `DeviceProcessEvents` for events where: 12 | - The `ProcessCommandLine` contains keywords related to ADFind command usage. 13 | - The `ProcessCommandLine` matches a regular expression pattern indicating piping or redirection, which may suggest an attempt to manipulate or exfiltrate the gathered data. 14 | 15 | ## Tags 16 | - Active Directory Reconnaissance 17 | - ADFind 18 | - Domain Enumeration 19 | - Lateral Movement 20 | - Suspicious Command-Line Activity 21 | - Threat Detection 22 | 23 | ## Search Query 24 | ```kql 25 | let commandline = dynamic(["objectcategory","domainlist","dcmodes","adinfo","trustdmp","computers_pwdnotreqd","Domain Admins", "objectcategory=*"]); 26 | DeviceProcessEvents 27 | | where ProcessCommandLine has_any (commandline) 28 | | where ProcessCommandLine matches regex "(.*)>(.*)" 29 | ``` 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Defense Evasion/EDRSandblast.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Detection of Suspicious Driver Loads Indicative of EDR Bypass 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies the loading of suspicious drivers, such as `WN_64.sys` and `wnbios.sys`, which are commonly associated with techniques used to bypass Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) systems. Attackers may use malicious or modified drivers to disable security software, avoid detection, and establish a foothold within the system. The identified drivers have been linked to sophisticated extortion and ransomware campaigns, as described by Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 in their analysis of EDR bypass techniques. 5 | 6 | Monitoring driver load events for these specific filenames can help detect early signs of an attempted security bypass and give security teams the opportunity to investigate and mitigate the threat before further damage occurs. 7 | 8 | - [Palo Alto Networks Unit 42: EDR Bypass Extortion Attempt](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/edr-bypass-extortion-attempt-thwarted/?pdf=download&lg=en&_wpnonce=70be2dde45) 9 | 10 | ## Detection Logic 11 | - Monitors `DeviceEvents` where: 12 | - The `ActionType` is `"DriverLoad"`. 13 | - The `FileName` includes `"WN_64.sys"` or `"wnbios.sys"`. 14 | 15 | ## Tags 16 | - EDR Bypass 17 | - Driver Load 18 | - Security Evasion 19 | - Ransomware 20 | - Suspicious Activity 21 | 22 | ## Search Query 23 | ```kql 24 | DeviceEvents 25 | | where ActionType == "DriverLoad" 26 | | where FileName has_any("WN_64.sys", "wnbios.sys") 27 | ``` 28 | 29 | You can add the following line to detect the specific vulnerable drivers 30 | ```| extend parsed = parse_json(AdditionalFields) 31 | | where FileName has_any("WN_64.sys", "wnbios.sys") or parsed.ImageSHA256 has_any("6106d1ce671b92d522144fcd3bc01276a975fe5d5b0fde09ca1cca16d09b7143","6106d1ce671b92d522144fcd3bc01276a975fe5d5b0fde09ca1cca16d09b7143") 32 | ``` 33 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /C2/PowerShellPossibleC2Connection.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Suspicious PowerShell Web Requests 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule is designed to identify PowerShell commands associated with downloading or transferring data from a system, often used by attackers during data exfiltration or for malicious downloads. Malicious actors use web request utilities such as `Invoke-WebRequest`, `iwr`, `wget`, `curl`, `Net.WebClient`, and `Start-BitsTransfer` within PowerShell to interact with remote resources, posing a significant threat to system security. 5 | 6 | Detecting these commands helps flag potential data exfiltration attempts or unauthorized file transfers that could indicate malicious activity or compromise. 7 | Sigma Rule: Suspicious Data Exfiltration via CLI https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/35a5eb9a4cb6f9c7a25277617806471d9999b255/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_data_exfiltration_via_cli.yml 8 | 9 | ## Detection Logic 10 | - Filters `DeviceEvents` where the `ActionType` contains `"PowerShellCommand"`. 11 | - Parses the `AdditionalFields` to analyze the PowerShell command executed. 12 | - Matches the PowerShell command against suspicious web request utilities such as: 13 | - `Invoke-WebRequest` (iwr) 14 | - `wget` 15 | - `curl` 16 | - `Net.WebClient` 17 | - `Start-BitsTransfer` 18 | 19 | These commands are often used to download or upload files, and their presence in command-line executions is suspicious in many scenarios, especially outside of standard administrative use. 20 | 21 | ## Tags 22 | - PowerShell 23 | - Data Exfiltration 24 | - Malicious Downloads 25 | - Suspicious Command Execution 26 | 27 | ## Search Query 28 | ```kql 29 | DeviceEvents 30 | | where ActionType contains "PowerShellCommand" 31 | | extend parsed = parse_json(AdditionalFields) 32 | | where parsed.Command matches regex @"\b(Invoke-WebRequest|iwr|wget|curl|Net\.WebClient|Start-BitsTransfer)\b" 33 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Privilege Escalation/CVE-2024-35250.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Potential CVE-2024-35250 Exploitation Activity 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | Detects potentially suspicious loading of "ksproxy.ax", which may indicate an attempt to exploit CVE-2024-35250. 5 | This detection rule identifies potential exploitation attempts of (CVE-2024-35250) that could allow attackers to achieve privilege escalation. By abusing the image load mechanism, threat actors may attempt to load a malicious module in place of a legitimate one, bypassing security controls and escalating privileges on the target system. 6 | 7 | - [Detection.fyi: Image Load Exploit CVE-2024-35250 Privilege Escalation](https://detection.fyi/sigmahq/sigma/emerging-threats/2024/exploits/cve-2024-35250/image_load_exploit_cve_2024_35250_privilege_escalation/) 8 | 9 | ## Detection Logic 10 | - Monitors `DeviceImageLoadEvents` events for ksproxy.ax being loaded by a suspicious process 11 | 12 | ## Tags 13 | - Privilege Escalation 14 | - Image Load Exploit 15 | - CVE-2024-35250 16 | - Exploitation 17 | - Windows Security 18 | - Suspicious Activity 19 | 20 | ## Search Query 21 | ```kql 22 | DeviceImageLoadEvents 23 | | where FileName endswith @"ksproxy.ax" 24 | ``` 25 | 26 | 27 | - **Exclusions:** 28 | you might need to excluded the following in your enviroment 29 | - Exclude events where the `FilenName` field starts with any of the following trusted system paths: 30 | - `C:\Program Files\` 31 | - `C:\Program Files (x86)\` 32 | - `C:\Windows\System32\` 33 | - `C:\Windows\SysWOW64\` 34 | - Exclude events where the `Image` field ends with any of the following known legitimate applications: 35 | - `\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe` 36 | - `\AppData\Roaming\Zoom\bin\Zoom.exe` 37 | - `\AppData\Local\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe` 38 | - `\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe` 39 | - `\AppData\Local\Programs\Opera\opera.exe` 40 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /C2/devtunnel/DevTunnelnetworkdetection.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Detection of Suspicious Visual Studio DevTunnels Communication 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule monitors network communications involving suspicious connections to Visual Studio DevTunnels APIs, specifically to domains ending with `tunnels.api.visualstudio.com` or `devtunnels.ms`. DevTunnels is a feature used for secure remote connections and debugging in Visual Studio. However, misuse of this service by malicious actors can lead to unauthorized remote access or data exfiltration. 5 | 6 | This rule flags potentially suspicious traffic by excluding legitimate processes such as `ServiceHub.Host.dotnet.x64.dll` or `ServiceHub.Host.dotnet.arm64` from Visual Studio's internal services. Monitoring for unusual process interactions with these URLs can help identify potential misuse or lateral movement in a network. 7 | 8 | - [SigmaHQ Rule for DevTunnels Communication](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/ab2fb3642611988012a1ee79b056e2f3068059aa/rules/windows/dns_query/dns_query_win_devtunnels_communication.yml) 9 | 10 | ## Detection Logic 11 | - Monitors `DeviceNetworkEvents` for events where: 12 | - The `RemoteUrl` ends with `tunnels.api.visualstudio.com` or `devtunnels.ms`, and 13 | - The initiating process is not associated with legitimate Visual Studio processes, such as `ServiceHub.Host.dotnet.x64.dll` or `ServiceHub.Host.dotnet.arm64`. 14 | 15 | ## Tags 16 | - DevTunnels Monitoring 17 | - Suspicious Network Traffic 18 | - Visual Studio Security 19 | - Remote Access Detection 20 | - Threat Detection 21 | 22 | ## Search Query 23 | ```kql 24 | DeviceNetworkEvents 25 | | where RemoteUrl endswith "tunnels.api.visualstudio.com" or RemoteUrl endswith "devtunnels.ms" 26 | | where InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName != @"ServiceHub.Host.dotnet.x64.dll" 27 | | where InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription != @"ServiceHub.Host.dotnet.arm64" 28 | ``` 29 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /C2/devtunnel/DevtunnelRegistry.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule Documentation: Devtunnel Detection through Registry Modifications Involving `InProcServer32` and MSAL Runtime 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies suspicious modifications to the `InProcServer32` registry key where the registry value data contains "msalruntime." Modifying this registry key can be an indication of persistence or DLL injection attacks. The `InProcServer32` key is commonly associated with Component Object Model (COM) hijacking, where adversaries attempt to load malicious DLLs through legitimate processes. 5 | 6 | This rule is important for monitoring persistence techniques where the MSAL (Microsoft Authentication Library) runtime may be abused to perform unauthorized code execution or maintain persistent access to a compromised machine. By leveraging COM hijacking, threat actors can inject malicious code into trusted processes, effectively evading detection. 7 | 8 | - [SigmaHQ Rule for DevTunnels Communication](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/ab2fb3642611988012a1ee79b056e2f3068059aa/rules/windows/dns_query/dns_query_win_devtunnels_communication.yml) 9 | - [MITRE ATT&CK - T1547.001: Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/) 10 | - [MSAL Documentation - Microsoft Authentication Library](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/msal-overview) 11 | 12 | ## Detection Logic 13 | - Monitors `DeviceRegistryEvents` where: 14 | - The `RegistryKey` contains "inprocserver32", and 15 | - The `RegistryValueData` contains "msalruntime." 16 | 17 | ## Tags 18 | - Registry Events 19 | - COM Hijacking 20 | - Persistence Mechanisms 21 | - Windows Registry Monitoring 22 | - Malicious DLL Injection 23 | - MSAL Runtime Abuse 24 | 25 | ## Search Query 26 | ```kql 27 | DeviceRegistryEvents 28 | | where RegistryKey contains "inprocserver32" 29 | | where RegistryValueData contains "msalruntime" 30 | ``` 31 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Defense Evasion/rnpkeysDllHijack.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Thunderbird rnpkeys.exe DLL Hijacking - StealC InfoStealer 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies the execution of `rnpkeys.exe` associated with the Thunderbird email client. The `rnpkeys.exe` process is related to the handling of cryptographic keys in Thunderbird. Monitoring this process is essential because it could be exploited by malicious actors to manipulate encryption keys, potentially compromising secure communications. According to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, such manipulations fall under "DLL Search Order Hijacking" (T1574.001), where adversaries may exploit the search order to load malicious DLLs. 5 | 6 | This rule helps detect and audit the usage of `rnpkeys.exe` within Thunderbird, ensuring that only legitimate key operations are performed and providing an early warning for potential malicious activities. 7 | 8 | Seen in version 115.6.0 9 | and the dll file name is rnp.dll 10 | - [MITRE ATT&CK: DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001/) 11 | 12 | ## Detection Logic 13 | ### DeviceProcessEvents 14 | - Monitors `DeviceProcessEvents` for events where: 15 | - The `FileName` contains "rnpkeys.exe". 16 | - The `ProcessVersionInfoProductName` is "Thunderbird". 17 | 18 | ### DeviceImageLoadEvents 19 | - Monitors `DeviceImageLoadEvents` for events where: 20 | - The `InitiatingProcessFileName` contains "rnpkeys.exe". 21 | 22 | ## Tags 23 | - Thunderbird 24 | - Cryptographic Keys 25 | - rnpkeys.exe 26 | - Email Security 27 | - Process Monitoring 28 | - DLL Search Order Hijacking 29 | - MITRE ATT&CK T1574.001 30 | - Suspicious Activity 31 | 32 | ## Search Query 33 | ```kql 34 | DeviceProcessEvents 35 | | where FileName contains "rnpkeys.exe" 36 | | where ProcessVersionInfoProductName == "Thunderbird" 37 | ``` 38 | ```kql 39 | DeviceImageLoadEvents 40 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName contains "rnpkeys.exe" 41 | ``` 42 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /ASRDetections/AsrLsassCredentialTheftAuditedQuery.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Detection of LSASS Credential Theft Audited 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies audited events where attempts to steal credentials from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process are detected. LSASS is a critical process that handles security policy and user authentication. Malicious actors often target LSASS to extract credentials and escalate privileges. This rule focuses on identifying rare instances of processes attempting to access LSASS, as frequent attempts may indicate a targeted attack. 5 | 6 | This rule helps detect and audit suspicious processes interacting with LSASS, providing an early warning for potential credential theft activities. 7 | 8 | - [Detect and Block Credential Dumps with Defender for Endpoint](https://jeffreyappel.nl/detect-and-block-credential-dumps-with-defender-for-endpoint-attack-surface-reduction/) 9 | 10 | ## Detection Logic 11 | - Monitors `DeviceEvents` for events where: 12 | - The `ActionType` is "AsrLsassCredentialTheftAudited". 13 | - The `Timestamp` is within the last 30 days. 14 | - Summarizes the count of unique devices and rule hits by the `FileName` and `InitiatingProcessFileName`. 15 | - Filters for events where the count of unique devices is less than 3. 16 | - Sorts the results by the count of unique devices in descending order. 17 | 18 | ## Tags 19 | - Credential Theft 20 | - LSASS 21 | - Malware 22 | - Advanced Security Rules (ASR) 23 | - Suspicious Activity 24 | 25 | ## Search Query 26 | ```kql 27 | DeviceEvents 28 | | where ActionType == "AsrLsassCredentialTheftAudited" and Timestamp > ago(30d) 29 | //| project BlockedProcess=FileName, ParentProcess=InitiatingProcessFileName, DeviceName 30 | | summarize Devicecount=dcount(DeviceName), RuleHits=count() by FileName, InitiatingProcessFileName 31 | | where Devicecount < 3 32 | | sort by Devicecount desc 33 | ``` 34 | ## Notes 35 | This is very noisy rule 36 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /WindowsAPIDetections/QueueUserApcRemoteApiCallDetectionRule.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Detection of QueueUserAPC Remote API Call 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies suspicious usage of the `QueueUserAPC` function for remote API calls. The `QueueUserAPC` function allows a program to specify a function to be called asynchronously in the context of a specified thread. While this is a legitimate function used by many applications, it can be exploited by malicious actors to execute arbitrary code in the context of another process, facilitating process injection and potentially leading to unauthorized actions or evasion of security controls. According to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this technique is categorized under "Process Injection: Asynchronous Procedure Call (APC) Injection" (T1055.004). 5 | 6 | This rule helps detect and audit suspicious usage of `QueueUserAPC`, providing an early warning for potential malicious activities involving process injection. 7 | 8 | - [MITRE ATT&CK: Asynchronous Procedure Call (APC) Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/004/) 9 | 10 | ## Detection Logic 11 | - Monitors `DeviceEvents` for events where: 12 | - The `ActionType` is "QueueUserApcRemoteApiCall". 13 | - The `InitiatingProcessCommandLine` is not `"svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection"`. 14 | - The `InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName` is not "Microsoft Edge Installer". 15 | - The `ProcessCommandLine` is not `"svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt"`. 16 | 17 | ## Tags 18 | - Process Injection 19 | - APC Injection 20 | - QueueUserAPC 21 | - Remote API Call 22 | - MITRE ATT&CK T1055.004 23 | - Suspicious Activity 24 | 25 | ## Search Query 26 | ```kql 27 | DeviceEvents 28 | | where ActionType == "QueueUserApcRemoteApiCall" 29 | | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine != "svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection" 30 | | where InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName != "Microsoft Edge Installer" 31 | | where ProcessCommandLine != "svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt" 32 | ``` 33 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Execution/LatrodectusFileCreation.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Detection of Suspicious MSI and DLL Activity Associated with Latrodectus Malware 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies suspicious file and process activities that could be indicative of Latrodectus malware or similar threats. The query monitors for specific file paths, particularly MSI files and the `aclui.dll`, often used in malicious contexts, in combination with `msiexec` or `rundll32` processes. Latrodectus malware, as described in recent analyses, leverages these files and processes to execute payloads and achieve persistence on infected systems. 5 | 6 | Latrodectus is a sophisticated malware family known for its ability to evade detection and deliver various payloads, including information stealers and ransomware. This rule is designed to detect the early stages of Latrodectus infection, focusing on suspicious file creations and process executions that are not typically associated with legitimate software installations or updates. 7 | 8 | - [Latrodectus Malware Analysis](https://blog.krakz.fr/articles/latrodectus/) 9 | 10 | ## Detection Logic 11 | - Monitors `DeviceFileEvents` for events where: 12 | - The `FolderPath` contains any of the following suspicious files: 13 | - `"aclui.dll"`, 14 | - `"Roaming\\capisp"`, 15 | - `"temp\\vpn.msi"`, 16 | - `"neuro.msi"`, 17 | - `"bst.msi"`, 18 | - `"aes256.msi"`, 19 | - `"neo.msi"`, 20 | - `"bim.msi"`, 21 | - `"WSC.msi"`. 22 | - The `InitiatingProcessCommandLine` includes `"msiexec"` or `"rundll32"`. 23 | 24 | ## Tags 25 | - Latrodectus Malware 26 | - Suspicious MSI Activity 27 | - DLL Hijacking 28 | - Process Execution 29 | - MITRE ATT&CK T1059 (Command and Scripting Interpreter) 30 | - Persistence 31 | - Suspicious Activity 32 | 33 | ## Search Query 34 | ```kql 35 | DeviceFileEvents 36 | | where FolderPath has_any ("aclui.dll", "Roaming\\capisp", "temp\\vpn.msi", "neuro.msi", "bst.msi","aes256.msi","neo.msi","bim.msi","WSC.msi") 37 | | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any("msiexec", "rundll32") 38 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Discovery/DNSZoneExport.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule Documentation: DNS Zone Export Commands Execution (PowerShell Command Audit) 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | Detects execution of **DNS zone enumeration/export** cmdlets via PowerShell — specifically `Export-DnsServerZone` and `Get-DnsServerZone`. Adversaries export DNS data to map internal hosts and services for lateral movement and targeting. This rule uses PowerShell command audit telemetry (e.g., `DeviceEvents` with `ActionType == "PowerShellCommand"`) and excludes the common benign COM host invocation from `MonitoringHost.exe -Embedding`. 5 | 6 | - **Source context:** DFIR cases where attackers export DNS zones to discover internal hostnames and domain controllers (see DFIR Report patterns). 7 | 8 | ## Detection Logic 9 | - Trigger when a PowerShell command event contains `Export-DnsServerZone` or `Get-DnsServerZone`. 10 | - Exclude benign automation noise where PowerShell is invoked by known monitoring components (example: `MonitoringHost.exe -Embedding`). 11 | - Scope to server-class systems (DNS servers, management hosts) and admin accounts to reduce false positives. 12 | - Prioritise events when: 13 | - Non-admin accounts execute the cmdlets. 14 | - Execution occurs from non-DNS servers or workstations. 15 | - Execution happens during off-hours or outside approved maintenance windows. 16 | - Correlate with: 17 | - Unusual DNS queries or mass DNS lookups from the same host. 18 | - Creation of local files (exports) in uncommon locations. 19 | - Subsequent lateral movement or privilege escalation activity within a short time window. 20 | 21 | ## Tags 22 | - Discovery 23 | - Reconnaissance 24 | - DNS Enumeration 25 | - PowerShell 26 | - MITRE ATT&CK: 27 | - **T1016** – System Network Configuration Discovery 28 | - **T1046** – Network Service Discovery 29 | 30 | ## Search Query 31 | ```kql 32 | DeviceEvents 33 | | where ActionType == "PowerShellCommand" 34 | | where AdditionalFields has_any ("Export-DnsServerZone", "Get-DnsServerZone") 35 | | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine != @"""MonitoringHost.exe"" -Embedding" 36 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /WindowsAPIDetections/GetAsyncKeyStateApiCallQuery.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Detection of GetAsyncKeyState API Call 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies suspicious usage of the `GetAsyncKeyState` API call. The `GetAsyncKeyState` function is used to determine whether a key is currently pressed or was pressed after a previous call to this function, which can be leveraged by keylogging malware to capture keystrokes. Legitimate software may use this function, but it is often exploited by malicious actors to monitor and capture user input, leading to unauthorized access to sensitive information. According to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this technique falls under "Input Capture: Keylogging" (T1056.001). 5 | 6 | This rule helps detect and audit suspicious usage of `GetAsyncKeyState`, providing an early warning for potential keylogging activities. 7 | 8 | - [MITRE ATT&CK: Input Capture: Keylogging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001/) 9 | 10 | ## Detection Logic 11 | - Monitors `DeviceEvents` for events where: 12 | - The `ActionType` is "GetAsyncKeyStateApiCall". 13 | - The `InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription` is not "Adobe Acrobat". 14 | - The `InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName` is not "QuickTime". 15 | - The `InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName` is not "Adobe Systems Incorporated". 16 | - The `InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName` is not "MAXON Computer GmbH". 17 | - The `InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName` is not "Adobe". 18 | 19 | ## Tags 20 | - Keylogging 21 | - GetAsyncKeyState 22 | - Input Capture 23 | - API Call 24 | - MITRE ATT&CK T1056.001 25 | - Suspicious Activity 26 | 27 | ## Search Query 28 | ```kql 29 | DeviceEvents 30 | | where ActionType == "GetAsyncKeyStateApiCall" 31 | | where InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription != "Adobe Acrobat" 32 | | where InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName != "QuickTime" 33 | | where InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName != "Adobe Systems Incorporated" 34 | | where InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName != "MAXON Computer GmbH" 35 | | where InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName != "Adobe" 36 | ``` 37 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Persistence/SuspiciousRunMRUentries.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Detection of Suspicious RunMRU Registry Modifications Related to info Stealers 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies suspicious modifications to the **RunMRU** registry key, which stores a history of commands executed via the Windows **Run Dialog** (`Win + R`). Adversaries, including those deploying **Lumma Stealer**, may use this technique to execute malicious commands, download payloads, or establish persistence by leveraging commonly abused executables like **PowerShell, cmd.exe, rundll32.exe, and pwsh**. 5 | 6 | As observed in **Lumma Stealer** campaigns, attackers may use **CAPTCHA-based evasion** techniques to distribute malware and execute commands that interact with malicious infrastructure via `iwr`, `https`, and `iex` in PowerShell. Monitoring changes to the **RunMRU** registry key helps detect malicious activity attempting to execute unauthorized commands or establish persistence through registry manipulation. 7 | 8 | - [Lumma Stealer Analysis - Medium](https://medium.com/@shaherzakaria8/downloading-trojan-lumma-infostealer-through-capatcha-1f25255a0e71) 9 | 10 | ## Detection Logic 11 | - **Monitors `DeviceRegistryEvents`** where: 12 | - The `RegistryKey` contains `"RunMRU"` (indicating execution history manipulation). 13 | - The `RegistryValueData` contains **potentially malicious command-line keywords**, such as: 14 | - `"powershell"` – PowerShell execution 15 | - `"pwsh"` – PowerShell Core execution 16 | - `"iwr"` – Invoke-WebRequest (used for downloading files) 17 | - `"https"` – Suspicious external network access 18 | - `"iex"` – Invoke-Expression (often abused in PowerShell attacks) 19 | - `"cmd.exe"` – Execution via the command prompt 20 | - `"rundll"` – DLL execution 21 | 22 | ## Tags 23 | - Malware Persistence 24 | - Registry Modification 25 | - Windows Run Dialog Abuse 26 | - Command Execution 27 | - Malicious Script Execution 28 | - Suspicious Activity 29 | - InfoStealers 30 | 31 | ## Search Query 32 | ```kql 33 | DeviceRegistryEvents 34 | | where RegistryKey contains "Runmru" 35 | | where RegistryValueData has_any("powershell", "iwr", "https", "iex", "cmd.exe", "rundll", "pwsh") 36 | ``` 37 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Defense Evasion/Peaklightinfection.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Peaklight Masquerading with PowerShell and Media Player files 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies instances of PowerShell being executed alongside media player executables, such as `wmplayer.exe`, `setup_wm.exe`, or `Microsoft.Media.Player.exe`, as well as PowerShell executions involving `.mp4` files in the `appdata` directory. This behavior is commonly associated with stealthy, memory-only malware attacks, such as Peaklight, which leverages masquerading techniques to evade detection. 5 | 6 | Peaklight malware is known for its ability to avoid writing files to disk by operating entirely in memory, using trusted system processes to appear legitimate. This makes detection more difficult. In this scenario, attackers abuse PowerShell to launch malware while masquerading it as media playback activity, exploiting user expectations and disguising malicious intent behind seemingly benign processes. 7 | 8 | By leveraging this detection, security teams can identify potential malicious activity masquerading as media players and block attempts to evade traditional defenses. 9 | 10 | - [Peaklight: Decoding Stealthy Memory-Only Malware](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/peaklight-decoding-stealthy-memory-only-malware) 11 | - [Masquerading Technique T1036: Malware Peaklight Defense Evasion](https://github.com/Sam0x90/CB-Threat-Hunting/blob/789fa8c238afd02059cd1ceadcdddbd146fcbf93/Detections/Malwares%26Tools/malware_peaklight_defense_evasion_t1036_masquerading_powershell_by_opening_video_file_as_expected_by_the_user.yaml) 12 | 13 | ## Detection Logic 14 | - Monitors `DeviceProcessEvents` for events where: 15 | - The `InitiatingProcessFileName` is `"powershell.exe"`, and 16 | - The `FileName` is `"setup_wm.exe"`, `"wmplayer.exe"`, or `"Microsoft.Media.Player.exe"`, or 17 | - The `ProcessCommandLine` contains both `"appdata"` and `".mp4"`. 18 | 19 | ## Tags 20 | - Process Events 21 | - Masquerading 22 | - PowerShell 23 | - Memory-Only Malware 24 | - Defense Evasion 25 | - Suspicious Activity 26 | 27 | ## Search Query 28 | ```kql 29 | DeviceProcessEvents 30 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName == "powershell.exe" 31 | | where FileName in ("setup_wm.exe", "wmplayer.exe", "Microsoft.Media.Player.exe") 32 | or (ProcessCommandLine contains "appdata" and ProcessCommandLine contains ".mp4") 33 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Sentinel/DeviceLogonEvents/BurteForceSingleIPmultipledestinationswithin10minutes.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule Documentation: Brute Force Logon Attempt from Single Source IP Across Multiple Devices 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies a potential **brute force attack** originating from a single external IP address (`RemoteIP`) that has failed to log in across **multiple Windows devices** within a short period of time. This behavior is indicative of credential stuffing or brute force login attempts, where an attacker systematically tries different combinations of usernames and passwords to gain access. 5 | 6 | The detection is triggered when **10 or more failed logon attempts** occur from the **same Remote IP address** across **10 or more distinct devices** within a **10-minute window**. This type of activity could represent early-stage reconnaissance or lateral movement attempts after an initial foothold. 7 | 8 | This logic is based on the behavior described in Elastic’s prebuilt rule: 9 | - [Elastic Rule: Multiple Logon Failures from the Same Source IP](https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/security/prebuilt-rules/rules/windows/credential_access_bruteforce_multiple_logon_failure_same_srcip) 10 | 11 | ## Detection Logic 12 | - **Source Table:** `DeviceLogonEvents` 13 | - **Filters Applied:** 14 | - `ActionType` is `"LogonFailed"` 15 | - `RemoteIP` is **not empty** and **not equal to localhost (`127.0.0.1`)** 16 | - **Aggregation Window:** 10 minutes 17 | - **Conditions:** 18 | - `FailedLogonCount >= 10` 19 | - `DistinctTargetDevices >= 10` 20 | 21 | ## Tags 22 | - Brute Force 23 | - Credential Access 24 | - Initial Access 25 | - Logon Failures 26 | - Suspicious Authentication Behavior 27 | - T1110 28 | 29 | ## Search Query 30 | ```kql 31 | DeviceLogonEvents 32 | | where ActionType == "LogonFailed" and isnotempty(RemoteIP) 33 | | where RemoteIP != @"127.0.0.1" 34 | | summarize 35 | FailedLogonCount = count(), 36 | DistinctTargetDevices = dcount(DeviceName), 37 | TargetDevices = make_set(DeviceName, 10), 38 | FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), 39 | LastSeen = max(Timestamp) 40 | by RemoteIP, bin(Timestamp, 10m) 41 | | where FailedLogonCount >= 10 and DistinctTargetDevices >= 10 42 | | project 43 | FirstSeen, 44 | LastSeen, 45 | RemoteIP, 46 | FailedLogonCount, 47 | DistinctTargetDevices, 48 | TargetDevices 49 | | order by FailedLogonCount desc 50 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Execution/UnsginedExecutionsfromuserdirectories.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Detection of Unsigned Executable Launches from User Directories 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies instances where unsigned or suspiciously signed executable files (`.exe`) are launched from common user directories—such as `\Users\`, `\Downloads\`, `\AppData\`, and `\Temp\`—by typical user-facing applications like **Explorer**, **Google Chrome**, or **Microsoft Edge**. Such behavior is often indicative of malicious activity, where attackers trick users into downloading and executing harmful payloads through familiar applications. 5 | 6 | The relevance of this detection is underscored by incidents like the **Fake Zoom Installer** campaign, where users were deceived into downloading a malicious Zoom installer. This installer executed additional payloads, leading to severe compromises, including ransomware deployment. Monitoring for unsigned executables originating from user directories can help in early detection of such deceptive tactics. 7 | 8 | - [Fake Zoom Ends in BlackSuit Ransomware](https://thedfirreport.com/2025/03/31/fake-zoom-ends-in-blacksuit-ransomware/) 9 | 10 | ## Detection Logic 11 | - **Monitored Directories:** 12 | - `\Users\` 13 | - `\Downloads\` 14 | - `\AppData\` 15 | - `\Temp\` 16 | 17 | - **Signature Status:** 18 | - `Unknown` 19 | - `Unsigned` 20 | - `Invalid` 21 | 22 | - **File Type:** 23 | - Files ending with `.exe` 24 | 25 | - **Exclusions:** 26 | - Processes associated with known legitimate software, such as: 27 | - **Telegram** (`Telegram FZ-LLC`) 28 | - **Zoom** 29 | 30 | - **Initiating Processes:** 31 | - `explorer.exe` 32 | - `chrome.exe` 33 | - `msedge.exe` 34 | 35 | ## Tags 36 | - Unsigned Executables 37 | - User Directory Execution 38 | - Initial Access 39 | - Malware Delivery 40 | - Windows Security 41 | - Fake Installer Detection 42 | 43 | ## Search Query 44 | ```kql 45 | DeviceProcessEvents 46 | | where FolderPath has_any ("\\Users\\", "\\Downloads\\", "\\AppData\\", "\\Temp\\") 47 | | where InitiatingProcessSignatureStatus in ("Unknown", "Unsigned", "Invalid") 48 | | where FileName endswith ".exe" 49 | | where ProcessVersionInfoCompanyName != "Telegram FZ-LLC" 50 | | where ProcessVersionInfoProductName != "Zoom" 51 | | where InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription != "Google Chrome" 52 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("explorer.exe", "chrome.exe", "msedge.exe") 53 | ``` 54 | ## Notes 55 | Exclude and fine tune in your enviroment 56 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /C2/GoogleSheetsC2Query.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule Documentation: Suspicious Non-Browser Access to Google APIs by Rare Processes on Windows 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies suspicious network connections to key Google API endpoints—such as `drive.googleapis.com`, `oauth2.googleapis.com`, `sheets.googleapis.com`, and `www.googleapis.com`—that are initiated by processes other than standard web browsers or legitimate Google Drive File Stream (`googledrivefs.exe`). Attackers may use custom or rarely seen processes to interact with these endpoints for data exfiltration, command and control, or other malicious activities. 5 | 6 | To enhance detection accuracy, the rule invokes file profiling on the initiating process using its SHA1 hash and flags events where the process has a low global prevalence (less than 100). The rule also ensures that the detected activity originates from Windows devices by joining with the `DeviceInfo` table. 7 | 8 | ## Detection Logic 9 | - **Google API Endpoints:** 10 | Monitor network events where the `RemoteUrl` contains any of the following: 11 | - `drive.googleapis.com` 12 | - `oauth2.googleapis.com` 13 | - `sheets.googleapis.com` 14 | - `www.googleapis.com` 15 | 16 | - **Non-Browser Filter:** 17 | Exclude events where the initiating process is one of the common web browsers or the legitimate Google Drive File Stream: 18 | - `"chrome.exe"`, `"firefox.exe"`, `"msedge.exe"`, `"edge.exe"`, `"googledrivefs.exe"` 19 | 20 | - **Rare Process Check:** 21 | Use file profiling (based on `InitiatingProcessSHA1`) to flag processes with a global prevalence of less than 100. 22 | 23 | - **Windows Platform Verification:** 24 | Join with the `DeviceInfo` table to ensure the event originates from a Windows client (where `OSPlatform` contains "windows"). 25 | 26 | ## Tags 27 | - Network Connection 28 | - Google API 29 | - Non-Browser Access 30 | - Rare Process 31 | - Data Exfiltration 32 | - Windows Security 33 | - Suspicious Activity 34 | 35 | ## Search Query 36 | ```kql 37 | DeviceNetworkEvents 38 | | where RemoteUrl has_any( @"drive.googleapis.com", @"oauth2.googleapis.com", "sheets.googleapis.com", "www.googleapis.com") 39 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName !in ("chrome.exe", "firefox.exe", "msedge.exe", "edge.exe", "googledrivefs.exe") 40 | | invoke FileProfile(InitiatingProcessSHA1) 41 | | where GlobalPrevalence < 100 42 | | join kind=inner ( 43 | DeviceInfo 44 | | project DeviceId, OSPlatform 45 | ) on DeviceId 46 | | where OSPlatform contains "windows" 47 | ``` 48 | ## Notes 49 | This might be generating false positive and the query needs fine tunning from you 50 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Initial Acccess/BumbleeBeeInitiailaccess.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule: Unexpected MSI Installation from User Directory Spawning consent.exe 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This rule detects suspicious **MSI installer executions** launched from **user-writable directories** such as `Downloads`, `Desktop`, `AppData`, or `ProgramData`, that subsequently spawn the **`consent.exe`** process. 5 | 6 | This behavior is commonly associated with **malicious MSI-based loaders** (e.g., *Bumblebee*) that abuse Windows’ User Account Control (UAC) mechanisms and DLL side-loading for stealth execution and persistence. 7 | 8 | In *The DFIR Report* case study *“From Bing Search to Ransomware: Bumblebee and AdaptixC2 Deliver Akira”* (August 2025), a trojanized installer (`ManageEngine-OpManager.msi`) executed legitimate software while side-loading a malicious `msimg32.dll` via `consent.exe`. This detection aims to identify similar initial access and execution behaviors. 9 | 10 | - **Source:** [The DFIR Report — From Bing Search to Ransomware: Bumblebee and AdaptixC2 Deliver Akira](https://thedfirreport.com/2025/08/05/from-bing-search-to-ransomware-bumblebee-and-adaptixc2-deliver-akira/) 11 | 12 | ## Detection Logic 13 | - Monitor process creation events where `msiexec.exe` is executed from **non-standard user paths**, such as: 14 | - `C:\Users\*\Downloads\*` 15 | - `C:\Users\*\Desktop\*` 16 | - `C:\ProgramData\*` 17 | - `C:\Users\*\AppData\*` 18 | and spawns **`consent.exe`**, which is uncommon for legitimate installers. 19 | - Flag unsigned or unknown MSI installers that perform secondary executions or DLL loads (`msimg32.dll` or similar). 20 | 21 | ## Tags 22 | - Initial Access 23 | - Execution 24 | - Defense Evasion 25 | - MSI Abuse 26 | - DLL Side-Loading 27 | - Bumblebee Loader 28 | - MITRE ATT&CK: 29 | - **T1204.002** – User Execution: Malicious File 30 | - **T1574.002** – Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading 31 | 32 | ## Search Query 33 | ```kql 34 | // Detect MSI installers launched from user-writable paths spawning consent.exe 35 | DeviceProcessEvents 36 | | where FileName =~ "msiexec.exe" 37 | | where InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any ( 38 | "\\Users\\", "\\ProgramData\\", "\\Desktop\\", "\\Downloads\\", "\\AppData\\" 39 | ) 40 | | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (".msi", "/i", "/qn") 41 | | join kind=inner ( 42 | DeviceProcessEvents 43 | | where FileName =~ "consent.exe" 44 | ) on DeviceId, InitiatingProcessId 45 | | project Timestamp, DeviceName, 46 | InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, 47 | FileName, FolderPath, ReportId 48 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Sentinel/MFA/MFASuspicious.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : User Reported MFA Suspicious Activity 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies and correlates suspicious user management activities within Azure Active Directory (AAD) audit logs with sign-in logs to provide a comprehensive overview of potential unauthorized access. This rule is particularly focused on operations that deviate from normal user management activities, such as those that are not associated with updating user profiles, and that contain terms indicative of reported activities. 5 | 6 | Azure AD provides functionality for reporting suspicious activity, helping administrators to investigate and mitigate potential security threats. This rule leverages similar principles by flagging and investigating user management operations that could indicate malicious intent, such as attempts to change user information after unauthorized access. 7 | 8 | By cross-referencing these user management events with corresponding sign-in logs, this rule helps to identify potentially compromised accounts and provides the necessary details, such as the IP address and the time of the related sign-in event, to facilitate a thorough investigation. 9 | 10 | - [Microsoft Tech Community on Reporting Suspicious Activity](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-entra/report-suspicious-activity-preview/m-p/3751886) 11 | 12 | ## Detection Logic 13 | - Monitors `AuditLogs` for suspicious user management activities where: 14 | - The `Category` is `"UserManagement"`, 15 | - The `ActivityDisplayName` is not `"Update user"`, 16 | - The `OperationName` contains `"reported"`. 17 | - Correlates these activities with `SigninLogs` based on the username to include information such as IP addresses and timestamps of the associated sign-ins. 18 | 19 | ## Tags 20 | - User Management 21 | - Account Compromise 22 | - Azure Active Directory 23 | - Suspicious Activity 24 | - Audit Logs 25 | - Sign-In Logs 26 | - Security Investigation 27 | 28 | ## Search Query 29 | ```kql 30 | AuditLogs 31 | | where Category == "UserManagement" 32 | | where ActivityDisplayName <> "Update user" 33 | | where OperationName contains "reported" 34 | | extend username = tostring(parse_json(tostring(InitiatedBy.user)).userPrincipalName) 35 | | join kind=inner ( 36 | // Get sign-in logs that match the username 37 | SigninLogs 38 | | extend username = UserPrincipalName 39 | | project username, IPAddress, TimeGenerated 40 | ) on username 41 | | distinct TimeGenerated, username, ActivityDisplayName, OperationName, IPAddress 42 | ``` 43 | Note: 44 | This might not report activities where IP addresses weren't in signinlogs. first part of the query can be used as a detection rule by itself 45 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Collection/DataStagingFileZillaPsFTPWinscp.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule : Data Staging in `C:\ProgramData` followed by Outbound File Transfer Activity "filezilla,psftp,winscp" 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies potential **data staging followed by exfiltration** from compromised systems. It correlates file-write events under `C:\ProgramData\` (where adversaries often stage reconnaissance results or sensitive data) with **subsequent outbound network connections** to public IP addresses using FTP/SFTP clients such as **FileZilla**, **WinSCP**, or **psftp**. 5 | 6 | Attackers commonly: 7 | 1. Run discovery commands (`net view`, `Get-SmbShare`, `Get-ADComputer`, etc.) 8 | 2. Store results in `C:\ProgramData\shares.txt` or similar `.txt` files. 9 | 3. Shortly afterward, use an SFTP/FTP client to transfer these staged files externally. 10 | 11 | This rule detects that pattern within a **5-hour correlation window** between the file staging and outbound data transfer. 12 | 13 | ## Detection Logic 14 | - **Monitors:** 15 | - File writes to `C:\ProgramData\shares.txt` and other `.txt` files (excluding legitimate Defender ATP download directory). 16 | - Outbound network events from known SFTP/FTP clients (`filezilla.exe`, `psftp.exe`, `sftp.exe`, `winscp.exe`, `pscp.exe`, `lftp.exe`). 17 | - **Correlates:** file-write and outbound events occurring on the same device (`DeviceId`) within a **5-hour window**. 18 | - **Summarizes:** 19 | - Earliest file write (`first_write`) 20 | - Latest network event (`last_network_activity`) 21 | - Count of total connections (`connections`) 22 | - Distinct external destinations (`distinct_remote_ips`) 23 | - **Flags:** hosts where outbound connections to public IPs followed file staging activity. 24 | 25 | ## Tags 26 | - Exfiltration 27 | - Collection 28 | - Data Staging 29 | - File Transfer 30 | - MITRE ATT&CK: 31 | - **T1005** – Data from Local System 32 | - **T1041** – Exfiltration Over C2 Channel 33 | - **T1537** – Transfer Data to Cloud Account 34 | 35 | ## Search Query 36 | ```kql 37 | // Correlate staging with outbound connections (SFTP/FTP/FileZilla) in next 5 hours 38 | let fileWrites = DeviceFileEvents 39 | | where FolderPath has_cs "\\ProgramData\\" 40 | and FolderPath !startswith @"C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\Downloads\" 41 | | where FileName == "shares.txt" or FileName endswith ".txt" 42 | | project DeviceId, DeviceName, FileName, FilePath=FolderPath, FileWriteTime=Timestamp, ReportId; 43 | let outbounds = DeviceNetworkEvents 44 | | where RemoteIPType == "Public" 45 | | where InitiatingProcessFileName in ("filezilla.exe","psftp.exe","sftp.exe","winscp.exe","pscp.exe","lftp.exe") 46 | | project DeviceId, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, RemotePort, NetTimestamp=Timestamp, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine; 47 | fileWrites 48 | | join kind=inner (outbounds) on DeviceId 49 | | where NetTimestamp between (FileWriteTime .. FileWriteTime + 5h) 50 | | summarize first_write=min(FileWriteTime), last_network_activity=max(NetTimestamp), connections=count(), distinct_remote_ips=dcount(RemoteIP) 51 | by DeviceId, DeviceName, FileName, FilePath 52 | | where connections > 0 53 | | project first_write, last_network_activity, DeviceName, FileName, connections, distinct_remote_ips 54 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Execution/PodContainerexec.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Rule: Suspicious Pod or Container Creation with Shell Execution 2 | 3 | ## Description 4 | This detection rule identifies suspicious creation of **containers or Kubernetes pods** that immediately execute an interactive shell (`bash`, `sh`, `zsh`, etc.) with command-line patterns commonly associated with **persistence**, **privilege escalation**, or **remote command execution**. 5 | 6 | Adversaries frequently abuse legitimate container administration tools such as `kubectl`, `docker`, or `nerdctl` to deploy short-lived pods or containers that run a malicious one-liner shell command. These commands are often used to: 7 | - establish persistence via `cron`, `at`, or startup scripts 8 | - modify sensitive system files such as `sudoers`, `shadow`, or SSH keys 9 | - stage payloads using `base64` or `xxd` 10 | - create reverse shells using `/dev/tcp`, `nc`, `socat`, or `telnet` 11 | - write artifacts into temporary or uncommon filesystem locations 12 | 13 | Monitoring container creation followed by suspicious shell execution provides early visibility into post-exploitation activity in containerized and Kubernetes environments. 14 | 15 | - **Elastic Detection Rule (same logic):** 16 | https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/linux/execution_suspicious_pod_or_container_creation_command_execution.toml 17 | 18 | ## Detection Logic 19 | - Monitors Linux process execution telemetry for container or pod creation commands. 20 | - Detects use of container administration tools (`kubectl`, `docker`, `nerdctl`, `ctl`) invoking `run`. 21 | - Flags cases where a shell is executed with suspicious command-line indicators related to persistence, credential access, or network-based command execution. 22 | 23 | ## Tags 24 | - Linux Security 25 | - Containers 26 | - Kubernetes 27 | - Execution 28 | - Persistence 29 | - Privilege Escalation 30 | - Suspicious Command Line 31 | - Living-off-the-Land 32 | 33 | ## Search Query 34 | ```kql 35 | let Shells = dynamic(["bash","dash","sh","tcsh","csh","zsh","ksh","fish"]); 36 | let Launchers = dynamic(["kubectl","docker","nerdctl","ctl"]); 37 | let Suspicious = dynamic([ 38 | "atd","cron", 39 | "/etc/rc.local", 40 | "/dev/tcp/", 41 | "/etc/init.d", 42 | "/etc/update-motd.d", 43 | "/etc/ld.so", 44 | "/etc/sudoers", 45 | "base64 ", 46 | "/etc/profile", 47 | "/etc/ssh", 48 | "/.ssh/", 49 | "/root/.ssh", 50 | "~/.ssh/", 51 | "autostart", 52 | "xxd ", 53 | "/etc/shadow", 54 | "./.", 55 | "import pty","pty.spawn", 56 | "import subprocess","subprocess.call", 57 | "TCPSocket.new","TCPSocket.open", 58 | "io.popen","os.execute","fsockopen", 59 | "disown", 60 | " ncat "," nc "," netcat "," nc.traditional ", 61 | "socat","telnet", 62 | "/tmp/","/dev/shm/","/var/tmp/", 63 | "/boot/","/sys/","/lost+found/","/media/","/proc/", 64 | "/var/backups/","/var/log/","/var/mail","/var/spool" 65 | ]); 66 | 67 | DeviceProcessEvents 68 | | where FileName in~ (Launchers) 69 | | where ProcessCommandLine has "run" 70 | | where ProcessCommandLine has_any (Shells) 71 | | where ProcessCommandLine has_any (Suspicious) 72 | | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, 73 | ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, 74 | InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FolderPath, 75 | ProcessId, InitiatingProcessId, ReportId 76 | | order by Timestamp desc 77 | ``` 78 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Malja3fingerpints: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | #Ja3Hashhttps://sslbl.abuse.ch/ja3-fingerprints/ 2 | fc54e0d16d9764783542f0146a98b300 3 | 8515076cbbca9dce33151b798f782456 4 | 8916410db85077a5460817142dcbc8de 5 | fc2299d5b2964cd242c5a2c8c531a5f0 6 | c2b4710c6888a5d47befe865c8e6fb19 7 | 25d74b7b4b779eb1efd4b31d26d651c6 8 | a50a861119aceb0ccc74902e8fddb618 9 | ffefafdb86336d057eda5fdf02b3d5ce 10 | 70722097d1fe1d78d8c2164640ab6df4 11 | bffa4501966196d3d6e90cee1f88fc89 12 | 534ce2dbc413c68e908363b5df0ae5e0 13 | da949afd9bd6df820730f8f171584a71 14 | c0220cd64849a629397a9cb68f78a0ea 15 | 08a8a4e85b25ac42e1490bc85cfdb5ce 16 | 8f52d1ce303fb4a6515836aec3cc16b1 17 | 32926ca3e59f0413d0b98725454594f5 18 | dff8a0aa1c904aaea76c5bf624e88333 19 | d81d654effb94714a4086734fa0adad9 20 | 52c7396a501e4fecbdfa99c5408334ac 21 | c5deb9465d47232dd48772f9c4d14679 22 | 1aee0238942d453d679fc1e37a303387 23 | 807fca46d9d0cf63adf4e5e80e414bbe 24 | 70a04365be5bbd4653698bebeb43ce68 25 | 49ed2ef3f1321e5f044f1e71b0e6fdd5 26 | e7643725fcff971e3051fe0e47fc2c71 27 | 1fe4c7a3544eb27afec2adfb3a3dbf60 28 | f735bbc6b69723b9df7b0e7ef27872af 29 | 40adfd923eb82b89d8836ba37a19bca1 30 | 1aa7bf8b97e540ca5edd75f7b8384bfa 31 | 3cda52da4ade09f1f781ad2e82dcfa20 32 | 7dd50e112cd23734a310b90f6f44a7cd 33 | 1be3ecebe5aa9d3654e6e703d81f6928 34 | c5235d3a8b9934b7fbbd204d50bc058d 35 | e62a5f4d538cbf169c2af71bec2399b4 36 | d2935c58fe676744fecc8614ee5356c7 37 | decfb48a53789ebe081b88aabb58ee34 38 | 51c64c77e60f3980eea90869b68c58a8 39 | cb98a24ee4b9134448ffb5714fd870ac 40 | 34f14a69ad7009ca5863379218af17f3 41 | d76ee64fb7273733cbe455ac81c292e6 42 | 8f6c918dcb585ebbea05e2cc94530e3d 43 | 1d095e68489d3c535297cd8dffb06cb9 44 | f22bdd57e3a52de86cda40da2d84e83b 45 | fb58831f892190644fe44e25bc830b45 46 | 0cc1e84568e471aa1d62ad4158ade6b5 47 | 2092e1fffb45d7e4a19a57f9bc5e203a 48 | d18a4da84af59e1108862a39bae7c9d4 49 | a61299f9b501adcf680b9275d79d4ac6 50 | b386946a5a44d1ddcc843bc75336dfce 51 | 8991a387e4cc841740f25d6f5139f92d 52 | 3d89c0dfb1fa44911b8fa7523ef8dedb 53 | e330bca99c8a5256ae126a55c4c725c5 54 | 83e04bc58d402f9633983cbf22724b02 55 | b8f81673c0e1d29908346f3bab892b9b 56 | d551fafc4f40f1dec2bb45980bfa9492 57 | 29085f03f8e8a03f0b399c5c7cf0b0b8 58 | 51a7ad14509fd614c7bb3a50c4982b8c 59 | bc6c386f480ee97b9d9e52d472b772d8 60 | b13d01846ad7a14a70bf030a16775c78 61 | 698e36219f3979420fa2581b21dac7ec 62 | 1712287800ac91b34cadd5884ce85568 63 | 550dce18de1bb143e69d6dd9413b8355 64 | d7150af4514b868defb854db0f62a441 65 | df5c30e670dba99f9270ed36060cf054 66 | 35c0a31c481927f022a3b530255ac080 67 | 7dcce5b76c8b17472d024758970a406b 68 | 911479ac8a0813ed1241b3686ccdade9 69 | 03e186a7f83285e93341de478334006e 70 | 17fd49722f8d11f3d76dce84f8e099a7 71 | fb00055a1196aeea8d1bc609885ba953 72 | 098f55e27d8c4b0a590102cbdb3a5f3a 73 | e3b2ab1f9a56f2fb4c9248f2f41631fa 74 | 46efd49abcca8ea9baa932da68fdb529 75 | 4d7a28d6f2263ed61de88ca66eb011e3 76 | b2b61db7b9490a60d270ccb20b462826 77 | 92579701f145605e9edc0b01a901c6d5 78 | 7691297bcb20a41233fd0a0baa0a3628 79 | 16efcf0e00504ddfedde13bfea997952 80 | 1543a7c46633acf71e8401baccbd0568 81 | d6f04b5a910115f4b50ecec09d40a1df 82 | 93d056782d649deb51cda44ecb714bb0 83 | 5e573c9c9f8ba720ef9b18e9fce2e2f7 84 | 590a232d04d56409fab72e752a8a2634 85 | 849b04bdbd1d2b983f6e8a457e0632a8 86 | 9c2589e1c0e9f533a022c6205f9719e1 87 | 96eba628dcb2b47607192ba74a3b55ba 88 | 7c410ce832e848a3321432c9a82e972b 89 | c50f6a8b9173676b47ba6085bd0c6cee 90 | 906004246f3ba5e755b043c057254a29 91 | f6fd83a21f9f3c5f9ff7b5c63bbc179d 92 | 57f3642b4e37e28f5cbe3020c9331b4c 93 | 9f62c4f26b90d3d757bea609e82f2eaf 94 | b90bdbe961a648f0427db21aaa6ccb59 95 | c201b92f8b483fa388be174d6689f534 96 | fd80fa9c6120cdeea8520510f3c644ac 97 | 2d8794cb7b52b777bee2695e79c15760 98 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /ASRDetections/Readme.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # What does ASR rules offer 2 | ASR rules offer a broad range of built-in rules to secure your endpoint, covering areas like Office applications (think macros, DDE’s, etc.) subversion or leverage, but also things like Webmail, script, WMI, LSASS, and much more. 3 | ## To implement ASR rules following is Required: 4 | - Computers running Windows 10, versions 1709 and later, Windows Server version 1803 (Semi-Annual Channel or later) and Windows Server 2019 5 | - Windows 10 Pro/Enterprise/Education 6 | - Microsoft Defender antivirus must be active (cannot be in passive mode!) 7 | - Some rules require cloud-delivered protection to be enabled 8 | References https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-defender-for-endpoint/demystifying-attack-surface-reduction-rules-part-1/ba-p/1306420 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | # ASR rule name to ASR guid 13 | | GUID | ASR rule name | 14 | |--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 15 | | 56A863A9-875E-4185-98A7-B882C64B5CE5 | Block abuse of exploited vulnerable signed drivers | 16 | | 7674BA52-37EB-4A4F-A9A1-F0F9A1619A2C | Block Adobe Reader from creating child processes | 17 | | D4F940AB-401B-4EFC-AADC-AD5F3C50688A | Block all Office applications from creating child processes | 18 | | 9E6C4E1F-7D60-472F-BA1A-A39EF669E4B2 | Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem (lsass.exe) | 19 | | BE9BA2D9-53EA-4CDC-84E5-9B1EEEE46550 | Block executable content from email client and webmail | 20 | | 01443614-CD74-433A-B99E-2ECDC07BFC25 | Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence - age - or trusted list criterion | 21 | | 5BEB7EFE-FD9A-4556-801D-275E5FFC04CC | Block execution of potentially obfuscated scripts | 22 | | D3E037E1-3EB8-44C8-A917-57927947596D | Block JavaScript or VBScript from launching downloaded executable content | 23 | | 3B576869-A4EC-4529-8536-B80A7769E899 | Block Office applications from creating executable content | 24 | | 75668C1F-73B5-4CF0-BB93-3ECF5CB7CC84 | Block Office applications from injecting code into other processes | 25 | | 26190899-1602-49E8-8B27-EB1D0A1CE869 | Block Office communication application from creating child processes | 26 | | E6DB77E5-3DF2-4CF1-B95A-636979351E5B | Block persistence through WMI event subscription | 27 | | D1E49AAC-8F56-4280-B9BA-993A6D77406C | Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands | 28 | | B2B3F03D-6A65-4F7B-A9C7-1C7EF74A9BA4 | Block untrusted and unsigned processes that run from USB | 29 | | 92E97FA1-2EDF-4476-BDD6-9DD0B4DDDC7B | Block Win32 API calls from Office macros | 30 | | C1DB55AB-C21A-4637-BB3F-A12568109D35 | Use advanced protection against ransomware | 31 | | A8F5898E-1DC8-49A9-9878-85004B8A61E6 | Block Webshell creation for Servers | 32 | 33 | # Implement ASR Rules 34 | Consult online documentation on deploying ASR Rules in audit mode to your network through Group policy or SCCM/Intune. a lot of work is required to move some of the rules to block mode 35 | to add exclusion this blog post here helps 36 | https://blog.nathanmcnulty.com/defender-for-endpoint-implementing-asr-rules/ 37 | - To be added exclusion list 38 | # Get the list of the availalbe ASR rule actiontypes 39 | ``` 40 | DeviceEvents 41 | | where ActionType startswith 'Asr' 42 | ``` 43 | 44 | # References 45 | - https://asrgen.streamlit.app/ASR_Atomic_Testing 46 | 47 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /README.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | 2 | 3 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 21 | [![Contributors][contributors-shield]][contributors-url] 22 | [![Forks][forks-shield]][forks-url] 23 | [![Stargazers][stars-shield]][stars-url] 24 | [![Issues][issues-shield]][issues-url] 25 | [![MIT License][license-shield]][license-url] 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 |
31 |

Microsoft Defender ATP Hunting Queries

32 | Report Bug 33 | · 34 | Request Feature 35 |

36 |
37 | 38 | 39 | 40 | 41 | ## About The Project 42 | 43 | This repository comprises Microsoft Defender Hunting queries. These queries have been developed using telemetry data provided by Defender ATP.This queries were used as Detection rules in production enviroment, They are a result of my own work and inspiration drawn from the contributions of the exceptional community members acknowledged below. Please don't hesitate to propose any additional queries for inclusion in this repository. 44 | ## Roadmap 45 | 46 | - [ ✅ ] Add detections based on ASR rules 47 | - [ ] Add detections based on windows API's logged 48 | 49 | See the [open issues](https://github.com/0xAnalyst/DefenderATPQueries/issues) for a full list of proposed features (and known issues). 50 | 51 | 52 | 53 | 54 | 55 | ## Contributing 56 | 57 | Contributions are what make the open source community such an amazing place to learn, inspire, and create. Any contributions you make are **greatly appreciated**. 58 | 59 | If you have a suggestion that would make this better, please fork the repo and create a pull request. You can also simply open an issue with the tag "enhancement". 60 | 61 | 62 | ## License 63 | 64 | Distributed under the MIT License. See `LICENSE.txt` for more information. 65 | 66 | 67 | ## Acknowledgments 68 | 69 | * []() https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma 70 | * []() https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/FalconFriday 71 | * []()https://detection.fyi/ 72 | * []()https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/tree/main/rules 73 | 74 | 75 | 76 | 77 | 78 | [contributors-shield]: https://img.shields.io/github/contributors/0xAnalyst/DefenderATPQueries.svg?style=for-the-badge 79 | [contributors-url]: https://github.com/0xAnalyst/DefenderATPQueries/graphs/contributors 80 | [forks-shield]: https://img.shields.io/github/forks/0xAnalyst/DefenderATPQueries.svg?style=for-the-badge 81 | [forks-url]: https://github.com/0xAnalyst/DefenderATPQueries/forks 82 | [stars-shield]: https://img.shields.io/github/stars/0xAnalyst/DefenderATPQueries.svg?style=for-the-badge 83 | [stars-url]: https://github.com/0xAnalyst/DefenderATPQueries/stargazers 84 | [issues-shield]: https://img.shields.io/github/issues/0xAnalyst/DefenderATPQueries.svg?style=for-the-badge 85 | [issues-url]: https://github.com/0xAnalyst/DefenderATPQueries/issues 86 | [license-shield]: https://img.shields.io/github/license/0xAnalyst/DefenderATPQueries.svg?style=for-the-badge 87 | [license-url]: https://github.com/0xAnalyst/DefenderATPQueries/blob/master/LICENSE 88 | [product-screenshot]: images/screenshot.png 89 | [Next.js]: https://img.shields.io/badge/next.js-000000?style=for-the-badge&logo=nextdotjs&logoColor=white 90 | [Next-url]: https://nextjs.org/ 91 | [React.js]: https://img.shields.io/badge/React-20232A?style=for-the-badge&logo=react&logoColor=61DAFB 92 | [React-url]: https://reactjs.org/ 93 | [Vue.js]: https://img.shields.io/badge/Vue.js-35495E?style=for-the-badge&logo=vuedotjs&logoColor=4FC08D 94 | [Vue-url]: https://vuejs.org/ 95 | [Angular.io]: https://img.shields.io/badge/Angular-DD0031?style=for-the-badge&logo=angular&logoColor=white 96 | [Angular-url]: https://angular.io/ 97 | [Svelte.dev]: https://img.shields.io/badge/Svelte-4A4A55?style=for-the-badge&logo=svelte&logoColor=FF3E00 98 | [Svelte-url]: https://svelte.dev/ 99 | [Laravel.com]: https://img.shields.io/badge/Laravel-FF2D20?style=for-the-badge&logo=laravel&logoColor=white 100 | [Laravel-url]: https://laravel.com 101 | [Bootstrap.com]: https://img.shields.io/badge/Bootstrap-563D7C?style=for-the-badge&logo=bootstrap&logoColor=white 102 | [Bootstrap-url]: https://getbootstrap.com 103 | [JQuery.com]: https://img.shields.io/badge/jQuery-0769AD?style=for-the-badge&logo=jquery&logoColor=white 104 | [JQuery-url]: https://jquery.com 105 | 106 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /LICENSE: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE 2 | Version 3, 29 June 2007 3 | 4 | Copyright (C) 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc. 5 | Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies 6 | of this license document, but changing it is not allowed. 7 | 8 | Preamble 9 | 10 | The GNU General Public License is a free, copyleft license for 11 | software and other kinds of works. 12 | 13 | The licenses for most software and other practical works are designed 14 | to take away your freedom to share and change the works. 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You may not convey a covered 525 | work if you are a party to an arrangement with a third party that is 526 | in the business of distributing software, under which you make payment 527 | to the third party based on the extent of your activity of conveying 528 | the work, and under which the third party grants, to any of the 529 | parties who would receive the covered work from you, a discriminatory 530 | patent license (a) in connection with copies of the covered work 531 | conveyed by you (or copies made from those copies), or (b) primarily 532 | for and in connection with specific products or compilations that 533 | contain the covered work, unless you entered into that arrangement, 534 | or that patent license was granted, prior to 28 March 2007. 535 | 536 | Nothing in this License shall be construed as excluding or limiting 537 | any implied license or other defenses to infringement that may 538 | otherwise be available to you under applicable patent law. 539 | 540 | 12. No Surrender of Others' Freedom. 541 | 542 | If conditions are imposed on you (whether by court order, agreement or 543 | otherwise) that contradict the conditions of this License, they do not 544 | excuse you from the conditions of this License. If you cannot convey a 545 | covered work so as to satisfy simultaneously your obligations under this 546 | License and any other pertinent obligations, then as a consequence you may 547 | not convey it at all. For example, if you agree to terms that obligate you 548 | to collect a royalty for further conveying from those to whom you convey 549 | the Program, the only way you could satisfy both those terms and this 550 | License would be to refrain entirely from conveying the Program. 551 | 552 | 13. Use with the GNU Affero General Public License. 553 | 554 | Notwithstanding any other provision of this License, you have 555 | permission to link or combine any covered work with a work licensed 556 | under version 3 of the GNU Affero General Public License into a single 557 | combined work, and to convey the resulting work. The terms of this 558 | License will continue to apply to the part which is the covered work, 559 | but the special requirements of the GNU Affero General Public License, 560 | section 13, concerning interaction through a network will apply to the 561 | combination as such. 562 | 563 | 14. Revised Versions of this License. 564 | 565 | The Free Software Foundation may publish revised and/or new versions of 566 | the GNU General Public License from time to time. Such new versions will 567 | be similar in spirit to the present version, but may differ in detail to 568 | address new problems or concerns. 569 | 570 | Each version is given a distinguishing version number. If the 571 | Program specifies that a certain numbered version of the GNU General 572 | Public License "or any later version" applies to it, you have the 573 | option of following the terms and conditions either of that numbered 574 | version or of any later version published by the Free Software 575 | Foundation. If the Program does not specify a version number of the 576 | GNU General Public License, you may choose any version ever published 577 | by the Free Software Foundation. 578 | 579 | If the Program specifies that a proxy can decide which future 580 | versions of the GNU General Public License can be used, that proxy's 581 | public statement of acceptance of a version permanently authorizes you 582 | to choose that version for the Program. 583 | 584 | Later license versions may give you additional or different 585 | permissions. However, no additional obligations are imposed on any 586 | author or copyright holder as a result of your choosing to follow a 587 | later version. 588 | 589 | 15. Disclaimer of Warranty. 590 | 591 | THERE IS NO WARRANTY FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY 592 | APPLICABLE LAW. EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT 593 | HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY 594 | OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, 595 | THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 596 | PURPOSE. THE ENTIRE RISK AS TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM 597 | IS WITH YOU. SHOULD THE PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF 598 | ALL NECESSARY SERVICING, REPAIR OR CORRECTION. 599 | 600 | 16. Limitation of Liability. 601 | 602 | IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING 603 | WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MODIFIES AND/OR CONVEYS 604 | THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES, INCLUDING ANY 605 | GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THE 606 | USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO LOSS OF 607 | DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY YOU OR THIRD 608 | PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER PROGRAMS), 609 | EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 610 | SUCH DAMAGES. 611 | 612 | 17. Interpretation of Sections 15 and 16. 613 | 614 | If the disclaimer of warranty and limitation of liability provided 615 | above cannot be given local legal effect according to their terms, 616 | reviewing courts shall apply local law that most closely approximates 617 | an absolute waiver of all civil liability in connection with the 618 | Program, unless a warranty or assumption of liability accompanies a 619 | copy of the Program in return for a fee. 620 | 621 | END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS 622 | 623 | How to Apply These Terms to Your New Programs 624 | 625 | If you develop a new program, and you want it to be of the greatest 626 | possible use to the public, the best way to achieve this is to make it 627 | free software which everyone can redistribute and change under these terms. 628 | 629 | To do so, attach the following notices to the program. It is safest 630 | to attach them to the start of each source file to most effectively 631 | state the exclusion of warranty; and each file should have at least 632 | the "copyright" line and a pointer to where the full notice is found. 633 | 634 | 635 | Copyright (C) 636 | 637 | This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify 638 | it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by 639 | the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or 640 | (at your option) any later version. 641 | 642 | This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, 643 | but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of 644 | MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the 645 | GNU General Public License for more details. 646 | 647 | You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License 648 | along with this program. If not, see . 649 | 650 | Also add information on how to contact you by electronic and paper mail. 651 | 652 | If the program does terminal interaction, make it output a short 653 | notice like this when it starts in an interactive mode: 654 | 655 | Copyright (C) 656 | This program comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY; for details type `show w'. 657 | This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it 658 | under certain conditions; type `show c' for details. 659 | 660 | The hypothetical commands `show w' and `show c' should show the appropriate 661 | parts of the General Public License. Of course, your program's commands 662 | might be different; for a GUI interface, you would use an "about box". 663 | 664 | You should also get your employer (if you work as a programmer) or school, 665 | if any, to sign a "copyright disclaimer" for the program, if necessary. 666 | For more information on this, and how to apply and follow the GNU GPL, see 667 | . 668 | 669 | The GNU General Public License does not permit incorporating your program 670 | into proprietary programs. If your program is a subroutine library, you 671 | may consider it more useful to permit linking proprietary applications with 672 | the library. If this is what you want to do, use the GNU Lesser General 673 | Public License instead of this License. But first, please read 674 | . 675 | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------