├── LICENSE
├── README.md
├── acp
    └── categorizer
    │   └── current
    │       └── microsoft
    │           └── sysmon.csv
└── fcp
    └── winc
        └── microsoft_windows_sysmon_operational
            ├── dns_codes.map.csv
            ├── microsoft_windows_sysmon.map.csv
            ├── microsoft_windows_sysmon.sdkkeyvaluefilereader.properties
            └── sysmon.xml


/LICENSE:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1 | MIT License
 2 | 
 3 | Copyright (c) 2019 S3COPS https://github.com/S3COPS/
 4 | 
 5 | Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
 6 | of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
 7 | in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
 8 | to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
 9 | copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
10 | furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
11 | 
12 | The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
13 | copies or substantial portions of the Software.
14 | 
15 | THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
16 | IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
17 | FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
18 | AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
19 | LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
20 | OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
21 | SOFTWARE.
22 | 


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/README.md:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  1 | # ArcSight-Sysmon-FlexConnector
  2 | Microfocus ArcSight Windows Native FlexConnector for Microsoft Sysmon tool https://technet.microsoft.com/en-gb/sysinternals/sysmon
  3 | 
  4 | Sysmon WINC Parser
  5 | Updated for Sysinternals Sysmon v10.x - System activity monitor, Copyright (C) Mark Russinovich and Thomas Garnier
  6 | 
  7 | NOTE: when using DNS Query Logging functionality, you may want to ensure the ArcSight SmartConnector Java Image is whitelisted or does not carry out DNS lookups or you will see the original DNS Query as well as a followup query from the <ArcSight Connector>jre/bin/java.exe image on the SmartConnector Host.
  8 | 
  9 | Device / Product version: Sysmon v10.x, should be backward compatible to Sysmon v3.
 10 | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-gb/sysinternals/sysmon
 11 | 
 12 | SmartConnector Type: Windows Native Connector
 13 | Dependencies: Microfocus ArcSight SmartConnector Framework at least 7.4 (For automatic IPv6 Parsing)
 14 | 
 15 | # Installation Summary
 16 | Copy the fcp and acp folders and the contents to the CONNECTOR_HOME/current/user/agent/ folder on the Windows Native Connector
 17 | 
 18 | Add the following Event Log to the Windows Native Connector Custom Log section:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
 19 | 
 20 | or add directly to the agent.properties file:agents[0].windowshoststable[0].eventlogtypes=Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational 
 21 | 
 22 | Restart the Windows Native Connector
 23 | 
 24 | For more details on configuration of Sysmon refer to https://technet.microsoft.com/en-gb/sysinternals/sysmon
 25 | 
 26 | for an excellent sample sysmon config file refer to https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config
 27 | 
 28 | # Field Mappings Summary: Common Fields
 29 | 
 30 | | ArcSight Fields                    | Mapping                                                   |
 31 | |------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
 32 | | deviceVendor                       | Microsoft                                                 |
 33 | | deviceProduct                      | Sysmon                                                    |
 34 | | endTime                            | UtcTime                                                   |
 35 | | deviceCustomDate1                  | UtcTime                                                   |
 36 | | deviceCustomDate1Label             | Event TimeStamp (UTC)                                     |
 37 | | deviceTimeZone                     | UC                                                        |
 38 | | transportProtocol                  | Protocol                                                  |
 39 | | fileName                           | TargetFilename                                            |
 40 | | fileCreateTime                     | CreationUtcTime                                           |
 41 | | oldFileCreateTime                  | PreviousCreationUtcTime                                   |
 42 | | fileId                             | FileVersion                                               |
 43 | | fileHash                           | SHA256                                                    |
 44 | | additionaldata.Hash_SHA1           | SHA1                                                      |
 45 | | additionaldata.Hash_MD5            | MD5                                                       |
 46 | | additionaldata.Hash_SHA256         | SHA256                                                    |
 47 | | deviceProcessId                    | ProcessId                                                 |
 48 | | deviceProcessName                  | Image                                                     |
 49 | | deviceAction                       | __oneOf(State,EventType)                                  |
 50 | | deviceFacility                     | RuleName                                                  |
 51 | | sourceUserName                     | User                                                      |
 52 | | sourceUserId                       | LogonId                                                   |
 53 | | sourceAddress                      | SourceIp                                                  |
 54 | | sourcePort                         | SourcePort                                                |
 55 | | sourceHostName                     | SourceHostname                                            |
 56 | | sourceProcessId                    | __oneOfInteger(ParentProcessId,SourceProcessId,ProcessId) |
 57 | | sourceProcessName                  | __oneOf(ParentImage,SourceImage,Image)                    |
 58 | | destinationAddress                 | DestinationIp                                             |
 59 | | destinationPort                    | DestinationPort                                           |
 60 | | destinationHostName                | DestinationHostname                                       |
 61 | | destinationProcessName             | __oneOf(ImageLoaded,TargetImage,Image)                    |
 62 | | destinationProcessId               | TargetProcessId                                           |
 63 | | destinationServiceName             | Product                                                   |
 64 | | deviceCustomNumber2                | TerminalSessionId                                         |
 65 | | deviceCustomNumber2Label           | Terminal Session ID                                       |
 66 | | deviceCustomNumber3                | SequenceNumber                                            |
 67 | | deviceCustomNumber3Label           | Sequence Number                                           |
 68 | | deviceCustomString4                | Initiated                                                 |
 69 | | deviceCustomString4Label           | Initiated                                                 |
 70 | | deviceCustomString5                | IntegrityLevel                                            |
 71 | | deviceCustomString5Label           | IntegrityLevel                                            |
 72 | | deviceCustomString6                | ProcessGuid                                               |
 73 | | deviceCustomString6Label           | Process Guid                                              |
 74 | | flexString1                        | SourceProcessGUID                                         |
 75 | | flexString1Label                   | Source Process Guid                                       |
 76 | | flexString2                        | TargetProcessGUID                                         |
 77 | | flexString2Label                   | Target Process GUID                                       |
 78 | | oldFilePermission                  | Description                                               |
 79 | | oldFileType                        | Company                                                   |
 80 | | additionaldata.SourcePortName      | SourcePortName                                            |
 81 | | additionaldata.DestinationPortName | DestinationPortName                                       |
 82 | | additionaldata.DestinationIsIpv6   | DestinationIsIpv6                                         |
 83 | | additionaldata.SourceIsIpv6        | SourceIsIpv6                                              |
 84 | | additionaldata.FileVersion         | FileVersion                                               |
 85 | | additionaldata.Description         | Description                                               |
 86 | | additionaldata.Product             | Product                                                   |
 87 | | additionaldata.Company             | Company                                                   |
 88 | 
 89 | 
 90 | # Event Specific Fields:
 91 | 
 92 | | EventID | ArcSight Fields          | Mapping                                                                                                                                                                                       |
 93 | |---------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
 94 | | 1       | message                  | __concatenate("Process Created: ",Image," Product: ",Product," Company: ",Company," Description: ",Description," FileVersion: ",FileVersion)                                                  |
 95 | | 1       | deviceEventClassId       | SysmonTask-SYSMON_CREATE_PROCESS                                                                                                                                                              |
 96 | | 1       | deviceCustomString1Label | Command Line                                                                                                                                                                                  |
 97 | | 1       | deviceCustomString1      | CommandLine                                                                                                                                                                                   |
 98 | | 1       | deviceCustomString2Label | Parent Command Line                                                                                                                                                                           |
 99 | | 1       | deviceCustomString2      | ParentCommandLine                                                                                                                                                                             |
100 | | 1       | deviceCustomString3Label | Current Directory                                                                                                                                                                             |
101 | | 1       | deviceCustomString3      | CurrentDirectory                                                                                                                                                                              |
102 | | 1       | deviceCustomString4Label | Parent Process GUID                                                                                                                                                                           |
103 | | 1       | deviceCustomString4      | ParentProcessGuid                                                                                                                                                                             |
104 | | 1       | destinationServiceName   | Product                                                                                                                                                                                       |
105 | | 1       | oldFileName              | OriginalFileName                                                                                                                                                                              |
106 | |         |                          |                                                                                                                                                                                               |
107 | | 2       | message                  | __concatenate("File creation time changed. Filename: ",TargetFilename)                                                                                                                        |
108 | | 2       | deviceEventClassId       | SysmonTask-SYSMON_FILE_TIME                                                                                                                                                                   |
109 | |         |                          |                                                                                                                                                                                               |
110 | | 3       | message                  | __concatenate("A network connection was detected from ",SourceIp," to ",DestinationIp," destination port ",DestinationPort)                                                                   |
111 | | 3       | deviceEventClassId       | SysmonTask-SYSMON_NETWORK_CONNECT                                                                                                                                                             |
112 | |         |                          |                                                                                                                                                                                               |
113 | | 4       | message                  | __concatenate("Sysmon Service state changed: ",State)                                                                                                                                         |
114 | | 4       | deviceEventClassId       | SysmonTask-SYSMON_SERVICE_STATE_CHANGE                                                                                                                                                        |
115 | | 4       | deviceCustomString1Label | Sysmon Version                                                                                                                                                                                |
116 | | 4       | deviceCustomString1      | Version                                                                                                                                                                                       |
117 | | 4       | deviceCustomString2Label | Schema Version                                                                                                                                                                                |
118 | | 4       | deviceCustomString2      | SchemaVersion                                                                                                                                                                                 |
119 | |         |                          |                                                                                                                                                                                               |
120 | | 5       | message                  | __concatenate("Process Terminated: ",Image)                                                                                                                                                   |
121 | | 5       | deviceEventClassId       | SysmonTask-SYSMON_PROCESS_TERMINATE                                                                                                                                                           |
122 | |         |                          |                                                                                                                                                                                               |
123 | | 6       | message                  | __concatenate("Driver Loaded: ",ImageLoaded," Signed: ",Signed," Valid: ",SignatureStatus)                                                                                                    |
124 | | 6       | deviceEventClassId       | SysmonTask-SYSMON_DRIVER_LOAD                                                                                                                                                                 |
125 | | 6       | deviceCustomString1Label | Signed                                                                                                                                                                                        |
126 | | 6       | deviceCustomString1      | Signed                                                                                                                                                                                        |
127 | | 6       | deviceCustomString2Label | Signature                                                                                                                                                                                     |
128 | | 6       | deviceCustomString2      | Signature                                                                                                                                                                                     |
129 | | 6       | deviceCustomString3Label | Signature Status                                                                                                                                                                              |
130 | | 6       | deviceCustomString3      | SignatureStatus                                                                                                                                                                               |
131 | |         |                          |                                                                                                                                                                                               |
132 | | 7       | message                  | __concatenate("Image Loaded: ",ImageLoaded," Signed: ",Signed," Valid: ",SignatureStatus," Product: ",Product," Company: ",Company," Description: ",Description," FileVersion: ",FileVersion) |
133 | | 7       | deviceEventClassId       | SysmonTask-SYSMON_IMAGE_LOAD                                                                                                                                                                  |
134 | | 7       | deviceCustomString1Label | Signed                                                                                                                                                                                        |
135 | | 7       | deviceCustomString1      | Signed                                                                                                                                                                                        |
136 | | 7       | deviceCustomString2Label | Signature                                                                                                                                                                                     |
137 | | 7       | deviceCustomString2      | Signature                                                                                                                                                                                     |
138 | | 7       | deviceCustomString3Label | Signature Status                                                                                                                                                                              |
139 | | 7       | deviceCustomString3      | SignatureStatus                                                                                                                                                                               |
140 | | 7       | destinationServiceName   | Product                                                                                                                                                                                       |
141 | | 7       | oldFileName              | OriginalFileName                                                                                                                                                                              |
142 | |         |                          |                                                                                                                                                                                               |
143 | | 8       | message                  | CreateRemoteThread detected                                                                                                                                                                   |
144 | | 8       | deviceEventClassId       | SysmonTask-SYSMON_CREATE_REMOTE_THREAD                                                                                                                                                        |
145 | | 8       | deviceCustomString1Label | New Thread ID                                                                                                                                                                                 |
146 | | 8       | deviceCustomString1      | NewThreadId                                                                                                                                                                                   |
147 | | 8       | deviceCustomString2Label | Start Address                                                                                                                                                                                 |
148 | | 8       | deviceCustomString2      | StartAddress                                                                                                                                                                                  |
149 | | 8       | deviceCustomString3Label | Start Module                                                                                                                                                                                  |
150 | | 8       | deviceCustomString3      | StartModule                                                                                                                                                                                   |
151 | | 8       | deviceCustomString4Label | Start Function                                                                                                                                                                                |
152 | | 8       | deviceCustomString4      | StartFunction                                                                                                                                                                                 |
153 | |         |                          |                                                                                                                                                                                               |
154 | | 9       | message                  | __concatenate("RawAccessRead detected. Image: ",Image)                                                                                                                                        |
155 | | 9       | deviceEventClassId       | SysmonTask-SYSMON_RAWACCESS_READ                                                                                                                                                              |
156 | | 9       | deviceCustomString1Label | Device                                                                                                                                                                                        |
157 | | 9       | deviceCustomString1      | Device                                                                                                                                                                                        |
158 | |         |                          |                                                                                                                                                                                               |
159 | | 10      | message                  | __concatenate("Process accessed. Target Process: ",TargetImage)                                                                                                                               |
160 | | 10      | deviceEventClassId       | SysmonTask-SYSMON_ACCESS_PROCESS                                                                                                                                                              |
161 | | 10      | deviceCustomString1Label | Source Thread ID                                                                                                                                                                              |
162 | | 10      | deviceCustomString1      | SourceThreadId                                                                                                                                                                                |
163 | | 10      | deviceCustomString2Label | Granted Access                                                                                                                                                                                |
164 | | 10      | deviceCustomString2      | GrantedAccess                                                                                                                                                                                 |
165 | | 10      | deviceCustomString3Label | Call Trace                                                                                                                                                                                    |
166 | | 10      | deviceCustomString3      | CallTrace                                                                                                                                                                                     |
167 | |         |                          |                                                                                                                                                                                               |
168 | | 11      | message                  | __concatenate("File: ",TargetFilename," created by: ",Image)                                                                                                                                  |
169 | | 11      | deviceEventClassId       | SysmonTask-SYSMON_FILE_CREATE                                                                                                                                                                 |
170 | |         |                          |                                                                                                                                                                                               |
171 | | 12      | message                  | __concatenate("Registry: ",EventType," Object: ",TargetObject," by process: ",Image)                                                                                                          |
172 | | 12      | deviceEventClassId       | SysmonTask-SYSMON_REG_KEY                                                                                                                                                                     |
173 | | 12      | fileName                 | TargetObject                                                                                                                                                                                  |
174 | |         |                          |                                                                                                                                                                                               |
175 | | 13      | message                  | __concatenate("Registry Value: ",TargetObject," set by process: ",Image)                                                                                                                      |
176 | | 13      | deviceEventClassId       | SysmonTask-SYSMON_REG_SETVALUE                                                                                                                                                                |
177 | | 13      | deviceCustomString1Label | Registry Value Details                                                                                                                                                                        |
178 | | 13      | deviceCustomString1      | Details                                                                                                                                                                                       |
179 | | 13      | fileName                 | TargetObject                                                                                                                                                                                  |
180 | |         |                          |                                                                                                                                                                                               |
181 | | 14      | message                  | __concatenate("Registry Object renamed: ",TargetObject," New name: ",NewName)                                                                                                                 |
182 | | 14      | deviceEventClassId       | SysmonTask-SYSMON_REG_NAME                                                                                                                                                                    |
183 | | 14      | oldFileName              | TargetObject                                                                                                                                                                                  |
184 | | 14      | fileName                 | NewName                                                                                                                                                                                       |
185 | |         |                          |                                                                                                                                                                                               |
186 | | 15      | message                  | __concatenate("File Stream Created: ",TargetFilename," by process: ",Image)                                                                                                                   |
187 | | 15      | deviceEventClassId       | SysmonTask-SYSMON_FILE_CREATE_STREAM_HASH                                                                                                                                                     |
188 | |         |                          |                                                                                                                                                                                               |
189 | | 16      | message                  | __concatenate("Sysmon configuration changed. Configuration: ",Configuration)                                                                                                                  |
190 | | 16      | deviceEventClassId       | SysmonTask-SYSMON_SERVICE_CONFIGURATION_CHANGE                                                                                                                                                |
191 | | 16      | fileName                 | Configuration                                                                                                                                                                                 |
192 | | 16      | fileHash                 | ConfigurationFileHash                                                                                                                                                                         |
193 | |         |                          |                                                                                                                                                                                               |
194 | | 17      | message                  | __concatenate("Pipe: ",PipeName," created                                                                                                                                                     |
195 | | 17      | deviceEventClassId       | SysmonTask-SYSMON_CREATE_NAMEDPIPE                                                                                                                                                            |
196 | | 17      | fileName                 | PipeName                                                                                                                                                                                      |
197 | |         |                          |                                                                                                                                                                                               |
198 | | 18      | message                  | __concatenate("Pipe: ",PipeName," connected                                                                                                                                                   |
199 | | 18      | deviceEventClassId       | SysmonTask-SYSMON_CONNECT_NAMEDPIPE                                                                                                                                                           |
200 | | 18      | fileName                 | PipeName                                                                                                                                                                                      |
201 | |         |                          |                                                                                                                                                                                               |
202 | | 19      | message                  | __concatenate(Name," ",Operation," Namespace: ",Namespace)                                                                                                                                    |
203 | | 19      | deviceEventClassId       | SysmonTask-SYSMON_WMI_FILTER                                                                                                                                                                  |
204 | | 19      | deviceCustomString1Label | Name                                                                                                                                                                                          |
205 | | 19      | deviceCustomString1      | Name                                                                                                                                                                                          |
206 | | 19      | deviceCustomString2Label | Operation                                                                                                                                                                                     |
207 | | 19      | deviceCustomString2      | Operation                                                                                                                                                                                     |
208 | | 19      | deviceCustomString3Label | Event Namespace                                                                                                                                                                               |
209 | | 19      | deviceCustomString3      | EventNamespace                                                                                                                                                                                |
210 | | 19      | deviceCustomString4Label | Query                                                                                                                                                                                         |
211 | | 19      | deviceCustomString4      | Query                                                                                                                                                                                         |
212 | |         |                          |                                                                                                                                                                                               |
213 | | 20      | message                  | __concatenate(Name," ",Operation," Type: ",Type," Location: ",Destination)                                                                                                                    |
214 | | 20      | deviceEventClassId       | SysmonTask-SYSMON_WMI_CONSUMER                                                                                                                                                                |
215 | | 20      | deviceCustomString1Label | Name                                                                                                                                                                                          |
216 | | 20      | deviceCustomString1      | Name                                                                                                                                                                                          |
217 | | 20      | deviceCustomString2Label | Operation                                                                                                                                                                                     |
218 | | 20      | deviceCustomString2      | Operation                                                                                                                                                                                     |
219 | | 20      | deviceCustomString3Label | Type                                                                                                                                                                                          |
220 | | 20      | deviceCustomString3      | Type                                                                                                                                                                                          |
221 | | 20      | fileName                 | Destination                                                                                                                                                                                   |
222 | |         |                          |                                                                                                                                                                                               |
223 | | 21      | message                  | __concatenate(EventType," Created by: ",User)                                                                                                                                                 |
224 | | 21      | deviceEventClassId       | SysmonTask-SYSMON_WMI_BINDING                                                                                                                                                                 |
225 | | 21      | deviceCustomString1Label | Consumer                                                                                                                                                                                      |
226 | | 21      | deviceCustomString1      | Consumer                                                                                                                                                                                      |
227 | | 21      | deviceCustomString2Label | Operation                                                                                                                                                                                     |
228 | | 21      | deviceCustomString2      | Operation                                                                                                                                                                                     |
229 | | 21      | deviceCustomString3Label | Filter                                                                                                                                                                                        |
230 | | 21      | deviceCustomString3      | Filter                                                                                                                                                                                        |
231 | |         |                          |                                                                                                                                                                                               |
232 | | 22      | message                  | Mapped by DNS Response Code                                                                                                                                                                   |
233 | | 22      | deviceEventClassId       | SysmonTask-DNS_QUERY                                                                                                                                                                          |
234 | | 22      | destinationHostName      | QueryName                                                                                                                                                                                     |
235 | | 22      | requestUrl               | QueryName                                                                                                                                                                                     |
236 | | 22      | deviceCustomNumber1Label | Query Status                                                                                                                                                                                  |
237 | | 22      | deviceCustomNumber1      | __safeToLong(QueryStatus)                                                                                                                                                                     |
238 | | 22      | deviceCustomString1Label | Query Results                                                                                                                                                                                 |
239 | | 22      | deviceCustomString1      | QueryResults                                                                                                                                                                                  |
240 | |         |                          |                                                                                                                                                                                               |
241 | | 255     | message                  | __concatenate("Sysmon Error ID: ",ID," Description: ",Description)                                                                                                                            |
242 | | 255     | deviceEventClassId       | SysmonTask-SYSMON_ERROR                                                                                                                                                                       |
243 | | 255     | deviceCustomString1Label | ID                                                                                                                                                                                            |
244 | | 255     | deviceCustomString1      | ID                                                                                                                                                                                            |
245 | | 255     | deviceCustomString2Label | Description                                                                                                                                                                                   |
246 | | 255     | deviceCustomString2      | Description                                                                                                                                                                                   |
247 | 
248 | 
249 | 
250 | 
251 | # USE CASE
252 | 
253 | Detect suspicious processes, Powershell use, dual use tools and attempts of lateral movement (and more)
254 | 
255 | Commmercial content package available for ArcSight SYSMON Content Package Via SOC Prime (https://socprime.com/)
256 | Sysmon Framework contains 26 scenarios which are recommended for monitoring in SOC and early detection of APT activity.
257 | https://tdm.socprime.com/use-case-library/info/425/
258 | 
259 | # Update 04/10/2019 - Microfocus release SmartConnector for Microsoft Sysmon
260 | Microfocus have now released an out of the box SmartConnector for Sysmon - most organisations implementing Sysmon for the first time should check that out in the first instance.
261 | https://community.microfocus.com/t5/ArcSight-Connectors/MS-Sysmon-Logs-Windows-Event-Log-Native/ta-p/2697357
262 | Current feedback is that the coverage and mappings of the Microfocus SmartConnector are not great, so for now we will maintain support for this Flex.
263 | To override the defaul parser and stop any issues with conflicts, we have added the override setting in the properties file.
264 | We will review the continued maintenance of this FlexConnector once the quality / adoption of the OOB release is better known.
265 | 
266 | 


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/acp/categorizer/current/microsoft/sysmon.csv:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1 | event.deviceEventClassId,set.event.categoryObject,set.event.categoryBehavior,set.event.categoryTechnique,set.event.categoryOutcome,set.event.categorySignificance,set.event.categoryDeviceGroup,set.event.categoryDeviceType,set.event.categoryCustomFormatField,set.event.originator
 2 | SysmonTask-SYSMON_CREATE_PROCESS,/Host/Resource/Process,/Execute/Start,,/Success,/Informational,/Operating System,/Operating System,/Attack Lifecycle/Install,Source
 3 | SysmonTask-SYSMON_FILE_TIME,/Host/Resource/File,/Modify/Configuration,,/Success,/Suspicious,/Operating System,/Operating System,/Attack Lifecycle/Install,Source
 4 | SysmonTask-SYSMON_NETWORK_CONNECT,/Host/Resource/Interface/Tunnel,/Access/Start,,/Success,/Informational,/Operating System,/Operating System,/Attack Lifecycle/Install,Source
 5 | SysmonTask-SYSMON_SERVICE_STATE_CHANGE,/Host/Application/Service,/Check,,/Success,/Informational/Warning,/Operating System,/Operating System,/Attack Lifecycle/Install,Source
 6 | SysmonTask-SYSMON_PROCESS_TERMINATE,/Host/Resource/Process,/Execute/Stop,,/Success,/Informational,/Operating System,/Operating System,/Attack Lifecycle/Install,Source
 7 | SysmonTask-SYSMON_DRIVER_LOAD,/Host/Resource/Process,/Execute/Start,,/Success,/Informational,/Operating System,/Operating System,/Attack Lifecycle/Install,Source
 8 | SysmonTask-SYSMON_IMAGE_LOAD,/Host/Resource/Process,/Execute/Start,,/Success,/Informational,/Operating System,/Operating System,/Attack Lifecycle/Install,Source
 9 | SysmonTask-SYSMON_CREATE_REMOTE_THREAD,/Host/Resource/Interface/Tunnel,/Access/Start,,/Success,/Informational,/Operating System,/Operating System,/Attack Lifecycle/Install,Source
10 | SysmonTask-SYSMON_RAWACCESS_READ,/Host/Resource/Interface/Tunnel,/Communicate,/Traffic Anomaly,/Success,/Suspicious,/Operating System,/Operating System,/Attack Lifecycle/Install,Source
11 | SysmonTask-SYSMON_ACCESS_PROCESS,/Host/Resource/Process,/Access,,/Success,/Informational,/Operating System,/Operating System,/Attack Lifecycle/Install,Source
12 | SysmonTask-SYSMON_FILE_CREATE,/Host/Resource/File,/Create,,/Success,/Informational,/Operating System,/Operating System,/Attack Lifecycle/Install,Source
13 | SysmonTask-SYSMON_REG_KEY,/Host/Resource/Registry,/Modify/Configuration,,/Success,/Informational,/Operating System,/Operating System,/Attack Lifecycle/Install,Source
14 | SysmonTask-SYSMON_REG_SETVALUE,/Host/Resource/Registry,/Modify/Configuration,,/Success,/Informational,/Operating System,/Operating System,/Attack Lifecycle/Install,Source
15 | SysmonTask-SYSMON_REG_NAME,/Host/Resource/Registry,/Modify/Configuration,,/Success,/Informational,/Operating System,/Operating System,/Attack Lifecycle/Install,Source
16 | SysmonTask-SYSMON_FILE_CREATE_STREAM_HASH,/Host/Resource/File,/Communicate,/Traffic Anomaly,/Success,/Suspicious,/Operating System,/Operating System,/Attack Lifecycle/Install,Source
17 | SysmonTask-SYSMON_SERVICE_CONFIGURATION_CHANGE,/Host/Application/Service,/Modify,,/Success,/Informational/Warning,/Operating System,/Operating System,,Source
18 | SysmonTask-SYSMON_CREATE_NAMEDPIPE,/Host/Resource/Interface/Tunnel,/Create,,/Success,/Informational/Warning,/Operating System,/Operating System,/Attack Lifecycle/Install,Source
19 | SysmonTask-SYSMON_CONNECT_NAMEDPIPE,/Host/Resource/Interface/Tunnel,/Communicate,,/Success,/Informational/Warning,/Operating System,/Operating System,/Attack Lifecycle/Install,Source
20 | SysmonTask-SYSMON_WMI_FILTER,/Host/Resource/File,/Access,,/Success,/Informational/Warning,/Operating System,/Operating System,/Attack Lifecycle/Install,Source
21 | SysmonTask-SYSMON_WMI_CONSUMER,/Host/Resource/File,/Access,,/Success,/Informational/Warning,/Operating System,/Operating System,/Attack Lifecycle/Install,Source
22 | SysmonTask-SYSMON_WMI_BINDING,/Host/Resource/File,/Access,,/Success,/Informational/Warning,/Operating System,/Operating System,/Attack Lifecycle/Install,Source
23 | SysmonTask-SYSMON_ERROR,/Execute/Response,/Communicate,,/Success,/Informational/Error,/Operating System,/Operating System,,Source
24 | SysmonTask-DNS_QUERY,/Host/Application/Service,/Communicate/Query,,/Success,/Informational,Operating System,/Operating System,,Source
25 | SysmonTask-SYSMON_FILE_DELETE,/Host/Resource/File,/Delete,,/Success,/Informational,/Operating System,/Operating System,/Attack Lifecycle/Install,Source
26 | SysmonTask-SYSMON_CLIPBOARD,/Host/Resource/File,/Modify/Content,,/Success,/Informational,/Operating System,/Operating System,,Source
27 | SysmonTask-SYSMON_PROCESS_IMAGE_TAMPERING,/Host/Resource/File,/Found/Vulnerable,/Traffic Anomaly,/Success,/Suspicious,/Operating System,/Operating System,,Source
28 | 


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/fcp/winc/microsoft_windows_sysmon_operational/dns_codes.map.csv:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  1 | event.deviceCustomNumber1,set.event.message
  2 | 0,The request completed successfully.
  3 | 9001,DNS server unable to interpret format.
  4 | 9002,DNS server failure.
  5 | 9003,DNS name does not exist.
  6 | 9004,DNS request not supported by name server.
  7 | 9005,DNS operation refused.
  8 | 9006,"DNS name that ought not exist, does exist."
  9 | 9007,"DNS RR set that ought not exist, does exist."
 10 | 9008,"DNS RR set that ought to exist, does not exist."
 11 | 9009,DNS server not authoritative for zone.
 12 | 9010,DNS name in update or prereq is not in zone.
 13 | 9016,DNS signature failed to verify.
 14 | 9017,DNS bad key.
 15 | 9018,DNS signature validity expired.
 16 | 9101,Only the DNS server acting as the key master for the zone may perform this operation.
 17 | 9102,This operation is not allowed on a zone that is signed or has signing keys.
 18 | 9103,NSEC3 is not compatible with the RSA-SHA-1 algorithm. Choose a different algorithm or use NSEC.
 19 | 9104,The zone does not have enough signing keys. There must be at least one key signing key (KSK) and at least one zone signing key (ZSK).
 20 | 9105,The specified algorithm is not supported.
 21 | 9106,The specified key size is not supported.
 22 | 9107,One or more of the signing keys for a zone are not accessible to the DNS server. Zone signing will not be operational until this error is resolved.
 23 | 9108,The specified key storage provider does not support DPAPI++ data protection. Zone signing will not be operational until this error is resolved.
 24 | 9109,An unexpected DPAPI++ error was encountered. Zone signing will not be operational until this error is resolved.
 25 | 9110,An unexpected crypto error was encountered. Zone signing may not be operational until this error is resolved.
 26 | 9111,The DNS server encountered a signing key with an unknown version. Zone signing will not be operational until this error is resolved.
 27 | 9112,The specified key service provider cannot be opened by the DNS server.
 28 | 9113,The DNS server cannot accept any more signing keys with the specified algorithm and KSK flag value for this zone.
 29 | 9114,The specified rollover period is invalid.
 30 | 9115,The specified initial rollover offset is invalid.
 31 | 9116,The specified signing key is already in process of rolling over keys.
 32 | 9117,The specified signing key does not have a standby key to revoke.
 33 | 9118,This operation is not allowed on a zone signing key (ZSK).
 34 | 9119,This operation is not allowed on an active signing key.
 35 | 9120,The specified signing key is already queued for rollover.
 36 | 9121,This operation is not allowed on an unsigned zone.
 37 | 9122,This operation could not be completed because the DNS server listed as the current key master for this zone is down or misconfigured. Resolve the problem on the current key master for this zone or use another DNS server to seize the key master role.
 38 | 9123,The specified signature validity period is invalid.
 39 | 9124,The specified NSEC3 iteration count is higher than allowed by the minimum key length used in the zone.
 40 | 9125,This operation could not be completed because the DNS server has been configured with DNSSEC features disabled. Enable DNSSEC on the DNS server.
 41 | 9126,This operation could not be completed because the XML stream received is empty or syntactically invalid.
 42 | 9127,"This operation completed, but no trust anchors were added because all of the trust anchors received were either invalid, unsupported, expired, or would not become valid in less than 30 days."
 43 | 9128,The specified signing key is not waiting for parental DS update.
 44 | 9129,"Hash collision detected during NSEC3 signing. Specify a different user-provided salt, or use a randomly generated salt, and attempt to sign the zone again."
 45 | 9130,NSEC is not compatible with the NSEC3-RSA-SHA-1 algorithm. Choose a different algorithm or use NSEC3.
 46 | 9501,No records found for given DNS query.
 47 | 9502,Bad DNS packet.
 48 | 9503,No DNS packet.
 49 | 9504,"DNS error, check rcode."
 50 | 9505,Unsecured DNS packet.
 51 | 9506,DNS query request is pending.
 52 | 9551,Invalid DNS type.
 53 | 9552,Invalid IP address.
 54 | 9553,Invalid property.
 55 | 9554,Try DNS operation again later.
 56 | 9555,Record for given name and type is not unique.
 57 | 9556,DNS name does not comply with RFC specifications.
 58 | 9557,DNS name is a fully-qualified DNS name.
 59 | 9558,DNS name is dotted (multi-label).
 60 | 9559,DNS name is a single-part name.
 61 | 9560,DNS name contains an invalid character.
 62 | 9561,DNS name is entirely numeric.
 63 | 9562,The operation requested is not permitted on a DNS root server.
 64 | 9563,The record could not be created because this part of the DNS namespace has been delegated to another server.
 65 | 9564,The DNS server could not find a set of root hints.
 66 | 9565,The DNS server found root hints but they were not consistent across all adapters.
 67 | 9566,The specified value is too small for this parameter.
 68 | 9567,The specified value is too large for this parameter.
 69 | 9568,This operation is not allowed while the DNS server is loading zones in the background. Please try again later.
 70 | 9569,The operation requested is not permitted on against a DNS server running on a read-only DC.
 71 | 9570,No data is allowed to exist underneath a DNAME record.
 72 | 9571,This operation requires credentials delegation.
 73 | 9572,Name resolution policy table has been corrupted. DNS resolution will fail until it is fixed. Contact your network administrator.
 74 | 9601,DNS zone does not exist.
 75 | 9602,DNS zone information not available.
 76 | 9603,Invalid operation for DNS zone.
 77 | 9604,Invalid DNS zone configuration.
 78 | 9605,DNS zone has no start of authority (SOA) record.
 79 | 9606,DNS zone has no Name Server (NS) record.
 80 | 9607,DNS zone is locked.
 81 | 9608,DNS zone creation failed.
 82 | 9609,DNS zone already exists.
 83 | 9610,DNS automatic zone already exists.
 84 | 9611,Invalid DNS zone type.
 85 | 9612,Secondary DNS zone requires master IP address.
 86 | 9613,DNS zone not secondary.
 87 | 9614,Need secondary IP address.
 88 | 9615,WINS initialization failed.
 89 | 9616,Need WINS servers.
 90 | 9617,NBTSTAT initialization call failed.
 91 | 9618,Invalid delete of start of authority (SOA).
 92 | 9619,A conditional forwarding zone already exists for that name.
 93 | 9620,This zone must be configured with one or more master DNS server IP addresses.
 94 | 9621,The operation cannot be performed because this zone is shut down.
 95 | 9622,This operation cannot be performed because the zone is currently being signed. Please try again later.
 96 | 9651,Primary DNS zone requires datafile.
 97 | 9652,Invalid datafile name for DNS zone.
 98 | 9653,Failed to open datafile for DNS zone.
 99 | 9654,Failed to write datafile for DNS zone.
100 | 9655,Failure while reading datafile for DNS zone.
101 | 9701,DNS record does not exist.
102 | 9702,DNS record format error.
103 | 9703,Node creation failure in DNS.
104 | 9704,Unknown DNS record type.
105 | 9705,DNS record timed out.
106 | 9706,Name not in DNS zone.
107 | 9707,CNAME loop detected.
108 | 9708,Node is a CNAME DNS record.
109 | 9709,A CNAME record already exists for given name.
110 | 9710,Record only at DNS zone root.
111 | 9711,DNS record already exists.
112 | 9712,Secondary DNS zone data error.
113 | 9713,Could not create DNS cache data.
114 | 9714,DNS name does not exist.
115 | 9715,Could not create pointer (PTR) record.
116 | 9716,DNS domain was undeleted.
117 | 9717,The directory service is unavailable.
118 | 9718,DNS zone already exists in the directory service.
119 | 9719,DNS server not creating or reading the boot file for the directory service integrated DNS zone.
120 | 9720,Node is a DNAME DNS record.
121 | 9721,A DNAME record already exists for given name.
122 | 9722,An alias loop has been detected with either CNAME or DNAME records.
123 | 9751,DNS AXFR (zone transfer) complete.
124 | 9752,DNS zone transfer failed.
125 | 9753,Added local WINS server.
126 | 9801,Secure update call needs to continue update request.
127 | 9851,TCP/IP network protocol not installed.
128 | 9852,No DNS servers configured for local system.
129 | 9901,The specified directory partition does not exist.
130 | 9902,The specified directory partition already exists.
131 | 9903,This DNS server is not enlisted in the specified directory partition.
132 | 9904,This DNS server is already enlisted in the specified directory partition.
133 | 9905,The directory partition is not available at this time. Please wait a few minutes and try again.
134 | 9906,The operation failed because the domain naming master FSMO role could not be reached. The domain controller holding the domain naming master FSMO role is down or unable to service the request or is not running Windows Server 2003 or later.
135 | 


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/fcp/winc/microsoft_windows_sysmon_operational/microsoft_windows_sysmon.map.csv:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1 | event.externalId,set.event.name
 2 | 1,Process Create
 3 | 2,File creation time changed
 4 | 3,Network connection detected
 5 | 4,Sysmon service state changed
 6 | 5,Process terminated
 7 | 6,Driver loaded
 8 | 7,Image loaded
 9 | 8,CreateRemoteThread detected
10 | 9,RawAccessRead detected
11 | 10,Process accessed
12 | 11,File created
13 | 12,Registry object added or deleted
14 | 13,Registry value set
15 | 14,Registry object renamed
16 | 15,File stream created
17 | 16,Sysmon config state changed
18 | 17,Pipe Created
19 | 18,Pipe Connected
20 | 19,WmiEventFilter activity detected
21 | 20,WmiEventConsumer activity detected
22 | 21,WmiEventConsumerToFilter activity detected
23 | 22,DNS Query
24 | 23,File Deleted
25 | 24,Clipboard changed
26 | 25,Process Tampering
27 | 255,Error report
28 | 


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/fcp/winc/microsoft_windows_sysmon_operational/microsoft_windows_sysmon.sdkkeyvaluefilereader.properties:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  1 | ###############################################################################################################
  2 | #
  3 | # Sysmon WINC Parser
  4 | # Sysinternals Sysmon - System activity monitor, Copyright (C) Mark Russinovich and Thomas Garnier
  5 | # Device / Product version: Sysmon v13.x (Backward compatible at least to version 6)
  6 | # https://technet.microsoft.com/en-gb/sysinternals/sysmon
  7 | # 
  8 | # Parser Author: KSQ
  9 | # Source repository: https://github.com/S3COPS/
 10 | # 
 11 | # SmartConnector Type: Windows Native Connector
 12 | # Dependencies: Microfocus ArcSight SmartConnector Framework at least 7.4 (For automatic IPv6 Parsing)
 13 | #
 14 | ##### MIT License ######
 15 | # 
 16 | # Copyright (c) 2019 S3COPS https://github.com/S3COPS/
 17 | # 
 18 | # Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
 19 | # in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
 20 | # copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
 21 | # 
 22 | # The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
 23 | # 
 24 | # THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
 25 | # FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
 26 | # LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
 27 | # SOFTWARE.
 28 | #
 29 | ##### Installation Summary ######
 30 | # Copy the fcp and acp folders and the contents to the CONNECTOR_HOME/current/user/agent/ folder on the Windows Native Connector
 31 | # Add the following Event Log to the Windows Native Connector Custom Log section:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
 32 | # or add directly to the agent.properties file:agents[0].windowshoststable[0].eventlogtypes=Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational 
 33 | # Restart the Windows Native Connector
 34 | #
 35 | # For more details on configuration of Sysmon refer to https://technet.microsoft.com/en-gb/sysinternals/sysmon
 36 | # for an excellent sample sysmon config file refer to https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config
 37 | #
 38 | ###############################################################################################################
 39 | 
 40 | 
 41 | ###############################################################################################################
 42 | # This setting forces ArcSight to ignore the out of the box parser and to use this instead
 43 | # 
 44 | replace.defaults=x
 45 | #
 46 | ###############################################################################################################
 47 | 
 48 | 
 49 | key.delimiter=&&
 50 | key.value.delimiter==
 51 | key.regexp=([^&=]+)
 52 | 
 53 | additionaldata.enabled=true
 54 | trim.values=true
 55 | trim.tokens=true
 56 | #
 57 | # IPv6 aware parser - needs Connector Framework 7.4 or above. 
 58 | # Sysmon events interchange IPv4 / IPv6 addresses in the SourceIp / DestinationIp field.
 59 | ipv6.aware=true
 60 | 
 61 | # Vendor details
 62 | event.deviceVendor=__getVendor("Microsoft")
 63 | event.deviceProduct=__stringConstant("Sysmon")
 64 | #
 65 | # Events are all recorded in UTC time
 66 | # depending on the time setting on the host, multiple formats are possible
 67 | # 
 68 | event.endTime=__parseMultipleTimeStamp(UtcTime,"MM/dd/yyyy HH\:mm\:ss.SSS","yyyy-MM-dd HH\:mm\:ss.SSS")
 69 | event.deviceCustomDate1=__parseMultipleTimeStamp(UtcTime,"MM/dd/yyyy HH\:mm\:ss.SSS","yyyy-MM-dd HH\:mm\:ss.SSS")
 70 | event.deviceCustomDate1Label=__stringConstant("Event TimeStamp (UTC)")
 71 | event.deviceTimeZone=__getTimeZone(__stringConstant("UTC"))
 72 | #
 73 | # Common Mappings to be applied Globally:
 74 | # General mappings
 75 | event.transportProtocol=Protocol
 76 | # Added various image/target image so that file name/file hash
 77 | # matching is easier next to each other and there's no analyst confusion what the hash is for (Thanks StevenD)
 78 | # Note that submessages also set this field
 79 | # July 2019 - updated previous mappings for event.fileName to the more correct event.filePath
 80 | # It is recommeded users double check any content developed
 81 | event.filePath=__oneOf(TargetFilename,ImageLoaded,TargetImage,Image)
 82 | #
 83 | event.fileCreateTime=__parseMultipleTimeStamp(CreationUtcTime,"MM/dd/yyyy HH\:mm\:ss.SSS","yyyy-MM-dd HH\:mm\:ss.SSS")
 84 | event.oldFileCreateTime=__parseMultipleTimeStamp(PreviousCreationUtcTime,"MM/dd/yyyy HH\:mm\:ss.SSS","yyyy-MM-dd HH\:mm\:ss.SSS")
 85 | event.fileId=FileVersion
 86 | # Hash selection
 87 | # By default SHA256 maps to the fileHash field
 88 | # The user has options to add additional Hash formats which are added to the relevant "additionaldata" field 
 89 | # These can be mapped at the Console or this parser can be updated below.
 90 | event.fileHash=__regexTokenNoWarning(Hashes,".*SHA256=(\\w+).*")
 91 | #
 92 | # Commented out non-default settings - these can be reset if used in an organisation
 93 | # additionaldata.Hash_SHA1=__regexTokenNoWarning(Hashes,".*SHA1=(\\w+).*")
 94 | additionaldata.Hash_MD5=__regexTokenNoWarning(Hashes,".*MD5=(\\w+).*")
 95 | # additionaldata.Hash_SHA256=__regexTokenNoWarning(Hashes,".*SHA256=(\\w+).*")
 96 | # additionaldata.Hash_IMPHASH=__regexTokenNoWarning(Hashes,".*IMPHASH=(\\w+).*")
 97 | # Device Mappings
 98 | event.deviceProcessId=__safeToInteger(ProcessId)
 99 | event.deviceProcessName=Image
100 | event.deviceAction=__oneOf(State,EventType)
101 | # Added RuleName in v8 - Changed from dvcfacility to reason for fitment/visibility
102 | # i have left event.deviceFacility mapping in place for now in case anyone has used it in content, 
103 | # but suggestion from StevenD to change to event.reason makes sense so please use this going forward.
104 | event.deviceFacility=RuleName
105 | event.reason=RuleName
106 | # Source Mappings
107 | event.sourceUserName=User
108 | event.sourceUserId=LogonId
109 | event.sourceAddress=SourceIp
110 | event.sourcePort=__safeToInteger(SourcePort)
111 | event.sourceHostName=SourceHostname
112 | event.sourceProcessId=__oneOfInteger(ParentProcessId,SourceProcessId,ProcessId)
113 | event.sourceProcessName=__oneOf(ParentImage,SourceImage,Image)
114 | #
115 | # Destination Mappings
116 | event.destinationAddress=DestinationIp
117 | event.destinationPort=__safeToInteger(DestinationPort)
118 | event.destinationHostName=DestinationHostname
119 | event.destinationProcessName=__oneOf(ImageLoaded,TargetImage,Image)
120 | event.destinationProcessId=__safeToInteger(TargetProcessId)
121 | event.destinationServiceName=Product
122 | 
123 | # Device Custom Settings
124 | #
125 | event.deviceCustomNumber2=__safeToLong(TerminalSessionId)
126 | event.deviceCustomNumber2Label=__stringConstant("Terminal Session ID")
127 | event.deviceCustomNumber3=__safeToLong(SequenceNumber)
128 | event.deviceCustomNumber3Label=__stringConstant("Sequence Number")
129 | #
130 | event.deviceCustomString4=Initiated
131 | event.deviceCustomString4Label=__stringConstant("Initiated")
132 | event.deviceCustomString5=IntegrityLevel
133 | event.deviceCustomString5Label=__stringConstant("IntegrityLevel")
134 | event.deviceCustomString6=ProcessGuid
135 | event.deviceCustomString6Label=__stringConstant("Process Guid")
136 | #
137 | event.flexString1=SourceProcessGUID
138 | event.flexString1Label=__stringConstant("Source Process Guid")
139 | event.flexString2=TargetProcessGUID
140 | event.flexString2Label=__stringConstant("Target Process GUID")
141 | 
142 | # Stuff that wont fit anywhere else, but could be useful
143 | # event.filePermission=
144 | event.oldFilePermission=Description
145 | event.oldFileType=Company
146 | # event.oldFileId=
147 | 
148 | #
149 | 
150 | # Additional Data Mappings - some of the below have now been moved into CEF Fields,
151 | # but have been left in the parser for backward compatability with end users content.
152 | #
153 | additionaldata.SourcePortName=SourcePortName
154 | additionaldata.DestinationPortName=DestinationPortName
155 | additionaldata.DestinationIsIpv6=DestinationIsIpv6
156 | additionaldata.SourceIsIpv6=SourceIsIpv6
157 | additionaldata.FileVersion=FileVersion
158 | additionaldata.Description=Description
159 | additionaldata.Product=Product
160 | additionaldata.Company=Company
161 | additionaldata.archived=Archived
162 | additionaldata.session=Session
163 | 
164 | 
165 | #
166 | ###############################################################################################################
167 | #
168 | # Conditional Map settings
169 | conditionalmap.count=1
170 | conditionalmap[0].field=event.externalId
171 | conditionalmap[0].mappings.count=27
172 | #
173 | ###############################################################################################################
174 | #
175 | # Event ID 1: Process Create
176 | # RuleName
177 | # UtcTime: %1
178 | # ProcessGuid: %2
179 | # ProcessId: %3
180 | # Image: %4
181 | # CommandLine: %5
182 | # CurrentDirectory: %6
183 | # User: %7
184 | # LogonGuid: %8
185 | # LogonId: %9
186 | # TerminalSessionId: %10
187 | # IntegrityLevel: %11
188 | # Hashes: %12
189 | # ParentProcessGuid: %13
190 | # ParentProcessId: %14
191 | # ParentImage: %15
192 | # ParentCommandLine: %16
193 | #
194 | # Introduced in v7:
195 | #
196 | # FileVersion: 
197 | # Description: 
198 | # Product: 
199 | # Company: 
200 | # OriginalFileName
201 | #
202 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[0].values=1
203 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[0].event.message=__concatenate("Process Created: ",Image," Product: ",Product," Company: ",Company," Description: ",Description," FileVersion: ",FileVersion)
204 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[0].event.deviceEventClassId=__stringConstant("SysmonTask-SYSMON_CREATE_PROCESS")
205 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[0].event.deviceCustomString1Label=__stringConstant("Command Line")
206 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[0].event.deviceCustomString1=__replaceAll(CommandLine,"\\s+"," ")
207 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[0].event.deviceCustomString2Label=__stringConstant("Parent Command Line")
208 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[0].event.deviceCustomString2=__replaceAll(ParentCommandLine,"\\s+"," ")
209 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[0].event.deviceCustomString3Label=__stringConstant("Current Directory")
210 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[0].event.deviceCustomString3=CurrentDirectory
211 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[0].event.deviceCustomString4Label=__stringConstant("Parent Process GUID")
212 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[0].event.deviceCustomString4=ParentProcessGuid
213 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[0].event.destinationServiceName=Product
214 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[0].event.oldFilePath=OriginalFileName
215 | #
216 | ###############################################################################################################
217 | #
218 | # event ID 2: File creation time changed
219 | # RuleName
220 | # UtcTime: %1
221 | # ProcessGuid: %2
222 | # ProcessId: %3
223 | # Image: %4
224 | # TargetFilename: %5
225 | # CreationUtcTime: %6
226 | # PreviousCreationUtcTime: %7
227 | 
228 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[1].values=2
229 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[1].event.message=__concatenate("File creation time changed. Filename: ",TargetFilename)
230 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[1].event.deviceEventClassId=__stringConstant("SysmonTask-SYSMON_FILE_TIME")
231 | #
232 | ###############################################################################################################
233 | # Event ID 3: Network connection detected
234 | # RuleName
235 | # UtcTime: %1
236 | # ProcessGuid: %2
237 | # ProcessId: %3
238 | # Image: %4
239 | # User: %5
240 | # Protocol: %6
241 | # Initiated: %7
242 | # SourceIsIpv6: %8
243 | # SourceIp: %9
244 | # SourceHostname: %10
245 | # SourcePort: %11
246 | # SourcePortName: %12
247 | # DestinationIsIpv6: %13
248 | # DestinationIp: %14
249 | # DestinationHostname: %15
250 | # DestinationPort: %16
251 | # DestinationPortName: %17
252 | # 
253 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[2].values=3
254 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[2].event.message=__concatenate("A network connection was detected from ",SourceIp," to ",DestinationIp," destination port ",DestinationPort)
255 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[2].event.deviceEventClassId=__stringConstant("SysmonTask-SYSMON_NETWORK_CONNECT")
256 | #
257 | ###############################################################################################################
258 | # Event ID 4: Sysmon service state changed:
259 | # UtcTime: %1
260 | # State: %2
261 | # Version: %3
262 | # SchemaVersion: %4
263 | 
264 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[3].values=4
265 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[3].event.message=__concatenate("Sysmon Service state changed: ",State)
266 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[3].event.deviceEventClassId=__stringConstant("SysmonTask-SYSMON_SERVICE_STATE_CHANGE")
267 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[3].event.deviceCustomString1Label=__stringConstant("Sysmon Version")
268 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[3].event.deviceCustomString1=Version
269 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[3].event.deviceCustomString2Label=__stringConstant("Schema Version")
270 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[3].event.deviceCustomString2=SchemaVersion
271 | 
272 | #
273 | ###############################################################################################################
274 | # Event ID 5: Process terminated
275 | # RuleName
276 | # UtcTime: %1
277 | # ProcessGuid: %2
278 | # ProcessId: %3
279 | # Image: %4
280 | 
281 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[4].values=5
282 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[4].event.message=__concatenate("Process Terminated: ",Image)
283 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[4].event.deviceEventClassId=__stringConstant("SysmonTask-SYSMON_PROCESS_TERMINATE")
284 | #
285 | ###############################################################################################################
286 | # Event ID 6: Driver loaded
287 | # RuleName
288 | # UtcTime: %1
289 | # ImageLoaded: %2
290 | # Hashes: %3
291 | # Signed: %4
292 | # Signature: %5
293 | # SignatureStatus: %6
294 | 
295 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[5].values=6
296 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[5].event.message=__concatenate("Driver Loaded: ",ImageLoaded," Signed: ",Signed," Valid: ",SignatureStatus)
297 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[5].event.deviceEventClassId=__stringConstant("SysmonTask-SYSMON_DRIVER_LOAD")
298 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[5].event.deviceCustomString1Label=__stringConstant("Signed")
299 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[5].event.deviceCustomString1=Signed
300 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[5].event.deviceCustomString2Label=__stringConstant("Signature")
301 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[5].event.deviceCustomString2=Signature
302 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[5].event.deviceCustomString3Label=__stringConstant("Signature Status")
303 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[5].event.deviceCustomString3=SignatureStatus
304 | #
305 | ###############################################################################################################
306 | # Event ID 7: Image loaded
307 | # RuleName
308 | # UtcTime: %1
309 | # ProcessGuid: %2
310 | # ProcessId: %3
311 | # Image: %4
312 | # ImageLoaded: %5
313 | # Hashes: %6
314 | # Signed: %7
315 | # Signature: %8
316 | # SignatureStatus: %9
317 | #
318 | # Introduced in v7:
319 | #
320 | # FileVersion: 
321 | # Description: 
322 | # Product: 
323 | # Company: 
324 | # OriginalFileName:
325 | 
326 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[6].values=7
327 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[6].event.message=__concatenate("Image Loaded: ",ImageLoaded," Signed: ",Signed," Valid: ",SignatureStatus," Product: ",Product," Company: ",Company," Description: ",Description," FileVersion: ",FileVersion)
328 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[6].event.deviceEventClassId=__stringConstant("SysmonTask-SYSMON_IMAGE_LOAD")
329 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[6].event.deviceCustomString1Label=__stringConstant("Signed")
330 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[6].event.deviceCustomString1=Signed
331 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[6].event.deviceCustomString2Label=__stringConstant("Signature")
332 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[6].event.deviceCustomString2=Signature
333 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[6].event.deviceCustomString3Label=__stringConstant("Signature Status")
334 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[6].event.deviceCustomString3=SignatureStatus
335 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[0].event.destinationServiceName=Product
336 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[0].event.oldFileName=OriginalFileName
337 | #
338 | ###############################################################################################################
339 | # Event ID 8: CreateRemoteThread detected
340 | # RuleName
341 | # UtcTime: %1
342 | # SourceProcessGuid: %2
343 | # SourceProcessId: %3
344 | # SourceImage: %4
345 | # TargetProcessGuid: %5
346 | # TargetProcessId: %6
347 | # TargetImage: %7
348 | # NewThreadId: %8
349 | # StartAddress: %9
350 | # StartModule: %10
351 | # StartFunction: %11
352 | 
353 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[7].values=8
354 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[7].event.message=__concatenate("CreateRemoteThread detected")
355 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[7].event.deviceEventClassId=__stringConstant("SysmonTask-SYSMON_CREATE_REMOTE_THREAD")
356 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[7].event.deviceCustomString1Label=__stringConstant("New Thread ID")
357 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[7].event.deviceCustomString1=NewThreadId
358 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[7].event.deviceCustomString2Label=__stringConstant("Start Address")
359 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[7].event.deviceCustomString2=StartAddress
360 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[7].event.deviceCustomString3Label=__stringConstant("Start Module")
361 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[7].event.deviceCustomString3=StartModule
362 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[7].event.deviceCustomString4Label=__stringConstant("Start Function")
363 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[7].event.deviceCustomString4=StartFunction
364 | #
365 | ###############################################################################################################
366 | # Event ID 9: RawAccessRead detected
367 | # RuleName
368 | # UtcTime: %1
369 | # ProcessGuid: %2
370 | # ProcessId: %3
371 | # Image: %4
372 | # Device: %5
373 | 
374 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[8].values=9
375 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[8].event.message=__concatenate("RawAccessRead detected. Image: ",Image)
376 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[8].event.deviceEventClassId=__stringConstant("SysmonTask-SYSMON_RAWACCESS_READ")
377 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[8].event.deviceCustomString1Label=__stringConstant("Device")
378 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[8].event.deviceCustomString1=Device
379 | #
380 | ###############################################################################################################
381 | # Event ID 10: Process accessed
382 | # RuleName
383 | # UtcTime: %1
384 | # SourceProcessGUID: %2
385 | # SourceProcessId: %3
386 | # SourceThreadId: %4
387 | # SourceImage: %5
388 | # TargetProcessGUID: %6
389 | # TargetProcessId: %7
390 | # TargetImage: %8
391 | # GrantedAccess: %9
392 | # CallTrace: %10
393 | 
394 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[9].values=10
395 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[9].event.message=__concatenate("Process accessed. Target Process: ",TargetImage)
396 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[9].event.deviceEventClassId=__stringConstant("SysmonTask-SYSMON_ACCESS_PROCESS")
397 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[9].event.deviceCustomString1Label=__stringConstant("Source Thread ID")
398 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[9].event.deviceCustomString1=SourceThreadId
399 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[9].event.deviceCustomString2Label=__stringConstant("Granted Access")
400 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[9].event.deviceCustomString2=GrantedAccess
401 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[9].event.deviceCustomString3Label=__stringConstant("Call Trace")
402 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[9].event.deviceCustomString3=CallTrace
403 | #
404 | ###############################################################################################################
405 | # Event ID 11: File created
406 | # RuleName
407 | # UtcTime: %1
408 | # ProcessGuid: %2
409 | # ProcessId: %3
410 | # Image: %4
411 | # TargetFilename: %5
412 | # CreationUtcTime: %6
413 | 
414 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[10].values=11
415 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[10].event.message=__concatenate("File: ",TargetFilename," created by: ",Image)
416 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[10].event.deviceEventClassId=__stringConstant("SysmonTask-SYSMON_FILE_CREATE")
417 | #
418 | ###############################################################################################################
419 | # Event ID 12: Registry object added or deleted
420 | # RuleName
421 | # EventType: %1
422 | # UtcTime: %2
423 | # ProcessGuid: %3
424 | # ProcessId: %4
425 | # Image: %5
426 | # TargetObject: %6
427 | 
428 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[11].values=12
429 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[11].event.message=__concatenate("Registry: ",EventType," Object: ",TargetObject," by process: ",Image)
430 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[11].event.deviceEventClassId=__stringConstant("SysmonTask-SYSMON_REG_KEY")
431 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[11].event.filePath=TargetObject
432 | #
433 | ###############################################################################################################
434 | # Event ID 13: Registry value set
435 | # RuleName
436 | # EventType: %1
437 | # UtcTime: %2
438 | # ProcessGuid: %3
439 | # ProcessId: %4
440 | # Image: %5
441 | # TargetObject: %6
442 | # Details: %7
443 | 
444 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[12].values=13
445 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[12].event.message=__concatenate("Registry Value: ",TargetObject," set by process: ",Image)
446 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[12].event.deviceEventClassId=__stringConstant("SysmonTask-SYSMON_REG_SETVALUE")
447 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[12].event.deviceCustomString1Label=__stringConstant("Registry Value Details")
448 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[12].event.deviceCustomString1=Details
449 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[12].event.filePath=TargetObject
450 | 
451 | #
452 | ###############################################################################################################
453 | # Event ID 14: Registry object renamed
454 | # RuleName
455 | # EventType: %1
456 | # UtcTime: %2
457 | # ProcessGuid: %3
458 | # ProcessId: %4
459 | # Image: %5
460 | # TargetObject: %6
461 | # NewName: %7
462 | 
463 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[13].values=14
464 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[13].event.message=__concatenate("Registry Object renamed: ",TargetObject," New name: ",NewName)
465 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[13].event.deviceEventClassId=__stringConstant("SysmonTask-SYSMON_REG_NAME")
466 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[13].event.oldFilePath=TargetObject
467 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[13].event.filePath=NewName
468 | #
469 | ###############################################################################################################
470 | # Event ID 15: File stream created
471 | # RuleName
472 | # UtcTime: %1
473 | # ProcessGuid: %2
474 | # ProcessId: %3
475 | # Image: %4
476 | # TargetFilename: %5
477 | # CreationUtcTime: %6
478 | # Hash: %7
479 | 
480 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[14].values=15
481 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[14].event.message=__concatenate("File Stream Created: ",TargetFilename," by process: ",Image)
482 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[14].event.deviceEventClassId=__stringConstant("SysmonTask-SYSMON_FILE_CREATE_STREAM_HASH")
483 | #
484 | ###############################################################################################################
485 | # Event ID 16: Sysmon config state changed
486 | # UtcTime: %1
487 | # Configuration: %2
488 | # ConfigurationFileHash: %3
489 | 
490 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[15].values=16
491 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[15].event.message=__concatenate("Sysmon configuration changed. Configuration: ",Configuration)
492 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[15].event.deviceEventClassId=__stringConstant("SysmonTask-SYSMON_SERVICE_CONFIGURATION_CHANGE")
493 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[15].event.filePath=Configuration
494 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[15].event.fileHash=__regexToken(ConfigurationFileHash,".*SHA1=(\\w+).*")
495 | #
496 | ###############################################################################################################
497 | # Event ID 17: Pipe Created
498 | # RuleName
499 | # EventType:
500 | # UtcTime: %1
501 | # ProcessGuid: %2
502 | # ProcessId: %3
503 | # PipeName: %4
504 | # Image: %5
505 | 
506 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[16].values=17
507 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[16].event.message=__concatenate("Pipe: ",PipeName," created")
508 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[16].event.deviceEventClassId=__stringConstant("SysmonTask-SYSMON_CREATE_NAMEDPIPE")
509 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[16].event.fileName=PipeName
510 | #
511 | ###############################################################################################################
512 | # Event ID 18: Pipe Connected
513 | # RuleName
514 | # EventType:
515 | # UtcTime: %1
516 | # ProcessGuid: %2
517 | # ProcessId: %3
518 | # PipeName: %4
519 | # Image: %5
520 | 
521 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[17].values=18
522 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[17].event.message=__concatenate("Pipe: ",PipeName," connected")
523 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[17].event.deviceEventClassId=__stringConstant("SysmonTask-SYSMON_CONNECT_NAMEDPIPE")
524 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[17].event.fileName=PipeName
525 | #
526 | ###############################################################################################################
527 | # The Following Events were introduced in Sysmon v7
528 | ###############################################################################################################
529 | # Event ID 19: Wmi Event Filtter Activity Detected
530 | # RuleName
531 | # EventType: %1
532 | # UtcTime: %2
533 | # Operation: %3
534 | # User: %4
535 | # EventNamespace: %5
536 | # Name: %6
537 | # Query: %7
538 | 
539 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[18].values=19
540 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[18].event.message=__concatenate(Name," ",Operation," Namespace: ",Namespace)
541 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[18].event.deviceEventClassId=__stringConstant("SysmonTask-SYSMON_WMI_FILTER")
542 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[18].event.deviceCustomString1Label=__stringConstant("Name")
543 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[18].event.deviceCustomString1=Name
544 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[18].event.deviceCustomString2Label=__stringConstant("Operation")
545 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[18].event.deviceCustomString2=Operation
546 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[18].event.deviceCustomString3Label=__stringConstant("Event Namespace")
547 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[18].event.deviceCustomString3=EventNamespace
548 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[18].event.deviceCustomString4Label=__stringConstant("Query")
549 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[18].event.deviceCustomString4=Query
550 | 
551 | #
552 | ###############################################################################################################
553 | # Event ID 20: WmiEventConsumer activity detected
554 | # RuleName
555 | # EventType: %1
556 | # UtcTime: %2
557 | # Operation: %3
558 | # User: %4
559 | # Name: %5
560 | # Type: %6
561 | # Destination: %7
562 | 
563 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[19].values=20
564 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[19].event.message=__concatenate(Name," ",Operation," Type: ",Type," Location: ",Destination)
565 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[19].event.deviceEventClassId=__stringConstant("SysmonTask-SYSMON_WMI_CONSUMER")
566 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[19].event.deviceCustomString1Label=__stringConstant("Name")
567 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[19].event.deviceCustomString1=Name
568 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[19].event.deviceCustomString2Label=__stringConstant("Operation")
569 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[19].event.deviceCustomString2=Operation
570 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[19].event.deviceCustomString3Label=__stringConstant("Type")
571 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[19].event.deviceCustomString3=Type
572 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[19].event.fileName=Destination
573 | #
574 | ###############################################################################################################
575 | # Event ID 21: WmiEventConsumerToFilter activity detected
576 | # RuleName
577 | # EventType: %1
578 | # UtcTime: %2
579 | # Operation: %3
580 | # User: %4
581 | # Consumer: %5
582 | # Filter: %6
583 | 
584 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[20].values=21
585 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[20].event.message=__concatenate(EventType," Created by: ",User)
586 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[20].event.deviceEventClassId=__stringConstant("SysmonTask-SYSMON_WMI_BINDING")
587 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[20].event.deviceCustomString1Label=__stringConstant("Consumer")
588 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[20].event.deviceCustomString1=Consumer
589 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[20].event.deviceCustomString2Label=__stringConstant("Operation")
590 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[20].event.deviceCustomString2=Operation
591 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[20].event.deviceCustomString3Label=__stringConstant("Filter")
592 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[20].event.deviceCustomString3=Filter
593 | #
594 | #
595 | ###############################################################################################################
596 | # The Following Events were introduced in Sysmon v10
597 | ###############################################################################################################
598 | # Event ID 22: DNS Query
599 | # RuleName
600 | # UtcTime
601 | # ProcessGuid
602 | # ProcessId
603 | # QueryName
604 | # QueryStatus
605 | # QueryResults
606 | # Image
607 | #
608 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[21].values=22
609 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[21].event.message=__concatenate(EventType)
610 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[21].event.deviceEventClassId=__stringConstant("SysmonTask-DNS_QUERY")
611 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[21].event.destinationHostName=QueryName
612 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[21].event.requestUrl=QueryName
613 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[21].event.deviceCustomNumber1Label=__stringConstant("Query Status")
614 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[21].event.deviceCustomNumber1=__safeToLong(QueryStatus)
615 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[21].event.deviceCustomString1Label=__stringConstant("Query Results")
616 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[21].event.deviceCustomString1=QueryResults
617 | #
618 | 
619 | ###############################################################################################################
620 | # The Following Event was introduced in Sysmon v11
621 | ###############################################################################################################
622 | # Event ID 23: File Delete
623 | # RuleName
624 | # UtcTime: %1
625 | # ProcessGuid: %2
626 | # ProcessId: %3
627 | # Image: %4
628 | # TargetFilename: %5
629 | # Hashes: %6
630 | # IsExecutable: %7
631 | # Archived: %8
632 | 
633 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[22].values=23
634 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[22].event.message=__concatenate("File: ",TargetFilename," deleted by: ",Image)
635 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[22].event.deviceEventClassId=__stringConstant("SysmonTask-SYSMON_FILE_DELETE")
636 | #
637 | ###############################################################################################################
638 | # The Following Event was introduced in Sysmon v13
639 | ###############################################################################################################
640 | # Event ID 24: Clipboard changed
641 | # RuleName: %1
642 | # UtcTime: %2
643 | # ProcessGuid: %3
644 | # ProcessId: %4
645 | # Image: %5
646 | # Session: %6
647 | # ClientInfo: %7
648 | # Hashes: %8
649 | # Archived: %9
650 | 
651 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[23].values=24
652 | # conditionalmap[0].mappings[23].event.message=__concatenate()
653 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[23].event.deviceEventClassId=__stringConstant("SSysmonTask-SYSMON_CLIPBOARD")
654 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[23].event.deviceCustomString1Label=__stringConstant("Client Info")
655 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[23].event.deviceCustomString1=ClientInfo
656 | #
657 | 
658 | ###############################################################################################################
659 | # The Following Event was introduced in Sysmon v13
660 | ###############################################################################################################
661 | # Event ID 25: Process Tampering
662 | # RuleName: %1
663 | # UtcTime: %2
664 | # ProcessGuid: %3
665 | # ProcessId: %4
666 | # Image: %5
667 | # Type: %6
668 | 
669 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[24].values=25
670 | # conditionalmap[0].mappings[24].event.message=__concatenate()
671 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[24].event.deviceEventClassId=__stringConstant("SysmonTask-SYSMON_PROCESS_IMAGE_TAMPERING")
672 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[24].event.deviceCustomString1Label=__stringConstant("Type")
673 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[24].event.deviceCustomString1=Type
674 | #
675 | 
676 | ###############################################################################################################
677 | # Event ID 255: Error report
678 | # UtcTime: %1
679 | # ID: %2
680 | # Description: %3
681 | 
682 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[25].values=255
683 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[25].event.message=__concatenate("Sysmon Error ID: ",ID," Description: ",Description)
684 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[25].event.deviceEventClassId=__stringConstant("SysmonTask-SYSMON_ERROR")
685 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[25].event.deviceCustomString1Label=__stringConstant("ID")
686 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[25].event.deviceCustomString1=ID
687 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[25].event.deviceCustomString2Label=__stringConstant("Description")
688 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[25].event.deviceCustomString2=Description
689 | 
690 | #
691 | ###############################################################################################################
692 | # catch all event for future changes / additions
693 | conditionalmap[0].mappings[26].event.name=__stringConstant("Unparsed Event")
694 | #
695 | ###############################################################################################################
696 | 
697 | # Extra Processor Settings
698 | # Set map file to map event Names and Categories
699 | extraprocessor.count=2
700 | extraprocessor[0].type=map
701 | extraprocessor[0].filename=winc/microsoft_windows_sysmon_operational/microsoft_windows_sysmon.map.csv
702 | extraprocessor[0].allowoverwrite=true
703 | #
704 | extraprocessor[1].type=map
705 | extraprocessor[1].filename=winc/microsoft_windows_sysmon_operational/dns_codes.map.csv
706 | extraprocessor[1].allowoverwrite=true
707 | ###############################################################################################################
708 | 


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/fcp/winc/microsoft_windows_sysmon_operational/sysmon.xml:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   1 | <!--
   2 |   ############### GO TO THE SwiftOnSecurity GitHub to get the latest version of this file ###############
   3 |   ########################### https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config ########################## 
   4 | 
   5 |   sysmon-config | A Sysmon configuration focused on default high-quality event tracing and easy customization by the community
   6 |   Source version:	71 | Date: 2020-01-16
   7 |   Source project:	https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config
   8 |   Source license:	Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 | You may privatize, fork, edit, teach, publish, or deploy for commercial use - with attribution in the text.
   9 | 
  10 |   Fork version:	<N/A>
  11 |   Fork author:	<N/A>
  12 |   Fork project:	<N/A>
  13 |   Fork license:	<N/A>
  14 | 
  15 |   REQUIRED: Sysmon version 10.0.4.1 or higher (due to changes in syntax and bug-fixes)
  16 | 	https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
  17 | 
  18 |   NOTE: To collect Sysmon logs centrally for free, see https://aka.ms/WEF | Command to allow log access to the Network Service:
  19 | 	wevtutil.exe sl Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational /ca:O:BAG:SYD:(A;;0xf0005;;;SY)(A;;0x5;;;BA)(A;;0x1;;;S-1-5-32-573)(A;;0x1;;;NS)
  20 | 
  21 |   NOTE: Do not let the size and complexity of this configuration discourage you from customizing it or building your own.
  22 | 	This configuration is based around known, high-signal event tracing, and thus appears complicated, but it is only very
  23 | 	detailed. Significant effort over years has been invested in front-loading as much filtering as possible onto the
  24 | 	client. This is to make analysis of intrusions possible by hand, and to try to surface anomalous activity as quickly
  25 | 	as possible to technicians armed only with Event Viewer. Its purpose is to democratize system monitoring for all organizations.
  26 | 
  27 |   NOTE: Sysmon is NOT a whitelist solution or HIDS correlation engine, it is a computer change logging tool.
  28 | 	Do NOT ignore everything possible. Sysmon's purpose is providing context during a threat or problem investigation. Legitimate
  29 | 	processes are routinely used by threats - do not blindly exclude them. Additionally, be mindful of process-hollowing / imitation.
  30 | 
  31 |   NOTE: By default this monitors DNS, which is extremely noisy. If you are starting out on your monitoring journey, just remove that section.
  32 | 	You can remove DNS events from Event Viewer screen by applying a 'Filter Current View' for event IDs of: -22
  33 | 	Additionally, if you want to monitor DNS, you should deploy client-side adblocking to reduce lookups. See the DNS section for info.
  34 | 
  35 |   NOTE: This configuration is designed for PER-MACHINE installs of Chrome and OneDrive. That moves their binaries out of user-controlled folders.
  36 | 	Otherwise, attackers could imitate these common applications, and bypass your logging. Below are silent upgrades you can do, no user impact:
  37 | 	- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/onedrive/per-machine-installation
  38 | 	- https://cloud.google.com/chrome-enterprise/browser/download/
  39 | 	- As of 2019-08-25 there is no usermode version of Microsoft Teams.
  40 | 
  41 |   NOTE: Sysmon is not hardened against an attacker with admin rights. Additionally, this configuration offers an attacker, willing
  42 | 	to study it, limited ways to evade some of the logging. If you are in a very high-threat environment, you should consider a broader,
  43 | 	log-most approach. However, in the vast majority of cases, an attacker will bumble through multiple behavioral traps which
  44 | 	this configuration monitors, especially in the first minutes. Even APT do not send their A-team unless they know you're hardened.
  45 | 	5% of the effort gets 95% of the results. APT rely on nobody watching because almost nobody does. Your effort makes the difference.
  46 | 
  47 |   NOTE: If you encounter unexplainable event inclusion/exclusion, you may have a second Sysmon instance installed under a different exe filename.
  48 | 	To clear this, try downloading the latest version and uninstalling with -u force. If it hangs, kill the processes and run it again to cleanup.
  49 | 
  50 |   TECHNICAL:
  51 |   - Run sysmon.exe -? for a briefing on Sysmon configuration.
  52 |   - Sysmon XML cannot use the AMPERSAND sign. Replace it with this: &amp;
  53 |   - Sysmon 8+ can track which rule caused an event to be logged through the "RuleName" field.
  54 |   - If you only specify exclude for a filtering subsection, everything in that subsection is logged by default.
  55 |   - Some Sysmon monitoring abilities are not meant for widely deployed general-purpose use due to performance impact. Depends on environment.
  56 |   - Duplicate or overlapping "Include" rules do not result in duplicate events being logged.
  57 |   - All characters enclosed by XML tags are always interpreted literally. Sysmon does not support wildcards (*), alternate characters, or RegEx.
  58 |   - In registry events, the value name is appended to the full key path with a "\" delimiter. Default key values are named "\(Default)"
  59 |   - "Image" is a technical term for a compiled binary file like an EXE or DLL. Also, it can match just the filename, or entire path.
  60 |   - "ProcessGuid" and "LoginGuid" are not random, they contain some embedded information. https://gist.github.com/mattifestation/0102042160c9a60b2b847378c0ef70b4
  61 | 
  62 |   FILTERING: Filter conditions available for use are: is, is not, contains, excludes, begin with, end with, less than, more than, image
  63 |   - The "image" filter is usable on any field. Same as "is" but can either match entire string, or only the text after last "\". Credit: @mattifestation
  64 | 
  65 | -->
  66 | 
  67 | <Sysmon schemaversion="4.22">
  68 | 	<!--SYSMON META CONFIG-->
  69 | 	<HashAlgorithms>md5,sha256,IMPHASH</HashAlgorithms> <!-- Both MD5 and SHA256 are the industry-standard algorithms for identifying files -->
  70 | 	<CheckRevocation/> <!-- Check loaded drivers, log if their code-signing certificate has been revoked, in case malware stole one to sign a kernel driver -->
  71 | 
  72 | 	<!-- <ImageLoad/> --> <!-- Would manually force-on ImageLoad monitoring, even without configuration below. Included only documentation. -->
  73 | 	<!-- <ProcessAccessConfig/> --> <!-- Would manually force-on ProcessAccess monitoring, even without configuration below. Included only documentation. -->
  74 | 	<!-- <PipeMonitoringConfig/> --> <!-- Would manually force-on PipeCreated / PipeConnected events, even without configuration below. Included only documentation. -->
  75 | 
  76 | 	<EventFiltering>
  77 | 
  78 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 1 : PROCESS CREATION [ProcessCreate]-->
  79 | 		<!--COMMENT:	All processes launched will be logged, except for what matches a rule below. It's best to be as specific as possible,
  80 | 			to avoid user-mode executables imitating other process names to avoid logging, or if malware drops files in an existing directory.
  81 | 			Ultimately, you must weigh CPU time checking many detailed rules, against the risk of malware exploiting the blindness created.
  82 | 			Beware of Masquerading, where attackers imitate the names and paths of legitimate tools. Ideally, you'd use both file path and
  83 | 			code signatures to validate, but Sysmon does not support that. Look into AppLocker/WindowsDeviceGuard for whitelisting support. -->
  84 | 
  85 | 		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessID, Image, FileVersion, Description, Product, Company, CommandLine, CurrentDirectory, User, LogonGuid, LogonId, TerminalSessionId, IntegrityLevel, Hashes, ParentProcessGuid, ParentProcessId, ParentImage, ParentCommandLine, RuleName-->
  86 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
  87 | 		<ProcessCreate onmatch="exclude">
  88 | 			<!--SECTION: Microsoft Windows-->
  89 | 			<CommandLine condition="begin with"> "C:\Windows\system32\wermgr.exe" "-queuereporting_svc" </CommandLine> <!--Windows:Windows error reporting/telemetry-->
  90 | 			<CommandLine condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid</CommandLine> <!--Windows-->
  91 | 			<CommandLine condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -Embedding</CommandLine> <!--Windows: WMI provider host-->
  92 | 			<CommandLine condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding</CommandLine> <!--Windows: WMI provider host-->
  93 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\wermgr.exe -upload</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Windows error reporting/telemetry-->
  94 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\SearchIndexer.exe /Embedding</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Search Indexer-->
  95 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\windows\system32\wermgr.exe -queuereporting</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Windows error reporting/telemetry-->
  96 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">\??\C:\Windows\system32\autochk.exe *</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Bootup: Auto Check Utility-->
  97 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">\SystemRoot\System32\smss.exe</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Bootup: Windows Session Manager-->
  98 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Apps permissions [ https://fossbytes.com/runtime-broker-process-windows-10/ ] -->
  99 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\microsoft shared\ink\TabTip32.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Touch Keyboard and Handwriting Panel Helper-->
 100 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\TokenBrokerCookies.exe</Image> <!--Windows: SSO sign-in assistant for MicrosoftOnline.com-->
 101 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\plasrv.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Performance Logs and Alerts DCOM Server-->
 102 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\wifitask.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Wireless Background Task-->
 103 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\CompatTelRunner.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Customer Experience Improvement-->
 104 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\PrintIsolationHost.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Printing-->
 105 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.Exe</Image> <!--Windows: KMS activation-->
 106 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\audiodg.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Launched constantly-->
 107 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Command line interface host process-->
 108 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\mobsync.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Network file syncing-->
 109 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\musNotification.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Update pop-ups-->
 110 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\musNotificationUx.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Update pop-ups-->
 111 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft:Power configuration management-->
 112 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\sndVol.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Volume control-->
 113 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\sppsvc.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Software Protection Service-->
 114 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\wbem\WmiApSrv.exe</Image> <!--Windows: WMI performance adapter host process-->
 115 | 			<IntegrityLevel condition="is">AppContainer</IntegrityLevel> <!--Windows: Don't care about sandboxed processes right now. Will need to revisit this decision.-->
 116 | 			<ParentCommandLine condition="begin with">%%SystemRoot%%\system32\csrss.exe ObjectDirectory=\Windows</ParentCommandLine> <!--Windows:CommandShell: Triggered when programs use the command shell, but doesn't provide attribution for what caused it-->
 117 | 			<ParentCommandLine condition="is">C:\windows\system32\wermgr.exe -queuereporting</ParentCommandLine> <!--Windows:Windows error reporting/telemetry-->
 118 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\WINDOWS\system32\devicecensus.exe UserCxt</CommandLine>
 119 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\usocoreworker.exe -Embedding</CommandLine>
 120 | 			<ParentImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\SearchIndexer.exe</ParentImage> <!--Windows:Search: Launches many uninteresting sub-processes-->
 121 | 			<!--SECTION: Windows:svchost-->
 122 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -s StateRepository</CommandLine>
 123 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s camsvc</CommandLine>
 124 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel</CommandLine> <!--Windows 10-->
 125 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s tiledatamodelsvc</CommandLine>
 126 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k camera -s FrameServer</CommandLine>
 127 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k dcomlaunch -s LSM</CommandLine>
 128 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k dcomlaunch -s PlugPlay</CommandLine>
 129 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k defragsvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows defragmentation-->
 130 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k devicesflow -s DevicesFlowUserSvc</CommandLine>
 131 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k imgsvc</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:The Windows Image Acquisition Service-->
 132 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localService -s EventSystem</CommandLine>
 133 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localService -s bthserv</CommandLine>
 134 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s BthAvctpSvc</CommandLine>
 135 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localService -s nsi</CommandLine>
 136 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localService -s w32Time</CommandLine>
 137 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceAndNoImpersonation</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
 138 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceNetworkRestricted -s Dhcp</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
 139 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceNetworkRestricted -s EventLog</CommandLine>
 140 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceNetworkRestricted -s TimeBrokerSvc</CommandLine>
 141 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceNetworkRestricted -s WFDSConMgrSvc</CommandLine>
 142 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s BTAGService</CommandLine>
 143 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService</CommandLine> <!--Win10:1903:Network Connection Broker-->
 144 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceNetworkRestricted</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
 145 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceAndNoImpersonation -s SensrSvc</CommandLine>
 146 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV</CommandLine> <!--Windows:SSDP [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Service_Discovery_Protocol ] -->
 147 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceNoNetwork</CommandLine>
 148 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s WPDBusEnum</CommandLine>
 149 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s fhsvc</CommandLine>
 150 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -s DeviceAssociationService</CommandLine>
 151 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -s NcbService</CommandLine>
 152 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -s SensorService</CommandLine>
 153 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -s TabletInputService</CommandLine>
 154 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -s UmRdpService</CommandLine>
 155 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -s WPDBusEnum</CommandLine>
 156 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcSvc</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Passport--> 
 157 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Passport Container--> 
 158 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceAndNoImpersonation -s SCardSvr</CommandLine>
 159 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wuauserv</CommandLine>
 160 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SessionEnv</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Remote desktop configuration-->
 161 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -s WdiSystemHost</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Diagnostic System Host [ http://www.blackviper.com/windows-services/diagnostic-system-host/ ] -->
 162 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s WdiSystemHost</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Diagnostic System Host [ http://www.blackviper.com/windows-services/diagnostic-system-host/ ] -->
 163 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted</CommandLine> <!--Windows-->
 164 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Windows Live Sign-In Assistant [ https://www.howtogeek.com/howto/30348/what-are-wlidsvc.exe-and-wlidsvcm.exe-and-why-are-they-running/ ] -->
 165 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ncaSvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network Connectivity Assistant [ http://www.blackviper.com/windows-services/network-connectivity-assistant/ ] -->
 166 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BDESVC</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: BitLocker Drive Encryption-->
 167 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s BDESVC</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Win10:1903:Network: BitLocker Drive Encryption-->
 168 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s BITS</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: Background Intelligent File Transfer (BITS) -->
 169 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: Background Intelligent File Transfer (BITS) -->
 170 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s CertPropSvc</CommandLine>
 171 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s DsmSvc</CommandLine>
 172 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Appinfo</CommandLine>
 173 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Gpsvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: Group Policy -->
 174 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s ProfSvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
 175 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s SENS</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
 176 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s SessionEnv</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
 177 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Themes</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
 178 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Winmgmt</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) -->
 179 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
 180 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkService -p -s DoSvc</CommandLine>
 181 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkService -s Dnscache</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: DNS caching, other uses -->
 182 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkService -s LanmanWorkstation</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: "Workstation" service, used for SMB file-sharing connections and RDP-->
 183 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkService -s NlaSvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: Network Location Awareness-->
 184 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkService -s TermService</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: Terminal Services (RDP)-->
 185 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkService</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
 186 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkServiceNetworkRestricted</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
 187 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k rPCSS</CommandLine> <!--Windows Services-->
 188 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k secsvcs</CommandLine>
 189 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k swprv</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Software Shadow Copy Provider-->
 190 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k unistackSvcGroup</CommandLine> <!--Windows 10-->
 191 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k utcsvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows Services-->
 192 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k wbioSvcGroup</CommandLine> <!--Windows Services-->
 193 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k werSvcGroup</CommandLine> <!--Windows: ErrorReporting-->
 194 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k wusvcs -p -s WaaSMedicSvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Update Medic Service [ https://www.thewindowsclub.com/windows-update-medic-service ] -->
 195 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k wsappx -p -s ClipSVC</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Apps: Client License Service-->
 196 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k wsappx -p -s AppXSvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Apps: AppX Deployment Service-->
 197 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k wsappx -s ClipSVC</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Apps: Client License Service-->
 198 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k wsappx</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Apps [ https://www.howtogeek.com/320261/what-is-wsappx-and-why-is-it-running-on-my-pc/ ] -->
 199 | 			<ParentCommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs</ParentCommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services: Spawns Consent.exe-->
 200 | 			<ParentCommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted</ParentCommandLine> <!--Windows-->
 201 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\deviceenroller.exe /c /AutoEnrollMDM</CommandLine> <!--Windows: AzureAD device enrollment agent-->
 202 | 			<!--SECTION: Microsoft:Edge-->
 203 | 			<CommandLine condition="begin with">"C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge Dev\Application\msedge.exe" --type=</CommandLine>
 204 | 			<!--SECTION: Microsoft:dotNet-->
 205 | 			<CommandLine condition="begin with">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\ngen.exe</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:DotNet-->
 206 | 			<CommandLine condition="begin with">C:\WINDOWS\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\Ngen.exe</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:DotNet-->
 207 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\mscorsvw.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft:DotNet-->
 208 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorsvw.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft:DotNet-->
 209 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\Framework64\v3.0\WPF\PresentationFontCache.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Font cache service-->
 210 | 			<ParentCommandLine condition="contains">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\ngentask.exe</ParentCommandLine>
 211 | 			<ParentImage condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\mscorsvw.exe</ParentImage> <!--Microsoft:DotNet-->
 212 | 			<ParentImage condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\ngentask.exe</ParentImage> <!--Microsoft:DotNet-->
 213 | 			<ParentImage condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorsvw.exe</ParentImage> <!--Microsoft:DotNet-->
 214 | 			<ParentImage condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\ngentask.exe</ParentImage> <!--Microsoft:DotNet: Spawns thousands of ngen.exe processes-->
 215 | 			<!--SECTION: Microsoft:Office-->
 216 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office16\MSOSYNC.EXE</Image> <!--Microsoft:Office: Background process for SharePoint/Office365 connectivity-->
 217 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\Office16\MSOSYNC.EXE</Image> <!--Microsoft:Office: Background process for SharePoint/Office365 connectivity-->
 218 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\OfficeSoftwareProtectionPlatform\OSPPSVC.EXE</Image> <!--Microsoft:Office: Licensing service-->
 219 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office16\msoia.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft:Office: Telemetry collector-->
 220 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\officebackgroundtaskhandler.exe</Image>
 221 | 			<!--SECTION: Microsoft:Office:Click2Run-->
 222 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeC2RClient.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft:Office: Background process-->
 223 | 			<ParentImage condition="is">C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe</ParentImage> <!--Microsoft:Office: Background process-->
 224 | 			<ParentImage condition="is">C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeC2RClient.exe</ParentImage> <!--Microsoft:Office: Background process-->
 225 | 			<!--SECTION: Windows: Media player-->
 226 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\wmpnscfg.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Windows Media Player Network Sharing Service Configuration Application-->
 227 | 			<!--SECTION: Google-->
 228 | 			<CommandLine condition="begin with">"C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe" --type=</CommandLine> <!--Google:Chrome: massive command-line arguments-->
 229 | 			<CommandLine condition="begin with">"C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe" --type=</CommandLine> <!--Google:Chrome: massive command-line arguments-->
 230 | 		</ProcessCreate>
 231 | 	</RuleGroup>
 232 | 	
 233 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 2 : FILE CREATION TIME RETROACTIVELY CHANGED IN THE FILESYSTEM [FileCreateTime]-->
 234 | 		<!--COMMENT:	[ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1099 ] -->
 235 | 
 236 | 		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, TargetFilename, CreationUtcTime, PreviousCreationUtcTime-->
 237 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 238 | 		<FileCreateTime onmatch="include">
 239 | 			<Image name="T1099" condition="begin with">C:\Users</Image> <!--Look for timestomping in user area, usually nothing should be doing that here-->
 240 | 			<TargetFilename name="T1099" condition="end with">.exe</TargetFilename> <!--Look for backdated executables anywhere-->
 241 | 			<Image name="T1099" condition="begin with">\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy</Image> <!--Nothing should be written here | Credit: @SBousseaden [ https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1133030955407630336 ] -->
 242 | 		</FileCreateTime>
 243 | 	</RuleGroup>
 244 | 
 245 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 246 | 		<FileCreateTime onmatch="exclude">
 247 | 			<Image condition="image">OneDrive.exe</Image> <!--OneDrive constantly changes file times-->
 248 | 			<Image condition="image">C:\Windows\system32\backgroundTaskHost.exe</Image>
 249 | 			<Image condition="contains">setup</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
 250 | 			<Image condition="contains">install</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
 251 | 			<Image condition="contains">Update\</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
 252 | 			<Image condition="end with">redist.exe</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
 253 | 			<Image condition="is">msiexec.exe</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
 254 | 			<Image condition="is">TrustedInstaller.exe</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
 255 | 			<TargetFilename condition="contains">\NVIDIA\NvBackend\ApplicationOntology\</TargetFilename> <!--NVIDIA GeForce Experience Application Ontology, 1000's of events in user profile-->
 256 | 		</FileCreateTime>
 257 | 	</RuleGroup>
 258 | 
 259 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 3 : NETWORK CONNECTION INITIATED [NetworkConnect]-->
 260 | 		<!--COMMENT:	By default this configuration takes a very conservative approach to network logging, limited to only extremely high-signal events.-->
 261 | 		<!--COMMENT:	[ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control ] [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Exfiltration ] [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Lateral_Movement ] -->
 262 | 		<!--TECHNICAL:	For the DestinationHostname, Sysmon uses the GetNameInfo API, which will often not have any information, and may just be a CDN. This is NOT reliable for filtering.-->
 263 | 		<!--TECHNICAL:	For the DestinationPortName, Sysmon uses the GetNameInfo API for the friendly name of ports you see in logs.-->
 264 | 		<!--TECHNICAL:	These exe do not initiate their connections, and thus includes do not work in this section: BITSADMIN NLTEST-->
 265 | 		
 266 | 		<!-- https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/APT-Log-Analysis-Tracking-Attack-Tools-by-Audit-Policy-and-Sysmon.pdf -->
 267 | 
 268 | 		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, User, Protocol, Initiated, SourceIsIpv6, SourceIp, SourceHostname, SourcePort, SourcePortName, DestinationIsIpV6, DestinationIp, DestinationHostname, DestinationPort, DestinationPortName-->
 269 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 270 | 		<NetworkConnect onmatch="include">
 271 | 			<!--Suspicious sources for network-connecting binaries-->
 272 | 			<Image name="Usermode" condition="begin with">C:\Users</Image> <!--Tools downloaded by users can use other processes for networking, but this is a very valuable indicator.-->
 273 | 			<Image name="Caution" condition="begin with">C:\Recycle</Image> <!--Nothing should operate from the RecycleBin locations.-->
 274 | 			<Image condition="begin with">C:\ProgramData</Image> <!--Normally, network communications should be sourced from "Program Files" not from ProgramData, something to look at-->
 275 | 			<Image condition="begin with">C:\Windows\Temp</Image> <!--Suspicious anything would communicate from the system-level temp directory-->
 276 | 			<Image name="Caution" condition="begin with">\</Image> <!--Devices and VSC shouldn't be executing changes | Credit: @SBousseaden @ionstorm @neu5ron @PerchedSystems [ https://twitter.com/SwiftOnSecurity/status/1133167323991486464 ] -->
 277 | 			<Image name="Caution" condition="begin with">C:\perflogs</Image> <!-- Credit @blu3_team [ https://blu3-team.blogspot.com/2019/05/netconn-from-suspicious-directories.html ] -->
 278 | 			<Image name="Caution" condition="begin with">C:\intel</Image> <!-- Credit @blu3_team [ https://blu3-team.blogspot.com/2019/05/netconn-from-suspicious-directories.html ] -->
 279 | 			<Image name="Caution" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\fonts</Image> <!-- Credit @blu3_team [ https://blu3-team.blogspot.com/2019/05/netconn-from-suspicious-directories.html ] -->
 280 | 			<Image name="Caution" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\config</Image> <!-- Credit @blu3_team [ https://blu3-team.blogspot.com/2019/05/netconn-from-suspicious-directories.html ] -->
 281 | 			<!--Suspicious Windows tools-->
 282 | 			<Image condition="image">at.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Remote task scheduling, removed in Win10 | Credit @ion-storm -->
 283 | 			<Image condition="image">certutil.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Certificate tool can contact outbound | Credit @ion-storm @FVT [ https://twitter.com/FVT/status/834433734602530817 ] -->
 284 | 			<Image condition="image">cmd.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Remote command prompt-->
 285 | 			<Image condition="image">cmstp.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Connection manager profiles can launch executables from WebDAV [ https://twitter.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408 ] | Credit @NickTyrer @Oddvarmoe @KyleHanslovan @subTee -->
 286 | 			<Image condition="image">cscript.exe</Image> <!--WindowsScriptingHost: | Credit @Cyb3rOps [ https://gist.github.com/Neo23x0/a4b4af9481e01e749409 ] -->
 287 | 			<Image condition="image">driverquery.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Remote recognisance of system configuration, oudated/vulnerable drivers -->
 288 | 			<Image condition="image">dsquery.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft: Query Active Directory -->
 289 | 			<Image condition="image">hh.exe</Image> <!--Windows: HTML Help Executable, opens CHM files -->
 290 | 			<Image condition="image">infDefaultInstall.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft: [ https://github.com/huntresslabs/evading-autoruns ] | Credit @KyleHanslovan -->
 291 | 			<Image condition="image">java.exe</Image> <!--Java: Monitor usage of vulnerable application and init from JAR files | Credit @ion-storm -->
 292 | 			<Image condition="image">javaw.exe</Image> <!--Java: Monitor usage of vulnerable application and init from JAR files -->
 293 | 			<Image condition="image">javaws.exe</Image> <!--Java: Monitor usage of vulnerable application and init from JAR files -->
 294 | 			<Image condition="image">mmc.exe</Image> <!--Windows: -->
 295 | 			<Image condition="image">msbuild.exe</Image> <!--Windows: [ https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/a314f6106633fba4b70f9d6ddbee452e8f8f44a72117749c21243dc93c7ed3ac?environmentId=100 ] -->
 296 | 			<Image condition="image">mshta.exe</Image> <!--Windows: HTML application executes scripts without IE protections | Credit @ion-storm [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application ] -->
 297 | 			<Image condition="image">msiexec.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Can install from http:// paths | Credit @vector-sec -->
 298 | 			<Image condition="image">nbtstat.exe</Image> <!--Windows: NetBIOS statistics, attackers use to enumerate local network -->
 299 | 			<Image condition="image">net.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Note - May not detect anything, net.exe is a front-end to lower APIs | Credit @ion-storm -->
 300 | 			<Image condition="image">net1.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Launched by "net.exe", but it may not detect connections either -->
 301 | 			<Image condition="image">notepad.exe</Image> <!--Windows: [ https://secrary.com/ReversingMalware/CoinMiner/ ] [ https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2013/08/08/why-is-notepad-exe-connecting-to-the-internet/ ] -->
 302 | 			<Image condition="image">nslookup.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Retrieve data over DNS -->
 303 | 			<Image condition="image">powershell.exe</Image> <!--Windows: PowerShell interface-->
 304 | 			<Image condition="image">qprocess.exe</Image> <!--Windows: [ https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/APT-Log-Analysis-Tracking-Attack-Tools-by-Audit-Policy-and-Sysmon.pdf ] -->
 305 | 			<Image condition="image">qwinsta.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Query remote sessions | Credit @ion-storm -->
 306 | 			<Image condition="image">qwinsta.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Remotely query login sessions on a server or workstation | Credit @ion-storm -->
 307 | 			<Image condition="image">reg.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Remote Registry editing ability | Credit @ion-storm -->
 308 | 			<Image condition="image">regsvcs.exe</Image> <!--Windows: [ https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/3f94d7080e6c5b8f59eeecc3d44f7e817b31562caeba21d02ad705a0bfc63d67?environmentId=100 ] -->
 309 | 			<Image condition="image">regsvr32.exe</Image> <!--Windows: [ https://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2016/04/bypass-application-whitelisting-script.html ] -->
 310 | 			<Image condition="image">rundll32.exe</Image> <!--Windows: [ https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2016/07/22/why-is-rundll32-exe-connecting-to-the-internet/ ] -->
 311 | 			<Image condition="image">rwinsta.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Disconnect remote sessions | Credit @ion-storm -->
 312 | 			<Image condition="image">sc.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Remotely change Windows service settings | Credit @ion-storm -->
 313 | 			<Image condition="image">schtasks.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Command-line interface to local and remote tasks -->
 314 | 			<Image condition="image">taskkill.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Kill processes, has remote ability -->
 315 | 			<Image condition="image">tasklist.exe</Image> <!--Windows: List processes, has remote ability -->
 316 | 			<Image condition="image">wmic.exe</Image> <!--WindowsManagementInstrumentation: Credit @Cyb3rOps [ https://gist.github.com/Neo23x0/a4b4af9481e01e749409 ] -->
 317 | 			<Image condition="image">wscript.exe</Image> <!--WindowsScriptingHost: | Credit @arekfurt -->
 318 | 			<!--Relevant 3rd Party Tools-->
 319 | 			<Image condition="image">nc.exe</Image> <!-- Nmap's modern version of netcat [ https://nmap.org/ncat/guide/index.html#ncat-overview ] [ https://securityblog.gr/1517/create-backdoor-in-windows-with-ncat/ ] -->
 320 | 			<Image condition="image">ncat.exe</Image> <!-- Nmap's modern version of netcat [ https://nmap.org/ncat/guide/index.html#ncat-overview ] [ https://securityblog.gr/1517/create-backdoor-in-windows-with-ncat/ ] -->
 321 | 			<Image condition="image">psexec.exe</Image> <!--Sysinternals:PsExec client side | Credit @Cyb3rOps -->
 322 | 			<Image condition="image">psexesvc.exe</Image> <!--Sysinternals:PsExec server side | Credit @Cyb3rOps -->
 323 | 			<Image condition="image">tor.exe</Image> <!--Tor [ https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/800bf028a23440134fc834efc5c1e02cc70f05b2e800bbc285d7c92a4b126b1c?environmentId=100 ] -->
 324 | 			<Image condition="image">vnc.exe</Image> <!-- VNC client | Credit @Cyb3rOps -->
 325 | 			<Image condition="image">vncservice.exe</Image> <!-- VNC server | Credit @Cyb3rOps -->
 326 | 			<Image condition="image">vncviewer.exe</Image> <!-- VNC client | Credit @Cyb3rOps -->
 327 | 			<Image condition="image">winexesvc.exe</Image> <!-- Winexe service executable | Credit @Cyb3rOps -->
 328 | 			<Image condition="image">nmap.exe</Image>
 329 | 			<Image condition="image">psinfo.exe</Image>
 330 | 			<!--Ports: Suspicious-->
 331 | 			<DestinationPort name="SSH" condition="is">22</DestinationPort> <!--SSH protocol, monitor admin connections-->
 332 | 			<DestinationPort name="Telnet" condition="is">23</DestinationPort> <!--Telnet protocol, monitor admin connections, insecure-->
 333 | 			<DestinationPort name="SMTP" condition="is">25</DestinationPort> <!--SMTP mail protocol port, insecure, used by threats-->
 334 | 			<DestinationPort name="IMAP" condition="is">143</DestinationPort> <!--IMAP mail protocol port, insecure, used by threats-->
 335 | 			<DestinationPort name="RDP" condition="is">3389</DestinationPort> <!--Windows:RDP: Monitor admin connections-->
 336 | 			<DestinationPort name="VNC" condition="is">5800</DestinationPort> <!--VNC protocol: Monitor admin connections, often insecure, using hard-coded admin password-->
 337 | 			<DestinationPort name="VNC" condition="is">5900</DestinationPort> <!--VNC protocol Monitor admin connections, often insecure, using hard-coded admin password-->
 338 | 			<DestinationPort name="Alert,Metasploit" condition="is">444</DestinationPort>
 339 | 			<!--Ports: Proxy-->
 340 | 			<DestinationPort name="Proxy" condition="is">1080</DestinationPort> <!--Socks proxy port | Credit @ion-storm-->
 341 | 			<DestinationPort name="Proxy" condition="is">3128</DestinationPort> <!--Socks proxy port | Credit @ion-storm-->
 342 | 			<DestinationPort name="Proxy" condition="is">8080</DestinationPort> <!--Socks proxy port | Credit @ion-storm-->
 343 | 			<!--Ports: Tor-->
 344 | 			<DestinationPort name="Tor" condition="is">1723</DestinationPort> <!--Tor protocol [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1090 ] | Credit @ion-storm-->
 345 | 			<DestinationPort name="Tor" condition="is">9001</DestinationPort> <!--Tor protocol [ http://www.computerworlduk.com/tutorial/security/tor-enterprise-2016-blocking-malware-darknet-use-rogue-nodes-3633907/ ] -->
 346 | 			<DestinationPort name="Tor" condition="is">9030</DestinationPort> <!--Tor protocol [ http://www.computerworlduk.com/tutorial/security/tor-enterprise-2016-blocking-malware-darknet-use-rogue-nodes-3633907/ ] -->
 347 | 		</NetworkConnect>
 348 | 	</RuleGroup>
 349 | 
 350 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 351 | 		<NetworkConnect onmatch="exclude">
 352 | 			<!--SECTION: Microsoft-->
 353 | 			<Image condition="begin with">C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\</Image>
 354 | 			<Image condition="end with">AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft: Teams-->
 355 | 			<DestinationHostname condition="end with">.microsoft.com</DestinationHostname> <!--Microsoft:Update delivery-->
 356 | 			<DestinationHostname condition="end with">microsoft.com.akadns.net</DestinationHostname> <!--Microsoft:Update delivery-->
 357 | 			<DestinationHostname condition="end with">microsoft.com.nsatc.net</DestinationHostname> <!--Microsoft:Update delivery-->
 358 | 			<!--Section: Loopback Addresses-->
 359 | 			<DestinationIp condition="is">127.0.0.1</DestinationIp> <!--Credit @ITProPaul-->
 360 | 			<DestinationIp condition="begin with">fe80:0:0:0</DestinationIp> <!--Credit @ITProPaul-->
 361 | 		</NetworkConnect>
 362 | 	</RuleGroup>
 363 | 
 364 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 4 : RESERVED FOR SYSMON SERVICE STATUS MESSAGES-->
 365 | 
 366 | 		<!--DATA: UtcTime, State, Version, SchemaVersion-->
 367 | 		<!--Cannot be filtered.-->
 368 | 
 369 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 5 : PROCESS ENDED [ProcessTerminate]-->
 370 | 		<!--COMMENT:	Useful data in building infection timelines.-->
 371 | 
 372 | 		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image-->
 373 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 374 | 		<ProcessTerminate onmatch="include">
 375 | 			<Image condition="begin with">C:\Users</Image> <!--Process terminations by user binaries-->
 376 | 			<Image condition="begin with">\</Image> <!--Devices and VSC shouldn't be executing changes | Credit: @SBousseaden @ionstorm @neu5ron @PerchedSystems [ https://twitter.com/SwiftOnSecurity/status/1133167323991486464 ] -->
 377 | 		</ProcessTerminate>
 378 | 	</RuleGroup>
 379 | 
 380 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 381 | 		<ProcessTerminate onmatch="exclude">
 382 | 		</ProcessTerminate>
 383 | 	</RuleGroup>
 384 | 
 385 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 6 : DRIVER LOADED INTO KERNEL [DriverLoad]-->
 386 | 		<!--COMMENT:	Because drivers with bugs can be used to escalate to kernel permissions, be extremely selective
 387 | 			about what you exclude from monitoring. Low event volume, little incentive to exclude.
 388 | 			[ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1014 ] -->
 389 | 		<!--TECHNICAL:	Sysmon will check the signing certificate revocation status of any driver you don't exclude.-->
 390 | 
 391 | 		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ImageLoaded, Hashes, Signed, Signature, SignatureStatus-->
 392 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 393 | 		<DriverLoad onmatch="exclude">
 394 | 			<Signature condition="contains">microsoft</Signature> <!--Exclude signed Microsoft drivers-->
 395 | 			<Signature condition="contains">windows</Signature> <!--Exclude signed Microsoft drivers-->
 396 | 			<Signature condition="begin with">Intel </Signature> <!--Exclude signed Intel drivers-->
 397 | 		</DriverLoad>
 398 | 	</RuleGroup>
 399 | 
 400 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 7 : DLL (IMAGE) LOADED BY PROCESS [ImageLoad]-->
 401 | 		<!--COMMENT:	Can cause high system load, disabled by default.-->
 402 | 		<!--COMMENT:	[ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1073 ] [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1038 ] [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1034 ] -->
 403 | 
 404 | 		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, ImageLoaded, Hashes, Signed, Signature, SignatureStatus-->
 405 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 406 | 		<ImageLoad onmatch="include">
 407 | 			<!--NOTE: Using "include" with no rules means nothing in this section will be logged-->
 408 | 		</ImageLoad>
 409 | 	</RuleGroup>
 410 | 
 411 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 8 : REMOTE THREAD CREATED [CreateRemoteThread]-->
 412 | 		<!--COMMENT:	Monitor for processes injecting code into other processes. Often used by malware to cloak their actions. Also when Firefox loads Flash.
 413 | 		[ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1055 ] -->
 414 | 
 415 | 		<!--DATA: UtcTime, SourceProcessGuid, SourceProcessId, SourceImage, TargetProcessId, TargetImage, NewThreadId, StartAddress, StartModule, StartFunction-->
 416 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 417 | 		<CreateRemoteThread onmatch="exclude">
 418 | 			<!--COMMENT: Exclude mostly-safe sources and log anything else.-->
 419 | 			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe</SourceImage>
 420 | 			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe</SourceImage>
 421 | 			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\wininit.exe</SourceImage>
 422 | 			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\csrss.exe</SourceImage>
 423 | 			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\services.exe</SourceImage>
 424 | 			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exe</SourceImage>
 425 | 			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\audiodg.exe</SourceImage>
 426 | 			<StartModule condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\kernel32.dll</StartModule>
 427 | 			<TargetImage condition="is">C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe</TargetImage>
 428 | 		</CreateRemoteThread>
 429 | 	</RuleGroup>
 430 | 
 431 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 9 : RAW DISK ACCESS [RawAccessRead]-->
 432 | 		<!--EVENT 9: "RawAccessRead detected"-->
 433 | 		<!--COMMENT:	Can cause high system load, disabled by default.-->
 434 | 		<!--COMMENT:	Monitor for raw sector-level access to the disk, often used to bypass access control lists or access locked files.
 435 | 			Disabled by default since including even one entry here activates this component. Reward/performance/rule maintenance decision.
 436 | 			Encourage you to experiment with this feature yourself. [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1067 ] -->
 437 | 		<!--COMMENT:	You will likely want to set this to a full capture on domain controllers, where no process should be doing raw reads.-->
 438 | 
 439 | 		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, Device-->
 440 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 441 | 		<RawAccessRead onmatch="include">
 442 | 			<!--NOTE: Using "include" with no rules means nothing in this section will be logged-->
 443 | 		</RawAccessRead>
 444 | 	</RuleGroup>
 445 | 
 446 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 10 : INTER-PROCESS ACCESS [ProcessAccess]-->
 447 | 		<!--EVENT 10: "Process accessed"-->
 448 | 		<!--COMMENT:	Can cause high system load, disabled by default.-->
 449 | 		<!--COMMENT:	Monitor for processes accessing other process' memory.-->
 450 | 
 451 | 		<!--DATA: UtcTime, SourceProcessGuid, SourceProcessId, SourceThreadId, SourceImage, TargetProcessGuid, TargetProcessId, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, CallTrace-->
 452 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 453 | 		<ProcessAccess onmatch="include">
 454 | 			<!--NOTE: Using "include" with no rules means nothing in this section will be logged-->
 455 | 		</ProcessAccess>
 456 | 	</RuleGroup>
 457 | 
 458 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 11 : FILE CREATED [FileCreate]-->
 459 | 		<!--EVENT 11: "File created"-->
 460 | 		<!--NOTE:	Other filesystem "minifilters" can make it appear to Sysmon that some files are being written twice. This is not a Sysmon issue, per Mark Russinovich.-->
 461 | 		<!--NOTE:	You may not see files detected by antivirus. Other filesystem minifilters, like antivirus, can act before Sysmon receives the alert a file was written.-->
 462 | 
 463 | 		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, TargetFilename, CreationUtcTime-->
 464 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 465 | 		<FileCreate onmatch="include">
 466 | 			<TargetFilename name="T1023" condition="contains">\Start Menu</TargetFilename> <!--Windows: Startup links and shortcut modification [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1023 ] -->
 467 | 			<TargetFilename name="T1165" condition="contains">\Startup\</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Changes to user's auto-launched files and shortcuts-->
 468 | 			<TargetFilename name="OutlookAttachment" condition="contains">\Content.Outlook\</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Outlook: attachments-->
 469 | 			<TargetFilename name="Downloads" condition="contains">\Downloads\</TargetFilename> <!--Downloaded files. Does not include "Run" files in IE-->
 470 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.application</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:ClickOnce: [ https://blog.netspi.com/all-you-need-is-one-a-clickonce-love-story/ ] -->
 471 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.appref-ms</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:ClickOnce application | Credit @ion-storm -->
 472 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.bat</TargetFilename> <!--Batch scripting-->
 473 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.chm</TargetFilename>
 474 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.cmd</TargetFilename> <!--Batch scripting: Batch scripts can also use the .cmd extension | Credit: @mmazanec -->
 475 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.cmdline</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:dotNet: Executed by cvtres.exe-->
 476 | 			<TargetFilename name="T1176" condition="end with">.crx</TargetFilename> <!--Chrome extension-->
 477 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.dmp</TargetFilename> <!--Process dumps [ (fr) http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/minidump ] -->
 478 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.docm</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Office:Word: Macro-->
 479 | 			<TargetFilename name="DLL" condition="end with">.dll</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Office:Word: Macro-->
 480 | 			<TargetFilename name="EXE" condition="end with">.exe</TargetFilename> <!--Executable-->
 481 | 			<TargetFilename name="ProcessHostingdotNETCode" condition="end with">.exe.log</TargetFilename> <!-- [ https://github.com/bitsadmin/nopowershell ] | Credit: @SBousseaden [ https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1137493597769687040 ]  -->
 482 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.jar</TargetFilename> <!--Java applets-->
 483 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.jnlp</TargetFilename> <!--Java applets-->
 484 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.jse</TargetFilename> <!--Scripting [ Example: https://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/Mal~Phires-C/detailed-analysis.aspx ] -->
 485 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.hta</TargetFilename> <!--Scripting-->
 486 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.job</TargetFilename> <!--Scheduled task-->
 487 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.pptm</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Office:Word: Macro-->
 488 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.ps1</TargetFilename> <!--PowerShell [ More information: http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/08/27/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-16/ ] -->
 489 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.sys</TargetFilename> <!--System driver files-->
 490 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.scr</TargetFilename> <!--System driver files-->
 491 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.vbe</TargetFilename> <!--VisualBasicScripting-->
 492 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.vbs</TargetFilename> <!--VisualBasicScripting-->
 493 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.xlsm</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Office:Word: Macro-->
 494 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">proj</TargetFilename><!--Microsoft:MSBuild:Script: More information: https://twitter.com/subTee/status/885919612969394177-->
 495 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.sln</TargetFilename><!--Microsoft:MSBuild:Script: More information: https://twitter.com/subTee/status/885919612969394177-->
 496 | 			<TargetFilename name="DefaultUserModified" condition="begin with">C:\Users\Default</TargetFilename> <!--Windows: Changes to default user profile-->
 497 | 			<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\Drivers</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft: Drivers dropped here-->
 498 | 			<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Drivers</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft: Drivers dropped here-->
 499 | 			<TargetFilename name="T1037,T1484" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\GroupPolicy\Machine\Scripts</TargetFilename> <!--Group policy [ More information: http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/01/07/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-52/ ] -->
 500 | 			<TargetFilename name="T1037,T1484" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\GroupPolicy\User\Scripts</TargetFilename> <!--Group policy [ More information: http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/01/07/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-52/ ] -->
 501 | 			<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\Wbem</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:WMI: [ More information: http://2014.hackitoergosum.org/slides/day1_WMI_Shell_Andrei_Dumitrescu.pdf ] -->
 502 | 			<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:WMI: [ More information: http://2014.hackitoergosum.org/slides/day1_WMI_Shell_Andrei_Dumitrescu.pdf ] -->
 503 | 			<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Powershell: Look for modifications for persistence [ https://www.malwarearchaeology.com/cheat-sheets ] -->
 504 | 			<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Powershell: Look for modifications for persistence [ https://www.malwarearchaeology.com/cheat-sheets ] -->
 505 | 			<TargetFilename name="T1053" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\Tasks\</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:ScheduledTasks [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1053 ] -->
 506 | 			<TargetFilename name="T1053" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\Tasks</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:ScheduledTasks [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1053 ] -->
 507 | 			<TargetFilename name="T1053" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Tasks</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:ScheduledTasks [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1053 ] -->
 508 | 			<Image condition="begin with">\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy</Image> <!--Nothing should be executing from VSC | Credit: @SBousseaden [ https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1133030955407630336 ] -->
 509 | 			<!--Windows application compatibility-->
 510 | 			<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\AppPatch\Custom</TargetFilename> <!--Windows: Application compatibility shims [ https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html ] -->
 511 | 			<TargetFilename condition="contains">VirtualStore</TargetFilename> <!--Windows: UAC virtualization [ https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20150902-00/?p=91681 ] -->
 512 | 			<!--Exploitable file names-->
 513 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.xls</TargetFilename> <!--Legacy Office files are often used for attacks-->
 514 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.ppt</TargetFilename> <!--Legacy Office files are often used for attacks-->
 515 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.rtf</TargetFilename> <!--RTF files often 0day malware vectors when opened by Office-->
 516 | 		</FileCreate>
 517 | 	</RuleGroup>
 518 | 
 519 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 520 | 		<FileCreate onmatch="exclude">
 521 | 			<!--SECTION: Microsoft-->
 522 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files (x86)\EMET 5.5\EMET_Service.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft:EMET: Writes to C:\Windows\AppPatch\-->
 523 | 			<!--SECTION: Microsoft:Office:Click2Run-->
 524 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeC2RClient.exe</Image> <!-- Microsoft:Office Click2Run-->
 525 | 			<!--SECTION: Windows-->
 526 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\smss.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Session Manager SubSystem: Creates swapfile.sys,pagefile.sys,hiberfile.sys-->
 527 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\CompatTelRunner.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Windows 10 app, creates tons of cache files-->
 528 | 			<Image condition="is">\\?\C:\Windows\system32\wbem\WMIADAP.EXE</Image> <!-- Windows: WMI Performance updates-->
 529 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\mobsync.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Network file syncing-->
 530 | 			<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\DriverStore\Temp\</TargetFilename> <!-- Windows: Temp files by DrvInst.exe-->
 531 | 			<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\wbem\Performance\</TargetFilename> <!-- Windows: Created in wbem by WMIADAP.exe-->
 532 | 			<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\Installer\</TargetFilename> <!--Windows:Installer: Ignore MSI installer files caching-->
 533 | 			<!--SECTION: Windows:Updates-->
 534 | 			<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\$WINDOWS.~BT\Sources\</TargetFilename> <!-- Windows: Feature updates containing lots of .exe and .sys-->
 535 | 			<Image condition="begin with">C:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows</Image> <!-- Windows: Windows update-->
 536 | 		</FileCreate>
 537 | 	</RuleGroup>
 538 | 
 539 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 12 & 13 & 14 : REGISTRY MODIFICATION [RegistryEvent]-->
 540 | 		<!--EVENT 12: "Registry object added or deleted"-->
 541 | 		<!--EVENT 13: "Registry value set"-->
 542 | 		<!--EVENT 14: "Registry objected renamed"-->
 543 | 
 544 | 		<!--NOTE:	Windows writes hundreds or thousands of registry keys a minute, so just because you're not changing things, doesn't mean these rules aren't being run.-->
 545 | 		<!--NOTE:	You do not have to spend a lot of time worrying about performance, CPUs are fast, but it's something to consider. Every rule and condition type has a small cost.-->
 546 | 		<!--NOTE:	"contains" works by finding the first letter, then matching the second, etc, so the first letters should be as low-occurrence as possible.-->
 547 | 		<!--NOTE:	[ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112 ] -->
 548 | 
 549 | 		<!--TECHNICAL:	You cannot filter on the "Details" attribute, due to performance issues when very large keys are written, and variety of data formats-->
 550 | 		<!--TECHNICAL:	Possible prefixes are HKLM, HKCR, and HKU-->
 551 | 		<!--CRITICAL:	Schema version 3.30 and higher change HKLM\="\REGISTRY\MACHINE\" and HKU\="\REGISTRY\USER\" and HKCR\="\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\" and CurrentControlSet="ControlSet001"-->
 552 | 		<!--CRITICAL:	Due to a bug, Sysmon versions BEFORE 7.01 may not properly log with the new prefix style for registry keys that was originally introduced in schema version 3.30-->
 553 | 		<!--NOTE:	Because Sysmon runs as a service, it has no filtering ability for, or concept of, HKCU or HKEY_CURRENT_USER. Use "contains" or "end with" to get around this limitation-->
 554 | 
 555 | 		<!-- ! CRITICAL NOTE !:	It may appear this section is MISSING important entries, but SOME RULES MONITOR MANY KEYS, so look VERY CAREFULLY to see if something is already covered.
 556 | 								Sysmon's wildcard monitoring along with highly-tuned generic strings cuts the rulesets down immensely, compared to doing this in other tools.
 557 | 								For example, most COM hijacking in CLSID's across the registry is covered by a single rule monitoring a InProcServer32 wildcard-->
 558 | 
 559 | 		<!--DATA: EventType, UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, TargetObject, Details (can't filter on), NewName (can't filter on)-->
 560 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 561 | 		<RegistryEvent onmatch="include">
 562 | 			<!--Autorun or Startups-->
 563 | 				<!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ http://www.ghacks.net/2016/06/04/windows-automatic-startup-locations/ ] -->
 564 | 				<!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https://arsenalrecon.com/downloads/resources/Registry_Keys_Related_to_Autorun.ods ] -->
 565 | 				<!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ http://www.silentrunners.org/launchpoints.html ] -->
 566 | 				<!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/articles/article.aspx?p=2762082&seqNum=2 ] -->
 567 | 				<!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ https://web.archive.org/web/20200116001643/http://scholarworks.rit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1533&context=theses | Understanding malware autostart techniques - Matthew Gottlieb ] -->
 568 | 			<TargetObject name="T1060,RunKey" condition="contains">CurrentVersion\Run</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Wildcard for Run keys, including RunOnce, RunOnceEx, RunServices, RunServicesOnce [Also covers terminal server] -->
 569 | 			<TargetObject name="T1060,RunPolicy" condition="contains">Policies\Explorer\Run</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Alternate runs keys | Credit @ion-storm-->
 570 | 			<TargetObject name="T1484" condition="contains">Group Policy\Scripts</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Group policy scripts-->
 571 | 			<TargetObject name="T1484" condition="contains">Windows\System\Scripts</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Wildcard for Logon, Loggoff, Shutdown-->
 572 | 			<TargetObject name="T1060" condition="contains">CurrentVersion\Windows\Load</TargetObject> <!--Windows: [ https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/jj874148.aspx ] -->
 573 | 			<TargetObject name="T1060" condition="contains">CurrentVersion\Windows\Run</TargetObject> <!--Windows: [ https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/jj874148.aspx ] -->
 574 | 			<TargetObject name="T1060" condition="contains">CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell</TargetObject> <!--Windows: [ https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms838576(v=winembedded.5).aspx ] -->
 575 | 			<TargetObject name="T1060" condition="contains">CurrentVersion\Winlogon\System</TargetObject> <!--Windows [ https://www.exterminate-it.com/malpedia/regvals/zlob-dns-changer/118 ] -->
 576 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Autorun location [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1004 ] [ https://www.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order ] -->
 577 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell</TargetObject> <!--Windows: [ https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee851671.aspx ] -->
 578 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Autorun location [ https://www.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order ] -->
 579 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Legacy driver loading | Credit @ion-storm -->
 580 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\BootExecute</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Autorun | Credit @ion-storm | [ https://www.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order ] -->
 581 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AeDebug</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Automatic program crash debug program [ https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-050712-5453-99&tabid=2 ] -->
 582 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">UserInitMprLogonScript</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Legacy logon script environment variable [ http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/11/14/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-18/ ] -->
 583 | 			<TargetObject name="T1112,ChangeStartupFolderPath" condition="end with">user shell folders\startup</TargetObject> <!--Monitor changes to Startup folder location for monitoring evasion | Credit @SBousseaden-->
 584 | 			<!--Services-->
 585 | 			<TargetObject name="T1031,T1050" condition="end with">\ServiceDll</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Points to a service's DLL [ https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-1-introduction-attack-phases-and-windows-services ] -->
 586 | 			<TargetObject name="T1031,T1050" condition="end with">\ServiceManifest</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Manifest pointing to service's DLL [ https://www.geoffchappell.com/studies/windows/win32/services/svchost/index.htm ] -->
 587 | 			<TargetObject name="T1031,T1050" condition="end with">\ImagePath</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Points to a service's EXE [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050 ] -->
 588 | 			<TargetObject name="T1031,T1050" condition="end with">\Start</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Services start mode changes (Disabled, Automatically, Manual)-->
 589 | 			<!--RDP-->
 590 | 			<TargetObject name="RDP port change" condition="end with">Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp\PortNumber</TargetObject> <!--Windows: RDP port change under Control [ https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/of-rdp-hijacking-part1-remote-desktop.html ]-->
 591 | 			<TargetObject name="RDP port change" condition="end with">Control\Terminal Server\fSingleSessionPerUser</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Allow same user to have mutliple RDP sessions, to hide from admin being impersonated-->
 592 | 			<TargetObject name="ModifyRemoteDesktopState" condition="end with">fDenyTSConnections</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Attacker turning on RDP-->
 593 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">LastLoggedOnUser</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Changing last-logged in user-->
 594 | 			<TargetObject name="ModifyRemoteDesktopPort" condition="end with">RDP-tcp\PortNumber</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Changing RDP port to evade IDS-->
 595 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">Services\PortProxy\v4tov4</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Changing RDP port to evade IDS-->
 596 | 			<!--CLSID launch commands and Default File Association changes-->
 597 | 			<TargetObject name="T1042" condition="contains">\command\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Sensitive sub-key under file associations and CLSID that map to launch command-->
 598 | 			<TargetObject name="T1122" condition="contains">\ddeexec\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Sensitive sub-key under file associations and CLSID that map to launch command-->
 599 | 			<TargetObject name="T1122" condition="contains">{86C86720-42A0-1069-A2E8-08002B30309D}</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Tooltip handler-->
 600 | 			<TargetObject name="T1042" condition="contains">exefile</TargetObject> <!--Windows Executable handler, to log any changes not already monitored-->
 601 | 			<!--Windows COM-->
 602 | 			<TargetObject name="T1122" condition="end with">\InprocServer32\(Default)</TargetObject> <!--Windows:COM Object Hijacking [ https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence ] | Credit @ion-storm -->
 603 | 			<!--Windows shell visual modifications used by malware-->
 604 | 			<TargetObject name="T1158" condition="end with">\Hidden</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: Some types of malware try to hide their hidden system files from the user, good signal event -->
 605 | 			<TargetObject name="T1158" condition="end with">\ShowSuperHidden</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: Some types of malware try to hide their hidden system files from the user, good signal event [ Example: https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-061811-4341-99&tabid=2 ] -->
 606 | 			<TargetObject name="T1158" condition="end with">\HideFileExt</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: Some malware hides file extensions to make diagnosis/disinfection more daunting to novice users -->
 607 | 			<!--Windows shell hijack and modifications-->
 608 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">Classes\*\</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: [ http://www.silentrunners.org/launchpoints.html ] -->
 609 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">Classes\AllFilesystemObjects\</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: [ http://www.silentrunners.org/launchpoints.html ] -->
 610 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">Classes\Directory\</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: [ https://stackoverflow.com/questions/1323663/windows-shell-context-menu-option ] -->
 611 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">Classes\Drive\</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: [ https://stackoverflow.com/questions/1323663/windows-shell-context-menu-option ] -->
 612 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">Classes\Folder\</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: ContextMenuHandlers, DragDropHandlers, CopyHookHandlers, [ https://stackoverflow.com/questions/1323663/windows-shell-context-menu-option ] -->
 613 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">Classes\PROTOCOLS\</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: Protocol handlers-->
 614 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">ContextMenuHandlers\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: [ http://oalabs.openanalysis.net/2015/06/04/malware-persistence-hkey_current_user-shell-extension-handlers/ ] -->
 615 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">CurrentVersion\Shell</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Shell Folders, ShellExecuteHooks, ShellIconOverloadIdentifers, ShellServiceObjects, ShellServiceObjectDelayLoad [ http://oalabs.openanalysis.net/2015/06/04/malware-persistence-hkey_current_user-shell-extension-handlers/ ] -->
 616 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\explorer\ShellExecuteHooks</TargetObject> <!--Windows: ShellExecuteHooks-->
 617 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\explorer\ShellServiceObjectDelayLoad</TargetObject> <!--Windows: ShellExecuteHooks-->
 618 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\explorer\ShellIconOverlayIdentifiers</TargetObject> <!--Windows: ShellExecuteHooks-->
 619 | 			<!--AppPaths hijacking-->
 620 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Credit to @Hexacorn [ http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/01/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-3/ ] -->
 621 | 			<!--Terminal service boobytrap-->
 622 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp\InitialProgram</TargetObject> <!--Windows:RDP: Note other Terminal Server run keys are handled by another wildcard already-->
 623 | 			<!--Group Policy integrity-->
 624 | 			<TargetObject name="T1484" condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\GPExtensions\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Group Policy internally uses a plug-in architecture that nothing should be modifying-->
 625 | 			<!--Winsock and Winsock2-->
 626 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSock</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Wildcard, includes Winsock and Winsock2-->
 627 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\ProxyServer</TargetObject> <!--Windows: System and user proxy server-->
 628 | 			<!--Credential providers-->
 629 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Authentication\Credential Provider</TargetObject> <!--Wildcard, includes Credential Providers and Credential Provider Filters-->
 630 | 			<TargetObject name="T1101" condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\</TargetObject> <!-- [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1131 ] [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1101 ] -->
 631 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\SecurityProviders</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Changes to WDigest-UseLogonCredential for password scraping [ https://www.trustedsec.com/april-2015/dumping-wdigest-creds-with-meterpreter-mimikatzkiwi-in-windows-8-1/ ] -->
 632 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Netsh</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Netsh helper DLL [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1128 ] -->
 633 | 			<!--Networking-->
 634 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\NetworkProvider\Order\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Order of network providers that are checked to connect to destination [ https://www.malwarearchaeology.com/cheat-sheets ] -->
 635 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\NetworkList\Profiles</TargetObject> <!--Windows: | Credit @ion-storm -->
 636 | 			<TargetObject name="T1089" condition="end with">\EnableFirewall</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Monitor for firewall disablement, all firewall profiles [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089 ] -->
 637 | 			<TargetObject name="T1089" condition="end with">\DoNotAllowExceptions</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Monitor for firewall disablement, all firewall profiles [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089 ] -->
 638 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfile\AuthorizedApplications\List</TargetObject> <!--Windows Firewall authorized applications for all networks| Credit @ion-storm -->
 639 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\DomainProfile\AuthorizedApplications\List</TargetObject> <!--Windows Firewall authorized applications for domain networks -->
 640 | 			<!--DLLs that get injected into every process at launch-->
 641 | 			<TargetObject name="T1103" condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Appinit_Dlls\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Feature disabled by default [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1103 ] -->
 642 | 			<TargetObject name="T1103" condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Appinit_Dlls\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Feature disabled by default [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1103 ] -->
 643 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\AppCertDlls\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Credit to @Hexacorn [ http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/01/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-3/ ] [ https://blog.comodo.com/malware/trojware-win32-trojanspy-volisk-a/ ] -->
 644 | 			<!--Office-->
 645 | 			<TargetObject name="T1137" condition="contains">Microsoft\Office\Outlook\Addins\</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Office: Outlook add-ins, access to sensitive data and often cause issues-->
 646 | 			<TargetObject name="T1137" condition="contains">Office Test\</TargetObject> <!-- Microsoft:Office: Persistence method [ http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/04/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-10/ ] | Credit @Hexacorn -->
 647 | 			<TargetObject name="Context,ProtectedModeExitOrMacrosUsed" condition="contains">Security\Trusted Documents\TrustRecords</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Office: Monitor when "Enable editing" or "Enable macros" is used | Credit @OutflankNL | [ https://outflank.nl/blog/2018/01/16/hunting-for-evil-detect-macros-being-executed/ ] -->
 648 | 			<!--IE-->
 649 | 			<TargetObject name="T1176" condition="contains">Internet Explorer\Toolbar\</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:InternetExplorer: Machine and user [ Example: https://www.exterminate-it.com/malpedia/remove-mywebsearch ] -->
 650 | 			<TargetObject name="T1176" condition="contains">Internet Explorer\Extensions\</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:InternetExplorer: Machine and user [ Example: https://www.exterminate-it.com/malpedia/remove-mywebsearch ] -->
 651 | 			<TargetObject name="T1176" condition="contains">Browser Helper Objects\</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:InternetExplorer: Machine and user [ https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb250436(v=vs.85).aspx ] -->
 652 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\DisableSecuritySettingsCheck</TargetObject>
 653 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\3\1206</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:InternetExplorer: Malware sometimes assures scripting is on in Internet Zone [ https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/182569/internet-explorer-security-zones-registry-entries-for-advanced-users ] -->
 654 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\3\2500</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:InternetExplorer: Malware sometimes disables Protected Mode in Internet Zone [ https://blog.avast.com/2013/08/12/your-documents-are-corrupted-from-image-to-an-information-stealing-trojan/ ] -->
 655 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\3\1809</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:InternetExplorer: Malware sometimes disables Pop-up Blocker in Internet Zone [ https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/182569/internet-explorer-security-zones-registry-entries-for-advanced-users ] -->
 656 | 			<!--Magic registry keys-->
 657 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Classes\CLSID\{AB8902B4-09CA-4BB6-B78D-A8F59079A8D5}\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Thumbnail cache autostart [ http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/poweliks-levels-up-with-new-autostart-mechanism/ ] -->
 658 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{AB8902B4-09CA-4BB6-B78D-A8F59079A8D5}\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Thumbnail cache autostart [ http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/poweliks-levels-up-with-new-autostart-mechanism/ ] -->
 659 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Classes\CLSID\{083863F1-70DE-11d0-BD40-00A0C911CE86}\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: DirectX instances-->
 660 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{083863F1-70DE-11d0-BD40-00A0C911CE86}\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: DirectX instances-->
 661 | 			<!--Install/Run artifacts-->
 662 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\UrlUpdateInfo</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:ClickOnce: Source URL is stored in this value [ https://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2016/12/mimikatz-delivery-via-clickonce-with.html ] -->
 663 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\InstallSource</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Source folder for certain program and component installations-->
 664 | 			<TargetObject name="Alert,Sysinternals Tool Used" condition="end with">\EulaAccepted</TargetObject> <!--Sysinternals tool launched. Lots of useful abilities for attackers -->
 665 | 			<!--Antivirus tampering-->
 666 | 			<TargetObject name="T1089,Tamper-Defender" condition="end with">\DisableAntiSpyware</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Defender: State modified via registry-->
 667 | 			<TargetObject name="T1089,Tamper-Defender" condition="end with">\DisableAntiVirus</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Defender: State modified via registry-->
 668 | 			<TargetObject name="T1089,Tamper-Defender" condition="end with">\SpynetReporting</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Defender: State modified via registry-->
 669 | 			<TargetObject name="T1089,Tamper-Defender" condition="end with">DisableRealtimeMonitoring</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Defender: State modified via registry-->
 670 | 			<TargetObject name="T1089,Tamper-Defender" condition="end with">\SubmitSamplesConsent</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Defender: State modified via registry-->
 671 | 			<!--Windows UAC tampering-->
 672 | 			<TargetObject name="T1088" condition="end with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA</TargetObject> <!--Detect: UAC Tampering | Credit @ion-storm -->
 673 | 			<TargetObject name="T1088" condition="end with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy</TargetObject> <!--Detect: UAC Tampering | Credit @ion-storm -->
 674 | 			<!--Microsoft Security Center tampering | Credit @ion-storm -->
 675 | 			<TargetObject name="T1089,Tamper-SecCenter" condition="end with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Security Center\</TargetObject> <!-- [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089 ] -->
 676 | 			<TargetObject name="T1089,Tamper-SecCenter" condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\HideSCAHealth</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Security Center: Malware sometimes disables [ https://blog.avast.com/2013/08/12/your-documents-are-corrupted-from-image-to-an-information-stealing-trojan/ ] -->
 677 | 			<!--Windows application compatibility-->
 678 | 			<TargetObject name="T1138,AppCompatShim" condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Custom</TargetObject> <!--Windows: AppCompat [ https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html ] -->
 679 | 			<TargetObject name="T1138,AppCompatShim" condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\InstalledSDB</TargetObject> <!--Windows: AppCompat [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1138 ] -->
 680 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">VirtualStore</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Registry virtualization, something's wrong if it's in use [ https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa965884(v=vs.85).aspx ] -->
 681 | 			<!--Windows internals integrity monitoring-->
 682 | 			<TargetObject name="T1183,IFEO" condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Malware likes changing IFEO, like adding Debugger to disable antivirus EXE-->
 683 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Event log system integrity and ACLs-->
 684 | 			<TargetObject name="Tamper-Safemode" condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Safeboot\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Services approved to load in safe mode. Almost nothing should ever modify this.-->
 685 | 			<TargetObject name="Tamper-Winlogon" condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Winlogon\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Providers notified by WinLogon-->
 686 | 			<TargetObject name="Context,DeviceConntectedOrUpdated" condition="end with">\FriendlyName</TargetObject> <!--Windows: New devices connected and remembered-->
 687 | 			<TargetObject name="Context,MsiInstallerStarted" condition="is">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Installer\InProgress\(Default)</TargetObject> <!--Windows: See when WindowsInstaller is engaged, useful for timeline matching with other events-->
 688 | 			<TargetObject name="Tamper-Tracing" condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Tracing\RASAPI32</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Malware sometimes disables tracing to obfuscate tracks-->
 689 | 			<!--Windows inventory events-->
 690 | 			<TargetObject name="InvDB-Path" condition="end with">\LowerCaseLongPath</TargetObject> <!-- [ https://binaryforay.blogspot.com/2017/10/amcache-still-rules-everything-around.html ] -->
 691 | 			<TargetObject name="InvDB-Pub" condition="end with">\Publisher</TargetObject> <!-- [ https://binaryforay.blogspot.com/2017/10/amcache-still-rules-everything-around.html ] -->
 692 | 			<TargetObject name="InvDB-Ver" condition="end with">\BinProductVersion</TargetObject> <!-- [ https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/privacy/basic-level-windows-diagnostic-events-and-fields-1709 ] -->
 693 | 			<TargetObject name="InvDB-DriverVer" condition="end with">\DriverVersion</TargetObject> <!-- [ https://df-stream.com/2015/02/leveraging-devicecontainers-key/ ] -->
 694 | 			<TargetObject name="InvDB-DriverVer" condition="end with">\DriverVerVersion</TargetObject> <!-- [ https://df-stream.com/2015/02/leveraging-devicecontainers-key/ ] -->
 695 | 			<TargetObject name="InvDB-CompileTimeClaim" condition="end with">\LinkDate</TargetObject> <!-- Compile time of EXE, may not be reliable [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Link_time ] -->
 696 | 			<TargetObject name="InvDB" condition="contains">Compatibility Assistant\Store\</TargetObject> <!-- Inventory -->
 697 | 			<!--Suspicious sources-->
 698 | 			<Image name="Suspicious,ImageBeginWithBackslash" condition="begin with">\</Image> <!--Devices and VSC shouldn't be executing changes | Credit: @SBousseaden @ionstorm @neu5ron @PerchedSystems [ https://twitter.com/SwiftOnSecurity/status/1133167323991486464 ] -->
 699 | 		</RegistryEvent>
 700 | 	</RuleGroup>
 701 | 
 702 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 703 | 		<RegistryEvent onmatch="exclude">
 704 | 		<!--COMMENT:	Remove low-information noise. Often these hide a procress recreating an empty key and do not hide the values created subsequently.-->
 705 | 		<!--NOTE:	A lot of noise can be removed by excluding CreateKey events, which are largely innocuous-->
 706 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">\{CAFEEFAC-</TargetObject>
 707 | 			<EventType condition="is">CreateKey</EventType>
 708 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\COMPONENTS</TargetObject>
 709 | 			<!--Inventory noise-->
 710 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppModel\StateRepository\Cache</TargetObject>
 711 | 			<!--Misc-->
 712 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">Toolbar\WebBrowser</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:IE: Extraneous activity-->
 713 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">Browser\ITBar7Height</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:IE: Extraneous activity, covers ShellBrowser and WebBrowser-->
 714 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">Browser\ITBar7Layout</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:IE: Extraneous activity-->
 715 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">Internet Explorer\Toolbar\Locked</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: Extraneous activity-->
 716 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">Toolbar\WebBrowser\{47833539-D0C5-4125-9FA8-0819E2EAAC93}</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: Extraneous activity-->
 717 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">}\PreviousPolicyAreas</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from \Winlogon\GPExtensions by svchost.exe-->
 718 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">\Control\WMI\Autologger\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "\Start"-->
 719 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\UsoSvc\Start</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "\Start"-->
 720 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\Lsa\OfflineJoin\CurrentValue</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Sensitive value during domain join-->
 721 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Installer\UserData\S-1-5-18\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise monitoring installations run as system-->
 722 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">_Classes\AppX</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise monitoring "Shell\open\command"--> <!--Win8+-->
 723 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Publishers\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: SvcHost Noise-->
 724 | 			<!--Bootup Control noise-->
 725 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\LsaPid</TargetObject> <!--Windows:lsass.exe: Boot noise-->
 726 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\SspiCache</TargetObject> <!--Windows:lsass.exe: Boot noise--> <!--Win8+-->
 727 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Kerberos\Domains</TargetObject> <!--Windows:lsass.exe: Boot noise--> <!--Win8+-->
 728 | 			<!--Services startup settings noise, some low-risk services routinely change it and this can be ignored-->
 729 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\Services\BITS\Start</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "\Start"-->
 730 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\clr_optimization_v2.0.50727_32\Start</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:dotNet: Windows 7-->
 731 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\clr_optimization_v2.0.50727_64\Start</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:dotNet: Windows 7-->
 732 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\clr_optimization_v4.0.30319_32\Start</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:dotNet: Windows 10-->
 733 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\clr_optimization_v4.0.30319_64\Start</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:dotNet: Windows 10-->
 734 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\deviceAssociationService\Start</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "\Start"-->
 735 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\fhsvc\Start</TargetObject> <!--Windows: File History Service-->
 736 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\nal\Start</TargetObject> <!--Intel: Network adapter diagnostic driver-->
 737 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\trustedInstaller\Start</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "\Start"-->
 738 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\tunnel\Start</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "\Start"-->
 739 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\usoSvc\Start</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "\Start"-->
 740 | 			<!--FileExts noise filtering-->
 741 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\UserChoice\ProgId</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "FileExts"--> <!--Win8+-->
 742 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\UserChoice\Hash</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "FileExts"--> <!--Win8+-->
 743 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\OpenWithList\MRUList</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "FileExts"-->
 744 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">Shell Extentions\Cached</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise generated by explorer.exe on monitored ShellCached binary keys--> <!--Win8+-->
 745 | 			<!--Group Policy noise-->
 746 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Audit\SpecialGroups</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Routinely set through Group Policy, not especially important to log-->
 747 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Startup\0\PSScriptOrder</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
 748 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Startup\0\SOM-ID</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
 749 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Startup\0\GPO-ID</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
 750 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Startup\0\0\IsPowershell</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
 751 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Startup\0\0\ExecTime</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
 752 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Shutdown\0\PSScriptOrder</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
 753 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Shutdown\0\SOM-ID</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
 754 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Shutdown\0\GPO-ID</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
 755 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Shutdown\0\0\IsPowershell</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
 756 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Shutdown\0\0\ExecTime</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
 757 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">\safer\codeidentifiers\0\HASHES\{</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Software Restriction Policies. Can be used to disable security tools, but very noisy to monitor if you use it-->
 758 | 			<!--SECTION: Office C2R-->
 759 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">VirtualStore\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\ClickToRun\</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft: SearchProtocolHost writes to OfficeC2R registry for Outlook, seemingly regarding mail indexing-->
 760 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\ClickToRun\</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft: Virtual registry for Office-->
 761 | 			<!--SECTION: 3rd party-->
 762 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\WIDCOMM\Bluetooth Software\btwdins.exe</Image> <!--Constantly writes to HKLM-->
 763 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKCR\VLC.</TargetObject> <!--VLC update noise-->
 764 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKCR\iTunes.</TargetObject> <!--Apple: iTunes update noise-->
 765 | 			<!--WINEVT publishers noise-->
 766 | 			<TargetObject condition="is">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Publishers\{945a8954-c147-4acd-923f-40c45405a658}</TargetObject> <!--Windows update-->
 767 | 		</RegistryEvent>
 768 | 	</RuleGroup>
 769 | 
 770 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 15 : ALTERNATE DATA STREAM CREATED [FileCreateStreamHash]-->
 771 | 		<!--EVENT 15: "File stream created"-->
 772 | 		<!--COMMENT:	Any files created with an NTFS Alternate Data Stream which match these rules will be hashed and logged.
 773 | 			[ https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2013/03/24/alternate-data-streams-in-ntfs/ ]
 774 | 			ADS's are used by browsers and email clients to mark files as originating from the Internet or other foreign sources.
 775 | 			[ https://textslashplain.com/2016/04/04/downloads-and-the-mark-of-the-web/ ] -->
 776 | 		<!--NOTE: Other filesystem minifilters can make it appear to Sysmon that some files are being written twice. This is not a Sysmon issue, per Mark Russinovich.-->
 777 | 
 778 | 		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, TargetFilename, CreationUtcTime, Hash-->
 779 | 		<FileCreateStreamHash onmatch="include">
 780 | 			<TargetFilename condition="contains">Downloads</TargetFilename> <!--Downloaded files. Does not include "Run" files in IE-->
 781 | 			<TargetFilename condition="contains">Temp\7z</TargetFilename> <!--7zip extractions-->
 782 | 			<TargetFilename condition="contains">Startup</TargetFilename> <!--ADS startup | Example: [ https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/a314f6106633fba4b70f9d6ddbee452e8f8f44a72117749c21243dc93c7ed3ac?environmentId=100 ] -->
 783 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.bat</TargetFilename> <!--Batch scripting-->
 784 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.cmd</TargetFilename> <!--Batch scripting | Credit @ion-storm -->
 785 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.doc</TargetFilename> <!--Office doc potentially with macro -->
 786 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.hta</TargetFilename> <!--Scripting-->
 787 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.lnk</TargetFilename> <!--Shortcut file | Credit @ion-storm -->
 788 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.ppt</TargetFilename> <!--Office doc potentially with macros-->
 789 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.ps1</TargetFilename> <!--PowerShell-->
 790 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.ps2</TargetFilename> <!--PowerShell-->
 791 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.reg</TargetFilename> <!--Registry File-->
 792 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.jse</TargetFilename> <!--Registry File-->
 793 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.vb</TargetFilename> <!--VisualBasicScripting files-->
 794 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.vbe</TargetFilename> <!--VisualBasicScripting files-->
 795 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.vbs</TargetFilename> <!--VisualBasicScripting files-->
 796 | 		</FileCreateStreamHash>
 797 | 
 798 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 799 | 		<FileCreateStreamHash onmatch="exclude">
 800 | 		</FileCreateStreamHash>
 801 | 	</RuleGroup>
 802 | 
 803 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 16 : SYSMON CONFIGURATION CHANGE-->
 804 | 		<!--EVENT 16: "Sysmon config state changed"-->
 805 | 		<!--COMMENT:	This ONLY logs if the hash of the configuration changes. Running "sysmon.exe -c" with the current configuration will not be logged with Event 16-->
 806 | 		
 807 | 		<!--DATA: UtcTime, Configuration, ConfigurationFileHash-->
 808 | 		<!--Cannot be filtered.-->
 809 | 
 810 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 17 & 18 : PIPE CREATED / PIPE CONNECTED [PipeEvent]-->
 811 | 		<!--EVENT 17: "Pipe Created"-->
 812 | 		<!--EVENT 18: "Pipe Connected"-->
 813 | 
 814 | 		<!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-smb-beacon ] -->
 815 | 		<!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2015/10/07/named-pipe-pivoting/ ] -->
 816 | 
 817 | 		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, PipeName, Image-->
 818 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 819 | 		<PipeEvent onmatch="include">
 820 | 			<!--NOTE: Using incide with no rules means nothing in this section will be logged-->
 821 | 		</PipeEvent>
 822 | 	</RuleGroup>
 823 | 
 824 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 19 & 20 & 21 : WMI EVENT MONITORING [WmiEvent]-->
 825 | 		<!--EVENT 19: "WmiEventFilter activity detected"-->
 826 | 		<!--EVENT 20: "WmiEventConsumer activity detected"-->
 827 | 		<!--EVENT 21: "WmiEventConsumerToFilter activity detected"-->
 828 | 
 829 | 		<!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ https://www.darkoperator.com/blog/2017/10/15/sysinternals-sysmon-610-tracking-of-permanent-wmi-events ] -->
 830 | 		<!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ https://rawsec.lu/blog/posts/2017/Sep/19/sysmon-v610-vs-wmi-persistence/ ] -->
 831 | 
 832 | 		<!--DATA: EventType, UtcTime, Operation, User, Name, Type, Destination, Consumer, Filter-->
 833 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 834 | 		<WmiEvent onmatch="exclude">
 835 | 			<!--NOTE: Using exclude with no rules means everything will be logged-->
 836 | 		</WmiEvent>
 837 | 	</RuleGroup>
 838 | 
 839 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 22 : DNS QUERY [DnsQuery]-->
 840 | 		<!--EVENT 22: "Dns query"-->
 841 | 
 842 | 		<!--NOTE:	Due to the volume of events that DNS queries generate, some orgs may want to remove this section from their configuration to reduce Sysmon log turnover. -->
 843 | 
 844 | 		<!--COMMENT:	DNS logging is a very nuanced challenge in monitoring due to event volume. Legitimate domains can be used to host malware/C2, but lookup itself is not very informative.
 845 | 						It's fine to exclude monitoring these bulk low-value lookups, but at same time, you would not have a full log of how malware communicated, potentially missing C2.
 846 | 						This section of Sysmon configuration will require your full judgement and knowledge of your org's priorities. There is no correct answer.-->
 847 | 
 848 | 		<!--OPERATIONS:	Chrome and Firefox prefetch DNS lookups, or use alternate DNS lookup methods Sysmon won't capture. You need to turn these off.
 849 | 						Search for Group Policy for these browsers to configure this.-->
 850 | 
 851 | 		<!--OPERATIONS:	Most DNS traffic is web advertising. To significantly reduce DNS queries and malware ads, enable client-side advertising filtering via Group Policy. This is easy.
 852 | 				Internet Explorer: https://decentsecurity.com/adblocking-for-internet-explorer-deployment/
 853 | 				Chrome: https://decentsecurity.com/ublock-for-google-chrome-deployment/
 854 | 				Firefox: ToDo
 855 | 						Also note, this configuration is designed for United States computers. Your country's users will may need customization to reduce noise.
 856 | 			-->
 857 | 
 858 | 		<!--CONFIG:	DNS poisoning is an issue during threat investigations. Try to only exclude ROUTINE system-level queries you know are strongly validated with HTTPS or code signing.-->
 859 | 		<!--CONFIG:	If you exclude microsoft.com, someone could register malware-microsoft.com and it wouldn't be logged. Use "END WITH" with leading . or "IS" operators.-->
 860 | 		<!--CONFIG:	Be very specific in exclusions. Threat actors use legitimate services, too. Dont exclude all of AWS or Azure or Google or CDNs!-->
 861 | 		<!--CONFIG: Popularity data: [ http://s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/umbrella-static/index.html ] [ https://better.fyi/trackers/alexa-top-500-news/ ] -->
 862 | 
 863 | 		<!--CRITICAL:	Do NOT exclude "wpad" lookups. This is a MitM vector routinely used by attackers. Disable WPAD or enforce client-side DNSSEC for AD domain lookups.-->
 864 | 		<!--CRITICAL:	Do NOT exclude IPv6 lookups.-->
 865 | 
 866 | 		<!--DATA: RuleName, UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, QueryName, QueryType, QueryStatus, QueryResults (can't filter on)-->
 867 | 
 868 | 		<!--BELOW: These domains should not be excluded at the top level. Be specific if you want to reduce noise under them.-->
 869 | 		<!-- Rejected: .cloudapp.net, customer content [ https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/ptsblog/2012/06/18/security-consideration-when-using-cloudapp-net-domain-as-production-environment-in-windows-azure/ ] -->
 870 | 		<!-- Rejected: .googleapis.com, customer content [ https://www.zdnet.com/article/this-business-email-scam-spreads-trojans-through-google-cloud-storage/ ] -->
 871 | 		<!-- Rejected: .cloudfront.net, customer content -->
 872 | 		<!-- Rejected: .windows.net, customer content -->
 873 | 		<!-- Rejected: *github.com, customer content, including open-source malware components -->
 874 | 
 875 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 876 | 		<DnsQuery onmatch="exclude">
 877 | 			<!--Network noise-->
 878 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.arpa.</QueryName> <!--Design decision to not log reverse DNS lookups. You will need to decide.-->
 879 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.arpa</QueryName> <!--Design decision to not log reverse DNS lookups. You will need to decide.-->
 880 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.msftncsi.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft proxy detection | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 881 | 			<QueryName condition="is">..localmachine</QueryName>
 882 | 			<QueryName condition="is">localhost</QueryName>
 883 | 			<!--Microsoft-->
 884 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">-pushp.svc.ms</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Doesn't appear to host customer content or subdomains-->
 885 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.b-msedge.net</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Doesn't appear to host customer content or subdomains-->
 886 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.bing.com</QueryName> <!-- Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion -->
 887 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.hotmail.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 888 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.live.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 889 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.live.net</QueryName> <!--Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 890 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.s-microsoft.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft-->
 891 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.microsoft.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 892 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.microsoftonline.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 893 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.microsoftstore.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 894 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.ms-acdc.office.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Doesn't appear to host customer content or subdomains-->
 895 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.msedge.net</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Doesn't appear to host customer content or subdomains-->
 896 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.msn.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 897 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.msocdn.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft-->
 898 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.skype.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 899 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.skype.net</QueryName> <!--Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 900 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.windows.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft-->
 901 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.windows.net.nsatc.net</QueryName> <!--Microsoft-->
 902 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.windowsupdate.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft-->
 903 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.xboxlive.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft-->
 904 | 			<QueryName condition="is">login.windows.net</QueryName> <!--Microsoft-->
 905 | 			<Image condition="begin with">C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\</Image> <!--Microsoft: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/network-protection -->
 906 | 			<!--Microsoft:Office365/AzureAD-->
 907 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.activedirectory.windowsazure.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: AzureAD-->
 908 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.aria.microsoft.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: OneDrive/SharePoint-->
 909 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.msauth.net</QueryName>
 910 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.msftauth.net</QueryName>
 911 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.opinsights.azure.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: AzureAD/InTune client event monitoring-->
 912 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">osi.office.net</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Office-->
 913 | 			<QueryName condition="is">loki.delve.office.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Office-->
 914 | 			<QueryName condition="is">management.azure.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: AzureAD/InTune-->
 915 | 			<QueryName condition="is">messaging.office.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Office-->
 916 | 			<QueryName condition="is">outlook.office365.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Protected by HSTS-->
 917 | 			<QueryName condition="is">portal.azure.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: AzureAD/InTune-->
 918 | 			<QueryName condition="is">protection.outlook.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Office-->
 919 | 			<QueryName condition="is">substrate.office.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Office-->
 920 | 			<!--3rd-party applications-->
 921 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.mozaws.net</QueryName> <!--Mozilla-->
 922 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.mozilla.com</QueryName> <!--Mozilla-->
 923 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.mozilla.net</QueryName> <!--Mozilla-->
 924 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.mozilla.org</QueryName> <!--Mozilla-->
 925 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.spotify.com</QueryName> <!--Spotify-->
 926 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.spotify.map.fastly.net</QueryName> <!--Spotify-->
 927 | 			<QueryName condition="is">clients1.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
 928 | 			<QueryName condition="is">clients2.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
 929 | 			<QueryName condition="is">clients3.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
 930 | 			<QueryName condition="is">clients4.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
 931 | 			<QueryName condition="is">clients5.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
 932 | 			<QueryName condition="is">clients6.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
 933 | 			<QueryName condition="is">safebrowsing.googleapis.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
 934 | 			<!--Goodlist CDN-->
 935 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.akadns.net</QueryName> <!--AkamaiCDN, extensively used by Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 936 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.netflix.com</QueryName>
 937 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">aspnetcdn.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft [ https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/aspnet/ajax/cdn/overview ]-->
 938 | 			<QueryName condition="is">ajax.googleapis.com</QueryName>
 939 | 			<QueryName condition="is">cdnjs.cloudflare.com</QueryName> <!--Cloudflare: Hosts popular javascript libraries-->
 940 | 			<QueryName condition="is">fonts.googleapis.com</QueryName> <!--Google fonts-->
 941 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.typekit.net</QueryName> <!--Adobe fonts-->
 942 | 			<QueryName condition="is">cdnjs.cloudflare.com</QueryName>
 943 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.stackassets.com</QueryName> <!--Stack Overflow-->
 944 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.steamcontent.com</QueryName>
 945 | 			<!--Web resources-->
 946 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.disqus.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft default exclusion-->
 947 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.fontawesome.com</QueryName>
 948 | 			<QueryName condition="is">disqus.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft default exclusion-->
 949 | 			<!--Ads-->
 950 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.1rx.io</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
 951 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.2mdn.net</QueryName> <!--Ads: Google | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 952 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.adadvisor.net</QueryName> <!--Ads: Neustar [ https://better.fyi/trackers/adadvisor.net/ ] -->
 953 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.adap.tv</QueryName> <!--Ads:AOL | Microsoft default exclusion [ https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/adap-tv ] -->
 954 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.addthis.com</QueryName> <!--Ads:Oracle | Microsoft default exclusion [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AddThis ] -->
 955 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.adform.net</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
 956 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.adnxs.com</QueryName> <!--Ads: AppNexus | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 957 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.adroll.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
 958 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.adrta.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
 959 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.adsafeprotected.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
 960 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.adsrvr.org</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
 961 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.advertising.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 962 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.amazon-adsystem.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
 963 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.amazon-adsystem.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
 964 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.analytics.yahoo.com</QueryName> <!--Ads:Yahoo-->
 965 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.aol.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion -->
 966 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.betrad.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 967 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.bidswitch.net</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
 968 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.casalemedia.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 969 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.chartbeat.net</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion [ https://better.fyi/trackers/chartbeat.com/ ]-->
 970 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.cnn.com</QueryName> <!-- Microsoft default exclusion-->
 971 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.convertro.com</QueryName> <!--Ads:Verizon-->
 972 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.criteo.com</QueryName> <!--Ads [ https://better.fyi/trackers/criteo.com/ ] -->
 973 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.criteo.net</QueryName> <!--Ads [ https://better.fyi/trackers/criteo.com/ ] -->
 974 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.crwdcntrl.net</QueryName> <!--Ads: Lotame [ https://better.fyi/trackers/crwdcntrl.net/ ] -->
 975 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.demdex.net</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 976 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.domdex.com</QueryName> 
 977 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.dotomi.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 978 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.doubleclick.net</QueryName> <!--Ads:Conversant | Microsoft default exclusion [ https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/dotomi ] -->
 979 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.doubleverify.com</QueryName> <!--Ads: Google-->
 980 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.emxdgt.com</QueryName> <!--Ads: EMX-->
 981 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.exelator.com</QueryName> <!--Ads:Nielson Marketing Cloud-->
 982 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.google-analytics.com</QueryName> <!--Ads:Google | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 983 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.googleadservices.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
 984 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.googlesyndication.com</QueryName> <!--Ads:Google, sometimes called during malicious ads, but not directly responsible | Microsoft default exclusion [ https://www.hackread.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-Zacinlo.pdf ]-->
 985 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.googletagmanager.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
 986 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.googlevideo.com</QueryName> <!--Google | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 987 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.gstatic.com</QueryName> <!--Google | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 988 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.gvt1.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
 989 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.gvt2.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
 990 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.ib-ibi.com</QueryName> <!--Ads: Offerpath [ https://better.fyi/trackers/ib-ibi.com/ ] -->
 991 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.jivox.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
 992 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.mathtag.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft default exclusion-->
 993 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.moatads.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 994 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.moatpixel.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 995 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.mookie1.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
 996 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.myvisualiq.net</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
 997 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.netmng.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
 998 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.nexac.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 999 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.openx.net</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1000 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.optimizely.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1001 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.outbrain.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1002 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.pardot.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1003 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.phx.gbl</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
1004 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.pinterest.com</QueryName> <!--Pinerest-->
1005 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.pubmatic.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
1006 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.quantcount.com</QueryName>
1007 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.quantserve.com</QueryName>
1008 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.revsci.net</QueryName> <!--Ads:Omniture | Microsoft default exclusion-->
1009 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.rfihub.net</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
1010 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.rlcdn.com</QueryName> <!--Ads: Rapleaf [ https://better.fyi/trackers/rlcdn.com/ ] -->
1011 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.rubiconproject.com</QueryName> <!--Ads: Rubicon Project | Microsoft default exclusion [ https://better.fyi/trackers/rubiconproject.com/ ] -->
1012 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.scdn.co</QueryName> <!--Spotify-->
1013 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.scorecardresearch.com</QueryName> <!--Ads: Comscore | Microsoft default exclusion-->
1014 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.serving-sys.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
1015 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.sharethrough.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1016 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.simpli.fi</QueryName>
1017 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.sitescout.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1018 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.smartadserver.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1019 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.snapads.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1020 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.spotxchange.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1021 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.taboola.com</QueryName> <!--Ads:Taboola-->
1022 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.taboola.map.fastly.net</QueryName> <!--Ads:Taboola-->
1023 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.tapad.com</QueryName>
1024 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.tidaltv.com</QueryName> <!--Ads: Videology [ https://better.fyi/trackers/tidaltv.com/ ] -->
1025 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.trafficmanager.net</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
1026 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.tremorhub.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1027 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.tribalfusion.com</QueryName> <!--Ads: Exponential [ https://better.fyi/trackers/tribalfusion.com/ ] -->
1028 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.turn.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion [ https://better.fyi/trackers/turn.com/ ] -->
1029 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.twimg.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
1030 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.tynt.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1031 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.w55c.net</QueryName> <!--Ads:dataxu-->
1032 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.ytimg.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
1033 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.zorosrv.com</QueryName> <!--Ads:Taboola-->
1034 | 			<QueryName condition="is">1rx.io</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1035 | 			<QueryName condition="is">adservice.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
1036 | 			<QueryName condition="is">ampcid.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
1037 | 			<QueryName condition="is">clientservices.googleapis.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
1038 | 			<QueryName condition="is">googleadapis.l.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
1039 | 			<QueryName condition="is">imasdk.googleapis.com</QueryName> <!--Google [ https://developers.google.com/interactive-media-ads/docs/sdks/html5/ ] -->
1040 | 			<QueryName condition="is">l.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
1041 | 			<QueryName condition="is">ml314.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1042 | 			<QueryName condition="is">mtalk.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
1043 | 			<QueryName condition="is">update.googleapis.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
1044 | 			<QueryName condition="is">www.googletagservices.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
1045 | 			<!--SocialNet-->
1046 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.pscp.tv</QueryName> <!--Twitter:Periscope-->
1047 | 			<!--OSCP/CRL Common-->
1048 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.digicert.com</QueryName>
1049 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.globalsign.com</QueryName>
1050 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.globalsign.net</QueryName>
1051 | 			<QueryName condition="is">msocsp.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft:OCSP-->
1052 | 			<QueryName condition="is">ocsp.msocsp.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft:OCSP-->
1053 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">pki.goog</QueryName>
1054 | 			<QueryName condition="is">ocsp.godaddy.com</QueryName>
1055 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">amazontrust.com</QueryName>
1056 | 			<QueryName condition="is">ocsp.sectigo.com</QueryName>
1057 | 			<QueryName condition="is">pki-goog.l.google.com</QueryName>
1058 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.usertrust.com</QueryName>
1059 | 			<QueryName condition="is">ocsp.comodoca.com</QueryName>
1060 | 			<QueryName condition="is">ocsp.verisign.com</QueryName>
1061 | 			<QueryName condition="is">ocsp.entrust.net</QueryName>
1062 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">ocsp.identrust.com</QueryName>
1063 | 			<QueryName condition="is">status.rapidssl.com</QueryName>
1064 | 			<QueryName condition="is">status.thawte.com</QueryName>
1065 | 			<QueryName condition="is">ocsp.int-x3.letsencrypt.org</QueryName>
1066 | 		</DnsQuery>
1067 | 	</RuleGroup>
1068 | 
1069 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 255 : ERROR-->
1070 | 		<!--"This event is generated when an error occurred within Sysmon. They can happen if the system is under heavy load
1071 | 			and certain tasked could not be performed or a bug exists in the Sysmon service. You can report any bugs on the
1072 | 			Sysinternals forum or over Twitter (@markrussinovich)."-->
1073 | 		<!--Cannot be filtered.-->
1074 | 
1075 | 	</EventFiltering>
1076 | </Sysmon>
1077 | 


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