├── README.md ├── screenshot-apptimize-1.PNG └── screenshot-localytics-1.PNG /README.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Grindr Privacy Leaks 2 | 3 | SVT and SINTEF conducted an experiment the 7th of February 2018 to analyse privacy leaks in the dating application Grindr. This was realised for the Sweedish TV program "Plus granskar", that you [may watch online.](https://www.svtplay.se/video/17267438/plus-granskar/plus-granskar-ditt-karleksliv-en-handelsvara) 4 | 5 | We discovered that Grindr contains many trackers, and shares personal information with various third parties directly from the application. 6 | 7 | 8 | ## Grindr Shares Personal Information With Third-Parties 9 | 10 | |Data|Sent to third-parties using unsafe HTTP ⚠ and HTTPS|Sent to third-parties using HTTPS only| 11 | |----|--------------------------------|---------------------------| 12 | |Grindr (App Name)|Adrta, Google,Liftoff, Manage.com, Mobfox, Mopub, OpenX, Smatoo|AdColony, Adsafeprotected, Apple, AppsFlyer, Apptimize, Crashlytics, Facebook, Fqtag, Kochava, Localytics, Moatads, TreasureData 13 | |Precise GPS Position|Adrta,Liftoff, Mopub, Nexage, OpenX|Apptimize, Localytics, Treasure Data 14 | |Gender|Adrta, Mopub, Smatoo|Apptimize, Localytics 15 | |HIV Status||Apptimize, Localytics 16 | |Last Tested Date||Apptimize, Localytics 17 | |Email||Localytics 18 | |Age|Mopub, Smatoo|Apptimize, Localytics 19 | |Height||Apptimize, Localytics 20 | |Weight||Apptimize, Localytics 21 | |Body Type||Apptimize, Localytics 22 | |Position (sexual)||Apptimize, Localytics 23 | |Grindr Profile ID||AdColony, Apptimize, Crashlytics, Localytics, TreasureData 24 | |Tribe (Bear, Clean Cut, Daddy, Discreet, Geek, Jock, Leather, Otter Poz, Rugged, Trans, Unknown)|Mopub|Apptimize, Localytics 25 | |Looking For (Chat, Dates, Friends, Networking, Relationship, Right Now, Unkown)|Mopub|Apptimize, Localytics 26 | |Etchnicity|Mopub|Apptimize, Localytics 27 | |Relationship Status|Mopub|Apptimize, Localytics 28 | |Phone ID|Liftoff, Adrta, Mopub, Smatoo|AdColony, Kochava, 29 | |Advertising ID|Adrta,Liftoff, Mopub, Mopub, Nexage, OpenX, Smatoo|AdColony, Adsafeprotected, AppsFlyer, Apptimize, Facebook, Fqtag, Localytics, Maxads, TreasureData 30 | |Phone Characteristics|Adrta,Liftoff, Mopub, OpenX, Smatoo|AdColony, AppsFlyer, Apptimize, Facebook, Maxads, TreasureData 31 | |Language|Liftoff, Mopub, Nexage, Smatoo|AdColony, AppsFlyer, Apptimize, Facebook, Maxads, TreasureData 32 | |Activity||App-measurement, Apptimize, Facebook, TreasureData 33 | |Pictures||| 34 | |Messages content||| 35 | 36 | ![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SINTEF-9012/grindr-privacy-leaks/master/screenshot-apptimize-1.PNG) 37 | ![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SINTEF-9012/grindr-privacy-leaks/master/screenshot-localytics-1.PNG) 38 | 39 | ## Grindr Shares Personal Information Including HIV Status With Apptimize And Localytics 40 | 41 | It is unnecessary for Grindr to track its users HIV Status using third-parties services. Moreover, these third-parties are not necessarily certified to host medical data, and Grindr's users may not be aware that they are sharing such data with them. 42 | 43 | ## Grindr Shares Personal Information Without Security 44 | 45 | Personal information is shared unencrypted, allowing people, companies, or governments to listen on a network to discover who is using Grindr, where they are precisely located during a day, how do they look, what do they like, what do they browse… By sharing such information in an unsafe way, Grindr is exposing its users. 46 | 47 | ## Grindr Contains Trackers 48 | 49 | By decompiling the Grindr Android source code, we discovered tracking software. Notably Facebook, Smatoop or Localytics. [This is also confirmed by the project Exodus.](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/reports/5323/) 50 | 51 | ## Experiment Setup 52 | 53 | We installed Grindr on a Samsung Galaxy running Android and on an iPhone running iOS. Two persons created a Grindr profile and started dating for a few minutes. 54 | 55 | We analysed the Grindr network traffic by using a man-in-the-middle proxy recording HTTP and HTTPS exchanges, using a setup similar to the one described in the paper ["Who knows what about me? A survey of behind the scenes personal data sharing to third parties by mobile apps." (Zang, K., Dummit, J., Graves, P.L. and Latanya, S. - Technology Science (2015)."](https://techscience.org/a/2015103001/download.pdf) 56 | We used Wireshark to monitor all TCP/IP traffic, Fiddler to capture HTTP and HTTPS traffic, and APKTool to decompile the Android application. 57 | 58 | 59 | 60 | 61 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /screenshot-apptimize-1.PNG: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SINTEF-9012/grindr-privacy-leaks/7af4dabe9db59b4d91b46233d8811c5a97c82250/screenshot-apptimize-1.PNG -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /screenshot-localytics-1.PNG: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SINTEF-9012/grindr-privacy-leaks/7af4dabe9db59b4d91b46233d8811c5a97c82250/screenshot-localytics-1.PNG --------------------------------------------------------------------------------