├── .gitignore
├── README.md
└── sysmonconfig-export.xml


/.gitignore:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 | sysmonconfig-export.xml.bak
2 | sysmonconfignxg.txt
3 | sysmon.exe
4 | *.exe
5 | *.cfg
6 | *.zip
7 | 


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/README.md:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1 | # sysmon-config | A Sysmon configuration file for everybody to fork #
 2 | 
 3 | This is a Microsoft Sysinternals Sysmon configuration file template with default high-quality event tracing.
 4 | 
 5 | The file should function as a great starting point for system change monitoring in a self-contained and accessible package. This configuration and results should give you a good idea of what's possible for Sysmon. Note that this does not track things like authentication and other Windows events that are also vital for incident investigation.
 6 | 
 7 |       **[sysmonconfig-export.xml](https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config/blob/master/sysmonconfig-export.xml)**
 8 | 
 9 | Because virtually every line is commented and sections are marked with explanations, it should also function as a tutorial for Sysmon and a guide to critical monitoring areas in Windows systems.
10 | 
11 | - For a far more exhaustive and detailed approach to Sysmon configuration from a different approach, see also **[sysmon-modular](https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular)** by [@olafhartong](https://twitter.com/olafhartong), which can act as a superset of sysmon-config.
12 | 
13 | - Sysmon is a compliment to native Windows logging abilities, not a replacement for it. For valuable advice on these configurations, see **[MalwareArchaeology Logging Cheat Sheets](https://www.malwarearchaeology.com/cheat-sheets)** by [@HackerHurricane](https://twitter.com/hackerhurricane).
14 | 
15 | Note: Exact syntax and filtering choices in the configuration are highly deliberate in what they target, and to have as little performance impact as possible. Sysmon's filtering abilities are different than the built-in Windows auditing features, so often a different approach is taken than the normal static listing of paths. 
16 | 
17 |       **[See other forks of this configuration](https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config/network)**
18 | 
19 | ## Use ##
20 | ### Install ###
21 | Run with administrator rights
22 | ~~~~
23 | sysmon.exe -accepteula -i sysmonconfig-export.xml
24 | ~~~~
25 | 
26 | ### Update existing configuration ###
27 | Run with administrator rights
28 | ~~~~
29 | sysmon.exe -c sysmonconfig-export.xml
30 | ~~~~
31 | 
32 | ### Uninstall ###
33 | Run with administrator rights
34 | ~~~~
35 | sysmon.exe -u
36 | ~~~~
37 | 
38 | ## Required actions ##
39 | 
40 | ### Prerequisites ###
41 | Highly recommend using [Notepad++](https://notepad-plus-plus.org/) to edit this configuration. It understands UNIX newline format and does XML syntax highlighting, which makes this very understandable. I do not recommend using the built-in Notepad.exe.
42 | 
43 | ### Customization ###
44 | You will need to install and observe the results of the configuration in your own environment before deploying it widely. For example, you will need to exclude actions of your antivirus, which will otherwise likely fill up your logs with useless information.
45 | 
46 | The configuration is highly commented and designed to be self-explanatory to assist you in this customization to your environment.
47 | 
48 | ### Design notes ###
49 | This configuration expects software to be installed system-wide and NOT in the C:\Users folder. Various pieces of software install themselves in User directories, which are subject to extra monitoring. Where possible, you should install the system-wide version of these pieces of software, like Chrome. See the configuration file for more instructions.
50 | 


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/sysmonconfig-export.xml:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   1 | <!--
   2 |   sysmon-config | A Sysmon configuration focused on default high-quality event tracing and easy customization by the community
   3 |   Source version:	74 | Date: 2021-07-08
   4 |   Source project:	https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config
   5 |   Source license:	Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 | You may privatize, fork, edit, teach, publish, or deploy for commercial use - with attribution in the text.
   6 | 
   7 |   Fork version:	<N/A>
   8 |   Fork author:	<N/A>
   9 |   Fork project:	<N/A>
  10 |   Fork license:	<N/A>
  11 | 
  12 |   REQUIRED: Sysmon version 13 or higher (due to changes in syntax and bug-fixes)
  13 | 	https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
  14 | 
  15 |   NOTE: To collect Sysmon logs centrally for free, see https://aka.ms/WEF | Command to allow log access to the Network Service:
  16 | 	wevtutil.exe sl Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational /ca:O:BAG:SYD:(A;;0xf0005;;;SY)(A;;0x5;;;BA)(A;;0x1;;;S-1-5-32-573)(A;;0x1;;;NS)
  17 | 
  18 |   NOTE: Do not let the size and complexity of this configuration discourage you from customizing it or building your own.
  19 | 	This configuration is based around known, high-signal event tracing, and thus appears complicated, but it is only very
  20 | 	detailed. Significant effort over years has been invested in front-loading as much filtering as possible onto the
  21 | 	client. This is to make analysis of intrusions possible by hand, and to try to surface anomalous activity as quickly
  22 | 	as possible to technicians armed only with Event Viewer. Its purpose is to democratize system monitoring for all organizations.
  23 | 
  24 |   NOTE: Sysmon is NOT a whitelist solution or HIDS correlation engine, it is a computer change logging tool.
  25 | 	Do NOT ignore everything possible. Sysmon's purpose is providing context during a threat or problem investigation. Legitimate
  26 | 	processes are routinely used by threats - do not blindly exclude them. Additionally, be mindful of process-hollowing / imitation.
  27 | 
  28 |   NOTE: By default this monitors DNS, which is extremely noisy. If you are starting out on your monitoring journey, just remove that section.
  29 | 	You can remove DNS events from Event Viewer screen by applying a 'Filter Current View' for event IDs of: -22
  30 | 	Additionally, if you want to monitor DNS, you should deploy client-side adblocking to reduce lookups. See the DNS section for info.
  31 | 
  32 |   NOTE: This configuration is designed for PER-MACHINE installs of Chrome and OneDrive. That moves their binaries out of user-controlled folders.
  33 | 	Otherwise, attackers could imitate these common applications, and bypass your logging. Below are silent upgrades you can do, no user impact:
  34 | 	- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/onedrive/per-machine-installation
  35 | 	- https://cloud.google.com/chrome-enterprise/browser/download/
  36 | 	- As of 2021-02-16 there is no machine-level version of Microsoft Teams. The one provided copies itself to the user profile.
  37 | 
  38 |   NOTE: Sysmon is not hardened against an attacker with admin rights. Additionally, this configuration offers an attacker, willing
  39 | 	to study it, limited ways to evade some of the logging. If you are in a very high-threat environment, you should consider a broader,
  40 | 	log-most approach. However, in the vast majority of cases, an attacker will bumble through multiple behavioral traps which
  41 | 	this configuration monitors, especially in the first minutes.
  42 | 
  43 |   NOTE: If you encounter unexplainable event inclusion/exclusion, you may have a second Sysmon instance installed under a different exe filename.
  44 | 	To clear this, try downloading the latest version and uninstalling with -u force. If it hangs, kill the processes and run it again to cleanup.
  45 | 
  46 |   TECHNICAL:
  47 |   - Run sysmon.exe -? for a briefing on Sysmon configuration.
  48 |   - Sysmon XML cannot use the AMPERSAND sign. Replace it with this: &amp;
  49 |   - Sysmon 8+ can track which rule caused an event to be logged through the "RuleName" field.
  50 |   - If you only specify exclude for a filtering subsection, everything in that subsection is logged by default.
  51 |   - Some Sysmon monitoring abilities are not meant for widely deployed general-purpose use due to performance impact. Depends on environment.
  52 |   - Duplicate or overlapping "Include" rules do not result in duplicate events being logged.
  53 |   - All characters enclosed by XML tags are always interpreted literally. Sysmon does not support wildcards (*), alternate characters, or RegEx.
  54 |   - In registry events, the value name is appended to the full key path with a "\" delimiter. Default key values are named "\(Default)"
  55 |   - "Image" is a technical term for a compiled binary file like an EXE or DLL. Also, it can match just the filename, or entire path.
  56 |   - "ProcessGuid" and "LoginGuid" are not random, they contain some embedded information. https://gist.github.com/mattifestation/0102042160c9a60b2b847378c0ef70b4
  57 | 
  58 |   FILTERING: Filter conditions available for use are: is,is not,contains,contains any,contains all,excludes,excludes any,excludes all,begin with,end with,less than,more than,image
  59 |   - The "image" filter is usable on any field. Same as "is" but can either match entire string, or only the text after last "\". Credit: @mattifestation
  60 | 
  61 | -->
  62 | 
  63 | <Sysmon schemaversion="4.50">
  64 | 	<!--SYSMON META CONFIG-->
  65 | 	<HashAlgorithms>md5,sha256,IMPHASH</HashAlgorithms> <!-- Both MD5 and SHA256 are the industry-standard algorithms. Remove IMPHASH if you do not use DLL import fingerprinting. -->
  66 | 	<CheckRevocation/> <!-- Check loaded drivers, log if their code-signing certificate has been revoked, in case malware stole one to sign a kernel driver -->
  67 | 
  68 | 	<!-- <ImageLoad/> --> <!-- Would manually force-on ImageLoad monitoring, even without configuration below. Included only documentation. -->
  69 | 	<!-- <ProcessAccessConfig/> --> <!-- Would manually force-on ProcessAccess monitoring, even without configuration below. Included only documentation. -->
  70 | 	<!-- <PipeMonitoringConfig/> --> <!-- Would manually force-on PipeCreated / PipeConnected events, even without configuration below. Included only documentation. -->
  71 | 	<!-- <ArchiveDirectory> -->
  72 | 
  73 | 	<EventFiltering>
  74 | 
  75 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 1 : PROCESS CREATION [ProcessCreate]-->
  76 | 		<!--COMMENT:	All processes launched will be logged, except for what matches a rule below. It's best to be as specific as possible,
  77 | 			to avoid user-mode executables imitating other process names to avoid logging, or if malware drops files in an existing directory.
  78 | 			Ultimately, you must weigh CPU time checking many detailed rules, against the risk of malware exploiting the blindness created.
  79 | 			Beware of Masquerading, where attackers imitate the names and paths of legitimate tools. Ideally, you'd use both file path and
  80 | 			code signatures to validate, but Sysmon does not support that. Look into AppLocker/WindowsDeviceGuard for whitelisting support. -->
  81 | 
  82 | 		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessID, Image, FileVersion, Description, Product, Company, CommandLine, CurrentDirectory, User, LogonGuid, LogonId, TerminalSessionId, IntegrityLevel, Hashes, ParentProcessGuid, ParentProcessId, ParentImage, ParentCommandLine, RuleName-->
  83 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
  84 | 		<ProcessCreate onmatch="exclude">
  85 | 			<!--SECTION: Microsoft Windows-->
  86 | 			<CommandLine condition="begin with"> "C:\Windows\system32\wermgr.exe" "-queuereporting_svc" </CommandLine> <!--Windows:Windows error reporting/telemetry-->
  87 | 			<CommandLine condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid</CommandLine> <!--Windows-->
  88 | 			<CommandLine condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -Embedding</CommandLine> <!--Windows: WMI provider host-->
  89 | 			<CommandLine condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding</CommandLine> <!--Windows: WMI provider host-->
  90 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\wermgr.exe -upload</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Windows error reporting/telemetry-->
  91 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\SearchIndexer.exe /Embedding</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Search Indexer-->
  92 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\windows\system32\wermgr.exe -queuereporting</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Windows error reporting/telemetry-->
  93 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">\??\C:\Windows\system32\autochk.exe *</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Bootup: Auto Check Utility-->
  94 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">\SystemRoot\System32\smss.exe</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Bootup: Windows Session Manager-->
  95 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Apps permissions [ https://fossbytes.com/runtime-broker-process-windows-10/ ] -->
  96 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\microsoft shared\ink\TabTip32.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Touch Keyboard and Handwriting Panel Helper-->
  97 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\TokenBrokerCookies.exe</Image> <!--Windows: SSO sign-in assistant for MicrosoftOnline.com-->
  98 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\plasrv.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Performance Logs and Alerts DCOM Server-->
  99 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\wifitask.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Wireless Background Task-->
 100 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\CompatTelRunner.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Customer Experience Improvement-->
 101 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\PrintIsolationHost.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Printing-->
 102 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.Exe</Image> <!--Windows: KMS activation-->
 103 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\audiodg.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Launched constantly-->
 104 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Command line interface host process-->
 105 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\mobsync.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Network file syncing-->
 106 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\musNotification.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Update pop-ups-->
 107 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\musNotificationUx.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Update pop-ups-->
 108 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft:Power configuration management-->
 109 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\sndVol.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Volume control-->
 110 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\sppsvc.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Software Protection Service-->
 111 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\wbem\WmiApSrv.exe</Image> <!--Windows: WMI performance adapter host process-->
 112 | 			<IntegrityLevel condition="is">AppContainer</IntegrityLevel> <!--Windows: Don't care about sandboxed processes right now. Will need to revisit this decision.-->
 113 | 			<ParentCommandLine condition="begin with">%%SystemRoot%%\system32\csrss.exe ObjectDirectory=\Windows</ParentCommandLine> <!--Windows:CommandShell: Triggered when programs use the command shell, but doesn't provide attribution for what caused it-->
 114 | 			<ParentCommandLine condition="is">C:\windows\system32\wermgr.exe -queuereporting</ParentCommandLine> <!--Windows:Windows error reporting/telemetry-->
 115 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\WINDOWS\system32\devicecensus.exe UserCxt</CommandLine>
 116 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\usocoreworker.exe -Embedding</CommandLine>
 117 | 			<ParentImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\SearchIndexer.exe</ParentImage> <!--Windows:Search: Launches many uninteresting sub-processes-->
 118 | 			<!--SECTION: Windows:svchost-->
 119 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -s StateRepository</CommandLine>
 120 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s camsvc</CommandLine>
 121 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel</CommandLine> <!--Windows 10-->
 122 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s tiledatamodelsvc</CommandLine>
 123 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k camera -s FrameServer</CommandLine>
 124 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k dcomlaunch -s LSM</CommandLine>
 125 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k dcomlaunch -s PlugPlay</CommandLine>
 126 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k defragsvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows defragmentation-->
 127 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k devicesflow -s DevicesFlowUserSvc</CommandLine>
 128 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k imgsvc</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:The Windows Image Acquisition Service-->
 129 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localService -s EventSystem</CommandLine>
 130 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localService -s bthserv</CommandLine>
 131 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s BthAvctpSvc</CommandLine>
 132 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localService -s nsi</CommandLine>
 133 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localService -s w32Time</CommandLine>
 134 |       <CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceAndNoImpersonation</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
 135 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceAndNoImpersonation -p</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
 136 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceNetworkRestricted -s Dhcp</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
 137 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceNetworkRestricted -s EventLog</CommandLine>
 138 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceNetworkRestricted -s TimeBrokerSvc</CommandLine>
 139 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceNetworkRestricted -s WFDSConMgrSvc</CommandLine>
 140 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s BTAGService</CommandLine>
 141 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService</CommandLine> <!--Win10:1903:Network Connection Broker-->
 142 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceNetworkRestricted</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
 143 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceAndNoImpersonation -s SensrSvc</CommandLine>
 144 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV</CommandLine> <!--Windows:SSDP [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Service_Discovery_Protocol ] -->
 145 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceNoNetwork</CommandLine>
 146 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s WPDBusEnum</CommandLine>
 147 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s fhsvc</CommandLine>
 148 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -s DeviceAssociationService</CommandLine>
 149 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -s NcbService</CommandLine>
 150 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -s SensorService</CommandLine>
 151 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -s TabletInputService</CommandLine>
 152 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -s UmRdpService</CommandLine>
 153 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -s WPDBusEnum</CommandLine>
 154 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcSvc</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Passport-->
 155 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Passport Container-->
 156 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceAndNoImpersonation -s SCardSvr</CommandLine>
 157 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wuauserv</CommandLine>
 158 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SessionEnv</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Remote desktop configuration-->
 159 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -s WdiSystemHost</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Diagnostic System Host [ http://www.blackviper.com/windows-services/diagnostic-system-host/ ] -->
 160 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s WdiSystemHost</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Diagnostic System Host [ http://www.blackviper.com/windows-services/diagnostic-system-host/ ] -->
 161 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted</CommandLine> <!--Windows-->
 162 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Windows Live Sign-In Assistant [ https://www.howtogeek.com/howto/30348/what-are-wlidsvc.exe-and-wlidsvcm.exe-and-why-are-they-running/ ] -->
 163 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ncaSvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network Connectivity Assistant [ http://www.blackviper.com/windows-services/network-connectivity-assistant/ ] -->
 164 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BDESVC</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: BitLocker Drive Encryption-->
 165 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s BDESVC</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Win10:1903:Network: BitLocker Drive Encryption-->
 166 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s BITS</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: Background Intelligent File Transfer (BITS) -->
 167 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: Background Intelligent File Transfer (BITS) -->
 168 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s CertPropSvc</CommandLine>
 169 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s DsmSvc</CommandLine>
 170 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Appinfo</CommandLine>
 171 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Gpsvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: Group Policy -->
 172 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s ProfSvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
 173 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s SENS</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
 174 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s SessionEnv</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
 175 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Themes</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
 176 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Winmgmt</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) -->
 177 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
 178 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkService -p -s DoSvc</CommandLine>
 179 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkService -s Dnscache</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: DNS caching, other uses -->
 180 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkService -s LanmanWorkstation</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: "Workstation" service, used for SMB file-sharing connections and RDP-->
 181 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkService -s NlaSvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: Network Location Awareness-->
 182 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkService -s TermService</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: Terminal Services (RDP)-->
 183 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkService</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
 184 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkService -p</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
 185 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkServiceNetworkRestricted</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
 186 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k rPCSS</CommandLine> <!--Windows Services-->
 187 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k secsvcs</CommandLine>
 188 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k swprv</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Software Shadow Copy Provider-->
 189 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k unistackSvcGroup</CommandLine> <!--Windows 10-->
 190 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k utcsvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows Services-->
 191 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k wbioSvcGroup</CommandLine> <!--Windows Services-->
 192 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k werSvcGroup</CommandLine> <!--Windows: ErrorReporting-->
 193 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k wusvcs -p -s WaaSMedicSvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Update Medic Service [ https://www.thewindowsclub.com/windows-update-medic-service ] -->
 194 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k wsappx -p -s ClipSVC</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Apps: Client License Service-->
 195 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k wsappx -p -s AppXSvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Apps: AppX Deployment Service-->
 196 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k wsappx -s ClipSVC</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Apps: Client License Service-->
 197 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k wsappx</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Apps [ https://www.howtogeek.com/320261/what-is-wsappx-and-why-is-it-running-on-my-pc/ ] -->
 198 | 			<ParentCommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs</ParentCommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services: Spawns Consent.exe-->
 199 | 			<ParentCommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted</ParentCommandLine> <!--Windows-->
 200 | 			<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\deviceenroller.exe /c /AutoEnrollMDM</CommandLine> <!--Windows: AzureAD device enrollment agent-->
 201 | 			<!--SECTION: Microsoft:Edge-->
 202 | 			<CommandLine condition="begin with">"C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge Dev\Application\msedge.exe" --type=</CommandLine>
 203 | 			<!--SECTION: Microsoft:dotNet-->
 204 | 			<CommandLine condition="begin with">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\ngen.exe</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:DotNet-->
 205 | 			<CommandLine condition="begin with">C:\WINDOWS\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\Ngen.exe</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:DotNet-->
 206 | 			<CommandLine condition="begin with">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\ngentask.exe</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:DotNet-->
 207 | 			<CommandLine condition="begin with">C:\WINDOWS\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\ngentask.exe</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:DotNet-->
 208 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\mscorsvw.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft:DotNet-->
 209 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorsvw.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft:DotNet-->
 210 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\Framework64\v3.0\WPF\PresentationFontCache.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Font cache service-->
 211 | 			<ParentCommandLine condition="begin with">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\ngentask.exe</ParentCommandLine>
 212 | 			<ParentImage condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\mscorsvw.exe</ParentImage> <!--Microsoft:DotNet-->
 213 | 			<ParentImage condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\ngentask.exe</ParentImage> <!--Microsoft:DotNet-->
 214 | 			<ParentImage condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorsvw.exe</ParentImage> <!--Microsoft:DotNet-->
 215 | 			<ParentImage condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\ngentask.exe</ParentImage> <!--Microsoft:DotNet: Spawns thousands of ngen.exe processes-->
 216 | 			<!--SECTION: Microsoft:Office-->
 217 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office16\MSOSYNC.EXE</Image> <!--Microsoft:Office: Background process for SharePoint/Office365 connectivity-->
 218 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\Office16\MSOSYNC.EXE</Image> <!--Microsoft:Office: Background process for SharePoint/Office365 connectivity-->
 219 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\OfficeSoftwareProtectionPlatform\OSPPSVC.EXE</Image> <!--Microsoft:Office: Licensing service-->
 220 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office16\msoia.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft:Office: Telemetry collector-->
 221 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\officebackgroundtaskhandler.exe</Image>
 222 | 			<!--SECTION: Microsoft:Office:Click2Run-->
 223 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeC2RClient.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft:Office: Background process-->
 224 | 			<ParentImage condition="is">C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe</ParentImage> <!--Microsoft:Office: Background process-->
 225 | 			<ParentImage condition="is">C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeC2RClient.exe</ParentImage> <!--Microsoft:Office: Background process-->
 226 | 			<!--SECTION: Windows: Media player-->
 227 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\wmpnscfg.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Windows Media Player Network Sharing Service Configuration Application-->
 228 | 			<!--SECTION: Google-->
 229 | 			<CommandLine condition="begin with">"C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe" --type=</CommandLine> <!--Google:Chrome: massive command-line arguments-->
 230 | 			<CommandLine condition="begin with">"C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe" --type=</CommandLine> <!--Google:Chrome: massive command-line arguments-->
 231 | 		</ProcessCreate>
 232 | 	</RuleGroup>
 233 | 
 234 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 2 : FILE CREATION TIME RETROACTIVELY CHANGED IN THE FILESYSTEM [FileCreateTime]-->
 235 | 		<!--COMMENT:	[ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1099 ] -->
 236 | 
 237 | 		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, TargetFilename, CreationUtcTime, PreviousCreationUtcTime-->
 238 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 239 | 		<FileCreateTime onmatch="include">
 240 | 			<Image name="T1099" condition="begin with">C:\Users</Image> <!--Look for timestomping in user area, usually nothing should be doing that here-->
 241 | 			<TargetFilename name="T1099" condition="end with">.exe</TargetFilename> <!--Look for backdated executables anywhere-->
 242 | 			<Image name="T1099" condition="begin with">\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy</Image> <!--Nothing should be written here | Credit: @SBousseaden [ https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1133030955407630336 ] -->
 243 | 		</FileCreateTime>
 244 | 	</RuleGroup>
 245 | 
 246 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 247 | 		<FileCreateTime onmatch="exclude">
 248 | 			<Image condition="image">OneDrive.exe</Image> <!--OneDrive constantly changes file times-->
 249 | 			<Image condition="image">C:\Windows\system32\backgroundTaskHost.exe</Image>
 250 | 			<Image condition="contains">setup</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
 251 | 			<Image condition="contains">install</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
 252 | 			<Image condition="contains">Update\</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
 253 | 			<Image condition="end with">redist.exe</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
 254 | 			<Image condition="is">msiexec.exe</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
 255 | 			<Image condition="is">TrustedInstaller.exe</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
 256 | 			<TargetFilename condition="contains">\NVIDIA\NvBackend\ApplicationOntology\</TargetFilename> <!--NVIDIA GeForce Experience Application Ontology, 1000's of events in user profile-->
 257 | 		</FileCreateTime>
 258 | 	</RuleGroup>
 259 | 
 260 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 3 : NETWORK CONNECTION INITIATED [NetworkConnect]-->
 261 | 		<!--COMMENT:	By default this configuration takes a very conservative approach to network logging, limited to only extremely high-signal events.-->
 262 | 		<!--COMMENT:	[ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control ] [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Exfiltration ] [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Lateral_Movement ] -->
 263 | 		<!--TECHNICAL:	For the DestinationHostname, Sysmon uses the GetNameInfo API, which will often not have any information, and may just be a CDN. This is NOT reliable for filtering.-->
 264 | 		<!--TECHNICAL:	For the DestinationPortName, Sysmon uses the GetNameInfo API for the friendly name of ports you see in logs.-->
 265 | 		<!--TECHNICAL:	These exe do not initiate their connections, and thus includes do not work in this section: BITSADMIN NLTEST-->
 266 | 
 267 | 		<!-- https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/APT-Log-Analysis-Tracking-Attack-Tools-by-Audit-Policy-and-Sysmon.pdf -->
 268 | 
 269 | 		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, User, Protocol, Initiated, SourceIsIpv6, SourceIp, SourceHostname, SourcePort, SourcePortName, DestinationIsIpV6, DestinationIp, DestinationHostname, DestinationPort, DestinationPortName-->
 270 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 271 | 		<NetworkConnect onmatch="include">
 272 | 			<!--Suspicious sources for network-connecting binaries-->
 273 | 			<Image name="Usermode" condition="begin with">C:\Users</Image> <!--Tools downloaded by users can use other processes for networking, but this is a very valuable indicator.-->
 274 | 			<Image name="Caution" condition="begin with">C:\Recycle</Image> <!--Nothing should operate from the RecycleBin locations.-->
 275 | 			<Image condition="begin with">C:\ProgramData</Image> <!--Normally, network communications should be sourced from "Program Files" not from ProgramData, something to look at-->
 276 | 			<Image condition="begin with">C:\Windows\Temp</Image> <!--Suspicious anything would communicate from the system-level temp directory-->
 277 | 			<Image name="Caution" condition="begin with">\</Image> <!--Devices and VSC shouldn't be executing changes | Credit: @SBousseaden @ionstorm @neu5ron @PerchedSystems [ https://twitter.com/SwiftOnSecurity/status/1133167323991486464 ] -->
 278 | 			<Image name="Caution" condition="begin with">C:\perflogs</Image> <!-- Credit @blu3_team [ https://blu3-team.blogspot.com/2019/05/netconn-from-suspicious-directories.html ] -->
 279 | 			<Image name="Caution" condition="begin with">C:\intel</Image> <!-- Credit @blu3_team [ https://blu3-team.blogspot.com/2019/05/netconn-from-suspicious-directories.html ] -->
 280 | 			<Image name="Caution" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\fonts</Image> <!-- Credit @blu3_team [ https://blu3-team.blogspot.com/2019/05/netconn-from-suspicious-directories.html ] -->
 281 | 			<Image name="Caution" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\config</Image> <!-- Credit @blu3_team [ https://blu3-team.blogspot.com/2019/05/netconn-from-suspicious-directories.html ] -->
 282 | 			<!--Suspicious Windows tools-->
 283 | 			<Image condition="image">at.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Remote task scheduling, removed in Win10 | Credit @ion-storm -->
 284 | 			<Image condition="image">certutil.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Certificate tool can contact outbound | Credit @ion-storm @FVT [ https://twitter.com/FVT/status/834433734602530817 ] -->
 285 | 			<Image condition="image">cmd.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Remote command prompt-->
 286 | 			<Image condition="image">cmstp.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Connection manager profiles can launch executables from WebDAV [ https://twitter.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408 ] | Credit @NickTyrer @Oddvarmoe @KyleHanslovan @subTee -->
 287 | 			<Image condition="image">cscript.exe</Image> <!--WindowsScriptingHost: | Credit @Cyb3rOps [ https://gist.github.com/Neo23x0/a4b4af9481e01e749409 ] -->
 288 | 			<Image condition="image">driverquery.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Remote recognisance of system configuration, oudated/vulnerable drivers -->
 289 | 			<Image condition="image">dsquery.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft: Query Active Directory -->
 290 | 			<Image condition="image">hh.exe</Image> <!--Windows: HTML Help Executable, opens CHM files -->
 291 | 			<Image condition="image">infDefaultInstall.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft: [ https://github.com/huntresslabs/evading-autoruns ] | Credit @KyleHanslovan -->
 292 | 			<Image condition="image">java.exe</Image> <!--Java: Monitor usage of vulnerable application and init from JAR files | Credit @ion-storm -->
 293 | 			<Image condition="image">javaw.exe</Image> <!--Java: Monitor usage of vulnerable application and init from JAR files -->
 294 | 			<Image condition="image">javaws.exe</Image> <!--Java: Monitor usage of vulnerable application and init from JAR files -->
 295 | 			<Image condition="image">mmc.exe</Image> <!--Windows: -->
 296 | 			<Image condition="image">msbuild.exe</Image> <!--Windows: [ https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/a314f6106633fba4b70f9d6ddbee452e8f8f44a72117749c21243dc93c7ed3ac?environmentId=100 ] -->
 297 | 			<Image condition="image">mshta.exe</Image> <!--Windows: HTML application executes scripts without IE protections | Credit @ion-storm [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application ] -->
 298 | 			<Image condition="image">msiexec.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Can install from http:// paths | Credit @vector-sec -->
 299 | 			<Image condition="image">nbtstat.exe</Image> <!--Windows: NetBIOS statistics, attackers use to enumerate local network -->
 300 | 			<Image condition="image">net.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Note - May not detect anything, net.exe is a front-end to lower APIs | Credit @ion-storm -->
 301 | 			<Image condition="image">net1.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Launched by "net.exe", but it may not detect connections either -->
 302 | 			<Image condition="image">notepad.exe</Image> <!--Windows: [ https://secrary.com/ReversingMalware/CoinMiner/ ] [ https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2013/08/08/why-is-notepad-exe-connecting-to-the-internet/ ] -->
 303 | 			<Image condition="image">nslookup.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Retrieve data over DNS -->
 304 | 			<Image condition="image">powershell.exe</Image> <!--Windows: PowerShell interface-->
 305 | 			<Image condition="image">powershell_ise.exe</Image> <!--Windows: PowerShell interface-->
 306 | 			<Image condition="image">qprocess.exe</Image> <!--Windows: [ https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/APT-Log-Analysis-Tracking-Attack-Tools-by-Audit-Policy-and-Sysmon.pdf ] -->
 307 | 			<Image condition="image">qwinsta.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Query remote sessions | Credit @ion-storm -->
 308 | 			<Image condition="image">qwinsta.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Remotely query login sessions on a server or workstation | Credit @ion-storm -->
 309 | 			<Image condition="image">reg.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Remote Registry editing ability | Credit @ion-storm -->
 310 | 			<Image condition="image">regsvcs.exe</Image> <!--Windows: [ https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/3f94d7080e6c5b8f59eeecc3d44f7e817b31562caeba21d02ad705a0bfc63d67?environmentId=100 ] -->
 311 | 			<Image condition="image">regsvr32.exe</Image> <!--Windows: [ https://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2016/04/bypass-application-whitelisting-script.html ] -->
 312 | 			<Image condition="image">rundll32.exe</Image> <!--Windows: [ https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2016/07/22/why-is-rundll32-exe-connecting-to-the-internet/ ] -->
 313 | 			<Image condition="image">rwinsta.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Disconnect remote sessions | Credit @ion-storm -->
 314 | 			<Image condition="image">sc.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Remotely change Windows service settings | Credit @ion-storm -->
 315 | 			<Image condition="image">schtasks.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Command-line interface to local and remote tasks -->
 316 | 			<Image condition="image">taskkill.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Kill processes, has remote ability -->
 317 | 			<Image condition="image">tasklist.exe</Image> <!--Windows: List processes, has remote ability -->
 318 | 			<Image condition="image">wmic.exe</Image> <!--WindowsManagementInstrumentation: Credit @Cyb3rOps [ https://gist.github.com/Neo23x0/a4b4af9481e01e749409 ] -->
 319 | 			<Image condition="image">wscript.exe</Image> <!--WindowsScriptingHost: | Credit @arekfurt -->
 320 | 			<!--Live of the Land Binaries and scripts (LOLBAS) -->
 321 | 			<Image condition="image">bitsadmin.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Background Intelligent Transfer Service - Can download from URLs -->
 322 | 			<Image condition="image">esentutl.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Database utilities for the ESE - Can fetch from UNC paths -->
 323 | 			<Image condition="image">expand.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Expands one or more compressed files - Can fetch from UNC paths -->
 324 | 			<Image condition="image">extrac32.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Uncompress .cab files - Can fetch from UNC paths -->
 325 | 			<Image condition="image">findstr.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Search for strings - Can fetch from UNC paths -->
 326 | 			<Image condition="image">GfxDownloadWrapper.exe</Image> <!-- Intel Graphics Control Panel: Remote file download -->
 327 | 			<Image condition="image">ieexec.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Microsoft .NET Framework application - Download and execute from URLs -->
 328 | 			<Image condition="image">makecab.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Packages existing files into a .cab - Can fetch from UNC paths -->
 329 | 			<Image condition="image">replace.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Used to replace file with another file - Can fetch from UNC paths -->
 330 | 			<Image condition="image">Excel.exe</Image> <!-- Windows Office: Excel - Can download from URLs -->
 331 | 			<Image condition="image">Powerpnt.exe</Image> <!-- Windows Office: PowerPoint - Can download from URLs -->
 332 | 			<Image condition="image">Winword.exe</Image> <!-- Windows Office: Word - Can download from URLs -->
 333 | 			<Image condition="image">squirrel.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Update the Nuget/Squirrel packages. Part of Teams. - Can download from URLs -->
 334 | 			<!--Relevant 3rd Party Tools-->
 335 | 			<Image condition="image">nc.exe</Image> <!-- Nmap's modern version of netcat [ https://nmap.org/ncat/guide/index.html#ncat-overview ] [ https://securityblog.gr/1517/create-backdoor-in-windows-with-ncat/ ] -->
 336 | 			<Image condition="image">ncat.exe</Image> <!-- Nmap's modern version of netcat [ https://nmap.org/ncat/guide/index.html#ncat-overview ] [ https://securityblog.gr/1517/create-backdoor-in-windows-with-ncat/ ] -->
 337 | 			<Image condition="image">psexec.exe</Image> <!--Sysinternals:PsExec client side | Credit @Cyb3rOps -->
 338 | 			<Image condition="image">psexesvc.exe</Image> <!--Sysinternals:PsExec server side | Credit @Cyb3rOps -->
 339 | 			<Image condition="image">tor.exe</Image> <!--Tor [ https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/800bf028a23440134fc834efc5c1e02cc70f05b2e800bbc285d7c92a4b126b1c?environmentId=100 ] -->
 340 | 			<Image condition="image">vnc.exe</Image> <!-- VNC client | Credit @Cyb3rOps -->
 341 | 			<Image condition="image">vncservice.exe</Image> <!-- VNC server | Credit @Cyb3rOps -->
 342 | 			<Image condition="image">vncviewer.exe</Image> <!-- VNC client | Credit @Cyb3rOps -->
 343 | 			<Image condition="image">winexesvc.exe</Image> <!-- Winexe service executable | Credit @Cyb3rOps -->
 344 | 			<Image condition="image">nmap.exe</Image>
 345 | 			<Image condition="image">psinfo.exe</Image>
 346 | 			<!--Ports: Suspicious-->
 347 | 			<DestinationPort name="SSH" condition="is">22</DestinationPort> <!--SSH protocol, monitor admin connections-->
 348 | 			<DestinationPort name="Telnet" condition="is">23</DestinationPort> <!--Telnet protocol, monitor admin connections, insecure-->
 349 | 			<DestinationPort name="SMTP" condition="is">25</DestinationPort> <!--SMTP mail protocol port, insecure, used by threats-->
 350 | 			<DestinationPort name="IMAP" condition="is">143</DestinationPort> <!--IMAP mail protocol port, insecure, used by threats-->
 351 | 			<DestinationPort name="RDP" condition="is">3389</DestinationPort> <!--Windows:RDP: Monitor admin connections-->
 352 | 			<DestinationPort name="VNC" condition="is">5800</DestinationPort> <!--VNC protocol: Monitor admin connections, often insecure, using hard-coded admin password-->
 353 | 			<DestinationPort name="VNC" condition="is">5900</DestinationPort> <!--VNC protocol Monitor admin connections, often insecure, using hard-coded admin password-->
 354 | 			<DestinationPort name="Alert,Metasploit" condition="is">4444</DestinationPort>
 355 | 			<!--Ports: Proxy-->
 356 | 			<DestinationPort name="Proxy" condition="is">1080</DestinationPort> <!--Socks proxy port | Credit @ion-storm-->
 357 | 			<DestinationPort name="Proxy" condition="is">3128</DestinationPort> <!--Socks proxy port | Credit @ion-storm-->
 358 | 			<DestinationPort name="Proxy" condition="is">8080</DestinationPort> <!--Socks proxy port | Credit @ion-storm-->
 359 | 			<!--Ports: Tor-->
 360 | 			<DestinationPort name="Tor" condition="is">1723</DestinationPort> <!--Tor protocol [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1090 ] | Credit @ion-storm-->
 361 | 			<DestinationPort name="Tor" condition="is">9001</DestinationPort> <!--Tor protocol [ http://www.computerworlduk.com/tutorial/security/tor-enterprise-2016-blocking-malware-darknet-use-rogue-nodes-3633907/ ] -->
 362 | 			<DestinationPort name="Tor" condition="is">9030</DestinationPort> <!--Tor protocol [ http://www.computerworlduk.com/tutorial/security/tor-enterprise-2016-blocking-malware-darknet-use-rogue-nodes-3633907/ ] -->
 363 | 		</NetworkConnect>
 364 | 	</RuleGroup>
 365 | 
 366 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 367 | 		<NetworkConnect onmatch="exclude">
 368 | 			<!--SECTION: Microsoft-->
 369 | 			<Image condition="begin with">C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\</Image>
 370 | 			<Image condition="end with">AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft: Teams-->
 371 | 			<DestinationHostname condition="end with">.microsoft.com</DestinationHostname> <!--Microsoft:Update delivery-->
 372 | 			<DestinationHostname condition="end with">microsoft.com.akadns.net</DestinationHostname> <!--Microsoft:Update delivery-->
 373 | 			<DestinationHostname condition="end with">microsoft.com.nsatc.net</DestinationHostname> <!--Microsoft:Update delivery-->
 374 | 			<!--OCSP known addresses-->
 375 | 			<DestinationIp condition="is">23.4.43.27</DestinationIp> <!--Digicert [ https://otx.alienvault.com/indicator/ip/23.4.43.27 ] -->
 376 | 			<DestinationIp condition="is">72.21.91.29</DestinationIp> <!--Digicert [ https://otx.alienvault.com/indicator/ip/72.21.91.29 ] -->
 377 | 			<!--Section: Loopback Addresses-->
 378 | 			<DestinationIp condition="is">127.0.0.1</DestinationIp> <!--Credit @ITProPaul-->
 379 | 			<DestinationIp condition="begin with">fe80:0:0:0</DestinationIp> <!--Credit @ITProPaul-->
 380 | 		</NetworkConnect>
 381 | 	</RuleGroup>
 382 | 
 383 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 4 : RESERVED FOR SYSMON SERVICE STATUS MESSAGES-->
 384 | 
 385 | 		<!--DATA: UtcTime, State, Version, SchemaVersion-->
 386 | 		<!--Cannot be filtered.-->
 387 | 
 388 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 5 : PROCESS ENDED [ProcessTerminate]-->
 389 | 		<!--COMMENT:	Useful data in building infection timelines.-->
 390 | 
 391 | 		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image-->
 392 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 393 | 		<ProcessTerminate onmatch="include">
 394 | 			<Image condition="begin with">C:\Users</Image> <!--Process terminations by user binaries-->
 395 | 			<Image condition="begin with">\</Image> <!--Devices and VSC shouldn't be executing changes | Credit: @SBousseaden @ionstorm @neu5ron @PerchedSystems [ https://twitter.com/SwiftOnSecurity/status/1133167323991486464 ] -->
 396 | 		</ProcessTerminate>
 397 | 	</RuleGroup>
 398 | 
 399 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 400 | 		<ProcessTerminate onmatch="exclude">
 401 | 		</ProcessTerminate>
 402 | 	</RuleGroup>
 403 | 
 404 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 6 : DRIVER LOADED INTO KERNEL [DriverLoad]-->
 405 | 		<!--COMMENT:	Because drivers with bugs can be used to escalate to kernel permissions, be extremely selective
 406 | 			about what you exclude from monitoring. Low event volume, little incentive to exclude.
 407 | 			[ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1014 ] -->
 408 | 		<!--TECHNICAL:	Sysmon will check the signing certificate revocation status of any driver you don't exclude.-->
 409 | 
 410 | 		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ImageLoaded, Hashes, Signed, Signature, SignatureStatus-->
 411 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 412 | 		<DriverLoad onmatch="exclude">
 413 | 			<Signature condition="contains">microsoft</Signature> <!--Exclude signed Microsoft drivers-->
 414 | 			<Signature condition="contains">windows</Signature> <!--Exclude signed Microsoft drivers-->
 415 | 			<Signature condition="begin with">Intel </Signature> <!--Exclude signed Intel drivers-->
 416 | 		</DriverLoad>
 417 | 	</RuleGroup>
 418 | 
 419 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 7 : DLL (IMAGE) LOADED BY PROCESS [ImageLoad]-->
 420 | 		<!--COMMENT:	Can cause high system load, disabled by default.-->
 421 | 		<!--COMMENT:	[ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1073 ] [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1038 ] [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1034 ] -->
 422 | 
 423 | 		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, ImageLoaded, Hashes, Signed, Signature, SignatureStatus-->
 424 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 425 | 		<ImageLoad onmatch="include">
 426 | 			<!--NOTE: Using "include" with no rules means nothing in this section will be logged-->
 427 | 		</ImageLoad>
 428 | 	</RuleGroup>
 429 | 
 430 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 8 : REMOTE THREAD CREATED [CreateRemoteThread]-->
 431 | 		<!--COMMENT:	Monitor for processes injecting code into other processes. Often used by malware to cloak their actions. Also when Firefox loads Flash.
 432 | 		[ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1055 ] -->
 433 | 
 434 | 		<!--DATA: UtcTime, SourceProcessGuid, SourceProcessId, SourceImage, TargetProcessId, TargetImage, NewThreadId, StartAddress, StartModule, StartFunction-->
 435 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 436 | 		<CreateRemoteThread onmatch="exclude">
 437 | 			<!--COMMENT: Exclude mostly-safe sources and log anything else.-->
 438 | 			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe</SourceImage>
 439 | 			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe</SourceImage>
 440 | 			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\wininit.exe</SourceImage>
 441 | 			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\csrss.exe</SourceImage>
 442 | 			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\services.exe</SourceImage>
 443 | 			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exe</SourceImage>
 444 | 			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\audiodg.exe</SourceImage>
 445 | 			<StartModule condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\kernel32.dll</StartModule>
 446 | 			<TargetImage condition="is">C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe</TargetImage>
 447 | 		</CreateRemoteThread>
 448 | 	</RuleGroup>
 449 | 
 450 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 9 : RAW DISK ACCESS [RawAccessRead]-->
 451 | 		<!--EVENT 9: "RawAccessRead detected"-->
 452 | 		<!--COMMENT:	Can cause high system load, disabled by default.-->
 453 | 		<!--COMMENT:	Monitor for raw sector-level access to the disk, often used to bypass access control lists or access locked files.
 454 | 			Disabled by default since including even one entry here activates this component. Reward/performance/rule maintenance decision.
 455 | 			Encourage you to experiment with this feature yourself. [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1067 ] -->
 456 | 		<!--COMMENT:	You will likely want to set this to a full capture on domain controllers, where no process should be doing raw reads.-->
 457 | 
 458 | 		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, Device-->
 459 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 460 | 		<RawAccessRead onmatch="include">
 461 | 			<!--NOTE: Using "include" with no rules means nothing in this section will be logged-->
 462 | 		</RawAccessRead>
 463 | 	</RuleGroup>
 464 | 
 465 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 10 : INTER-PROCESS ACCESS [ProcessAccess]-->
 466 | 		<!--EVENT 10: "Process accessed"-->
 467 | 		<!--COMMENT:	Can cause high system load, disabled by default.-->
 468 | 		<!--COMMENT:	Monitor for processes accessing other process' memory.-->
 469 | 
 470 | 		<!--DATA: UtcTime, SourceProcessGuid, SourceProcessId, SourceThreadId, SourceImage, TargetProcessGuid, TargetProcessId, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, CallTrace-->
 471 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 472 | 		<ProcessAccess onmatch="include">
 473 | 			<!--NOTE: Using "include" with no rules means nothing in this section will be logged-->
 474 | 		</ProcessAccess>
 475 | 	</RuleGroup>
 476 | 
 477 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 11 : FILE CREATED [FileCreate]-->
 478 | 		<!--EVENT 11: "File created"-->
 479 | 		<!--NOTE:	Other filesystem "minifilters" can make it appear to Sysmon that some files are being written twice. This is not a Sysmon issue, per Mark Russinovich.-->
 480 | 		<!--NOTE:	You may not see files detected by antivirus. Other filesystem minifilters, like antivirus, can act before Sysmon receives the alert a file was written.-->
 481 | 
 482 | 		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, TargetFilename, CreationUtcTime-->
 483 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 484 | 		<FileCreate onmatch="include">
 485 | 			<TargetFilename name="T1023" condition="contains">\Start Menu</TargetFilename> <!--Windows: Startup links and shortcut modification [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1023 ] -->
 486 | 			<TargetFilename name="T1165" condition="contains">\Startup\</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Changes to user's auto-launched files and shortcuts-->
 487 | 			<TargetFilename name="OutlookAttachment" condition="contains">\Content.Outlook\</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Outlook: attachments-->
 488 | 			<TargetFilename name="Downloads" condition="contains">\Downloads\</TargetFilename> <!--Downloaded files. Does not include "Run" files in IE-->
 489 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.application</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:ClickOnce: [ https://blog.netspi.com/all-you-need-is-one-a-clickonce-love-story/ ] -->
 490 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.appref-ms</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:ClickOnce application | Credit @ion-storm -->
 491 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.bat</TargetFilename> <!--Batch scripting-->
 492 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.chm</TargetFilename>
 493 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.cmd</TargetFilename> <!--Batch scripting: Batch scripts can also use the .cmd extension | Credit: @mmazanec -->
 494 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.cmdline</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:dotNet: Executed by cvtres.exe-->
 495 | 			<TargetFilename name="T1176" condition="end with">.crx</TargetFilename> <!--Chrome extension-->
 496 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.dmp</TargetFilename> <!--Process dumps [ (fr) http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/minidump ] -->
 497 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.docm</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Office:Word: Macro-->
 498 | 			<TargetFilename name="DLL" condition="end with">.dll</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Office:Word: Macro-->
 499 | 			<TargetFilename name="EXE" condition="end with">.exe</TargetFilename> <!--Executable-->
 500 | 			<TargetFilename name="ProcessHostingdotNETCode" condition="end with">.exe.log</TargetFilename> <!-- [ https://github.com/bitsadmin/nopowershell ] | Credit: @SBousseaden [ https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1137493597769687040 ]  -->
 501 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.jar</TargetFilename> <!--Java applets-->
 502 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.jnlp</TargetFilename> <!--Java applets-->
 503 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.jse</TargetFilename> <!--Scripting [ Example: https://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/Mal~Phires-C/detailed-analysis.aspx ] -->
 504 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.hta</TargetFilename> <!--Scripting-->
 505 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.job</TargetFilename> <!--Scheduled task-->
 506 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.pptm</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Office:Word: Macro-->
 507 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.ps1</TargetFilename> <!--PowerShell [ More information: http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/08/27/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-16/ ] -->
 508 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.sct</TargetFilename> <!--Scripting | Credit @bartblaze -->
 509 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.sys</TargetFilename> <!--System driver files-->
 510 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.scr</TargetFilename> <!--System driver files-->
 511 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.vbe</TargetFilename> <!--VisualBasicScripting-->
 512 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.vbs</TargetFilename> <!--VisualBasicScripting-->
 513 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.wsc</TargetFilename> <!--Scripting | Credit @bartblaze -->
 514 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.wsf</TargetFilename> <!--Scripting | Credit @bartblaze -->
 515 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.xlsm</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Office:Word: Macro-->
 516 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.ocx</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:ActiveX-->
 517 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">proj</TargetFilename><!--Microsoft:MSBuild:Script: [ https://twitter.com/subTee/status/885919612969394177 ] -->
 518 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.sln</TargetFilename><!--Microsoft:MSBuild:Script: [ https://twitter.com/subTee/status/885919612969394177 ] -->
 519 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.xls</TargetFilename><!--Microsoft [ https://medium.com/@threathuntingteam/msxsl-exe-and-wmic-exe-a-way-to-proxy-code-execution-8d524f642b75 ] -->
 520 | 			<TargetFilename name="DefaultUserModified" condition="begin with">C:\Users\Default</TargetFilename> <!--Windows: Changes to default user profile-->
 521 | 			<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\Drivers</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft: Drivers dropped here-->
 522 | 			<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Drivers</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft: Drivers dropped here-->
 523 | 			<TargetFilename name="T1037,T1484" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\GroupPolicy\Machine\Scripts</TargetFilename> <!--Group policy [ More information: http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/01/07/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-52/ ] -->
 524 | 			<TargetFilename name="T1037,T1484" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\GroupPolicy\User\Scripts</TargetFilename> <!--Group policy [ More information: http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/01/07/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-52/ ] -->
 525 | 			<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\Wbem</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:WMI: [ More information: http://2014.hackitoergosum.org/slides/day1_WMI_Shell_Andrei_Dumitrescu.pdf ] -->
 526 | 			<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:WMI: [ More information: http://2014.hackitoergosum.org/slides/day1_WMI_Shell_Andrei_Dumitrescu.pdf ] -->
 527 | 			<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Powershell: Look for modifications for persistence [ https://www.malwarearchaeology.com/cheat-sheets ] -->
 528 | 			<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Powershell: Look for modifications for persistence [ https://www.malwarearchaeology.com/cheat-sheets ] -->
 529 | 			<TargetFilename name="T1053" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\Tasks\</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:ScheduledTasks [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1053 ] -->
 530 | 			<TargetFilename name="T1053" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\Tasks</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:ScheduledTasks [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1053 ] -->
 531 | 			<TargetFilename name="T1053" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Tasks</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:ScheduledTasks [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1053 ] -->
 532 | 			<Image condition="begin with">\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy</Image> <!--Nothing should be executing from VSC | Credit: @SBousseaden [ https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1133030955407630336 ] -->
 533 | 			<!--Windows application compatibility-->
 534 | 			<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\AppPatch\Custom</TargetFilename> <!--Windows: Application compatibility shims [ https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html ] -->
 535 | 			<TargetFilename condition="contains">VirtualStore</TargetFilename> <!--Windows: UAC virtualization [ https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20150902-00/?p=91681 ] -->
 536 | 			<!--Exploitable file names-->
 537 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.xls</TargetFilename> <!--Legacy Office files are often used for attacks-->
 538 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.ppt</TargetFilename> <!--Legacy Office files are often used for attacks-->
 539 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.rtf</TargetFilename> <!--RTF files often 0day malware vectors when opened by Office-->
 540 | 		</FileCreate>
 541 | 	</RuleGroup>
 542 | 
 543 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 544 | 		<FileCreate onmatch="exclude">
 545 | 			<!--SECTION: Microsoft-->
 546 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files (x86)\EMET 5.5\EMET_Service.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft:EMET: Writes to C:\Windows\AppPatch\-->
 547 | 			<!--SECTION: Microsoft:Office:Click2Run-->
 548 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeC2RClient.exe</Image> <!-- Microsoft:Office Click2Run-->
 549 | 			<!--SECTION: Windows-->
 550 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\smss.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Session Manager SubSystem: Creates swapfile.sys,pagefile.sys,hiberfile.sys-->
 551 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\CompatTelRunner.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Windows 10 app, creates tons of cache files-->
 552 | 			<Image condition="is">\\?\C:\Windows\system32\wbem\WMIADAP.EXE</Image> <!-- Windows: WMI Performance updates-->
 553 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\mobsync.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Network file syncing-->
 554 | 			<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\DriverStore\Temp\</TargetFilename> <!-- Windows: Temp files by DrvInst.exe-->
 555 | 			<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\wbem\Performance\</TargetFilename> <!-- Windows: Created in wbem by WMIADAP.exe-->
 556 | 			<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\Installer\</TargetFilename> <!--Windows:Installer: Ignore MSI installer files caching-->
 557 | 			<!--SECTION: Windows:Updates-->
 558 | 			<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\$WINDOWS.~BT\Sources\</TargetFilename> <!-- Windows: Feature updates containing lots of .exe and .sys-->
 559 | 			<Image condition="begin with">C:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows</Image> <!-- Windows: Windows update-->
 560 | 		</FileCreate>
 561 | 	</RuleGroup>
 562 | 
 563 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 12 & 13 & 14 : REGISTRY MODIFICATION [RegistryEvent]-->
 564 | 		<!--EVENT 12: "Registry object added or deleted"-->
 565 | 		<!--EVENT 13: "Registry value set"-->
 566 | 		<!--EVENT 14: "Registry objected renamed"-->
 567 | 
 568 | 		<!--NOTE:	Windows writes hundreds or thousands of registry keys a minute, so just because you're not changing things, doesn't mean these rules aren't being run.-->
 569 | 		<!--NOTE:	You do not have to spend a lot of time worrying about performance, CPUs are fast, but it's something to consider. Every rule and condition type has a small cost.-->
 570 | 		<!--NOTE:	"contains" works by finding the first letter, then matching the second, etc, so the first letters should be as low-occurrence as possible.-->
 571 | 		<!--NOTE:	[ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112 ] -->
 572 | 
 573 | 		<!--TECHNICAL:	You cannot filter on the "Details" attribute, due to performance issues when very large keys are written, and variety of data formats-->
 574 | 		<!--TECHNICAL:	Possible prefixes are HKLM, HKCR, and HKU-->
 575 | 		<!--CRITICAL:	Schema version 3.30 and higher change HKLM\="\REGISTRY\MACHINE\" and HKU\="\REGISTRY\USER\" and HKCR\="\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\" and CurrentControlSet="ControlSet001"-->
 576 | 		<!--CRITICAL:	Due to a bug, Sysmon versions BEFORE 7.01 may not properly log with the new prefix style for registry keys that was originally introduced in schema version 3.30-->
 577 | 		<!--NOTE:	Because Sysmon runs as a service, it has no filtering ability for, or concept of, HKCU or HKEY_CURRENT_USER. Use "contains" or "end with" to get around this limitation-->
 578 | 
 579 | 		<!-- ! CRITICAL NOTE !:	It may appear this section is MISSING important entries, but SOME RULES MONITOR MANY KEYS, so look VERY CAREFULLY to see if something is already covered.
 580 | 								Sysmon's wildcard monitoring along with highly-tuned generic strings cuts the rulesets down immensely, compared to doing this in other tools.
 581 | 								For example, most COM hijacking in CLSID's across the registry is covered by a single rule monitoring a InProcServer32 wildcard-->
 582 | 
 583 | 		<!--DATA: EventType, UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, TargetObject, Details (can't filter on), NewName (can't filter on)-->
 584 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 585 | 		<RegistryEvent onmatch="include">
 586 | 			<!--Autorun or Startups-->
 587 | 				<!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ http://www.ghacks.net/2016/06/04/windows-automatic-startup-locations/ ] -->
 588 | 				<!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https://arsenalrecon.com/downloads/resources/Registry_Keys_Related_to_Autorun.ods ] -->
 589 | 				<!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ http://www.silentrunners.org/launchpoints.html ] -->
 590 | 				<!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/articles/article.aspx?p=2762082&seqNum=2 ] -->
 591 | 				<!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ https://web.archive.org/web/20200116001643/http://scholarworks.rit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1533&context=theses | Understanding malware autostart techniques - Matthew Gottlieb ] -->
 592 | 			<TargetObject name="T1060,RunKey" condition="contains">CurrentVersion\Run</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Wildcard for Run keys, including RunOnce, RunOnceEx, RunServices, RunServicesOnce [Also covers terminal server] -->
 593 | 			<TargetObject name="T1060,RunPolicy" condition="contains">Policies\Explorer\Run</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Alternate runs keys | Credit @ion-storm-->
 594 | 			<TargetObject name="T1484" condition="contains">Group Policy\Scripts</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Group policy scripts-->
 595 | 			<TargetObject name="T1484" condition="contains">Windows\System\Scripts</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Wildcard for Logon, Loggoff, Shutdown-->
 596 | 			<TargetObject name="T1060" condition="contains">CurrentVersion\Windows\Load</TargetObject> <!--Windows: [ https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/jj874148.aspx ] -->
 597 | 			<TargetObject name="T1060" condition="contains">CurrentVersion\Windows\Run</TargetObject> <!--Windows: [ https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/jj874148.aspx ] -->
 598 | 			<TargetObject name="T1060" condition="contains">CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell</TargetObject> <!--Windows: [ https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms838576(v=winembedded.5).aspx ] -->
 599 | 			<TargetObject name="T1060" condition="contains">CurrentVersion\Winlogon\System</TargetObject> <!--Windows [ https://www.exterminate-it.com/malpedia/regvals/zlob-dns-changer/118 ] -->
 600 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Autorun location [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1004 ] [ https://www.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order ] -->
 601 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell</TargetObject> <!--Windows: [ https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee851671.aspx ] -->
 602 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Autorun location [ https://www.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order ] -->
 603 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Legacy driver loading | Credit @ion-storm -->
 604 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\BootExecute</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Autorun | Credit @ion-storm | [ https://www.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order ] -->
 605 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AeDebug</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Automatic program crash debug program [ https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-050712-5453-99&tabid=2 ] -->
 606 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">UserInitMprLogonScript</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Legacy logon script environment variable [ http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/11/14/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-18/ ] -->
 607 | 			<TargetObject name="T1112,ChangeStartupFolderPath" condition="end with">user shell folders\startup</TargetObject> <!--Monitor changes to Startup folder location for monitoring evasion | Credit @SBousseaden-->
 608 | 			<!--Services-->
 609 | 			<TargetObject name="T1031,T1050" condition="end with">\ServiceDll</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Points to a service's DLL [ https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-1-introduction-attack-phases-and-windows-services ] -->
 610 | 			<TargetObject name="T1031,T1050" condition="end with">\ServiceManifest</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Manifest pointing to service's DLL [ https://www.geoffchappell.com/studies/windows/win32/services/svchost/index.htm ] -->
 611 | 			<TargetObject name="T1031,T1050" condition="end with">\ImagePath</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Points to a service's EXE [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050 ] -->
 612 | 			<TargetObject name="T1031,T1050" condition="end with">\Start</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Services start mode changes (Disabled, Automatically, Manual)-->
 613 | 			<!--RDP-->
 614 | 			<TargetObject name="RDP port change" condition="end with">Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp\PortNumber</TargetObject> <!--Windows: RDP port change under Control [ https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/of-rdp-hijacking-part1-remote-desktop.html ]-->
 615 | 			<TargetObject name="RDP port change" condition="end with">Control\Terminal Server\fSingleSessionPerUser</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Allow same user to have mutliple RDP sessions, to hide from admin being impersonated-->
 616 | 			<TargetObject name="ModifyRemoteDesktopState" condition="end with">fDenyTSConnections</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Attacker turning on RDP-->
 617 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">LastLoggedOnUser</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Changing last-logged in user-->
 618 | 			<TargetObject name="ModifyRemoteDesktopPort" condition="end with">RDP-tcp\PortNumber</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Changing RDP port to evade IDS-->
 619 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">Services\PortProxy\v4tov4</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Changing RDP port to evade IDS-->
 620 | 			<!--CLSID launch commands and Default File Association changes-->
 621 | 			<TargetObject name="T1042" condition="contains">\command\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Sensitive sub-key under file associations and CLSID that map to launch command-->
 622 | 			<TargetObject name="T1122" condition="contains">\ddeexec\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Sensitive sub-key under file associations and CLSID that map to launch command-->
 623 | 			<TargetObject name="T1122" condition="contains">{86C86720-42A0-1069-A2E8-08002B30309D}</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Tooltip handler-->
 624 | 			<TargetObject name="T1042" condition="contains">exefile</TargetObject> <!--Windows Executable handler, to log any changes not already monitored-->
 625 | 			<!--Windows COM-->
 626 | 			<TargetObject name="T1122" condition="end with">\InprocServer32\(Default)</TargetObject> <!--Windows:COM Object Hijacking [ https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence ] | Credit @ion-storm -->
 627 | 			<!--Windows shell visual modifications used by malware-->
 628 | 			<TargetObject name="T1158" condition="end with">\Hidden</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: Some types of malware try to hide their hidden system files from the user, good signal event -->
 629 | 			<TargetObject name="T1158" condition="end with">\ShowSuperHidden</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: Some types of malware try to hide their hidden system files from the user, good signal event [ Example: https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-061811-4341-99&tabid=2 ] -->
 630 | 			<TargetObject name="T1158" condition="end with">\HideFileExt</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: Some malware hides file extensions to make diagnosis/disinfection more daunting to novice users -->
 631 | 			<!--Windows shell hijack and modifications-->
 632 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">Classes\*\</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: [ http://www.silentrunners.org/launchpoints.html ] -->
 633 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">Classes\AllFilesystemObjects\</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: [ http://www.silentrunners.org/launchpoints.html ] -->
 634 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">Classes\Directory\</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: [ https://stackoverflow.com/questions/1323663/windows-shell-context-menu-option ] -->
 635 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">Classes\Drive\</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: [ https://stackoverflow.com/questions/1323663/windows-shell-context-menu-option ] -->
 636 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">Classes\Folder\</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: ContextMenuHandlers, DragDropHandlers, CopyHookHandlers, [ https://stackoverflow.com/questions/1323663/windows-shell-context-menu-option ] -->
 637 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">Classes\PROTOCOLS\</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: Protocol handlers-->
 638 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">ContextMenuHandlers\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: [ http://oalabs.openanalysis.net/2015/06/04/malware-persistence-hkey_current_user-shell-extension-handlers/ ] -->
 639 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">CurrentVersion\Shell</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Shell Folders, ShellExecuteHooks, ShellIconOverloadIdentifers, ShellServiceObjects, ShellServiceObjectDelayLoad [ http://oalabs.openanalysis.net/2015/06/04/malware-persistence-hkey_current_user-shell-extension-handlers/ ] -->
 640 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\explorer\ShellExecuteHooks</TargetObject> <!--Windows: ShellExecuteHooks-->
 641 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\explorer\ShellServiceObjectDelayLoad</TargetObject> <!--Windows: ShellExecuteHooks-->
 642 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\explorer\ShellIconOverlayIdentifiers</TargetObject> <!--Windows: ShellExecuteHooks-->
 643 | 			<!--AppPaths hijacking-->
 644 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Credit to @Hexacorn [ http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/01/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-3/ ] -->
 645 | 			<!--Terminal service boobytrap-->
 646 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp\InitialProgram</TargetObject> <!--Windows:RDP: Note other Terminal Server run keys are handled by another wildcard already-->
 647 | 			<!--Group Policy integrity-->
 648 | 			<TargetObject name="T1484" condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\GPExtensions\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Group Policy internally uses a plug-in architecture that nothing should be modifying-->
 649 | 			<!--Winsock and Winsock2-->
 650 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSock</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Wildcard, includes Winsock and Winsock2-->
 651 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\ProxyServer</TargetObject> <!--Windows: System and user proxy server-->
 652 | 			<!--Credential providers-->
 653 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Authentication\Credential Provider</TargetObject> <!--Wildcard, includes Credential Providers and Credential Provider Filters-->
 654 | 			<TargetObject name="T1101" condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\</TargetObject> <!-- [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1131 ] [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1101 ] -->
 655 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Changes to WDigest-UseLogonCredential for password scraping [ https://www.trustedsec.com/april-2015/dumping-wdigest-creds-with-meterpreter-mimikatzkiwi-in-windows-8-1/ ] -->
 656 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Netsh</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Netsh helper DLL [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1128 ] -->
 657 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ProxyEnable</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Malware often disables a web proxy for 2nd stage downloads -->
 658 | 			<!--Networking-->
 659 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\NetworkProvider\Order\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Order of network providers that are checked to connect to destination [ https://www.malwarearchaeology.com/cheat-sheets ] -->
 660 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\NetworkList\Profiles</TargetObject> <!--Windows: | Credit @ion-storm -->
 661 | 			<TargetObject name="T1089" condition="end with">\EnableFirewall</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Monitor for firewall disablement, all firewall profiles [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089 ] -->
 662 | 			<TargetObject name="T1089" condition="end with">\DoNotAllowExceptions</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Monitor for firewall disablement, all firewall profiles [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089 ] -->
 663 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfile\AuthorizedApplications\List</TargetObject> <!--Windows Firewall authorized applications for all networks| Credit @ion-storm -->
 664 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\DomainProfile\AuthorizedApplications\List</TargetObject> <!--Windows Firewall authorized applications for domain networks -->
 665 | 			<!--DLLs that get injected into every process at launch-->
 666 | 			<TargetObject name="T1103" condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Appinit_Dlls\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Feature disabled by default [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1103 ] -->
 667 | 			<TargetObject name="T1103" condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Appinit_Dlls\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Feature disabled by default [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1103 ] -->
 668 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\AppCertDlls\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Credit to @Hexacorn [ http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/01/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-3/ ] [ https://blog.comodo.com/malware/trojware-win32-trojanspy-volisk-a/ ] -->
 669 | 			<!--Office-->
 670 | 			<TargetObject name="T1137" condition="contains">Microsoft\Office\Outlook\Addins\</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Office: Outlook add-ins, access to sensitive data and often cause issues-->
 671 | 			<TargetObject name="T1137" condition="contains">Office Test\</TargetObject> <!-- Microsoft:Office: Persistence method [ http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/04/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-10/ ] | Credit @Hexacorn -->
 672 | 			<TargetObject name="Context,ProtectedModeExitOrMacrosUsed" condition="contains">Security\Trusted Documents\TrustRecords</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Office: Monitor when "Enable editing" or "Enable macros" is used | Credit @OutflankNL | [ https://outflank.nl/blog/2018/01/16/hunting-for-evil-detect-macros-being-executed/ ] -->
 673 | 			<TargetObject name="Context,ContactedDomain" condition="end with">\EnableBHO</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Office: Contacted domains stored here 'HKEY_CURRENT_USER\<SID>\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\Internet\Server Cache\<domain>\EnableBHO' -->
 674 | 			<!--IE-->
 675 | 			<TargetObject name="T1176" condition="contains">Internet Explorer\Toolbar\</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:InternetExplorer: Machine and user [ Example: https://www.exterminate-it.com/malpedia/remove-mywebsearch ] -->
 676 | 			<TargetObject name="T1176" condition="contains">Internet Explorer\Extensions\</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:InternetExplorer: Machine and user [ Example: https://www.exterminate-it.com/malpedia/remove-mywebsearch ] -->
 677 | 			<TargetObject name="T1176" condition="contains">Browser Helper Objects\</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:InternetExplorer: Machine and user [ https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb250436(v=vs.85).aspx ] -->
 678 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\DisableSecuritySettingsCheck</TargetObject>
 679 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\3\1206</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:InternetExplorer: Malware sometimes assures scripting is on in Internet Zone [ https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/182569/internet-explorer-security-zones-registry-entries-for-advanced-users ] -->
 680 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\3\2500</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:InternetExplorer: Malware sometimes disables Protected Mode in Internet Zone [ https://blog.avast.com/2013/08/12/your-documents-are-corrupted-from-image-to-an-information-stealing-trojan/ ] -->
 681 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\3\1809</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:InternetExplorer: Malware sometimes disables Pop-up Blocker in Internet Zone [ https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/182569/internet-explorer-security-zones-registry-entries-for-advanced-users ] -->
 682 | 			<!--Magic registry keys-->
 683 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Classes\CLSID\{AB8902B4-09CA-4BB6-B78D-A8F59079A8D5}\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Thumbnail cache autostart [ http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/poweliks-levels-up-with-new-autostart-mechanism/ ] -->
 684 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{AB8902B4-09CA-4BB6-B78D-A8F59079A8D5}\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Thumbnail cache autostart [ http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/poweliks-levels-up-with-new-autostart-mechanism/ ] -->
 685 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Classes\CLSID\{083863F1-70DE-11d0-BD40-00A0C911CE86}\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: DirectX instances-->
 686 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{083863F1-70DE-11d0-BD40-00A0C911CE86}\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: DirectX instances-->
 687 | 			<!--Install/Run artifacts-->
 688 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\UrlUpdateInfo</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:ClickOnce: Source URL is stored in this value [ https://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2016/12/mimikatz-delivery-via-clickonce-with.html ] -->
 689 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\InstallSource</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Source folder for certain program and component installations-->
 690 | 			<TargetObject name="Alert,Sysinternals Tool Used" condition="end with">\EulaAccepted</TargetObject> <!--Sysinternals tool launched. Lots of useful abilities for attackers -->
 691 | 			<!--Antivirus tampering-->
 692 | 			<TargetObject name="T1089,Tamper-Defender" condition="end with">\DisableAntiSpyware</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Defender: State modified via registry-->
 693 | 			<TargetObject name="T1089,Tamper-Defender" condition="end with">\DisableAntiVirus</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Defender: State modified via registry-->
 694 | 			<TargetObject name="T1089,Tamper-Defender" condition="end with">\SpynetReporting</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Defender: State modified via registry-->
 695 | 			<TargetObject name="T1089,Tamper-Defender" condition="end with">DisableRealtimeMonitoring</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Defender: State modified via registry-->
 696 | 			<TargetObject name="T1089,Tamper-Defender" condition="end with">\SubmitSamplesConsent</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Defender: State modified via registry-->
 697 | 			<TargetObject name="T1562,Tamper-Defender" condition="begin with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Defender: Exclusions in policy key-->
 698 | 			<!--Windows UAC tampering-->
 699 | 			<TargetObject name="T1088" condition="end with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA</TargetObject> <!--Detect: UAC Tampering | Credit @ion-storm -->
 700 | 			<TargetObject name="T1088" condition="end with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy</TargetObject> <!--Detect: UAC Tampering | Credit @ion-storm -->
 701 | 			<!--Microsoft Security Center tampering | Credit @ion-storm -->
 702 | 			<TargetObject name="T1089,Tamper-SecCenter" condition="end with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Security Center\</TargetObject> <!-- [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089 ] -->
 703 | 			<TargetObject name="T1089,Tamper-SecCenter" condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\HideSCAHealth</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Security Center: Malware sometimes disables [ https://blog.avast.com/2013/08/12/your-documents-are-corrupted-from-image-to-an-information-stealing-trojan/ ] -->
 704 | 			<!--Windows application compatibility-->
 705 | 			<TargetObject name="T1138,AppCompatShim" condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Custom</TargetObject> <!--Windows: AppCompat [ https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html ] -->
 706 | 			<TargetObject name="T1138,AppCompatShim" condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\InstalledSDB</TargetObject> <!--Windows: AppCompat [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1138 ] -->
 707 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">VirtualStore</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Registry virtualization, something's wrong if it's in use [ https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa965884(v=vs.85).aspx ] -->
 708 | 			<!--Windows internals integrity monitoring-->
 709 | 			<TargetObject name="T1183,IFEO" condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Malware likes changing IFEO, like adding Debugger to disable antivirus EXE-->
 710 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Event log system integrity and ACLs-->
 711 | 			<TargetObject name="Tamper-Safemode" condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Safeboot\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Services approved to load in safe mode. Almost nothing should ever modify this.-->
 712 | 			<TargetObject name="Tamper-Winlogon" condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Winlogon\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Providers notified by WinLogon-->
 713 | 			<TargetObject name="Context,DeviceConnectedOrUpdated" condition="end with">\FriendlyName</TargetObject> <!--Windows: New devices connected and remembered-->
 714 | 			<TargetObject name="Context,MsiInstallerStarted" condition="is">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Installer\InProgress\(Default)</TargetObject> <!--Windows: See when WindowsInstaller is engaged, useful for timeline matching with other events-->
 715 | 			<TargetObject name="Tamper-Tracing" condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Tracing\RASAPI32</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Malware sometimes disables tracing to obfuscate tracks-->
 716 | 			<TargetObject name="Context,ProcessAccessedPrivateResource" condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CapabilityAccessManager\ConsentStore\</TargetObject> <!-- Windows: Win10 tracks when and what process uses webcam/microphone/location etc [ https://medium.com/@7a616368/can-you-track-processes-accessing-the-camera-and-microphone-7e6885b37072 ] -->
 717 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">\Keyboard Layout\Preload</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Keyboard layout loaded into user session [ https://renenyffenegger.ch/notes/Windows/registry/tree/HKEY_CURRENT_USER/Keyboard-Layout/Preload/index ] | Credit @cyb3rops -->
 718 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">\Keyboard Layout\Substitutes</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Keyboard layout loaded into user session [ https://renenyffenegger.ch/notes/Windows/registry/tree/HKEY_CURRENT_USER/Keyboard-Layout/Preload/index ] | Credit @cyb3rops -->
 719 | 			<!--Windows inventory events-->
 720 | 			<TargetObject name="InvDB-Path" condition="end with">\LowerCaseLongPath</TargetObject> <!-- [ https://binaryforay.blogspot.com/2017/10/amcache-still-rules-everything-around.html ] -->
 721 | 			<TargetObject name="InvDB-Pub" condition="end with">\Publisher</TargetObject> <!-- [ https://binaryforay.blogspot.com/2017/10/amcache-still-rules-everything-around.html ] -->
 722 | 			<TargetObject name="InvDB-Ver" condition="end with">\BinProductVersion</TargetObject> <!-- [ https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/privacy/basic-level-windows-diagnostic-events-and-fields-1709 ] -->
 723 | 			<TargetObject name="InvDB-DriverVer" condition="end with">\DriverVersion</TargetObject> <!-- [ https://df-stream.com/2015/02/leveraging-devicecontainers-key/ ] -->
 724 | 			<TargetObject name="InvDB-DriverVer" condition="end with">\DriverVerVersion</TargetObject> <!-- [ https://df-stream.com/2015/02/leveraging-devicecontainers-key/ ] -->
 725 | 			<TargetObject name="InvDB-CompileTimeClaim" condition="end with">\LinkDate</TargetObject> <!-- Compile time of EXE, may not be reliable [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Link_time ] -->
 726 | 			<TargetObject name="InvDB" condition="contains">Compatibility Assistant\Store\</TargetObject> <!-- Inventory -->
 727 | 			<!--Suspicious sources-->
 728 | 			<Image name="Suspicious,ImageBeginWithBackslash" condition="end with">regedit.exe</Image> <!--Users and helpdesk staff making system modifications -->
 729 | 			<Image name="Suspicious,ImageBeginWithBackslash" condition="begin with">\</Image> <!--Devices and VSC shouldn't be executing changes | Credit: @SBousseaden @ionstorm @neu5ron @PerchedSystems [ https://twitter.com/SwiftOnSecurity/status/1133167323991486464 ] -->
 730 | 		</RegistryEvent>
 731 | 	</RuleGroup>
 732 | 
 733 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 734 | 		<RegistryEvent onmatch="exclude">
 735 | 		<!--COMMENT:	Remove low-information noise. Often these hide a procress recreating an empty key and do not hide the values created subsequently.-->
 736 | 		<!--NOTE:	A lot of noise can be removed by excluding CreateKey events, which are largely innocuous-->
 737 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">\{CAFEEFAC-</TargetObject>
 738 | 			<EventType condition="is">CreateKey</EventType>
 739 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\COMPONENTS</TargetObject>
 740 | 			<!--Inventory noise-->
 741 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppModel\StateRepository\Cache</TargetObject>
 742 | 			<!--Misc-->
 743 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">Toolbar\WebBrowser</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:IE: Extraneous activity-->
 744 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">Browser\ITBar7Height</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:IE: Extraneous activity, covers ShellBrowser and WebBrowser-->
 745 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">Browser\ITBar7Layout</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:IE: Extraneous activity-->
 746 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">Internet Explorer\Toolbar\Locked</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: Extraneous activity-->
 747 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">Toolbar\WebBrowser\{47833539-D0C5-4125-9FA8-0819E2EAAC93}</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: Extraneous activity-->
 748 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">}\PreviousPolicyAreas</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from \Winlogon\GPExtensions by svchost.exe-->
 749 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">\Control\WMI\Autologger\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "\Start"-->
 750 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\UsoSvc\Start</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "\Start"-->
 751 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\Lsa\OfflineJoin\CurrentValue</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Sensitive value during domain join-->
 752 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Installer\UserData\S-1-5-18\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise monitoring installations run as system-->
 753 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">_Classes\AppX</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise monitoring "Shell\open\command"--> <!--Win8+-->
 754 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Publishers\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: SvcHost Noise-->
 755 | 			<!--Bootup Control noise-->
 756 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\LsaPid</TargetObject> <!--Windows:lsass.exe: Boot noise-->
 757 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\SspiCache</TargetObject> <!--Windows:lsass.exe: Boot noise--> <!--Win8+-->
 758 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Kerberos\Domains</TargetObject> <!--Windows:lsass.exe: Boot noise--> <!--Win8+-->
 759 | 			<!--Services startup settings noise, some low-risk services routinely change it and this can be ignored-->
 760 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\Services\BITS\Start</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "\Start"-->
 761 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\clr_optimization_v2.0.50727_32\Start</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:dotNet: Windows 7-->
 762 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\clr_optimization_v2.0.50727_64\Start</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:dotNet: Windows 7-->
 763 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\clr_optimization_v4.0.30319_32\Start</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:dotNet: Windows 10-->
 764 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\clr_optimization_v4.0.30319_64\Start</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:dotNet: Windows 10-->
 765 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\deviceAssociationService\Start</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "\Start"-->
 766 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\fhsvc\Start</TargetObject> <!--Windows: File History Service-->
 767 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\nal\Start</TargetObject> <!--Intel: Network adapter diagnostic driver-->
 768 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\trustedInstaller\Start</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "\Start"-->
 769 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\tunnel\Start</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "\Start"-->
 770 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\usoSvc\Start</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "\Start"-->
 771 | 			<!--FileExts noise filtering-->
 772 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\UserChoice\ProgId</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "FileExts"--> <!--Win8+-->
 773 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\UserChoice\Hash</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "FileExts"--> <!--Win8+-->
 774 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">\OpenWithList\MRUList</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "FileExts"-->
 775 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">Shell Extentions\Cached</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise generated by explorer.exe on monitored ShellCached binary keys--> <!--Win8+-->
 776 | 			<!--Group Policy noise-->
 777 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Audit\SpecialGroups</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Routinely set through Group Policy, not especially important to log-->
 778 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Startup\0\PSScriptOrder</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
 779 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Startup\0\SOM-ID</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
 780 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Startup\0\GPO-ID</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
 781 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Startup\0\0\IsPowershell</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
 782 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Startup\0\0\ExecTime</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
 783 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Shutdown\0\PSScriptOrder</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
 784 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Shutdown\0\SOM-ID</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
 785 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Shutdown\0\GPO-ID</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
 786 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Shutdown\0\0\IsPowershell</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
 787 | 			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Shutdown\0\0\ExecTime</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
 788 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">\safer\codeidentifiers\0\HASHES\{</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Software Restriction Policies. Can be used to disable security tools, but very noisy to monitor if you use it-->
 789 | 			<!--SECTION: Office C2R-->
 790 | 			<TargetObject condition="contains">VirtualStore\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\ClickToRun\</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft: SearchProtocolHost writes to OfficeC2R registry for Outlook, seemingly regarding mail indexing-->
 791 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\ClickToRun\</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft: Virtual registry for Office-->
 792 | 			<!--SECTION: 3rd party-->
 793 | 			<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\WIDCOMM\Bluetooth Software\btwdins.exe</Image> <!--Constantly writes to HKLM-->
 794 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKCR\VLC.</TargetObject> <!--VLC update noise-->
 795 | 			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKCR\iTunes.</TargetObject> <!--Apple: iTunes update noise-->
 796 | 			<!--WINEVT publishers noise-->
 797 | 			<TargetObject condition="is">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Publishers\{945a8954-c147-4acd-923f-40c45405a658}</TargetObject> <!--Windows update-->
 798 | 		</RegistryEvent>
 799 | 	</RuleGroup>
 800 | 
 801 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 15 : ALTERNATE DATA STREAM CREATED [FileCreateStreamHash]-->
 802 | 		<!--EVENT 15: "File stream created"-->
 803 | 		<!--COMMENT:	Any files created with an NTFS Alternate Data Stream which match these rules will be hashed and logged.
 804 | 			[ https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2013/03/24/alternate-data-streams-in-ntfs/ ]
 805 | 			ADS's are used by browsers and email clients to mark files as originating from the Internet or other foreign sources.
 806 | 			[ https://textslashplain.com/2016/04/04/downloads-and-the-mark-of-the-web/ ] -->
 807 | 		<!--NOTE: Other filesystem minifilters can make it appear to Sysmon that some files are being written twice. This is not a Sysmon issue, per Mark Russinovich.-->
 808 | 
 809 | 		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, TargetFilename, CreationUtcTime, Hash-->
 810 | 		<FileCreateStreamHash onmatch="include">
 811 | 			<TargetFilename condition="contains">Downloads</TargetFilename> <!--Downloaded files. Does not include "Run" files in IE-->
 812 | 			<TargetFilename condition="contains">Temp\7z</TargetFilename> <!--7zip extractions-->
 813 | 			<TargetFilename condition="contains">Startup</TargetFilename> <!--ADS startup | Example: [ https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/a314f6106633fba4b70f9d6ddbee452e8f8f44a72117749c21243dc93c7ed3ac?environmentId=100 ] -->
 814 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.bat</TargetFilename> <!--Batch scripting-->
 815 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.cmd</TargetFilename> <!--Batch scripting | Credit @ion-storm -->
 816 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.doc</TargetFilename> <!--Office doc potentially with macro -->
 817 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.hta</TargetFilename> <!--Scripting-->
 818 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.jse</TargetFilename> <!--Registry File-->
 819 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.lnk</TargetFilename> <!--Shortcut file | Credit @ion-storm -->
 820 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.ppt</TargetFilename> <!--Office doc potentially with macros-->
 821 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.ps1</TargetFilename> <!--PowerShell-->
 822 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.ps2</TargetFilename> <!--PowerShell-->
 823 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.reg</TargetFilename> <!--Registry File-->
 824 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.sct</TargetFilename> <!--Scripting | Credit @bartblaze -->
 825 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.vb</TargetFilename> <!--VisualBasicScripting files-->
 826 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.vbe</TargetFilename> <!--VisualBasicScripting files-->
 827 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.vbs</TargetFilename> <!--VisualBasicScripting files-->
 828 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.wsc</TargetFilename> <!--Scripting | Credit @bartblaze -->
 829 | 			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.wsf</TargetFilename> <!--Scripting | Credit @bartblaze -->
 830 | 		</FileCreateStreamHash>
 831 | 
 832 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 833 | 		<FileCreateStreamHash onmatch="exclude">
 834 | 		</FileCreateStreamHash>
 835 | 	</RuleGroup>
 836 | 
 837 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 16 : SYSMON CONFIGURATION CHANGE-->
 838 | 		<!--EVENT 16: "Sysmon config state changed"-->
 839 | 		<!--COMMENT:	This ONLY logs if the hash of the configuration changes. Running "sysmon.exe -c" with the current configuration will not be logged with Event 16-->
 840 | 
 841 | 		<!--DATA: UtcTime, Configuration, ConfigurationFileHash-->
 842 | 		<!--Cannot be filtered.-->
 843 | 
 844 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 17 & 18 : PIPE CREATED / PIPE CONNECTED [PipeEvent]-->
 845 | 		<!--EVENT 17: "Pipe Created"-->
 846 | 		<!--EVENT 18: "Pipe Connected"-->
 847 | 
 848 | 		<!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-smb-beacon ] -->
 849 | 		<!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2015/10/07/named-pipe-pivoting/ ] -->
 850 | 
 851 | 		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, PipeName, Image-->
 852 | 		<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 853 | 			<PipeEvent onmatch="include">
 854 | 				<!-- Remote Command Execution Tools -->
 855 | 				<PipeName condition="contains any">paexec;remcom;csexec</PipeName>
 856 | 				<!-- Password or Credential Dumpers -->
 857 | 				<PipeName condition="contains any">\lsadump;\cachedump;\wceservicepipe</PipeName>
 858 | 				<!-- Malware -->
 859 | 				<PipeName condition="contains any">\isapi_http;\isapi_dg;\isapi_dg2;\sdlrpc;\ahexec;\winsession;\lsassw;\46a676ab7f179e511e30dd2dc41bd388;\9f81f59bc58452127884ce513865ed20;\e710f28d59aa529d6792ca6ff0ca1b34;\rpchlp_3;\NamePipe_MoreWindows;\pcheap_reuse;\gruntsvc;\583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e;\bizkaz;\svcctl;\Posh;\jaccdpqnvbrrxlaf;\csexecsvc</PipeName>
 860 | 				<PipeName condition="contains any">\atctl;\userpipe;\iehelper;\sdlrpc;\comnap</PipeName>
 861 | 				<!-- Cobalt Strike Pipe Names -->
 862 | 				<PipeName condition="contains all">MSSE-;-server</PipeName>
 863 | 				<PipeName condition="begin with">\postex_</PipeName>
 864 | 				<PipeName condition="begin with">\postex_ssh_</PipeName>
 865 | 				<PipeName condition="begin with">\status_</PipeName>
 866 | 				<PipeName condition="begin with">\msagent_</PipeName>
 867 | 			</PipeEvent>
 868 | 		</RuleGroup>
 869 | 
 870 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 19 & 20 & 21 : WMI EVENT MONITORING [WmiEvent]-->
 871 | 		<!--EVENT 19: "WmiEventFilter activity detected"-->
 872 | 		<!--EVENT 20: "WmiEventConsumer activity detected"-->
 873 | 		<!--EVENT 21: "WmiEventConsumerToFilter activity detected"-->
 874 | 
 875 | 		<!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ https://www.darkoperator.com/blog/2017/10/15/sysinternals-sysmon-610-tracking-of-permanent-wmi-events ] -->
 876 | 		<!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ https://rawsec.lu/blog/posts/2017/Sep/19/sysmon-v610-vs-wmi-persistence/ ] -->
 877 | 
 878 | 		<!--DATA: EventType, UtcTime, Operation, User, Name, Type, Destination, Consumer, Filter-->
 879 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 880 | 		<WmiEvent onmatch="exclude">
 881 | 			<!--NOTE: Using exclude with no rules means everything will be logged-->
 882 | 		</WmiEvent>
 883 | 	</RuleGroup>
 884 | 
 885 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 22 : DNS QUERY [DnsQuery]-->
 886 | 		<!--EVENT 22: "Dns query"-->
 887 | 
 888 | 		<!--NOTE:	Due to the volume of events that DNS queries generate, some orgs may want to remove this section from their configuration to reduce Sysmon log turnover. -->
 889 | 
 890 | 		<!--COMMENT:	DNS logging is a very nuanced challenge in monitoring due to event volume. Legitimate domains can be used to host malware/C2, but lookup itself is not very informative.
 891 | 						It's fine to exclude monitoring these bulk low-value lookups, but at same time, you would not have a full log of how malware communicated, potentially missing C2.
 892 | 						This section of Sysmon configuration will require your full judgement and knowledge of your org's priorities. There is no correct answer.-->
 893 | 
 894 | 		<!--OPERATIONS:	Chrome and Firefox prefetch DNS lookups, or use alternate DNS lookup methods Sysmon won't capture. You need to turn these off.
 895 | 						Search for Group Policy for these browsers to configure this.-->
 896 | 
 897 | 		<!--OPERATIONS:	Most DNS traffic is web advertising. To significantly reduce DNS queries and malware ads, enable client-side advertising filtering via Group Policy. This is easy.
 898 | 				Internet Explorer: https://decentsecurity.com/adblocking-for-internet-explorer-deployment/
 899 | 				Chrome: https://decentsecurity.com/ublock-for-google-chrome-deployment/
 900 | 				Firefox: ToDo
 901 | 						Also note, this configuration is designed for United States computers. Your country's users will may need customization to reduce noise.
 902 | 			-->
 903 | 
 904 | 		<!--CONFIG:	DNS poisoning is an issue during threat investigations. Try to only exclude ROUTINE system-level queries you know are strongly validated with HTTPS or code signing.-->
 905 | 		<!--CONFIG:	If you exclude microsoft.com, someone could register malware-microsoft.com and it wouldn't be logged. Use "END WITH" with leading . or "IS" operators.-->
 906 | 		<!--CONFIG:	Be very specific in exclusions. Threat actors use legitimate services, too. Dont exclude all of AWS or Azure or Google or CDNs!-->
 907 | 		<!--CONFIG: Popularity data: [ http://s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/umbrella-static/index.html ] [ https://better.fyi/trackers/alexa-top-500-news/ ] -->
 908 | 
 909 | 		<!--CRITICAL:	Do NOT exclude "wpad" lookups. This is a MitM vector routinely used by attackers. Disable WPAD or enforce client-side DNSSEC for AD domain lookups.-->
 910 | 		<!--CRITICAL:	Do NOT exclude IPv6 lookups.-->
 911 | 
 912 | 		<!--DATA: RuleName, UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, QueryName, QueryType, QueryStatus, QueryResults (can't filter on)-->
 913 | 
 914 | 		<!--BELOW: These domains should not be excluded at the top level. Be specific if you want to reduce noise under them.-->
 915 | 		<!-- Rejected: .cloudapp.net, customer content [ https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/ptsblog/2012/06/18/security-consideration-when-using-cloudapp-net-domain-as-production-environment-in-windows-azure/ ] -->
 916 | 		<!-- Rejected: .googleapis.com, customer content [ https://www.zdnet.com/article/this-business-email-scam-spreads-trojans-through-google-cloud-storage/ ] -->
 917 | 		<!-- Rejected: .cloudfront.net, customer content -->
 918 | 		<!-- Rejected: .windows.net, customer content -->
 919 | 		<!-- Rejected: *github.com, customer content, including open-source malware components -->
 920 | 
 921 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
 922 | 		<DnsQuery onmatch="exclude">
 923 | 			<!--Network noise-->
 924 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.arpa.</QueryName> <!--Design decision to not log reverse DNS lookups. You will need to decide.-->
 925 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.arpa</QueryName> <!--Design decision to not log reverse DNS lookups. You will need to decide.-->
 926 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.msftncsi.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft proxy detection | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 927 | 			<QueryName condition="is">..localmachine</QueryName>
 928 | 			<QueryName condition="is">localhost</QueryName>
 929 | 			<!--Microsoft-->
 930 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">-pushp.svc.ms</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Doesn't appear to host customer content or subdomains-->
 931 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.b-msedge.net</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Doesn't appear to host customer content or subdomains-->
 932 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.bing.com</QueryName> <!-- Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion -->
 933 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.hotmail.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 934 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.live.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 935 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.live.net</QueryName> <!--Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 936 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.s-microsoft.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft-->
 937 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.microsoft.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 938 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.microsoftonline.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 939 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.microsoftstore.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 940 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.ms-acdc.office.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Doesn't appear to host customer content or subdomains-->
 941 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.msedge.net</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Doesn't appear to host customer content or subdomains-->
 942 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.msn.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 943 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.msocdn.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft-->
 944 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.skype.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 945 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.skype.net</QueryName> <!--Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 946 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.windows.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft-->
 947 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.windows.net.nsatc.net</QueryName> <!--Microsoft-->
 948 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.windowsupdate.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft-->
 949 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.xboxlive.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft-->
 950 | 			<QueryName condition="is">login.windows.net</QueryName> <!--Microsoft-->
 951 | 			<Image condition="begin with">C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\</Image> <!--Microsoft: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/network-protection -->
 952 | 			<!--Microsoft:Office365/AzureAD-->
 953 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.activedirectory.windowsazure.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: AzureAD-->
 954 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.aria.microsoft.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: OneDrive/SharePoint-->
 955 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.msauth.net</QueryName>
 956 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.msftauth.net</QueryName>
 957 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.office.net</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Office-->
 958 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.opinsights.azure.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: AzureAD/InTune client event monitoring-->
 959 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.res.office365.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Office-->
 960 | 			<QueryName condition="is">acdc-direct.office.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Office-->
 961 | 			<QueryName condition="is">atm-fp-direct.office.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Office-->
 962 | 			<QueryName condition="is">loki.delve.office.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Office-->
 963 | 			<QueryName condition="is">management.azure.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: AzureAD/InTune-->
 964 | 			<QueryName condition="is">messaging.office.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Office-->
 965 | 			<QueryName condition="is">outlook.office365.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Protected by HSTS-->
 966 | 			<QueryName condition="is">portal.azure.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: AzureAD/InTune-->
 967 | 			<QueryName condition="is">protection.outlook.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Office-->
 968 | 			<QueryName condition="is">substrate.office.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Office-->
 969 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.measure.office.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Office-->
 970 | 			<!--3rd-party applications-->
 971 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.adobe.com</QueryName> <!--Adobe-->
 972 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.adobe.io</QueryName> <!--Adobe-->
 973 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.mozaws.net</QueryName> <!--Mozilla-->
 974 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.mozilla.com</QueryName> <!--Mozilla-->
 975 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.mozilla.net</QueryName> <!--Mozilla-->
 976 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.mozilla.org</QueryName> <!--Mozilla-->
 977 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.spotify.com</QueryName> <!--Spotify-->
 978 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.spotify.map.fastly.net</QueryName> <!--Spotify-->
 979 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.wbx2.com</QueryName> <!--Webex-->
 980 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.webex.com</QueryName> <!--Webex-->
 981 | 			<QueryName condition="is">clients1.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
 982 | 			<QueryName condition="is">clients2.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
 983 | 			<QueryName condition="is">clients3.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
 984 | 			<QueryName condition="is">clients4.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
 985 | 			<QueryName condition="is">clients5.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
 986 | 			<QueryName condition="is">clients6.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
 987 | 			<QueryName condition="is">safebrowsing.googleapis.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
 988 | 			<!--Goodlist CDN-->
 989 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.akadns.net</QueryName> <!--AkamaiCDN, extensively used by Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
 990 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.netflix.com</QueryName>
 991 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">aspnetcdn.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft [ https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/aspnet/ajax/cdn/overview ]-->
 992 | 			<QueryName condition="is">ajax.googleapis.com</QueryName>
 993 | 			<QueryName condition="is">cdnjs.cloudflare.com</QueryName> <!--Cloudflare: Hosts popular javascript libraries-->
 994 | 			<QueryName condition="is">fonts.googleapis.com</QueryName> <!--Google fonts-->
 995 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.typekit.net</QueryName> <!--Adobe fonts-->
 996 | 			<QueryName condition="is">cdnjs.cloudflare.com</QueryName>
 997 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.stackassets.com</QueryName> <!--Stack Overflow-->
 998 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.steamcontent.com</QueryName>
 999 | 			<QueryName condition="is">play.google.com</QueryName>
1000 | 			<QueryName condition="is">content-autofill.googleapis.com</QueryName>
1001 | 			<!--Web resources-->
1002 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.disqus.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft default exclusion-->
1003 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.fontawesome.com</QueryName>
1004 | 			<QueryName condition="is">disqus.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft default exclusion-->
1005 | 			<!--Ads-->
1006 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.1rx.io</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1007 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.2mdn.net</QueryName> <!--Ads: Google | Microsoft default exclusion-->
1008 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.3lift.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1009 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.adadvisor.net</QueryName> <!--Ads: Neustar [ https://better.fyi/trackers/adadvisor.net/ ] -->
1010 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.adap.tv</QueryName> <!--Ads:AOL | Microsoft default exclusion [ https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/adap-tv ] -->
1011 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.addthis.com</QueryName> <!--Ads:Oracle | Microsoft default exclusion [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AddThis ] -->
1012 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.adform.net</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1013 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.adnxs.com</QueryName> <!--Ads: AppNexus | Microsoft default exclusion-->
1014 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.adroll.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1015 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.adrta.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1016 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.adsafeprotected.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1017 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.adsrvr.org</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1018 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.adsymptotic.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1019 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.advertising.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
1020 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.agkn.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | [ https://www.home.neustar/privacy ] -->
1021 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.amazon-adsystem.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1022 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.amazon-adsystem.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1023 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.analytics.yahoo.com</QueryName> <!--Ads:Yahoo-->
1024 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.aol.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion -->
1025 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.betrad.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
1026 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.bidswitch.net</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1027 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.casalemedia.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
1028 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.chartbeat.net</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion [ https://better.fyi/trackers/chartbeat.com/ ]-->
1029 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.cnn.com</QueryName> <!-- Microsoft default exclusion-->
1030 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.convertro.com</QueryName> <!--Ads:Verizon-->
1031 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.criteo.com</QueryName> <!--Ads [ https://better.fyi/trackers/criteo.com/ ] -->
1032 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.criteo.net</QueryName> <!--Ads [ https://better.fyi/trackers/criteo.com/ ] -->
1033 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.crwdcntrl.net</QueryName> <!--Ads: Lotame [ https://better.fyi/trackers/crwdcntrl.net/ ] -->
1034 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.demdex.net</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
1035 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.domdex.com</QueryName>
1036 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.dotomi.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
1037 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.doubleclick.net</QueryName> <!--Ads:Conversant | Microsoft default exclusion [ https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/dotomi ] -->
1038 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.doubleverify.com</QueryName> <!--Ads: Google-->
1039 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.emxdgt.com</QueryName> <!--Ads: EMX-->
1040 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.everesttech.net</QueryName> <!--Ads | [ https://better.fyi/trackers/everesttech.net/ ] -->
1041 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.exelator.com</QueryName> <!--Ads:Nielson Marketing Cloud-->
1042 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.google-analytics.com</QueryName> <!--Ads:Google | Microsoft default exclusion-->
1043 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.googleadservices.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
1044 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.googlesyndication.com</QueryName> <!--Ads:Google, sometimes called during malicious ads, but not directly responsible | Microsoft default exclusion [ https://www.hackread.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-Zacinlo.pdf ]-->
1045 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.googletagmanager.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
1046 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.googlevideo.com</QueryName> <!--Google | Microsoft default exclusion-->
1047 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.gstatic.com</QueryName> <!--Google | Microsoft default exclusion-->
1048 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.gvt1.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
1049 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.gvt2.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
1050 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.ib-ibi.com</QueryName> <!--Ads: Offerpath [ https://better.fyi/trackers/ib-ibi.com/ ] -->
1051 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.jivox.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1052 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.krxd.net</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1053 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.lijit.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1054 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.mathtag.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft default exclusion-->
1055 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.moatads.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
1056 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.moatpixel.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
1057 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.mookie1.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1058 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.myvisualiq.net</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1059 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.netmng.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1060 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.nexac.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
1061 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.openx.net</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1062 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.optimizely.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1063 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.outbrain.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1064 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.pardot.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1065 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.phx.gbl</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
1066 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.pinterest.com</QueryName> <!--Pinerest-->
1067 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.pubmatic.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
1068 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.quantcount.com</QueryName>
1069 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.quantserve.com</QueryName>
1070 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.revsci.net</QueryName> <!--Ads:Omniture | Microsoft default exclusion-->
1071 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.rfihub.net</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
1072 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.rlcdn.com</QueryName> <!--Ads: Rapleaf [ https://better.fyi/trackers/rlcdn.com/ ] -->
1073 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.rubiconproject.com</QueryName> <!--Ads: Rubicon Project | Microsoft default exclusion [ https://better.fyi/trackers/rubiconproject.com/ ] -->
1074 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.scdn.co</QueryName> <!--Spotify-->
1075 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.scorecardresearch.com</QueryName> <!--Ads: Comscore | Microsoft default exclusion-->
1076 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.serving-sys.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
1077 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.sharethrough.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1078 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.simpli.fi</QueryName>
1079 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.sitescout.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1080 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.smartadserver.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1081 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.snapads.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1082 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.spotxchange.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1083 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.taboola.com</QueryName> <!--Ads:Taboola-->
1084 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.taboola.map.fastly.net</QueryName> <!--Ads:Taboola-->
1085 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.tapad.com</QueryName>
1086 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.tidaltv.com</QueryName> <!--Ads: Videology [ https://better.fyi/trackers/tidaltv.com/ ] -->
1087 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.trafficmanager.net</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
1088 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.tremorhub.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1089 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.tribalfusion.com</QueryName> <!--Ads: Exponential [ https://better.fyi/trackers/tribalfusion.com/ ] -->
1090 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.turn.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion [ https://better.fyi/trackers/turn.com/ ] -->
1091 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.twimg.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
1092 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.tynt.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1093 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.w55c.net</QueryName> <!--Ads:dataxu-->
1094 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.ytimg.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
1095 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.zorosrv.com</QueryName> <!--Ads:Taboola-->
1096 | 			<QueryName condition="is">1rx.io</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1097 | 			<QueryName condition="is">adservice.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
1098 | 			<QueryName condition="is">ampcid.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
1099 | 			<QueryName condition="is">clientservices.googleapis.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
1100 | 			<QueryName condition="is">googleadapis.l.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
1101 | 			<QueryName condition="is">imasdk.googleapis.com</QueryName> <!--Google [ https://developers.google.com/interactive-media-ads/docs/sdks/html5/ ] -->
1102 | 			<QueryName condition="is">l.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
1103 | 			<QueryName condition="is">ml314.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
1104 | 			<QueryName condition="is">mtalk.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
1105 | 			<QueryName condition="is">update.googleapis.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
1106 | 			<QueryName condition="is">www.googletagservices.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
1107 | 			<!--SocialNet-->
1108 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.pscp.tv</QueryName> <!--Twitter:Periscope-->
1109 | 			<!--OSCP/CRL Common-->
1110 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.amazontrust.com</QueryName>
1111 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.digicert.com</QueryName>
1112 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.globalsign.com</QueryName>
1113 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.globalsign.net</QueryName>
1114 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.intel.com</QueryName>
1115 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.symcb.com</QueryName> <!--Digicert-->
1116 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.symcd.com</QueryName> <!--Digicert-->
1117 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.thawte.com</QueryName>
1118 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.usertrust.com</QueryName>
1119 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.verisign.com</QueryName>
1120 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">ocsp.identrust.com</QueryName>
1121 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">pki.goog</QueryName>
1122 | 			<QueryName condition="is">msocsp.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft:OCSP-->
1123 | 			<QueryName condition="is">ocsp.comodoca.com</QueryName>
1124 | 			<QueryName condition="is">ocsp.entrust.net</QueryName>
1125 | 			<QueryName condition="is">ocsp.godaddy.com</QueryName>
1126 | 			<QueryName condition="is">ocsp.int-x3.letsencrypt.org</QueryName>
1127 | 			<QueryName condition="is">ocsp.msocsp.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft:OCSP-->
1128 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">pki.goog</QueryName>
1129 | 			<QueryName condition="is">ocsp.godaddy.com</QueryName>
1130 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">amazontrust.com</QueryName>
1131 | 			<QueryName condition="is">ocsp.sectigo.com</QueryName>
1132 | 			<QueryName condition="is">pki-goog.l.google.com</QueryName>
1133 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">.usertrust.com</QueryName>
1134 | 			<QueryName condition="is">ocsp.comodoca.com</QueryName>
1135 | 			<QueryName condition="is">ocsp.verisign.com</QueryName>
1136 | 			<QueryName condition="is">ocsp.entrust.net</QueryName>
1137 | 			<QueryName condition="end with">ocsp.identrust.com</QueryName>
1138 | 			<QueryName condition="is">status.rapidssl.com</QueryName>
1139 | 			<QueryName condition="is">status.thawte.com</QueryName>
1140 | 			<QueryName condition="is">ocsp.int-x3.letsencrypt.org</QueryName>
1141 | 		</DnsQuery>
1142 | 	</RuleGroup>
1143 | 
1144 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 23 : FILE DELETE [FileDelete]-->
1145 | 		<!--EVENT 22: "File Delete"-->
1146 | 		<!--COMMENT:	Sandbox usage. When a program signals to Windows a file should be deleted or wiped, Sysmon may be able to capture it. 
1147 | 			[ https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Sysmon+and+File+Deletion/26084/ ]
1148 | 		-->
1149 | 
1150 | 		<!--DATA: RuleName, UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, User, Image, TargetFilename, Hashes, IsExecutable, Archived -->
1151 | 
1152 | 	<!--
1153 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
1154 | 		<ClipboardChange onmatch="include">
1155 | 		</ClipboardChange>
1156 | 	</RuleGroup>
1157 | 	-->
1158 | 
1159 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 24 : CLIPBOARD EVENT MONITORING [ClipboardChange]-->
1160 | 		<!--EVENT 24: "Clipboard changed"-->
1161 | 		<!--COMMENT:	Sandbox usage.  Sysmon can capture the contents of clipboard events.
1162 | 			An  example of what could be a production usage on restricted desktops is provided below, but it is commented-out. -->
1163 | 			
1164 | 		<!--DATA: EventType, UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, Session, ClientInfo, Hashes, Archived -->
1165 | 
1166 | 	<!--
1167 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
1168 | 		<ClipboardChange onmatch="include">
1169 | 			<Image condition="end with">wscript.exe</Image>
1170 | 			<Image condition="end with">cscript.exe</Image>
1171 | 			<Image condition="end with">powershell.exe</Image>
1172 | 			<Image condition="end with">rdpclip.exe</Image>
1173 | 		</ClipboardChange>
1174 | 	</RuleGroup>
1175 | 	-->
1176 | 
1177 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 25 : PROCESS TAMPERING [ProcessTampering]-->
1178 | 		<!--EVENT 25: "Process Tampering"-->
1179 | 		<!--COMMENT:	This event is generated when a process image is changed from an external source, such as a different process.
1180 | 			This may or may not provide value in your environment as it requires tuning and a SIEM to correlate the ProcessGuids.
1181 | 			[ https://medium.com/falconforce/sysmon-13-process-tampering-detection-820366138a6c ] -->
1182 | 		
1183 | 		<!--DATA: EventType, RuleName, UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, Type -->
1184 | 	
1185 | 	<!--
1186 | 	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
1187 | 		<ProcessTampering onmatch="exclude">
1188 | 			<Image condition="begin with">C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\</Image>
1189 | 		</ProcessTampering>
1190 | 	</RuleGroup>
1191 | 	-->
1192 | 
1193 | 	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 255 : ERROR-->
1194 | 		<!--"This event is generated when an error occurred within Sysmon. They can happen if the system is under heavy load
1195 | 			and certain tasked could not be performed or a bug exists in the Sysmon service. You can report any bugs on the
1196 | 			Sysinternals forum or over Twitter (@markrussinovich)."-->
1197 | 		<!--Cannot be filtered.-->
1198 | 
1199 | 	</EventFiltering>
1200 | </Sysmon>
1201 | 


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