├── .eslintrc.js ├── .github └── workflows │ └── PR-build.yml ├── .gitignore ├── .prettierrc.js ├── ISSUE_TEMPLATE.md ├── PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md ├── README.md ├── bulkEdit.js ├── ci ├── checkFrontmatters.js └── statuses.js ├── content ├── sccp │ ├── asset │ │ ├── curve_decrease_32 │ │ │ ├── charts.PNG │ │ │ └── data.xlsx │ │ ├── liquidation_delay │ │ │ ├── .ipynb_checkpoints │ │ │ │ └── SNX_RETURNS_PROB-checkpoint.ipynb │ │ │ ├── SNX_RETURNS_PROB.ipynb │ │ │ ├── returns-plot.png │ │ │ ├── returns.csv │ │ │ └── snx-eth-corr.png │ │ ├── sccp-2008 │ │ │ └── perps_v1_positions.csv │ │ ├── sccp-307 │ │ │ └── SCCP-307.jpg │ │ ├── sccp-52 │ │ │ └── snapshot-deviations.svg │ │ ├── sccp-55-snapshot-staleness │ │ │ └── deviation_chart.svg │ │ └── uniswap_seth_end │ │ │ ├── chart.PNG │ │ │ └── data.xlsx │ ├── sccp-1.md │ ├── sccp-10.md │ ├── sccp-100.md │ ├── sccp-101.md │ ├── sccp-102.md │ ├── sccp-103.md │ ├── sccp-104.md │ ├── sccp-105.md │ ├── sccp-106.md │ ├── sccp-107.md │ ├── sccp-108.md │ ├── sccp-109.md │ ├── sccp-11.md │ ├── sccp-110.md │ ├── sccp-111.md │ ├── sccp-112.md │ ├── sccp-113.md │ ├── sccp-114.md │ ├── sccp-115.md │ ├── sccp-116.md │ ├── sccp-117.md │ ├── sccp-118.md │ ├── sccp-119.md │ ├── sccp-12.md │ ├── sccp-120.md │ ├── sccp-121.md │ ├── sccp-122.md │ ├── sccp-123.md │ ├── sccp-124.md │ ├── sccp-125.md │ ├── sccp-126.md │ ├── sccp-127.md │ ├── sccp-128.md │ ├── sccp-129.md │ ├── sccp-13.md │ ├── sccp-130.md │ ├── sccp-131.md │ ├── sccp-132.md │ ├── sccp-133.md │ ├── sccp-134.md │ ├── sccp-135.md │ ├── sccp-136.md │ ├── sccp-137.md │ ├── sccp-138.md │ ├── sccp-139.md │ ├── sccp-14.md │ ├── sccp-140.md │ ├── sccp-141.md │ ├── sccp-142.md │ ├── sccp-143.md │ ├── sccp-144.md │ ├── sccp-145.md │ ├── sccp-146.md │ ├── sccp-147.md │ ├── sccp-148.md │ ├── sccp-149.md │ ├── sccp-15.md │ ├── sccp-150.md │ ├── sccp-151.md │ ├── sccp-152.md │ ├── sccp-153.md │ ├── sccp-154.md │ ├── sccp-155.md │ ├── sccp-156.md │ ├── sccp-157.md │ ├── sccp-158.md │ ├── sccp-159.md │ ├── sccp-16.md │ ├── sccp-160.md │ ├── sccp-161.md │ ├── sccp-162.md │ ├── sccp-163.md │ ├── sccp-164.md │ ├── sccp-165.md │ ├── sccp-166.md │ ├── sccp-167.md │ ├── sccp-168.md │ ├── sccp-169.md │ ├── sccp-17.md │ ├── sccp-170.md │ ├── sccp-171.md │ ├── sccp-172.md │ ├── sccp-173.md │ ├── sccp-174.md │ ├── sccp-175.md │ ├── sccp-176.md │ ├── sccp-177.md │ ├── sccp-178.md │ ├── sccp-179.md │ ├── sccp-18.md │ ├── sccp-180.md │ ├── sccp-181.md │ ├── sccp-182.md │ ├── sccp-183.md │ ├── sccp-184.md │ ├── sccp-185.md │ ├── sccp-186.md │ ├── sccp-187.md │ ├── sccp-188.md │ ├── sccp-189.md │ ├── sccp-19.md │ ├── sccp-190.md │ ├── sccp-191.md │ ├── sccp-192.md │ ├── sccp-193.md │ ├── sccp-194.md │ ├── sccp-195.md │ ├── sccp-196.md │ ├── sccp-197.md │ ├── sccp-198.md │ ├── sccp-199.md │ ├── sccp-2.md │ ├── sccp-20.md │ ├── sccp-200.md │ ├── sccp-2000.md │ ├── sccp-2001.md │ ├── sccp-2002.md │ ├── sccp-2003.md │ ├── sccp-2004.md │ ├── sccp-2005.md │ ├── sccp-2006.md │ ├── sccp-2007.md │ ├── sccp-2008.md │ ├── sccp-2009.md │ ├── sccp-201.md │ ├── sccp-2010.md │ ├── sccp-2011.md │ ├── sccp-2012.md │ ├── sccp-2013.md │ ├── sccp-2014.md │ ├── sccp-2015.md │ ├── sccp-2016.md │ ├── sccp-2017.md │ ├── sccp-2018.md │ ├── sccp-2019.md │ ├── sccp-202.md │ ├── sccp-2020.md │ ├── sccp-2021.md │ ├── sccp-2022.md │ ├── sccp-2023.md │ ├── sccp-2024.md │ ├── sccp-2025.md │ ├── sccp-2026.md │ ├── sccp-2027.md │ ├── sccp-2028.md │ ├── sccp-2029.md │ ├── sccp-203.md │ ├── sccp-2030.md │ ├── sccp-2031.md │ ├── sccp-2032.md │ ├── sccp-2033.md │ ├── sccp-2034.md │ ├── sccp-2035.md │ ├── sccp-2036.md │ ├── sccp-2037.md │ ├── sccp-2038.md │ ├── sccp-2039.md │ ├── sccp-204.md │ ├── sccp-2040.md │ ├── sccp-2041.md │ ├── sccp-2042.md │ ├── sccp-2043.md │ ├── sccp-2044.md │ ├── sccp-2045.md │ ├── sccp-2046.md │ ├── sccp-2047.md │ ├── sccp-2048.md │ ├── sccp-2049.md │ ├── sccp-205.md │ ├── sccp-2050.md │ ├── sccp-2051.md │ ├── sccp-2052.md │ ├── sccp-2053.md │ ├── sccp-2054.md │ ├── sccp-2055.md │ ├── sccp-2056.md │ ├── sccp-2057.md │ ├── sccp-2058.md │ ├── sccp-2059.md │ ├── sccp-206.md │ ├── sccp-2060.md │ ├── sccp-2061.md │ ├── sccp-2062.md │ ├── sccp-2063.md │ ├── sccp-2064.md │ ├── sccp-2065.md │ ├── sccp-2066.md │ ├── sccp-2067.md │ ├── sccp-2068.md │ ├── sccp-2069.md │ ├── sccp-207.md │ ├── sccp-2070.md │ ├── sccp-2071.md │ ├── sccp-2072.md │ ├── sccp-2073.md │ ├── sccp-2074.md │ ├── sccp-2075.md │ ├── sccp-2076.md │ ├── sccp-2077.md │ ├── sccp-2078.md │ ├── sccp-2079.md │ ├── sccp-208.md │ ├── sccp-2080.md │ ├── sccp-2081.md │ ├── sccp-2082.md │ ├── sccp-2083.md │ ├── sccp-2084.md │ ├── sccp-2085.md │ ├── sccp-2086.md │ ├── sccp-2087.md │ ├── sccp-2088.md │ ├── sccp-2089.md │ ├── sccp-209.md │ ├── sccp-2090.md │ ├── sccp-2091.md │ ├── sccp-2092.md │ ├── sccp-2093.md │ ├── sccp-2094.md │ ├── sccp-2095.md │ ├── sccp-2096.md │ ├── sccp-2097.md │ ├── sccp-2098.md │ ├── sccp-2099.md │ ├── sccp-21.md │ ├── sccp-210.md │ ├── sccp-2100.md │ ├── sccp-2101.md │ ├── sccp-2102.md │ ├── sccp-2103.md │ ├── sccp-2104.md │ ├── sccp-2105.md │ ├── sccp-2106.md │ ├── sccp-2107.md │ ├── sccp-2108.md │ ├── sccp-2109.md │ ├── sccp-211.md │ ├── sccp-2110.md │ ├── sccp-2111.md │ ├── sccp-2112.md │ ├── sccp-2113.md │ ├── sccp-2114.md │ ├── sccp-2115.md │ ├── sccp-2116.md │ ├── sccp-2117.md │ ├── sccp-2118.md │ ├── sccp-2119.md │ ├── sccp-212.md │ ├── sccp-2120.md │ ├── sccp-2121.md │ ├── sccp-2123.md │ ├── sccp-2124.md │ ├── sccp-2125.md │ ├── sccp-2126.md │ ├── sccp-2127.md │ ├── sccp-2129.md │ ├── sccp-213.md │ ├── sccp-2130.md │ ├── sccp-2131.md │ ├── sccp-2132.md │ ├── sccp-2133.md │ ├── sccp-2134.md │ ├── sccp-2135.md │ ├── sccp-2136.md │ ├── sccp-2138.md │ ├── sccp-2139.md │ ├── sccp-214.md │ ├── sccp-2140.md │ ├── sccp-2141.md │ ├── sccp-2142.md │ ├── sccp-2143.md │ ├── sccp-2144.md │ ├── sccp-2145.md │ ├── sccp-2146.md │ ├── sccp-2147.md │ ├── sccp-2148.md │ ├── sccp-2149.md │ ├── sccp-215.md │ ├── sccp-2150.md │ ├── sccp-2151.md │ ├── sccp-2152.md │ ├── sccp-2153.md │ ├── sccp-2154.md │ ├── sccp-2155.md │ ├── sccp-2156.md │ ├── sccp-2157.md │ ├── sccp-2158.md │ ├── sccp-2159.md │ ├── sccp-216.md │ ├── sccp-2160.md │ ├── sccp-2161.md │ ├── sccp-2162.md │ ├── sccp-2163.md │ ├── sccp-2164.md │ ├── sccp-217.md │ ├── sccp-218.md │ ├── sccp-219.md │ ├── sccp-22.md │ ├── sccp-220.md │ ├── sccp-221.md │ ├── sccp-222.md │ ├── sccp-223.md │ ├── sccp-224.md │ ├── sccp-225.md │ ├── sccp-226.md │ ├── sccp-227.md │ ├── sccp-228.md │ ├── sccp-229.md │ ├── sccp-23.md │ ├── sccp-230.md │ ├── sccp-231.md │ ├── sccp-232.md │ ├── sccp-233.md │ ├── sccp-234.md │ ├── sccp-235.md │ ├── sccp-236.md │ ├── sccp-237.md │ ├── sccp-238.md │ ├── sccp-239.md │ ├── sccp-24.md │ ├── sccp-240.md │ ├── sccp-241.md │ ├── sccp-242.md │ ├── sccp-243.md │ ├── sccp-244.md │ ├── sccp-245.md │ ├── sccp-246.md │ ├── sccp-247.md │ ├── sccp-248.md │ ├── sccp-249.md │ ├── sccp-25.md │ ├── sccp-250.md │ ├── sccp-251.md │ ├── sccp-252.md │ ├── sccp-253.md │ ├── sccp-254.md │ ├── sccp-255.md │ ├── sccp-256.md │ ├── sccp-257.md │ ├── sccp-258.md │ ├── sccp-259.md │ ├── sccp-26.md │ ├── sccp-260.md │ ├── sccp-261.md │ ├── sccp-262.md │ ├── sccp-263.md │ ├── sccp-264.md │ ├── sccp-265.md │ ├── sccp-266.md │ ├── sccp-267.md │ ├── sccp-268.md │ ├── sccp-269.md │ ├── sccp-27.md │ ├── sccp-270.md │ ├── sccp-271.md │ ├── sccp-272.md │ ├── sccp-273.md │ ├── sccp-274.md │ ├── sccp-275.md │ ├── sccp-276.md │ ├── sccp-277.md │ ├── sccp-278.md │ ├── sccp-279.md │ ├── sccp-28.md │ ├── sccp-280.md │ ├── sccp-281.md │ ├── sccp-282.md │ ├── sccp-283.md │ ├── sccp-284.md │ ├── sccp-285.md │ ├── sccp-286.md │ ├── sccp-287.md │ ├── sccp-288.md │ ├── sccp-289.md │ ├── sccp-29.md │ ├── sccp-290.md │ ├── sccp-291.md │ ├── sccp-292.md │ ├── sccp-293.md │ ├── sccp-294.md │ ├── sccp-295.md │ ├── sccp-296.md │ ├── sccp-297.md │ ├── sccp-298.md │ ├── sccp-299.md │ ├── sccp-3.md │ ├── sccp-30.md │ ├── sccp-300.md │ ├── sccp-301.md │ ├── sccp-302.md │ ├── sccp-303.md │ ├── sccp-304.md │ ├── sccp-305.md │ ├── sccp-306.md │ ├── sccp-307.md │ ├── sccp-308.md │ ├── sccp-309.md │ ├── sccp-31.md │ ├── sccp-310.md │ ├── sccp-311.md │ ├── sccp-312.md │ ├── sccp-313.md │ ├── sccp-314.md │ ├── sccp-315.md │ ├── sccp-316.md │ ├── sccp-317.md │ ├── sccp-318.md │ ├── sccp-319.md │ ├── sccp-32.md │ ├── sccp-320.md │ ├── sccp-321.md │ ├── sccp-322.md │ ├── sccp-323.md │ ├── sccp-324.md │ ├── sccp-325.md │ ├── sccp-326.md │ ├── sccp-327.md │ ├── sccp-328.md │ ├── sccp-329.md │ ├── sccp-33.md │ ├── sccp-330.md │ ├── sccp-331.md │ ├── sccp-332.md │ ├── sccp-333.md │ ├── sccp-334.md │ ├── sccp-335.md │ ├── sccp-336.md │ ├── sccp-337.md │ ├── sccp-338.md │ ├── sccp-339.md │ ├── sccp-34.md │ ├── sccp-340.md │ ├── sccp-341.md │ ├── sccp-342.md │ ├── sccp-343.md │ ├── sccp-344.md │ ├── sccp-345.md │ ├── sccp-346.md │ ├── sccp-347.md │ ├── sccp-348.md │ ├── sccp-349.md │ ├── sccp-35.md │ ├── sccp-350.md │ ├── sccp-351.md │ ├── sccp-352.md │ ├── sccp-353.md │ ├── sccp-354.md │ ├── sccp-355.md │ ├── sccp-356.md │ ├── sccp-357.md │ ├── sccp-358.md │ ├── sccp-359.md │ ├── sccp-36.md │ ├── sccp-360.md │ ├── sccp-361.md │ ├── sccp-362.md │ ├── sccp-363.md │ ├── sccp-364.md │ ├── sccp-365.md │ ├── sccp-366.md │ ├── sccp-367.md │ ├── sccp-368.md │ ├── sccp-369.md │ ├── sccp-37.md │ ├── sccp-370.md │ ├── sccp-371.md │ ├── sccp-372.md │ ├── sccp-373.md │ ├── sccp-374.md │ ├── sccp-375.md │ ├── sccp-376.md │ ├── sccp-377.md │ ├── sccp-378.md │ ├── sccp-379.md │ ├── sccp-38.md │ ├── sccp-380.md │ ├── sccp-381.md │ ├── sccp-382.md │ ├── sccp-383.md │ ├── sccp-384.md │ ├── sccp-385.md │ ├── sccp-386.md │ ├── sccp-387.md │ ├── sccp-388.md │ ├── sccp-389.md │ ├── sccp-39.md │ ├── sccp-390.md │ ├── sccp-391.md │ ├── sccp-392.md │ ├── sccp-393.md │ ├── sccp-394.md │ ├── sccp-395.md │ ├── sccp-396.md │ ├── sccp-397.md │ ├── sccp-398.md │ ├── sccp-399.md │ ├── sccp-4.md │ ├── sccp-40.md │ ├── sccp-400.md │ ├── sccp-401.md │ ├── sccp-402.md │ ├── sccp-403.md │ ├── sccp-404.md │ ├── sccp-405.md │ ├── sccp-406.md │ ├── sccp-407.md │ ├── sccp-408.md │ ├── sccp-409.md │ ├── sccp-41.md │ ├── sccp-42.md │ ├── sccp-43.md │ ├── sccp-44.md │ ├── sccp-46.md │ ├── sccp-47.md │ ├── sccp-48.md │ ├── sccp-49.md │ ├── sccp-5.md │ ├── sccp-50.md │ ├── sccp-51.md │ ├── sccp-52.md │ ├── sccp-53.md │ ├── sccp-55.md │ ├── sccp-56.md │ ├── sccp-57.md │ ├── sccp-58.md │ ├── sccp-59.md │ ├── sccp-6.md │ ├── sccp-60.md │ ├── sccp-61.md │ ├── sccp-62.md │ ├── sccp-63.md │ ├── sccp-64.md │ ├── sccp-65.md │ ├── sccp-66.md │ ├── sccp-67.md │ ├── sccp-68.md │ ├── sccp-69.md │ ├── sccp-7.md │ ├── sccp-70.md │ ├── sccp-71.md │ ├── sccp-72.md │ ├── sccp-73.md │ ├── sccp-74.md │ ├── sccp-75.md │ ├── sccp-76.md │ ├── sccp-77.md │ ├── sccp-78.md │ ├── sccp-79.md │ ├── sccp-8.md │ ├── sccp-80.md │ ├── sccp-81.md │ ├── sccp-82.md │ ├── sccp-83.md │ ├── sccp-84.md │ ├── sccp-85.md │ ├── sccp-86.md │ ├── sccp-87.md │ ├── sccp-88.md │ ├── sccp-89.md │ ├── sccp-9.md │ ├── sccp-90.md │ ├── sccp-91.md │ ├── sccp-92.md │ ├── sccp-93.md │ ├── sccp-94.md │ ├── sccp-95.md │ ├── sccp-96.md │ ├── sccp-97.md │ ├── sccp-98.md │ └── sccp-99.md ├── sips │ ├── assets │ │ ├── sip-167 │ │ │ ├── l1_and_l2.png │ │ │ ├── l2_current.png │ │ │ └── only_l1.png │ │ ├── sip-172 │ │ │ ├── gov_v3_model.jpeg │ │ │ └── site_map.png │ │ ├── sip-181 │ │ │ ├── image1.png │ │ │ ├── image2.png │ │ │ ├── image3.png │ │ │ ├── image4.png │ │ │ ├── image5.png │ │ │ ├── image6.png │ │ │ ├── image7.png │ │ │ └── image8.png │ │ ├── sip-24 │ │ │ └── formula.png │ │ ├── sip-285 │ │ │ ├── 1.png │ │ │ ├── 10.png │ │ │ ├── 11.png │ │ │ ├── 12.png │ │ │ ├── 2.png │ │ │ ├── 3.png │ │ │ ├── 4.png │ │ │ ├── 5.png │ │ │ ├── 6.png │ │ │ ├── 7.png │ │ │ ├── 8.png │ │ │ └── 9.png │ │ ├── sip-306 │ │ │ └── diagram.jpg │ │ ├── sip-349 │ │ │ ├── CCQ-arch.png │ │ │ └── Uniswap-assesment.png │ │ ├── sip-354 │ │ │ └── interest.png │ │ ├── sip-398 │ │ │ ├── image1.png │ │ │ ├── image10.png │ │ │ ├── image11.png │ │ │ ├── image2.png │ │ │ ├── image3.png │ │ │ ├── image4.png │ │ │ ├── image5.png │ │ │ ├── image6.png │ │ │ ├── image7.png │ │ │ ├── image8.png │ │ │ └── image9.png │ │ ├── sip-53 │ │ │ └── smart-contract-architecture.svg │ │ └── sip-93 │ │ │ └── example-timeline.png │ ├── sip-1.md │ ├── sip-10.md │ ├── sip-100.md │ ├── sip-101.md │ ├── sip-102.md │ ├── sip-103.md │ ├── sip-104.md │ ├── sip-105.md │ ├── sip-106.md │ ├── sip-107.md │ ├── sip-108.md │ ├── sip-109.md │ ├── sip-11.md │ ├── sip-110.md │ ├── sip-111.md │ ├── sip-112.md │ ├── sip-113.md │ ├── sip-114.md │ ├── sip-115.md │ ├── sip-116.md │ ├── sip-117.md │ ├── sip-118.md │ ├── sip-119.md │ ├── sip-12.md │ ├── sip-120.md │ ├── sip-121.md │ ├── sip-122.md │ ├── sip-123.md │ ├── sip-124.md │ ├── sip-125.md │ ├── sip-126.md │ ├── sip-127.md │ ├── sip-128.md │ ├── sip-129.md │ ├── sip-13.md │ ├── sip-130.md │ ├── sip-131.md │ ├── sip-132.md │ ├── sip-133.md │ ├── sip-134.md │ ├── sip-135.md │ ├── sip-136.md │ ├── sip-137.md │ ├── sip-138.md │ ├── sip-139.md │ ├── sip-14.md │ ├── sip-140.md │ ├── sip-141.md │ ├── sip-142.md │ ├── sip-143.md │ ├── sip-144.md │ ├── sip-145.md │ ├── sip-146.md │ ├── sip-147.md │ ├── sip-148.md │ ├── sip-149.md │ ├── sip-15.md │ ├── sip-150.md │ ├── sip-151.md │ ├── sip-152.md │ ├── sip-153.md │ ├── sip-154.md │ ├── sip-155.md │ ├── sip-156.md │ ├── sip-157.md │ ├── sip-158.md │ ├── sip-159.md │ ├── sip-16.md │ ├── sip-160.md │ ├── sip-161.md │ ├── sip-165.md │ ├── sip-166.md │ ├── sip-167.md │ ├── sip-168.md │ ├── sip-169.md │ ├── sip-17.md │ ├── sip-170.md │ ├── sip-171.md │ ├── sip-172.md │ ├── sip-173.md │ ├── sip-174.md │ ├── sip-175.md │ ├── sip-176.md │ ├── sip-177.md │ ├── sip-178.md │ ├── sip-179.md │ ├── sip-18.md │ ├── sip-180.md │ ├── sip-181.md │ ├── sip-182.md │ ├── sip-183.md │ ├── sip-184.md │ ├── sip-185.md │ ├── sip-186.md │ ├── sip-187.md │ ├── sip-188.md │ ├── sip-189.md │ ├── sip-19.md │ ├── sip-190.md │ ├── sip-191.md │ ├── sip-192.md │ ├── sip-193.md │ ├── sip-194.md │ ├── sip-195.md │ ├── sip-196.md │ ├── sip-197.md │ ├── sip-198.md │ ├── sip-199.md │ ├── sip-2.md │ ├── sip-20.md │ ├── sip-200.md │ ├── sip-2000.md │ ├── sip-2001.md │ ├── sip-2002.md │ ├── sip-2003.md │ ├── sip-2004.md │ ├── sip-2005.md │ ├── sip-2006.md │ ├── sip-2007.md │ ├── sip-2008.md │ ├── sip-2009.md │ ├── sip-201.md │ ├── sip-2010.md │ ├── sip-2011.md │ ├── sip-2012.md │ ├── sip-2013.md │ ├── sip-2014.md │ ├── sip-2015.md │ ├── sip-2016.md │ ├── sip-2017.md │ ├── sip-2018.md │ ├── sip-2019.md │ ├── sip-202.md │ ├── sip-2020.md │ ├── sip-2021.md │ ├── sip-2022.md │ ├── sip-2023.md │ ├── sip-2024.md │ ├── sip-2025.md │ ├── sip-2026.md │ ├── sip-2027.md │ ├── sip-2028.md │ ├── sip-2029.md │ ├── sip-203.md │ ├── sip-2030.md │ ├── sip-2031.md │ ├── sip-2032.md │ ├── sip-2033.md │ ├── sip-2034.md │ ├── sip-2035.md │ ├── sip-2036.md │ ├── sip-2037.md │ ├── sip-2038.md │ ├── sip-2039.md │ ├── sip-204.md │ ├── sip-2040.md │ ├── sip-2041.md │ ├── sip-2042.md │ ├── sip-2043.md │ ├── sip-2044.md │ ├── sip-2045.md │ ├── sip-2046.md │ ├── sip-2047.md │ ├── sip-2048.md │ ├── sip-2049.md │ ├── sip-205.md │ ├── sip-2050.md │ ├── sip-2051.md │ ├── sip-2052.md │ ├── sip-2053.md │ ├── sip-2054.md │ ├── sip-2055.md │ ├── sip-2056.md │ ├── sip-2057.md │ ├── sip-2058.md │ ├── sip-2059.md │ ├── sip-206.md │ ├── sip-207.md │ ├── sip-208.md │ ├── sip-209.md │ ├── sip-21.md │ ├── sip-210.md │ ├── sip-211.md │ ├── sip-212.md │ ├── sip-213.md │ ├── sip-214.md │ ├── sip-215.md │ ├── sip-216.md │ ├── sip-217.md │ ├── sip-218.md │ ├── sip-219.md │ ├── sip-22.md │ ├── sip-220.md │ ├── sip-221.md │ ├── sip-222.md │ ├── sip-223.md │ ├── sip-224.md │ ├── sip-225.md │ ├── sip-226.md │ ├── sip-227.md │ ├── sip-228.md │ ├── sip-229.md │ ├── sip-23.md │ ├── sip-230.md │ ├── sip-231.md │ ├── sip-232.md │ ├── sip-233.md │ ├── sip-234.md │ ├── sip-235.md │ ├── sip-236.md │ ├── sip-237.md │ ├── sip-238.md │ ├── sip-239.md │ ├── sip-24.md │ ├── sip-240.md │ ├── sip-241.md │ ├── sip-242.md │ ├── sip-243.md │ ├── sip-244.md │ ├── sip-245.md │ ├── sip-246.md │ ├── sip-247.md │ ├── sip-248.md │ ├── sip-249.md │ ├── sip-25.md │ ├── sip-250.md │ ├── sip-251.md │ ├── sip-252.md │ ├── sip-254.md │ ├── sip-255.md │ ├── sip-256.md │ ├── sip-257.md │ ├── sip-258.md │ ├── sip-259.md │ ├── sip-26.md │ ├── sip-260.md │ ├── sip-261.md │ ├── sip-262.md │ ├── sip-263.md │ ├── sip-264.md │ ├── sip-265.md │ ├── sip-266.md │ ├── sip-267.md │ ├── sip-268.md │ ├── sip-269.md │ ├── sip-27.md │ ├── sip-270.md │ ├── sip-271.md │ ├── sip-272.md │ ├── sip-273.md │ ├── sip-274.md │ ├── sip-275.md │ ├── sip-276.md │ ├── sip-277.md │ ├── sip-278.md │ ├── sip-279.md │ ├── sip-28.md │ ├── sip-280.md │ ├── sip-281.md │ ├── sip-282.md │ ├── sip-283.md │ ├── sip-284.md │ ├── sip-285.md │ ├── sip-286.md │ ├── sip-287.md │ ├── sip-288.md │ ├── sip-289.md │ ├── sip-29.md │ ├── sip-290.md │ ├── sip-291.md │ ├── sip-292.md │ ├── sip-293.md │ ├── sip-294.md │ ├── sip-295.md │ ├── sip-296.md │ ├── sip-297.md │ ├── sip-298.md │ ├── sip-299.md │ ├── sip-3.md │ ├── sip-30.md │ ├── sip-300.md │ ├── sip-301.md │ ├── sip-302.md │ ├── sip-303.md │ ├── sip-304.md │ ├── sip-305.md │ ├── sip-306.md │ ├── sip-307.md │ ├── sip-308.md │ ├── sip-309.md │ ├── sip-31.md │ ├── sip-310.md │ ├── sip-311.md │ ├── sip-312.md │ ├── sip-313.md │ ├── sip-314.md │ ├── sip-315.md │ ├── sip-316.md │ ├── sip-317.md │ ├── sip-318.md │ ├── sip-319.md │ ├── sip-32.md │ ├── sip-320.md │ ├── sip-321.md │ ├── sip-322.md │ ├── sip-323.md │ ├── sip-324.md │ ├── sip-325.md │ ├── sip-326.md │ ├── sip-327.md │ ├── sip-328.md │ ├── sip-329.md │ ├── sip-33.md │ ├── sip-330.md │ ├── sip-331.md │ ├── sip-332.md │ ├── sip-333.md │ ├── sip-334.md │ ├── sip-335.md │ ├── sip-336.md │ ├── sip-337.md │ ├── sip-338.md │ ├── sip-339.md │ ├── sip-34.md │ ├── sip-340.md │ ├── sip-341.md │ ├── sip-342.md │ ├── sip-343.md │ ├── sip-345.md │ ├── sip-346.md │ ├── sip-347.md │ ├── sip-348.md │ ├── sip-349.md │ ├── sip-35.md │ ├── sip-350.md │ ├── sip-351.md │ ├── sip-352.md │ ├── sip-353.md │ ├── sip-354.md │ ├── sip-355.md │ ├── sip-356.md │ ├── sip-357.md │ ├── sip-358.md │ ├── sip-359.md │ ├── sip-36.md │ ├── sip-360.md │ ├── sip-361.md │ ├── sip-362.md │ ├── sip-363.md │ ├── sip-364.md │ ├── sip-365.md │ ├── sip-366.md │ ├── sip-367.md │ ├── sip-368.md │ ├── sip-369.md │ ├── sip-37.md │ ├── sip-370.md │ ├── sip-371.md │ ├── sip-372.md │ ├── sip-373.md │ ├── sip-374.md │ ├── sip-375.md │ ├── sip-376.md │ ├── sip-377.md │ ├── sip-378.md │ ├── sip-379.md │ ├── sip-38.md │ ├── sip-380.md │ ├── sip-381.md │ ├── sip-382.md │ ├── sip-383.md │ ├── sip-384.md │ ├── sip-385.md │ ├── sip-386.md │ ├── sip-387.md │ ├── sip-388.md │ ├── sip-389.md │ ├── sip-39.md │ ├── sip-390.md │ ├── sip-391.md │ ├── sip-392.md │ ├── sip-393.md │ ├── sip-394.md │ ├── sip-395.md │ ├── sip-396.md │ ├── sip-397.md │ ├── sip-398.md │ ├── sip-399.md │ ├── sip-4.md │ ├── sip-40.md │ ├── sip-400.md │ ├── sip-401.md │ ├── sip-402.md │ ├── sip-403.md │ ├── sip-404.md │ ├── sip-405.md │ ├── sip-406.md │ ├── sip-407.md │ ├── sip-408.md │ ├── sip-409.md │ ├── sip-41.md │ ├── sip-410.md │ ├── sip-411.md │ ├── sip-412.md │ ├── sip-413.md │ ├── sip-415.md │ ├── sip-416.md │ ├── sip-42.md │ ├── sip-420.md │ ├── sip-421.md │ ├── sip-422.md │ ├── sip-43.md │ ├── sip-44.md │ ├── sip-45.md │ ├── sip-46.md │ ├── sip-47.md │ ├── sip-48.md │ ├── sip-49.md │ ├── sip-5.md │ ├── sip-50.md │ ├── sip-51.md │ ├── sip-52.md │ ├── sip-53.md │ ├── sip-54.md │ ├── sip-55.md │ ├── sip-56.md │ ├── sip-57.md │ ├── sip-58.md │ ├── sip-59.md │ ├── sip-6.md │ ├── sip-60.md │ ├── sip-61.md │ ├── sip-62.md │ ├── sip-63.md │ ├── sip-64.md │ ├── sip-65.md │ ├── sip-66.md │ ├── sip-67.md │ ├── sip-68.md │ ├── sip-69.md │ ├── sip-7.md │ ├── sip-70.md │ ├── sip-71.md │ ├── sip-72.md │ ├── sip-73.md │ ├── sip-74.md │ ├── sip-75.md │ ├── sip-76.md │ ├── sip-77.md │ ├── sip-78.md │ ├── sip-79.md │ ├── sip-8.md │ ├── sip-80.md │ ├── sip-81.md │ ├── sip-82.md │ ├── sip-83.md │ ├── sip-84.md │ ├── sip-85.md │ ├── sip-86.md │ ├── sip-87.md │ ├── sip-88.md │ ├── sip-89.md │ ├── sip-9.md │ ├── sip-90.md │ ├── sip-91.md │ ├── sip-92.md │ ├── sip-93.md │ ├── sip-94.md │ ├── sip-95.md │ ├── sip-96.md │ ├── sip-97.md │ ├── sip-98.md │ └── sip-99.md ├── srs │ ├── sr-1.md │ └── sr-2.md └── stps │ ├── assets │ ├── stp-11 │ │ └── job-description.md │ └── stp-5 │ │ └── bd-job-description.md │ ├── stp-1.md │ ├── stp-10.md │ ├── stp-11.md │ ├── stp-12.md │ ├── stp-13.md │ ├── stp-14.md │ ├── stp-15.md │ ├── stp-16.md │ ├── stp-17.md │ ├── stp-18.md │ ├── stp-19.md │ ├── stp-2.md │ ├── stp-20.md │ ├── stp-3.md │ ├── stp-4.md │ ├── stp-5.md │ ├── stp-6.md │ ├── stp-7.md │ ├── stp-8.md │ └── stp-9.md ├── gatsby-browser.js ├── gatsby-config.js ├── gatsby-node.js ├── old.css ├── package-lock.json ├── package.json ├── postcss.config.js ├── sccp-x.md ├── sip-x.md ├── sr-x.md ├── src ├── components │ ├── AuthorList.tsx │ ├── FrontmatterTable.tsx │ ├── ProposalStatus.tsx │ ├── StatusLabel.tsx │ ├── StatusTable.tsx │ └── utils.ts ├── html.js ├── icons │ ├── DarkMode.tsx │ ├── Github.tsx │ ├── LightMode.tsx │ ├── Source.tsx │ └── Twitter.tsx ├── layout │ └── Main.tsx └── pages │ ├── 404.js │ ├── all-sccp.tsx │ ├── all-sip.tsx │ ├── all-sr.tsx │ ├── all-stp.tsx │ ├── index.tsx │ ├── sccp │ └── sccp-{MarkdownRemark.frontmatter__sccp}.tsx │ ├── sips │ └── sip-{MarkdownRemark.frontmatter__sip}.tsx │ ├── srs │ └── sr-{MarkdownRemark.frontmatter__sr}.tsx │ └── stps │ └── stp-{MarkdownRemark.frontmatter__stp}.tsx ├── static ├── favicon.ico ├── mathjax-config.js └── sip-workflow.png ├── stp-x.md ├── tailwind.config.js └── tailwind.css /.eslintrc.js: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | module.exports = { 2 | env: { 3 | browser: true, 4 | es2021: true, 5 | }, 6 | extends: [ 7 | 'eslint:recommended', 8 | 'plugin:react/recommended', 9 | 'plugin:@typescript-eslint/recommended', 10 | ], 11 | parser: '@typescript-eslint/parser', 12 | parserOptions: { 13 | ecmaFeatures: { 14 | jsx: true, 15 | }, 16 | ecmaVersion: 12, 17 | sourceType: 'module', 18 | }, 19 | plugins: ['react', '@typescript-eslint'], 20 | rules: { 21 | 'react/prop-types': 0, 22 | }, 23 | } 24 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /.github/workflows/PR-build.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | name: Gatsby PR build 2 | 3 | on: 4 | pull_request: 5 | branches: 6 | - master 7 | 8 | jobs: 9 | build: 10 | runs-on: ubuntu-latest 11 | steps: 12 | - uses: actions/checkout@v2 13 | - uses: actions/setup-node@v2 14 | with: 15 | node-version: '20' 16 | - name: Get latest npm version 17 | run: npm install -g npm@latest --prefix . 18 | - name: Install dependencies 19 | run: npm install --prefer-offline --no-audit 20 | - name: Validate SIP, STP, SR & SCCP frontmatters 21 | run: npm test 22 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /.gitignore: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | node_modules/ 2 | .cache/ 3 | public 4 | types/gql.ts 5 | .DS_Store 6 | .idea 7 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /.prettierrc.js: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | module.exports = { 2 | semi: false, 3 | trailingComma: 'all', 4 | singleQuote: true, 5 | tabWidth: 2, 6 | } 7 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | When opening a pull request to submit a new SIP, please use the suggested template: https://github.com/Synthetixio/SIPs/blob/master/sip-X.md 2 | 3 | We have a GitHub bot that automatically merges some PRs. It will merge yours immediately if certain criteria are met: 4 | 5 | - The PR edits only existing Draft PRs. 6 | - The build passes. 7 | - Your Github username or email address is listed in the 'author' header of all affected PRs, inside . 8 | - If matching on email address, the email address is the one publicly listed on your GitHub profile. 9 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /bulkEdit.js: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | const { batch } = require('frontmatter-file-batcher') 2 | 3 | ;(() => { 4 | batch('content/**/*.md', Infinity, async ({ goods, actions }) => { 5 | console.log(goods) 6 | const { update, save } = actions 7 | 8 | const newData = update({ 9 | data: { type: { $set: 'Governance' } }, 10 | }) 11 | 12 | await save(newData) 13 | console.log('Just saved:', goods.path) 14 | }) 15 | })() 16 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /ci/statuses.js: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | module.exports = [ 2 | 'Draft', 3 | 'Feasibility', 4 | 'SC_Review_Pending', 5 | 'Vote_Pending', 6 | 'Approved', 7 | 'Implemented', 8 | 'Rejected', 9 | 'Deprecated', 10 | ] 11 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/asset/curve_decrease_32/charts.PNG: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Synthetixio/SIPs/7784610c661a7fb8c06fba68622801ae776413f6/content/sccp/asset/curve_decrease_32/charts.PNG -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/asset/curve_decrease_32/data.xlsx: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Synthetixio/SIPs/7784610c661a7fb8c06fba68622801ae776413f6/content/sccp/asset/curve_decrease_32/data.xlsx -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/asset/liquidation_delay/returns-plot.png: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Synthetixio/SIPs/7784610c661a7fb8c06fba68622801ae776413f6/content/sccp/asset/liquidation_delay/returns-plot.png -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/asset/liquidation_delay/snx-eth-corr.png: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Synthetixio/SIPs/7784610c661a7fb8c06fba68622801ae776413f6/content/sccp/asset/liquidation_delay/snx-eth-corr.png -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/asset/sccp-307/SCCP-307.jpg: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Synthetixio/SIPs/7784610c661a7fb8c06fba68622801ae776413f6/content/sccp/asset/sccp-307/SCCP-307.jpg -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/asset/uniswap_seth_end/chart.PNG: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Synthetixio/SIPs/7784610c661a7fb8c06fba68622801ae776413f6/content/sccp/asset/uniswap_seth_end/chart.PNG -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/asset/uniswap_seth_end/data.xlsx: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Synthetixio/SIPs/7784610c661a7fb8c06fba68622801ae776413f6/content/sccp/asset/uniswap_seth_end/data.xlsx -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-130.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 130 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Raise Fees on Altcoin Synths to 300 bp 5 | author: Kaleb Keny (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Rejected 7 | created: 2021-07-08T00:00:00.000Z 8 | type: Governance 9 | --- 10 | 11 | ## Simple Summary 12 | 13 | Raise fees on exchanges into sXTZ, sXMR, sETC, sDOT, sEOS, sTRX, sDASH, sDEFI ,sCRV, sAAVE, sRUNE, sCOMP, sYFI and s1INCH to 300 bp from 100 bp. 14 | 15 | ## Motivation 16 | 17 | Analysis of on-chain data showed that the wider availablity of synths (due to wrappr) has allowed certain actors to take up sizeable slippage-less positions in synths beyound what is deemed reasonable on CEX and DEX's. 18 | This SCCP proposes to raise fees on these tokens to 300 bp, as a stopgap measure, until other sips such as [that proposed on supply caps](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-146) and volume weighted fees measures are in place. 19 | 20 | ## Copyright 21 | 22 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 23 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-138.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 138 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Reduce L2 Target C-Ratio To 600% 5 | author: Spreek (@Spreek) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2021-09-13T00:00:00.000Z 8 | type: Governance 9 | --- 10 | 11 | ## Simple Summary 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | Lower target c-ratio on L2 from 750% to 600% 16 | 17 | ## Abstract 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | As laid out in SCCP 96, we intend to steadily reduce c-ratio as needed to maintain peg and appropriate risk controls. 22 | 23 | ## Motivation 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | We observe that the peg on uniswap is ~1.2 after the launch of Lyra liquidity mining rewards. We would like to take steps to bring it closer to 1 as we wait for ETH wrapper 28 | 29 | ## Copyright 30 | 31 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 32 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-141.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 141 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Up the Weekly SNX Minting reward 5 | author: JJ (@justinjmoses) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2021-10-12 8 | type: Governance 9 | --- 10 | 11 | ## Simple Summary 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | Update the reward to mint the weekly SNX inflation 16 | 17 | ## Abstract 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | In order to ensure a keeper calls the weekly `Synthetix.mint()` function, the reward for calling needs to be updated to `50 SNX` from `30` to account for gas costs. 22 | 23 | ## Motivation 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | The mint for SNX starting the 7 days following Oct 7, 2021 was not called. Presumeably, this was because the reward was low (30 SNX) compared to gas prices and the current market rate of SNX. This SCCP proposed updating it to `50 SNX` weekly. 28 | 29 | ## Copyright 30 | 31 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 32 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-145.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 145 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Increase L2 ETH Wrappr Minting Fee to 250 bp 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2021-11-04 8 | type: Governance 9 | --- 10 | 11 | ## Simple Summary 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | The SCCP aims at increasing the minting fee on the ETH Wrappr to 250 bp. 16 | 17 | ## Abstract 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | Increase the L2 ETH Wrappr minting fee to 250 bp will improve value capture to snx stakers, given the increased demand for synths on L2 for farming. 22 | 23 | ## Motivation 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | In order to maximize the revenue for snx stakers and leave less money on the table, this sccp proposes to increase the ETH Wrappr minting fee to 250 bp. 28 | 29 | ## Copyright 30 | 31 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 32 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-160.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 160 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update LUSD Wrappr Parameters 5 | author: Kain (@kaiynne) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2021-12-07 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/QmYoxQRx27Zrkb7rCoMKKW7FBGc7x2F6iQ6ThjcvJkRPNA 11 | --- 12 | 13 | ## Simple Summary 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | This SCCP proposes to update the following parameters on the LUSD wrappr on L2: 18 | 19 | - Increase the capacity by 25 million sUSD to 100 million sUSD 20 | 21 | ## Abstract 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | The LUSD cap sets the maximum amount of sUSD that can be minted by the wrappr. 26 | 27 | ## Motivation 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | Raising the LUSD wrappr capacity is recommended as the cap has now been reached. 32 | 33 | ## Copyright 34 | 35 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 36 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-166.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 166 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Lower L2 Exchange fees to 25 bp 5 | author: Afif Bandak (@aband1), Kaleb Keny (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/QmRbx6px5fPvboA5ToxnasSovTRLZzFwv9nHz94jJsnhP3 9 | created: 2022-02-16T00:00:00.000Z 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | ## Simple Summary 14 | 15 | Lower fees on exchanges into sBTC, sETH, sLINK, sSOL, and sUSD from 40bp to 25bp on Optimism; and lower `exchangeDynamicFeeThreshold` to 25bp on Optimism. 16 | 17 | ## Motivation 18 | 19 | Analysis of on-chain data has shown that with the implementation of [SIP-184 for dynamic fees](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-184), lower base exchange fees are now feasible. 20 | This SCCP proposes to lower base exchange fees for sBTC, sETH, sLINK, sSOL, and sUSD to 25bp on Optimism, and also lower the dynamic fee parameter `exchangeDynamicFeeThreshold` to 25bp. 21 | 22 | ## Copyright 23 | 24 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 25 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-175.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 175 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update Base Fees 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2022-03-31 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/Qmboi8f6p4mDZ6FMnSGWm2fRy492Y6QLFmmqw2scewmS3b 11 | --- 12 | 13 | ## Simple Summary 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | This SCCP proposes to update the following base fee parameters: 18 | 19 | - raise sSOL baseFee to 50 bp 20 | - raise sAVAX baseFee to 50 bp 21 | 22 | ## Abstract 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | The `baseFee` is the fee charged for exchange into a particular synth. 27 | 28 | ## Motivation 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | The main reason for this change is to decrease the likelihood of latency arbitrage attacks. 33 | 34 | ## Copyright 35 | 36 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-176.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 176 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update Base Fees 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2022-04-01 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/QmdXWywY4Hi4Hs6SUpFoNdBe7sBYvDePxrztsyoXV1DxYc 11 | --- 12 | 13 | ## Simple Summary 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | This SCCP proposes to update the following base fee parameters: 18 | 19 | - raise sAAVE baseFee to 70 bp 20 | - raise sUNI baseFee to 70 bp 21 | - raise sMATIC baseFee to 70 bp 22 | 23 | ## Abstract 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | The `baseFee` is the fee charged for exchange into a particular synth. 28 | 29 | ## Motivation 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | The main reason for this change is to decrease the likelihood of latency arbitrage attacks. 34 | 35 | ## Copyright 36 | 37 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-177.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 177 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update Base Fees 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2022-04-01 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/QmaiZW7HtVV72EfTLTTKDKTPSyYD1eYfDiTjjrSVuKQWaY 11 | --- 12 | 13 | ## Simple Summary 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | This SCCP proposes to update the following base fee parameters: 18 | 19 | - raise sAVAX baseFee to 70 bp 20 | - raise sSOL baseFee to 70 bp 21 | 22 | ## Abstract 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | The `baseFee` is the fee charged for exchange into a particular synth. 27 | 28 | ## Motivation 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | The main reason for this change is to decrease the likelihood of latency arbitrage attacks. 33 | 34 | ## Copyright 35 | 36 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-182.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 182 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update Open Interest Limits 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2022-04-11 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/QmV2N21C24PEwmgBWo4ktjsMNSQdSbTHzTTYraEBgCpcHB 11 | --- 12 | 13 | ## Simple Summary 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | This SCCP proposes to lower the `MaxMarketValueUSD` on futures markets to the following: 18 | 19 | - On BTC to 3 million USD 20 | - On ETH to 7 million USD 21 | - On LINK to 3 million USD 22 | 23 | ## Abstract 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | The `MaxMarketValueUSD` is the maximum amount of open interest available for a certain Futures Market. 28 | 29 | ## Motivation 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | The primary motivation is to limit the possibility of latency arbitrage. 34 | 35 | ## Copyright 36 | 37 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-184.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 184 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update Open Interest Limits 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2022-04-14 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/QmQEYgoZrTn2ii9yVMGnn1YA4ziiB4U39fsMYo9gJX2end 11 | --- 12 | 13 | ## Simple Summary 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | This SCCP proposes to increase the sETH futures market `MaxMarketValueUSD` to sUSD 15 million from sUSD 7 million. 18 | 19 | ## Abstract 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | The `MaxMarketValueUSD` is the maximum amount of open interest available for a certain Futures Market. 24 | 25 | ## Motivation 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | The primary motivation to increase the open interest limit gradually until dynamic fees are calibrated well enough to offset the oracle latency gap. 30 | 31 | ## Copyright 32 | 33 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 34 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-185.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 185 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update Open Interest Limits 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2022-04-15 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/Qmc3ofeuqF7ZWcj88ervZNUc3TLKSK8M63Hx1H2zjSXfMR 11 | --- 12 | 13 | ## Simple Summary 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | This SCCP proposes to increase the sETH futures market `MaxMarketValueUSD` to sUSD 25 million from sUSD 15 million. 18 | 19 | ## Abstract 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | The `MaxMarketValueUSD` is the maximum amount of open interest available for a certain Futures Market. 24 | 25 | ## Motivation 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | The primary motivation to increase the open interest limit given the increased demand for ETH futures. 30 | 31 | ## Copyright 32 | 33 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 34 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2001.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2001 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Increase `minKeeperFee` 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2023-05-02 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x811d38666aebfa4ca51614514ea4a57c34fdd251aee0d28794e9e7100d063b9b 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to raise the `minKeeperFee` to 4$ from 2$ 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The `minKeeperFee` is the fee paid to the bots for executing a given perp trade 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The main motivation is the recent surge in gas cost which has priced out all decentralized keepers and increased the load on the centralized keeper funded by Treasury and is burning around 2 ETH per day. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2002.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2002 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Increase `maxLeverage` by 10% 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2023-05-02 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x1ced2cf0e711be720bb5a0ae6d15e710d38abbec8ce6a0fda603d1e4ae785972 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to increase leverage on all crypto perps (including those mentioned in [SCCP-2000](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-2000/)) by 10%. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The `maxLeverage` is the maximum possible leverage to undertake on a given position. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The main motivation is to improve the ux, since between the time traders signal their intention to trade at max leverage, and the time the order actually gets executed, prices could move leading to a max leverage being exceeded revert and the order becoming stale in consequence. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2017.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2017 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Increase Price Divergence PEPE 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2023-06-23 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x85e7884f42dee9aa387d082e8e9ee5f33c085cb6857a5af21621cec0111c2012 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to increase the offchain price divergence on PEPE market from 2% to 5%. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | Below is a description of the parameter being changed: 20 | - `offchainPriceDivergence` is the maximum divergence allowed between chainlink and pyth for an order to execute. 21 | 22 | # Motivation 23 | 24 | The primary motivation is volatility of the PEPE market, which is causing slight delay in prices between the two feeds to be aligned. This change will alleviate these issues while keeping the check on pyth price not drifting away too far from chainlink prices. 25 | 26 | # Copyright 27 | 28 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 29 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2019.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2019 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update Perp Parameters - Offchain Maker Fee 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x4db3e50a38502c11ba7b06a5bdd3fdf9e0a27f4c1f290002788652788d4aa0e7 9 | created: 2023-07-10 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to lower the maker fee for offchain trades on FTM and BCH markets to zero from 2 bp. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The parameter description is as follows: 20 | - The maker offchain delayed order fee is the fee charged in order to derisk the debt pool from an imbalanced skew. 21 | 22 | # Motivation 23 | 24 | As can be seen for the [BCH](https://dune.com/queries/2694676/4482559?asset_t6c1ea=BCH) and [FTM](https://dune.com/queries/2694676/4482559?asset_t6c1ea=FTM) remain imbalanced for longer period of time when compared to the more liquid ETH and BTC markets. This SCCP will allow us to understand the elasticity of demand for arbitrages when faced with no potential upfront fees for executing trades that derisk the debt pool. 25 | 26 | 27 | # Copyright 28 | 29 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2020.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2020 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update Perp Parameters - offchainDelayedOrderMinAge 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x92462a486c4035b63dbbd1fbdf9dd41a1055fef7024f19f5d2f080e5c757edf7 9 | created: 2023-07-10 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to lower `offchainDelayedOrderMinAge` to 2 seconds for all markets 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The parameter description is as follows: 20 | - The `offchainDelayedOrderMinAge` is the minimum amount of time that should elapse after the intent transaction, in order for a pyth price to be viable for execution. 21 | 22 | # Motivation 23 | 24 | The change in the parameter should improve the overall user experience of traders and arbitrageurs. Note that the pyth price freshness is assured by the delayed order execution logic Therefore, there is no additional taken on by the debt pool from this parameter change. 25 | 26 | # Copyright 27 | 28 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 29 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2021.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2021 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update Perp Parameters - FTM Market 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x7268f6e7ecfcb8da7b020b927fd3e130214e06b2f1b370f7b450cb8fbf0a624a 9 | created: 2023-07-10 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to increase the `maxMarketValue` of the FTM market from 3 million to 6 million (1.5m$). 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The parameter description is as follows: 20 | - The `maxMarketValue` is the maximum potential size of a given perp market on either the long or short side. 21 | 22 | # Motivation 23 | 24 | The proposed change in the parameter should allow more trades to materialize on this market which has seen an increase in activity. Note that the parameters are still conservative vis-a-vis the open interest sizes seen on centralized exchanges (>25m$). 25 | 26 | # Copyright 27 | 28 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 29 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2022.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2022 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update Perp Parameters - MaxPD and MaxLiquidationDelta 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2023-07-12 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x51c2ec786d6fcdf3b36d370136c2b69389c9a721eb0f03c3117d23be2eb0dc70 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to update the `maxLiquidationDelta` and `maxPD` parameters to 10 and 20 bp respectively on the FTM and BCH markets. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | `maxPD` (MPD) and `maxLiquidationDelta` (MLD) are parameters introduced in [SIP-2005](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-2005/) and they are set by governance taking into account the below rules: 20 | - `maxPD` is set to 2 * (offchain maker fee + offchain taker fee) 21 | - `maxLiquidationDelta` is set to offchain maker + offchain taker fees 22 | These parameters determine whether an account can be liquidated spontaneously or exclusively by endorsed Liquidators. 23 | 24 | # Motivation 25 | 26 | The proposed changes in this SCCP are necessary, in order to continue to execute liquidations safely, taking into account changes to the makerFee proposed in [SCCP-2019](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-2019/). 27 | 28 | # Copyright 29 | 30 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 31 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2024.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2024 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update Perp Parameters - XRP Skew Scale 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2023-07-14 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xe9f4663a13d4cc02bbeeddca10e70d3cb2592acd48ffd565bcf1cc69ff1abd46 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to update the XRP skew scale parameter from 750 million to 300 million. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The parameter description is as follows: 20 | - The `skewScale` parameter helps determine the premium and discount applied for a given level of skewness in a given market. 21 | 22 | # Motivation 23 | 24 | The proposed change is due to the recent market action where offchain slippage for large sizes has increased significantly due to recent events, the change proposed in this sccp helps brings perps in line with markets and paves the way for arbitrages to rebalance the xrp perp market. 25 | 26 | # Copyright 27 | 28 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 29 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2026.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2026 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update Perp Parameters - Update `offchainDelayedOrderMinAge` 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xba467d55da1c2be8beb046a4330994c1abad8a620ce3337717af16279136bc26 9 | created: 2023-07-24 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to decrease the `offchainDelayedOrderMinAge` parameter on both the ETH and BTC markets to 1 second from 2 seconds. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The `offchainDelayedOrderMinAge`` represents the least amount of time that needs to elapse, since the order intention time, before a delayed offchain order can be executed. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The primary motivation is to significantly improve the PerpsV2 user experience, by decreasing the amount of time needed for a delayed order to be executed. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2027.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2027 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update Perp V2 Parameters 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xd0203ef3b12a48a6de92045c876b0ca5b50a3e94d8947a6bb5fafba7361395fa 9 | created: 2023-07-24 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to increase the `maxFundingVelocity` to 27 from 9 on the BCH, XRP and FTM markets. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The `maxFundingVelocity` is the parameter that helps calibrate the speed by which funding rate changes for a given level of skew & skew scale. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The main motivation is to help promote arbitrages of the skew, by allowing funding to settle back into neutrality at a faster pace, when outsized positions are executed on the debt pool that flip the skew from short to long or vice-versa. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-203.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 203 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Increase ETH Wrappr Burn Fee Rate to 5% 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2022-06-19 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/QmYTQUMiUCLqCg4CTjnmeoHULrLaf5fPxc58q6vYugjgRJ 11 | --- 12 | 13 | ## Simple Summary 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | Increase the `burnFeeRate` from 5 bp to 5% on the ETH wrapper on ethereum 18 | 19 | ## Abstract 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | The `burnFeeRate` is paid to snx stakers for burning sETH to unlock the ETH. 24 | 25 | ## Motivation 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | The main motivation is to lock in the amount of synth liquidity circulating on ethereum and maximize the exchange volume that results from arbitrage across the different curve LPs. 30 | 31 | ## Copyright 32 | 33 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 34 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2031.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2031 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update Perp Parameters - Increase CRV Max Market Value 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2023-07-31 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xcd78eda5d35439da8e5542d5cd5df080b55bfdb3cdfa8fd98927ce98a760eed7 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to increase the CRV market's max market value from 3m to 6m. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The maxMarketValue is the max market value of the relevant market in the underlying currency 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The main motivation is the recent surge in off chain crv liquidity and [open interest](https://www.binance.com/en/futures/funding-history/perpetual/trading-data), which allows us to increase the limit and remain conservative in our configurations. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | 29 | 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2033.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2033 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update Perp Parameters - Update WLD Skew Scale 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2023-08-02 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xd8f914f1c6f72c4ed89ac4ebc1c534eb945f2183575ac90f84c3bd72d9c25c12 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to lower the WLD skew scale from 33 million to 20 million. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | Skew scale is the scaling factor of the relevant market in the underlying currency for computing PD and Funding Rates 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The main motivation is the recent review of data suggests that slippage is much more pronounced on exchanges and warrant a lower skew scale in order to ensure that delta neutral arbitrages materialize on chain. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | 29 | 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2037.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2037 3 | title: Increase `maxPriceDivergence` for perps v2 markets 4 | network: Optimism 5 | type: Governance 6 | author: Troy (@Tburm) 7 | status: Implemented 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x9199ebe621c70af5f52d0ae882579a874f5951b482acea9ffbe16e7c430298a4 10 | created: 2023-08-15 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | Increase the `maxPriceDivergence` parameter for all Perps V2 markets from 2% to 10%. 16 | 17 | ## Abstract 18 | 19 | The `maxPriceDivergence` setting is used to prevent trades from confirming when there are large deviations between the onchain Chainlink price and the offchain Pyth price. The setting is intended to prevent trading on bad price updates, however the current setting restricts trading during volatile periods. During the time when Pyth prices have moved but Chainlink hasn't yet updated, trades at the market price will revert. 20 | 21 | ## Motivation 22 | 23 | Increasing the `maxPriceDivergence` setting will allow trading to continue during volatility and prevent keepers from spending significant gas on trades that will revert. 24 | 25 | ## Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2039.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2039 3 | title: Update ETH Wrapper `maxTokenAmount` 4 | network: Optimism 5 | type: Governance 6 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 7 | status: Implemented 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x5683a356ca0c2c746e527815f91ad3b6c7a9549512384681dfc42ec85cb3f087 10 | created: 2023-08-18 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to lower the `maxTokenAmount` on the ETH wrapper to zero from 15k ETH. 16 | 17 | ## Abstract 18 | 19 | The `maxTokenAmount` is the maximum amount of ETH that can be wrapped to issue sETH. 20 | 21 | ## Motivation 22 | 23 | The proposed proposed changes are in order to facilitate migration into V3, as well as limit the possibility of having a negative debt pool skew on ETH, when users acquire sUSD with ETH. 24 | 25 | ## Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2046.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2046 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update Max Market Value - GMX / LDO 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x1d5e1dcdf12a58445982c93188fb63664cb869ecd8020f917095726309f366f2 9 | created: 2023-09-23 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to double the max market value of GMX and LDO: 16 | 17 | | **Market** | **Current** | **Proposed** | **Proposed $** | **CEX OI** | 18 | |:----------:|:-----------:|:------------:|:--------------:|:----------:| 19 | | LDO | 200,000 | 400,000 | 592,671 | 12,000,000 | 20 | | GMX | 7,000 | 14,000 | 484,400 | 200,000 | 21 | 22 | # Abstract 23 | 24 | `maxMarketValue` is the max open interest on one either side of the market denominated underlying currency of that market. 25 | 26 | # Motivation 27 | 28 | The main motivation is to cater for the increase in open interest and appease the high utilization (> 90%) on those markets. 29 | 30 | # Copyright 31 | 32 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 33 | 34 | 35 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2049.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2049 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update APE Market Parameters 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2023-10-06 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x054b037ab40502146525c3de844ef9859718338f034c3cde29bf3000d6099314 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to lower the skew scale parameter on the APE market from `45,000,000` to `25,000,000`. 16 | The slippage on 100k$ on a centralized exchange amounts to 5 bp, while synthetix's slippage would be slightly above 15 bp after these changes are implemented. 17 | 18 | # Abstract 19 | 20 | The description of the parameters changes is as follows: 21 | - `skewScale` is the scaling factor of the relevant market in the underlying currency for computing PD and Funding Rates. 22 | 23 | # Motivation 24 | 25 | The main motivation is to increase the incentive on arbitrageurs to arbitrage the skew by targeting an effective liquidity comfortably below liquidity available on centralized exchanges. 26 | 27 | # Copyright 28 | 29 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 30 | 31 | 32 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2052.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2052 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update Perps V2 Parameters 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2023-10-13 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xde83046b2c0902511a5bf343cfd47b927c6706f1140e356a66a89427416b43fe 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to increase the ETH Max Market Value from 31,000 ETH to 36,000 ETH (i.e. by 7.5m$ increase). 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The `MaxMarketValue` is the maximum possible open interest on any given side of a perp market. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The main motivation is the high utilization of the ETH perp market which is close of 80% capacity. 24 | It is worth highlighting that the maximum capacity of all the crypto volatile pools is currently around 174m$, compared to a total debt pool size of 115m$. 25 | 26 | # Copyright 27 | 28 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 29 | 30 | 31 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2054.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2054 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update Perps V2 Parameters 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2023-10-24 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xa2fb4035bdba3869ca023fe701fc30c99083ae13010802e82821bad34e59a6a1 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to update the perps v2 parameters as per the below: 16 | 17 | | Max Market Value | Current | Proposed | Proposed in $M | Cex OI in $M | 18 | |:----------------:|:---------:|:---------:|:--------------:|:------------:| 19 | | LINK | 600,000 | 900,000 | 9.5 | 117 | 20 | | SOL | 300,000 | 460,000 | 14.7 | 169 | 21 | 22 | 23 | # Abstract 24 | 25 | `MaxMarketValue` is the maximum possible open interest on any given side of a perp market. 26 | 27 | # Motivation 28 | 29 | While the motivation behind the changes on max market value levels are done in order to align the oi caps with historical utilization. 30 | 31 | # Copyright 32 | 33 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 34 | 35 | 36 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2056.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2056 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update Perps V2 Parameters 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x422d337ef879ea8d3f129cc348775f249e27dcd317994c831d9b520bea48bcf8 9 | created: 2023-11-06 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to increase the max market value of XRP Perps v2 market to 3 million tokens (2.1m$) from 1.625 million tokens (1.1m$). 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | `MaxMarketValue` is the maximum possible open interest on any given side of a perp market. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The proposed parameter changes is due to the high utilization seen on the XRP market. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | 29 | 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2060.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2060 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Update ETH Wrapper Parameters 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xda9b727c762a007038c1ff8c1437ebd4707e329b0ce0b8005327ba1464e7d644 9 | created: 2023-11-24 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to update the ETH Wrapper configurations as per the below: 16 | - Lower the burnFeeRate to zero from 50 bp 17 | - Lowers the `maxTokenAmount` to zero from 20k ETH 18 | 19 | # Abstract 20 | 21 | Below is a description of the parameter changes propopsed in the SCCP: 22 | - `burnFeeRate` is the rate paid when unwraping ETH by burning sETH 23 | - `maxTokenAmount` is the maximum amount of sETH that can be minted with ETH 24 | 25 | # Motivation 26 | 27 | The proposed parameter changes are meant to facilitate arbitrage of the peg on L1, with arbitrages taking place by: 28 | - buying cheap sUSD on L2 29 | - bridging it to L1 30 | - swapping to sETH at 5 bp 31 | - unwrapping it to ETH 32 | - Swapping the ETH to USDC 33 | 34 | 35 | # Copyright 36 | 37 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 38 | 39 | 40 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2061.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2061 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Update Exchange Fee Parameters 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xfc160435a3d12c951b2b648979ddc3e0cdd1a1632f2227e2869222e606523bf4 9 | created: 2023-11-24 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to lower the `exchangeFeeRate` on sETH synth exchanges with fee reclamation on L1 from 35 bp to 5 bp. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The `exchangeFeeRate` is the fee rate applied on the amount being exchanged via conventional synth exchanges with fee reclamation. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The proposed parameter changes are meant to facilitate arbitrage of the peg on L1, with arbitrages taking place by: 24 | - buying cheap sUSD on L2 25 | - bridging it to L1 26 | - swapping to sETH at 5 bp 27 | - unwrapping it to ETH 28 | - Swapping the ETH to USDC 29 | 30 | # Copyright 31 | 32 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 33 | 34 | 35 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2070.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2070 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Increase BTC Perp Market `maxMarketValue` 5 | proposal: >- 6 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x074f6712c75d89196230d36da00cece68cd794bddf918df3723dbac0df5b7f12 7 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 8 | status: Implemented 9 | created: 2023-12-15 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to increase the oi cap on the BTC perp market by 600 BTC, from 1,750 to 2,350 (~99m$) 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The `maxMarketValue` is the maximum size of the market (longs/shorts) that can be assumed at any point. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The proposed parameter changes are proposed to cater for the increase in open interest utilization on the BTC market. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | 29 | 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2071.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2071 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update ENJ Perps V2 Market 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x3f5e571a917f5ed336063d20952aaf82d2f0bf6c0ea2018a525c3930cfa04f2d 9 | created: 2023-12-18 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to lower the `maxMarketValue` on the ENJ perp market to 0. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The `maxMarketValue` is the maximum size of the market (longs/shorts) that can be assumed at any point. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | This parameter change is proposed because of the lack of proper price discovery on this market, with prices on centralized exchanges not being consistent with one another for a persistently prolonged period of time 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | 29 | 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2072.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2072 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update TRB Perps V2 Market 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x541fdd57232b6b45b44e24304e9f927c9a72a509003cb78dbbc0a32c6f806596 9 | created: 2024-01-08 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to lower the `maxMarketValue` on the TRB perp market to 0. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The `maxMarketValue` is the maximum size of the market (longs/shorts) that can be assumed at any point. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | This parameter change is proposed because of the lack of proper arbitrage on this market with respect to the PERP market counterpart. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | 29 | 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2074.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2074 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Lower maxMarketValue on UMAP Perp 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x4503294b354e4d5488f0acaf915a5ccd81bb1f888186b51f2bef8fbe38fde01b 9 | created: 2024-01-19 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to decrease the `maxMarketValue` on UMA perp market to zero. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | `maxMarketValue` refer to the maximum open interest allowed on either side of the market. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The proposed parameter changes is due to the unreliability of hedging markets in balancing out the skew on the UMA perp market. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | 29 | 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2078.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2078 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Decrease XMR Perp MaxMarketValue 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2024-02-06 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xd1ccdc3798ec7ee4ab1127b231c44f35e018ffa618d44907bb4090b4e9a71edb 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to lower the XMR perp v2 `MaxMarketValue` parameter, from 5,000 to 1,000. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | `maxMarketValue` represents the maximum open interest allowed on either the long side or the short side of the perp market. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The motivation is because of the recently announced delisting on centralized exchanges, resulting in skew arbitrage being more difficult. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | 29 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2079.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2079 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Decrease DYDX Perp MaxMarketValue 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2024-02-15 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xab318190f7fc8d771f627d1d18dc3ec655c6a283a6d6d034eff8c1533ea577bb 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to lower the DYDX perp v2 `MaxMarketValue` parameter, to 318,000 (1m$) from 1.9m (~6m$). 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | `maxMarketValue` represents the maximum open interest allowed on either the long side or the short side of the perp market. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The motivation is because of the on-going [token migration](https://docs.dydx.community/dydx-token-migration/start-here/introduction) that could cause price discrepancies between oracle providers. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | 29 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2083.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2083 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Increase OI Cap - FIL 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | proposal: >- 7 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xba61e6adac5d613fb51ea989f5d57abb357f1ec932abad705bd9bf1ea874c644 8 | status: Implemented 9 | created: 2024-02-26 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to increase the `maxMarketValue` of `sFILPERP` from 165,800 to 312,500 (2.5m$). 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | `maxMarketValue` is the max market value of the relevant market in the underlying currency. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The main motivation is the increased utilization (nearing the current cap) and trading volume associated with the FIL market. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | 29 | 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2087.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2087 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Update LUSD Wrapper Parameters 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x550db452dd7e7b9b7f1c52181dc8e8d68ba15b9b2809be9d1f0e2e42ed65da1c 9 | created: 2024-03-05 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to lower the LUSD wrapper `maxTokenAmount` back to zero. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The `maxTokenAmount` is the max amount allowed to be used to issue a synth with a underlying specified in the wrapper contract, in this case it's LUSD. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The main motivation is to lean on the sETH skew by encouraging more on-ramp via the `ETH > sETH > sUSD` route. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | 29 | 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2088.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2088 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update ETH Wrapper Parameters 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2024-03-05 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x709f732ae3b0c0eebae2d71671b52e8d7d05d6b693d2c4b993c0bb588f1e84a1 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to update the ETH wrapper parameter on Optimism to the following: 16 | - `maxTokenAmount`: 2,000 17 | - `mintFeeRate`: 0 bp 18 | - `burnFeeRate`: 100 bp 19 | 20 | # Abstract 21 | 22 | - The `burnFeeRate` is a parameter that determines the fee to be paid in order to release the underlying, when a synth is burned 23 | - The `mintFeeRate` is the rate that paid for locking up a certain underlying to mint it's respective synth equivalent. 24 | - The `maxTokenAmount` is the max amount allowed to be used to issue a synth with a underlying specified in the wrapper contract, in this case it's LUSD. 25 | 26 | 27 | # Motivation 28 | 29 | The main motivation is to encourage more on-ramp of synth via the ETH wrapper in order to lean on the debt pool skew. 30 | 31 | # Copyright 32 | 33 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 34 | 35 | 36 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2089.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2089 3 | network: Ethereum & Optimism 4 | title: Update Loan Parameters 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2024-03-05 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x709f732ae3b0c0eebae2d71671b52e8d7d05d6b693d2c4b993c0bb588f1e84a1 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to update the `issueFeeRate` on loans to 40% from 1% 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | `issueFeeRate` is the rate charged on drawing down on existing loans 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | Despite the recent parameter changes, loans are still being tapped in order to draw out sUSD liquidity which leans on monetary policy changes that aim to control the debt pool skew. The parameter change proposed in this SCCP significantly discourages more sUSD liquidity being drawn out from legacy loans. 24 | 25 | 26 | # Copyright 27 | 28 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 29 | 30 | 31 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2090.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2090 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update DynamicFeeRounds 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Rejected 7 | created: 2024-03-05 8 | type: Governance 9 | --- 10 | 11 | # Simple Summary 12 | 13 | This SCCP proposes to decrease the `exchangeDynamicFeeRounds` on sETH to 1 14 | 15 | # Abstract 16 | 17 | Decreasing the `exchangeDynamicFeeRounds` to 1 effectively disabled the dynamic fee rate on swaps to sETH 18 | 19 | # Motivation 20 | 21 | In order to encourage more on-ramp of sUSD via the `ETH > sETH > sUSD`, friction can be alleviated with the parameter change proposed in this sccp. 22 | 23 | Updates as per authors' request. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | 29 | 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2091.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2091 3 | title: Lower c-ratio to 400% 4 | type: Governance 5 | network: Ethereum & Optimism 6 | author: Kain Warwick (@kaiynne) 7 | status: Rejected 8 | created: 2024-03-07 9 | --- 10 | 11 | 12 | ## Simple Summary 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | Lower the c-ratio to 400%. 17 | 18 | ## Abstract 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | Lowering the c-ratio to 400% will increase the capital efficiency of the network. 23 | 24 | ## Motivation 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | The c-ratio was raised during the bear market to prevent liquidations. Given the shift to a bull market, increasing capital efficiency is important to compete with other staking options. 29 | 30 | Switched to rejected as sccp is inactive and not followed up by author. 31 | 32 | ## Copyright 33 | 34 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 35 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2094.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2094 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Increase wETH Wrapper maxTokenAmount 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Rejected 7 | created: 2024-03-20 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xe14115685bbce85a2d0bda72bd4e751c53eef17990677ae442584c653d9c1178 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to increase the `maxTokenAmount` to 6k `sETH` from 2k `sETH` 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The `maxTokenAmount` is the maximum possible amount of tokens that can be minted from a given wrapper by depositing the underlying, `wETH`. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The proposed changes in this SCCP is part of a suite of pre-requisite changes done, in order to facilitate migration of spot synths on L1 as specified in [SIP-2059](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-2059/) and unwinding of the debt pool skew. 24 | 25 | Status switched to rejected as per author's request. 26 | 27 | # Copyright 28 | 29 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 30 | 31 | 32 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2097.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2097 3 | network: Base 4 | title: Update Perps V3 Gas Units 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2024-03-25 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x02cff99410a1e97b06f17e2ec47df1b3c1165b48de927c3c9e52fd6924405bbd 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to increase the L2 gas units to 1.5m from 1.3m for settling orders. 16 | 17 | 18 | # Abstract 19 | 20 | Keepers are compensated a specific amount of L2 gas units for settling orders. 21 | 22 | # Motivation 23 | 24 | The motivation is to continue to provide keepers with the necessary incentive to execute orders. 25 | 26 | # Copyright 27 | 28 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 29 | 30 | 31 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2098.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2098 3 | network: Arbitrum & Base 4 | title: Creating referral code and tracking code for CyberDEX 5 | author: Makarid (@makarid) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2024-04-03T21:00:00.000Z 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x29b7a5bcde8255d179424cc5f839cdc6e5383ab3309b9f549a2e89922c06213d 11 | --- 12 | 13 | ## Simple Summary 14 | 15 | CyberDEX is preparing to integrate Synthetix V3 on Arbitrum and Base and we need to create referral code and tracking code in order to finish it. 16 | 17 | ## Abstract 18 | 19 | Our address for the referral is `0x829d7E022c2ACD05a875bCa4Bd11F56E003B727B` and we propose to use the following trackingCode "CyberDEX". 20 | We are looking forward to create value for Synthetix ecosystem. Thank you very much. 21 | 22 | ## Copyright 23 | 24 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 25 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2099.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2099 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Increase PEPE Perp Cap 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2024-04-08 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x95fceb8114bf4cc10edb2af40bc1f104369dc23ad6a25002801dc7366186aa3d 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to increase the PEPE market `maxMarketValue` from 275 billion (2.2m$) to 500 billion (4m$). 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | the `maxMarketValue` is the maximum possible oi on each side of a given perp market. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The motivation is to accommodate for the increase in oi on the PEPE market on v2x, which is near 99% utilization at the time of writing this SCCP. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | 29 | 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2100.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2100 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update Perps V2 Parameters 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xedd08f0811f4c80237316b4d0aa155253a12c6592d1b0b95c183e01c8b2990fa 9 | created: 2024-04-13 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to lower the skew scale parameters on SOL from 5,625,000 to 2,812,500. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | Below is a description of the parameter changes proposed in the SCCP: 20 | - `skewScale` is the scaling factor of the relevant market in the underlying currency for computing PD and Funding Rates. 21 | 22 | # Motivation 23 | 24 | The proposed parameter changes on skew scale aim at increasing the incentive on arbitrageurs to arbitrage the skew by targeting an effective liquidity comfortably below liquidity available on centralized exchanges. 25 | 26 | # Copyright 27 | 28 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 29 | 30 | 31 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2102.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2102 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update burnFeeRate 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2024-04-22 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x7876f5d73e2b4c5bbbdff6269393b77b800226cf3f3e998d2d8d6b8bec8f825c 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to lower the burn fee rate on the ethereum wrapper on L2 to 0. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The burnFeeRate is the fee rate paid when releasing wETH from the synth wrapper, against burning sETH. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The main motivation is to help provide stability to the peg on optimism. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | 29 | 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2103.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2103 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Enable Dynamic Redeemer 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2024-04-22 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x743722a31f5f431feb4cafabdd545d1cf7231ddd5c00446ad73cac8cca89fedc 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to enable the dynamic redeemer specified in [SIP-2059](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-2059/) and lower the discountRate from 100% to 90%. By enabling the dynamic redeemer, all spot synth exchanges and atomic synth exchanges will be disabled and users with volatile synths on the ethereum network can only swap their synths to sUSD. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The `discountRate` is the rate applied on the chainlink price, at which synth can be redeemed into sUSD. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The primary motivation is to lean on the debt pool skew as per [SIP-2059](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-2059/) with a mechanism that encourages users to swap their volatile synths to sUSD. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | 29 | 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2104.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2104 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Lower Oi Caps on FET on Perps V2 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2024-04-22 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x0b34f1e5417ee2c4ca5d5464a60b807de1574f42dc0e5b93f4c434df9e64da05 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes switch the FET market on perps v2 to close only, by setting the open interest caps, `maxMarketValue`, to zero. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | `maxMarketValue` sets the open interest cap (longs & shorts) on the given market. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The primary motivation is because of the looming uncertainty with regards to the price of the token, given an anticipated token [merge](https://www.binance.com/en/square/post/6854648762434?ref=527586087). 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | 29 | 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2105.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2105 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Update Dynamic Redeemer Discount Rate 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2024-05-06 8 | type: Governance 9 | --- 10 | 11 | # Simple Summary 12 | 13 | This SCCP proposes to decrease the dynamic redeemer to 0.75 from 0.90. 14 | 15 | # Abstract 16 | 17 | `discountRate` as per [SIP-2059](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-2059/), is used to compute the value of the debt pool. It also determines the price at which a user can redeem his outstanding spot synths. 18 | 19 | # Motivation 20 | 21 | The primary motivation is to move forward the intention of [SIP-2059](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-2059/), increasing the incentives on users to migrate their synths over into sUSD. 22 | 23 | # Copyright 24 | 25 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 26 | 27 | 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2107.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2107 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Deprecate FET Perps V2 Market 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2024-05-14 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x5a4f6bc585d662f43c235ec43375d106788f2b61f5fedec6648c4fce7525d81c 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to deprecate the FET perp market as described in [SIP-2068](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-2068/). 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | Dropping this market entails removing the market from the `FuturesMarketManager` contract. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The market oi cap was decreased to zero following [SCCP-2104](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-2104/) giving a chance to users to close their positions and remove their margin. However, an insignificant amount remains outstanding and it is recommended to dissociate this market from the system as per oracle providers' recommendations who are also expected to deprecate the feeds. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2109.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2109 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Lower Wrapper maxTokenAmount 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2024-05-14 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x798151ced3b661f3ca73a08cc32a2df0d1a735376a3aaed61e772f4acf942694 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to lower the `maxTokenAmount` on the [wETH wrapper](https://optimistic.etherscan.io/address/0x6202a3b0be1d222971e93aab084c6e584c29db70) on optimism to zero from 2k ETH. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The `maxTokenAmount` is the maximum amount that can be wrapped at any point. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The primary motivation is the abundance of synth liquidity on AMMs on both L1 and L2, making the excess wrapper capacity not necessary. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2110.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2110 3 | title: Redeem `0xb84ac` At Parity 4 | network: Ethereum 5 | status: Implemented 6 | type: Governance 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x5ce3f1118be7399db2fafcb1664090043a4c4a64890889df2d2fc7e03bd32fd7 9 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 10 | --- 11 | 12 | ## Simple Summary 13 | 14 | The SCCP proposes to redeem `0xb84acf5af9132680876ccef334f7d6f8b4599c16` at parity. This is done by increasing the `discountRate` to 1, executing the redemption on the sBTC held by the user and setting `discount` rate to 60%. 15 | 16 | # Abstract 17 | 18 | The `discountRate`, described in [SIP-2059](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-2059/), determines the rate which users can redeem their synths for sUSD. 19 | 20 | ## Motivation 21 | 22 | The `discountRate` is currently set to 75%, as per [SCCP-2105](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-2105/) in order to encourage volatile synth holders to redeem their synths to sUSD and help rebalance the long skew. However, users who hold volatile synths, can request from governance to be redeemed at parity. 23 | 24 | ## Copyright 25 | 26 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 27 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2112.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2112 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Update Dynamic Redeemer Discount Rate 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x42f870e5411874e9f156190983ba285423fcbca3e83ce5dd26c4458c26aa3f10 9 | created: 2024-05-23 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to decrease the dynamic redeemer discount rate to 50% from 60%. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | `discountRate` as per [SIP-2059](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-2059/), is used to compute the value of the debt pool. It also determines the price at which a user can redeem his outstanding spot synths. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The primary motivation is to move forward the intention of [SIP-2059](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-2059/), increasing the incentives on users to migrate their synths over into sUSD. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | 29 | 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2118.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2118 3 | title: Redeem `0x1B51cCe51` At Parity 4 | network: Ethereum 5 | status: Implemented 6 | type: Governance 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x0b7596ec1a72f5f0a956a6dcee05c012a1a37a3e31def7da2ec62eb3dab8ab0c 9 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 10 | --- 11 | 12 | ## Simple Summary 13 | 14 | The SCCP proposes to redeem `0x1B51cCe51E2531C478daA9b68eb80D47247dCbec` at parity. This is done by increasing the `discountRate` to 1, executing the redemption on the sBTC held by the user and setting `discount` rate to 48% (as per the schedule voted on in [SCCP-2113](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-2113/)). 15 | 16 | # Abstract 17 | 18 | The `discountRate`, described in [SIP-2059](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-2059/), determines the rate which users can redeem their synths for sUSD. 19 | 20 | ## Motivation 21 | 22 | The `discountRate` is currently set to 50%, in order to encourage volatile synth holders to redeem their synths to sUSD and help rebalance the long skew. However, users who hold volatile synths, can request from governance to be redeemed at parity. 23 | 24 | ## Copyright 25 | 26 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 27 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2120.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2120 3 | network: Ethereum & Optimism 4 | title: Lower Liquidation Reward 5 | author: db (@dbeal-eth) 6 | status: Rejected 7 | created: 2024-07-04 8 | type: Governance 9 | --- 10 | 11 | # Simple Summary 12 | 13 | This SCCP proposes to reduce mark for liquidation reward and liquidation reward on Optimism and Mainnet both to 0.1 SNX. 14 | 15 | # Abstract 16 | 17 | The liquidation rate determines how much the account initiating a liquidation gets as compensation for gas and effort. The mark for liquidation rate similarly blocks it. 18 | 19 | # Motivation 20 | 21 | The Synthetix v2x system prevents the liquidation of accounts less than the mark + liquidation reward. Since the current reward on L1 is 30 SNX, it has not possible to liquidate these small accounts even if they have insufficient collateral ratio. This has lead to thousands of small accounts with bad debt on v2x which cannot be liquidated due to this limitation. In preparation 22 | for the migration to Synthetix v3, as well as general cleanliness and health of the system, these limits should be lowered to allow for the cleaning of all these unnecessary accounts. 23 | 24 | # Copyright 25 | 26 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 27 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2125.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2125 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Lower maxMarketValue RNDR to zero 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xbc99bb416d0e331eb1c391d8fbc932615c7aac9f761ce38f787058fd6f19d7fd 9 | created: 2024-07-11 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to lower the `maxMarketValue` on RNDR to zero (i.e. close mode), given the upcoming token swap. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The `maxMarketValue` governs the maximum open interest size, denominated in the market's underlying currency. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The main motivation is the token swap and delisting of the legacy token by centralized exchanges. 24 | 25 | # References 26 | - [Binance](https://www.binance.com/en/support/announcement/binance-will-support-the-render-rndr-token-swap-and-rebranding-to-render-render-d1f2ae8d99b24439a7a900caa9bb6b3b?hl=en) 27 | - [RNDR](https://know.rendernetwork.com/general-render-network/rndr-to-render-what-you-need-to-know/render-network-upgrade-portal-faq) 28 | 29 | # Copyright 30 | 31 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 32 | 33 | 34 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2126.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2126 3 | network: Ethereum & Optimism 4 | title: Increase the minimum collateralization ratio to 500% 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xb3cc6ec2e5b5b838a12cbb186d0aa5e32e99086c669852260b34d7d4a49a30c2 9 | created: 2024-07-15 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to increase the min collateralization ratio back to 500% (or 20% in `issuanceRatio` terms). 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The issuance ratio is the ratio that determines the maximum amount of sUSD that can be minted for a staked amount of snx collateral. 20 | 21 | 22 | # Motivation 23 | 24 | The min c-ratio was recently lowered via an emergency decision as per [SCCP-2122](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-2122/). This SCCP proposes to undo SCCP-2122 by setting the min cratio back to previous levels, given that the risks to the stability of the protocol are asymmetrically more pronounced if a price recovery materializes. 25 | 26 | # Copyright 27 | 28 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 29 | 30 | 31 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2129.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2129 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: crvUSD Wrapper 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2024-07-29 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x5e48918cb4af8605a19007f15219ddb8a86c7bf8bedcefbf6cbd4db7802d07dc 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to setup a `crvUSD` wrapper with 2.5 million cap. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | Wrappers can be setup by calling `createWrapper` under the [`WrapperFactor`](https://etherscan.io/address/0x02f9bC46beD33acdB9cb002fe346734CeF8a9480#writeContract) contract. The parameters of the call would be: 20 | - token: `0xf939E0A03FB07F59A73314E73794Be0E57ac1b4E` 21 | - currencyKey: `sUSD` 22 | - synthContractName: `SynthsUSD` 23 | 24 | # Motivation 25 | 26 | In order to continue to scale and meet the demand for sUSD, a crvUSD wrapper is proposed. 27 | 28 | # Copyright 29 | 30 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 31 | 32 | 33 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2130.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2130 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: USDe Wrapper 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2024-07-29 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x6c209ec31de704b7cdb8bbaeba9e1398a70ea8b7ca03739a9b1f27e60802c7ac 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to setup a `USDe` wrapper with 5 million cap. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | Wrappers can be setup by calling `createWrapper` under the [`WrapperFactor`](https://etherscan.io/address/0x02f9bC46beD33acdB9cb002fe346734CeF8a9480#writeContract) contract. The parameters of the call would be: 20 | - token: `0x4c9edd5852cd905f086c759e8383e09bff1e68b3` 21 | - currencyKey: `sUSD` 22 | - synthContractName: `SynthsUSD` 23 | 24 | # Motivation 25 | 26 | In order to continue to scale and meet the demand for sUSD, a USDe wrapper is proposed. 27 | 28 | # Copyright 29 | 30 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 31 | 32 | 33 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2131.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2131 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: GHO Wrapper 5 | proposal: >- 6 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xaa9ca643f7b55e5fb74bf7785ed3f79225e80d7323f183b95c183611bd3b451c 7 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 8 | status: Implemented 9 | created: 2024-07-30 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to setup a `GHO` wrapper with 2.5 million cap. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | Wrappers can be setup by calling `createWrapper` under the [`WrapperFactor`](https://etherscan.io/address/0x02f9bC46beD33acdB9cb002fe346734CeF8a9480#writeContract) contract. The parameters of the call would be: 20 | - token: `0x40D16FC0246aD3160Ccc09B8D0D3A2cD28aE6C2f` 21 | - currencyKey: `sUSD` 22 | - synthContractName: `SynthsUSD` 23 | 24 | # Motivation 25 | 26 | In order to continue to scale and meet the demand for sUSD, a GHO wrapper is proposed. 27 | 28 | # Copyright 29 | 30 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 31 | 32 | 33 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2136.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2136 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Perps V2 - Deprecate MATIC Market 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xa3af09eb75cc7a3d92440615e2860afb743a7fff07b319730c4a14e0347b083f 9 | created: 2024-08-29 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to lower the `maxMarketValue` parameter to zero on the MATIC market because of the [token swap](https://www.binance.com/en/support/announcement/binance-will-support-the-polygon-matic-token-swap-to-polygon-pol-6a6de383727f4659a3050f7982e1620f?hl=en) and as per oracle providers' recommendations. 16 | Furthermore, the market will be completely deprecated on the 5th of September and the remaining margin associated with that market sent to the treasury council to distribute to traders. 17 | 18 | # Abstract 19 | `maxMarketValue` determines the maximum open interest on the market, setting the parameter to zero effectively sets the market to close only. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The proposed change is in light of the recent token swap. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | 29 | 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2138.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2138 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Lower minimumStakeTime 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2024-09-26 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xc14f719687bfee53b436957bda6d631bc3f1847ce11e3f76945d49d36d46adbd 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to lower the `minimumStakeTime` on ethereum to 1 second from 7 days. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | `minimumStakeTime` is the minimum amount of time an account can be staked on v2x, before he can burn max and release his SNX. 19 | 20 | # Motivation 21 | 22 | The proposed change is in light of [SCCP-2134](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-2134/) which effectively restricted staking on v2x Ethereum. 23 | 24 | # Copyright 25 | 26 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 27 | 28 | 29 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-214.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 214 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update Fees on Silver Futures 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2022-07-13 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/bafkreid3ysplbsi3wkidvitldszrgdek7xzp3yhoq3kk45y6zieaejbrru 11 | --- 12 | 13 | ## Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to increase maker/taker fees on silver futures to 20 and 25 bp from 15 and 15 bp. 16 | 17 | ## Abstract 18 | 19 | `makerFeePrice` and `takerFeePrice` are the fees paid by traders when filled for futures orders. 20 | 21 | ## Motivation 22 | 23 | The reason behind the fee increase is the inherent latency in commodity feeds, vis-a-vis their crypto market counterparts. Raising fees reduces the chance of latency arbitrages. 24 | 25 | ## Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2142.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2142 3 | network: Ethereum & Optimism 4 | title: Raise the USDe Wrapper Cap on Optimism 5 | author: Kaleb 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2024-11-06 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x0f73efa4656aa3cc77d97ce2a8ee5076e919a95f4f286525d4b3473d6b97c94c 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP aims at improving the user experience by 16 | - Raising the USDe wrapper cap on optimism to 30m from the previously proposed limit of 15m 17 | - Lowering the caps on all the wrappers on ethereum to 0 18 | 19 | # Abstract 20 | 21 | The `maxTokenAmount` is the maximum amount of underlying that can be wrapped to mint sUSD. 22 | 23 | 24 | # Motivation 25 | 26 | The proposed changes are in light of increased usage of the USDe wrapper on optimism by traders, to acquire synths and get back the underlying. `USDe` being instantly bridgeable via [stargate](https://stargate.finance/) makes the usage of `USDe` ideal. 27 | 28 | 29 | # Copyright 30 | 31 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 32 | 33 | 34 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2143.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2143 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Raise the USDe Wrapper Cap on Optimism 5 | author: Kaleb 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2024-11-06 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xff94e64c213c43b85e6a03ae73e19853893be261433ec846b1b54087beda4907 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to raise the USDe wrapper cap on optimism to 40m from 30m 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The `maxTokenAmount` is the maximum amount of underlying that can be wrapped to mint sUSD. 20 | 21 | 22 | # Motivation 23 | 24 | The proposed changes are in light of increased usage of the USDe wrapper on optimism by trader. 25 | 26 | 27 | # Copyright 28 | 29 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 30 | 31 | 32 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2144.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2144 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Lower Maker Fees 5 | author: Kaleb 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xb83c5501828b6c36f49b46a084bf10ba5e5807369decc03825be813c2a2ada94 9 | created: 2024-11-12 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to lower the offchain delayed order maker fee to 0.01 bp on ETH, BTC, PEPE and DOGE markets 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The `makerFeeOffchainDelayedOrder` is the fee charged in order to close a skew on the perps v2 markets 20 | 21 | 22 | # Motivation 23 | 24 | The changes are proposed in order to increase the chances that market makers arbitrage a skew 25 | 26 | 27 | # Copyright 28 | 29 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 30 | 31 | 32 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2145.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2145 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Raise the USDe Wrapper Cap on Optimism 5 | author: Kaleb 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x5c9fea00e37bc13f2376c23c44d8fb10282deb253c385811b1f4c59639d7b2e1 9 | created: 2024-11-12 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to raise the USDe wrapper cap on optimism to 50m from 40m 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The `maxTokenAmount` is the maximum amount of underlying that can be wrapped to mint sUSD. 20 | 21 | 22 | # Motivation 23 | 24 | The proposed changes are in light of increased usage of the USDe wrapper on optimism by trader. 25 | 26 | 27 | # Copyright 28 | 29 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 30 | 31 | 32 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2146.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2146 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Raise the USDe Wrapper Cap on Optimism 5 | author: Kaleb 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x31f3078ce7110bf267d81d49509bd33fc1d6632c3c7ba80270bd4e4af8c37f2a 9 | created: 2024-11-18 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to raise the USDe wrapper cap on optimism to 60m from 50m 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The `maxTokenAmount` is the maximum amount of underlying that can be wrapped to mint sUSD. 20 | 21 | 22 | # Motivation 23 | 24 | The proposed changes are in light of increased usage of the USDe wrapper on optimism by trader. 25 | 26 | 27 | # Copyright 28 | 29 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 30 | 31 | 32 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2147.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2147 3 | title: Raise the OI Cap on SOL 4 | network: Optimism 5 | status: Implemented 6 | type: Governance 7 | created: 2024-11-22 8 | author: Kaleb 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x5301c7277ec41c80b194d7d0d395606e5c0884d9b52b1a1c58e724ee5088bbe4 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to raise the `maxMarketValue` on the SOL market to 670k (175m dollars) from 550k. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The `maxMarketValue` is the limit set on open interest (longs or shorts). 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The change is in light of the recent utilization of the limit on the SOL market which is quickly approaching 90%. Note that the market is backed by the size of the SNX staked, close to 370m$, given the deprecation of spot markets and legacy products. 24 | 25 | 26 | # Copyright 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2148.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2148 3 | title: Raise the Capacity on USDe Wrapper 4 | network: Optimism 5 | status: Implemented 6 | type: Governance 7 | created: 2024-11-22 8 | author: Kaleb 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x6d8ebec1efa80184df8afa1dd4e0857536fcae956dd030a79e7b82226de8fd85 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to raise the `maxTokenAmount` on the USDe wrapper on optimism from 60m to 70m. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The `maxTokenAmount` is the limit set the total size that can be wrapped by given token. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The change is in light of the recent utilization of the limit on the wrapper with wound 52m currently being wrapped. 24 | 25 | 26 | # Copyright 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2149.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2149 3 | title: USDC Wrapper 4 | network: Optimism 5 | status: Implemented 6 | type: Governance 7 | created: 2024-11-25 8 | author: Kaleb 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x526ba12ac26e1592d8ae081d060862cfc35ec98f29e91868f2d09611fee3e24c 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to deploy a USDC wrapper with 70 million dollar cap on optimism with 0 fees. 16 | Furthermore, this sccp also proposes to decrease the wrapper cap on USDe to zero and increase the burnFeeRate to 10 bp. Note that decreasing the cap would only be implemented after partner integrators (1inch, odos, kwenta...) put in place the necessary for on-boarding the USDC wrapper. 17 | 18 | # Abstract 19 | 20 | Wrappers can be setup by calling createWrapper under the WrapperFactor contract. The parameters of the call would be: 21 | 22 | - token: `0xb9a2adcc9674c9569a7beea2a34640f398cb015f` 23 | - currencyKey: `sUSD` 24 | - synthContractName: `SynthsUSD` 25 | 26 | 27 | # Motivation 28 | 29 | The change is in order to improving the trading user experience as USDC is the defacto stable coin of choice for most users. 30 | 31 | 32 | # Copyright 33 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 34 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-215.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 215 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Lower `minKeeperFee` to 1 sUSD 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2022-07-13 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/bafkreiglj626yk3feoawtxgxzl4odkniba6rhcgbk6ugpkegrglmf73qoe 11 | --- 12 | 13 | ## Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to lower the `minKeeperFee` to 1 sUSD from 5 sUSD. 16 | 17 | 18 | ## Abstract 19 | 20 | The `minKeeperFee` is used for two purposes: 21 | 1) It's the minimal fee paid for a liquidation to a keeper (for small positions). 22 | 2) It's the constant fee paid to a keeper for executing a next-price order. The fee is withheld from the user when submitting the order. 23 | This means that small next-price orders aren't viable when executed by keepers (because of the imposed fixed fee). 24 | 25 | 26 | ## Motivation 27 | 28 | The reason behind the decrease is because of the low cost of executing transactions on optimism, which results in keepers needing to be paid far less in order to fulfill next price orders and liquidations. 29 | 30 | ## Copyright 31 | 32 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2150.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2150 3 | network: Ethereum & Optimism 4 | title: Deprecate GHO and USDe Wrappers 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2024-12-03 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x23e056411f9c8845d95173013dd6a9634ca13f18263a0eb8dd6c1e102855f318 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes deprecate the ethereum GHO and USDe wrappers on ethereum and move the liquidity to the USDC wrapper on optimism. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The proposal entails the protocol: 20 | - Drawing out GHO and USDe liquidity from the ethereum wrappers (5m$ worth) 21 | - Swapping the GHO and USDe to USDC 22 | - Sending the USDC to optimism 23 | - Wrapping the USDC to mint sUSD 24 | - Burning the sUSD 25 | 26 | # Motivation 27 | 28 | The main motivation is the recent drawdowns in exit liquidity on the optimism wrapper. The move will facilitate users wanting to exit sUSD without undo effects on the peg. 29 | In addition, the recent increase in sUSD sent to L2 is limiting the amount of sUSD that can be swapped to v3, this proposal will increase that limit by 5m$. 30 | 31 | 32 | # Copyright 33 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 34 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2151.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2151 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Deploy sUSD in AAVE 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2024-12-05 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xc975f275b03b975cfea4e8a5a6c39050d78423c08cca18cd77c87088ecc02b36 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes deposit in a special Treasury account 5m sUSD backed by the protocol. The funds would be used by Treasury to alleviate the sUSD borrow pressure on AAVE on optimism. Treasury would be required to burn the funds once usage of these funds had run it's course. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The proposal entails: 20 | - Minting 5m sUSD 21 | - Sending it to the [TC wallet address](https://etherscan.io/address/0x99f4176ee457afedffcb1839c7ab7a030a5e4a92) 22 | - Treasury would be required to deposit the sUSD on AAVE on optimism 23 | - Treasury would burn the sUSD along with any interest profit made on the deposit as the usage of these funds had run it's course 24 | 25 | # Motivation 26 | 27 | The main motivation is to alleviate the high demand for sUSD on aave optimism, with the apy hitting highs. 28 | 29 | 30 | # Copyright 31 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 32 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2152.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2152 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Deprecate FTM Market 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2025-01-06 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x3c7d4cef9ff712bd65c4dd4070c5ace12147e82c69735e91515a0fa32abd8e0e 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes deprecate the FTM market on optimism by first setting the oi cap to zero and deprecating the market completely on the 13th of January. The sUSD margin would be sent to Treasury allowing users to reclaim that margin by opening a ticket on discord. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | OI cap is lowered to zero by setting the `maxMarketValue` parameter to zero. The markets are then deprecated by calling the `removeMarketByKey` function with the argument `sFTMPERP`. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The main motivation is given the rebrand and token swap which is expected to cause issues as oracle providers switch over to new feeds. 24 | 25 | 26 | # Copyright 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2153.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2153 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Open Account Merge Window 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2025-01-06 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xb8d5627f6298f268c310e40b05cfa8d6b9b5ca19ae8ddb4759ac208d2e0624fa 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes open the account merge window for 30 days on optimism. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The account merge window is not currently open on optimism, opening entails setting the `accountMergingDuration` to 30 days and executing the `startMergingWindow` afterwards. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The main motivation is that certain users are looking to move their escrow snx into different accounts. This SCCP caters for that request. 24 | 25 | 26 | # Copyright 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2157.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2157 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Open Account Merge Window 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2025-02-21 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x41ae47880a762d04b160b2e5b4d5f2bfbacdc92a2f6eec081ce91a1db4c73901 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes open the account merge window for 30 days on optimism. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The account merge window is not currently open on optimism, opening entails setting the `accountMergingDuration` to 30 days and executing the `startMergingWindow` afterwards. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The main motivation is that certain users are looking to move their escrow snx into different accounts. This SCCP caters for that request. 24 | 25 | 26 | # Copyright 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2158.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2158 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update v2x Staking Parameters on Optimism 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2025-02-27 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x5cc707878aea13b370a4f2c32164928b39e1eac79785586b5e43e04e04863122 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes implement the following: 16 | - Lower the `issuanceRatio` to 1 wei 17 | - Lower the `minimumStakeTime` to 1 second 18 | 19 | # Abstract 20 | 21 | The `issuanceRatio` determines the amount of leverage a snx staker would be able to get on his position. Lowering the `issuanceRatio` to 1 wei would effectively disable ability of stakers to borrow sUSD against deposited SNX. 22 | The `minimumStakeTime` is the minimum amount of time that should elapse after staking, in order to be able to exit the system. Given that staking on v2x on optimism would be disabled this parameter can be set to the minimum. 23 | 24 | # Motivation 25 | 26 | The main motivation is the upcoming release related to [SIP-420](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-420/) with the above changes needed in order to facilitate the transition. 27 | 28 | 29 | # Copyright 30 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 31 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2159.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2159 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: snxUSD Wrapper 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2025-03-01 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x93bf78bcf5de3d908a18de7ee1bcd8be98a08b7acf4645f1a2555fbd4545aa41 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to setup a `snxUSD` wrapper with 1 million cap and no fees. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | Wrappers can be setup by calling `createWrapper` under the [`WrapperFactor`](https://etherscan.io/address/0x02f9bC46beD33acdB9cb002fe346734CeF8a9480#writeContract) contract. The parameters of the call would be: 20 | - token: `0xb2F30A7C980f052f02563fb518dcc39e6bf38175` 21 | - currencyKey: `sUSD` 22 | - synthContractName: `SynthsUSD` 23 | 24 | # Motivation 25 | 26 | The motivation behind this sccp proposes to create a wrapper that allow users to swap out `snxUSD` into `sUSD` which is more liquid on ethereum. 27 | 28 | # Copyright 29 | 30 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 31 | 32 | 33 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2160.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2160 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: snxUSD Wrapper - Increase Max Token Amount 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2025-03-05 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xb57190da4f02a2703a682c6ebff912308390d81fd478b7077c52ab1499b6ff99 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to increase the `snxUSD` wrapper cap to 3 million sUSD from 1 million. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | Wrappers can be updated by calling `setWrapperMaxTokenAmount` under the [`SystemSettings`](https://etherscan.io/address/0x202ae40Bed1640b09e2AF7aC5719D129A498B7C8#writeContract) contract. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The motivation behind this sccp is to allow Treasury to get more sUSD from their holding of snxUSD. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | 29 | 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2161.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2161 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Deprecate Low Utilization Perps V2 Markets 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2024-05-28 8 | type: Governance 9 | --- 10 | 11 | # Simple Summary 12 | 13 | This SCCP proposes to deprecate the below markets on optimism: 14 | 15 | | **Market** | **Volume** | 16 | |:----------:|:----------:| 17 | | comp | 28,545 | 18 | | etc | 27,695 | 19 | | steth | 20,341 | 20 | | jto | 19,722 | 21 | | dot | 13,734 | 22 | | bal | 12,850 | 23 | | yfi | 7,357 | 24 | | icp | 1,522 | 25 | | rpl | 517 | 26 | | meme | 0 | 27 | | perp | 0 | 28 | 29 | # Abstract 30 | 31 | Deprecation takes the form of remove the markets the futures market manager and minting the equivalent worth of sUSD margin held in these markets to Treasury for users to redeem. Note that at the time of of writing this SCCP the amount of margin held in these markets is below 500 sUSD. 32 | 33 | # Motivation 34 | 35 | The main motivation is deprecate markets that have had no historical utilization. 36 | 37 | # Copyright 38 | 39 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2163.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2163 3 | title: Deprecate low usage perp markets 4 | network: Optimism 5 | status: Implemented 6 | type: Governance 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xc19c6d17095cf6f28aa2a1d0fca2cd045b7851495058522d636fa1d3503695c1 9 | created: 2025-05-19 10 | author: Cavalier 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to deprecate markets with $0 volume in the past 7 days. The market affected is the USDT market which has not seen any volume in recent months. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | Removing these market entails removing them from `FuturesMarketManager` contract. In parallel, the margin locked up in this contract will be sent to treasury who in turn handle the disbursement to the relevant traders. 20 | 21 | 22 | # Motivation 23 | 24 | The motivation is the gradual deprecation of low utilization markets on V2, as Synthetix shifts focus to its roadmap priorities and reallocates resources away from legacy products. 25 | 26 | 27 | # Copyright 28 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 29 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-2164.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 2164 3 | title: Deprecate EOS Perp Market 4 | network: Optimism 5 | status: Implemented 6 | type: Governance 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x5f788f6fe49df505428e0297768e1dab171ad98be6d715d6103807f01f5dee81 9 | created: 2025-05-20 10 | author: Kaleb 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to deprecate EOS market in light of the upcoming rebrand to [`A`](https://www.binance.com/en/support/announcement/detail/1e89a9ca957c4b0ca7502e60b993e201). 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | Removing these market entails removing them from `FuturesMarketManager` contract. In parallel, the margin locked up in this contract will be sent to treasury who in turn handle the disbursement to the relevant traders. 20 | 21 | 22 | # Motivation 23 | 24 | The motivation is the gradual deprecation of low utilization markets on V2, as Synthetix shifts focus to its roadmap priorities and reallocates resources away from legacy products. 25 | 26 | 27 | # Copyright 28 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 29 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-217.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 217 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Lower Atomic Twap Window 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2022-07-18 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/bafkreifjfpqag7spyytkzrjeliik43ze4lxicvecty2yypizfmn27g3eju 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | ## Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This sccp proposes to lower `atomicTwapWindow` to 60 seconds. 16 | 17 | ## Abstract 18 | 19 | The `atomicTwapWindow` is the twap window used when fetching the uniswap price. 20 | 21 | ## Motivation 22 | 23 | Lowering the `atomicTwapWindow` reduces the twap impact on the traders price as it converges towards the spot exchange. This is necessary until [SIP-258](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-258/) is implemented. 24 | It is worth noting that Twap protection is not needed to protect against flash attacks, given that the uniswap price used is that set at the begining of the block. Furthermore, chainlink protection limits the amount of upside exploiters can earn by moving the uniswap-v3 pool price for several consecutive blocks and makes such an attack unprofitable due to the cost of moving the univ3 pools. 25 | 26 | ## Copyright 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | 29 | 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-226.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 226 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Increase Atomic Exchange Fees - ETH 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x6a0f5f3098ab4dccf1e952633828b7e996526f6af8a3de2e7e3fbfd238d6975b 9 | created: 2022-09-05 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | ## Simple Summary 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | This SCCP proposes to increase fee on swaps into ETH to 25 bp from 17 bp. 18 | 19 | 20 | ## Abstract 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | The `atomicExchangeFeeRate` is levied on exchanges into a particular synth. 25 | 26 | 27 | ## Motivation 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | The primary motivation is to optimize the parameters of the exchange function in order to lower the chance of latency arbitrages. 32 | 33 | ## Copyright 34 | 35 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 36 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-238.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 238 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Increase BTC Futures Market Open Interest 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2022-10-05 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x9e844bc0167738f1f714ce4655962e84bd9a443ec737c8c2968ad59ae05e621a 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | ## Simple Summary 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | This SCCP proposes to increase the `maxMarketValueUSD` on the BTC futures market to 10m sUSD from 5m sUSD. 18 | 19 | 20 | ## Abstract 21 | 22 | 23 | The `maxMarketValueUSD` is the maximum amount of open interest allowed on each side of a market. 24 | 25 | ## Motivation 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | The primary motivation is the increase in oi utilization, which currently stands at around 90%. 30 | 31 | ## Copyright 32 | 33 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 34 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-24.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 24 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Setting initial differential fee levels 5 | author: Spreek (@Spreek) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2020-06-04T00:00:00.000Z 8 | requires: SIP-56 9 | type: Governance 10 | --- 11 | 12 | ## Simple Summary 13 | 14 | Per [SIP-56](https://github.com/Synthetixio/SIPs/blob/master/SIPS/sip-56.md), each synth can now have its own fee levels. In this SCCP, we set initial fee levels based on which category a synth belongs to. 15 | 16 | ## Abstract 17 | 18 | **Old fees**: 19 | 30 bps (0.3%) for all synths 20 | 21 | **New fees**: 22 | 23 | - Forex synths: 5bps (0.05%) 24 | - Commodity synths: 5bps (0.05%) 25 | - Equity synths: 5bps (0.05%) 26 | - Crypto synths: 30bps (0.3%) 27 | - Inverse crypto synths: 30bps (0.3%) 28 | 29 | ## Motivation 30 | 31 | Fees chosen by vote in discord. Crypto synths were deemed to be riskier/less efficient as well as having relatively high fees on other exchanges. We chose to lower fees on forex/commodity/equities synths in recognition of the lower spreads/fees in those markets and in hopes of spurring more adoption/trading volume on those synths. 32 | 33 | ## Copyright 34 | 35 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 36 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-241.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 241 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update DOGE Futures Parameters 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x5aa4f9b3ae8a05a412c113cc5021c2445c5dcef5d1e98cfd7d92e7c953eb663f 9 | created: 2022-10-31 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | ## Simple Summary 14 | 15 | Increase DOGE Futures makerFee and takerFee to 60 and 65 bp, from 35 and 40 bp. 16 | 17 | ## Abstract 18 | 19 | makerFee and takerFee are the fees paid by traders when filled immediately. 20 | 21 | ## Motivation 22 | 23 | The main motivation is the recent increase in market volatiliy related to DOGE which exposes stakers to few latency arbitrage opportunities, despite the offchain circuit breaker helping lean against these periods. Raising fees on DOGE will allow us to scale back the aggressiveness of the latency circuit breaker and ensure that the latency arbitrages are constrained. 24 | 25 | ## Copyright 26 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-242.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 242 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Update Atomic Swap Fees 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2022-11-03 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x6b5fa95da6b551dbd6b5b9ff4925e56815a1c6693a73c1681f33a9ddeef712ec 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | ## Simple Summary 14 | 15 | Increase the standard atomic exchange fee that does not go throught direct integration, on sETH and sBTC to `40 bp` and `35 bp` respectively, from `10 bp` on both. 16 | 17 | ## Abstract 18 | 19 | The `atomicExchangeFee` is the fee levied on trades into the repsective synth. 20 | 21 | ## Motivation 22 | 23 | Given the recent release of [SIP-267](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-267/) as well as the 1inch integration [SCCP-288](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-288/), the standard atomic exchange fees can be increased, given that users that utilize synth exchanges over 1inch benefit from the overriden parameters. This sccp, helps lean against the 1 block uniswap latency. 24 | 25 | ## Copyright 26 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-250.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 250 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Update Open Interest Limits 5 | author: Synthquest 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2022-11-23T21:32:53.938Z 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x925b96f33d110dd8dc58be744a468e26e76916a2321732224f9bcf40cc4c5f29 10 | type: Governance 11 | requires: 12 | --- 13 | 14 | 15 | # Simple Summary 16 | 17 |

This SCCP proposes to increase the MaxMarketValueUSD on futures markets to the following:


18 | 19 | # Abstract 20 | 21 |

The MaxMarketValueUSD is the maximum amount of open interest available for a certain Futures Market.

22 | 23 | # Motivation 24 | 25 |

The primary motivation to increase the open interest limit given the increased demand for LINK tokens & futures.

26 | 27 | # Copyright 28 | 29 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-26.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 26 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Lower c-ratio to 750% 5 | author: Andrew Kang (@rewkang) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2020-04-14T00:00:00.000Z 8 | type: Governance 9 | --- 10 | 11 | ## Simple Summary 12 | 13 | Decrease the target Collateralisation Ratio for SNX stakers to 750%. 14 | 15 | ## Abstract 16 | 17 | There is currently a deficit of Synths (relative to demand) in the Synthetix ecosystem. Decreasing the target Collateralisation Ratio will cause some SNX stakers to increase amount of synths minted 18 | 19 | ## Motivation 20 | 21 | The Synth pegs (both sETH on Uniswap and sUSD on Curve) are off-peg. This means demand for Synths is high. There are currently other levers in the works that should contribute to tightening these pegs, but one such lever is the Collateralisation Ratio 22 | 23 | ## Copyright 24 | 25 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 26 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-272.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 272 3 | network: Ethereum & Optimism 4 | title: Update Wrapper Parameters 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2023-01-14 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xa37a397635b6af46b9f2cb1faa5444f4cdfa5a19e48d3e58507ab14629ce8354 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | Update the ETH and DAI wrapper parameters as follows: 16 | - Increase the DAI mintFeeRate to 25 bp from 10 bp 17 | - Lower the ETH mintFeeRate to 10 bp from 25 bp 18 | 19 | # Abstract 20 | 21 | The `mintFeeRate` is the rate that paid for locking up a certain underlying to mint it's respective synth equivalent. 22 | 23 | # Motivation 24 | 25 | The primary motivation is to lean against the recent increase in the debt skew which exceeded 40%, up from 20% a couple of weeks ago. Increasing the incentive to scale with ETH helps lower the skew to a certain extent as the sETH is swapped to other synths. 26 | 27 | # Copyright 28 | 29 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-273.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 273 3 | network: Ethereum & Optimism 4 | title: Pause new loans 5 | author: Afif (@aband1) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x8e76ede3443ef6f6b20d26c734989d0f8916ab033833c764cd65dfffac6e9f66 9 | created: 2023-01-14 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | Pause new loans 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | This SCCP proposes to pause ETH-backed sETH and sUSD loans. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | Given that wrappers are superior tools for scaling synth liquidity, pausing loans ahead of the migration to v3 will simplify the transition. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-275.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 275 3 | network: Ethereum & Optimism 4 | title: Update Wrapper Parameters 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2023-01-26 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x70c0f866dee5b94d6a0bac937e67bcd48c8f6a624ade3a0a06031750be10b2a2 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to implement the following: 16 | - Increase the WETH wrapper `burnFeeRate` to 50 bp from 10 bp 17 | - Lower the the DAI wrapper `burnFeeRate` to 5 bp from 10 bp 18 | 19 | # Abstract 20 | 21 | The `burnFeeRate` is a parameter that determines the fee to be paid in order to release the underlying, when a synth is burned. 22 | 23 | # Motivation 24 | 25 | The main motivation is to lean against the increasing ETH skew in the debt pool, by increasing the chance that arbitrage bots would reverse sUSD to sETH trade flow imbalance in the curve pools with synth exchanges, rather than using the ETH wrapper. 26 | 27 | # Copyright 28 | 29 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-278.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 278 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Unwind Perps V1 Markets 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2023-02-08 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x0e26409b6e50ab74c8867341ef131cbe25ae6a32e2ddfeb73fc4a961f46c0a44 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to lower the open interest capacity on perps v1 markets gradually, as traders unwind their position. This SCCP can only be implemented subsequent to [SCCP-277](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-277/). 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The parameters configuration that would be changed is `maxMarketValueUSD` which would be lowered iteratively to the amount of open interest available until the `maxMarketValueUSD` reaches zero. 20 | 21 | 22 | # Motivation 23 | 24 | The main motivation is to unwind in the least disruptive manner the perps v1 markets. 25 | 26 | 27 | # Copyright 28 | 29 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-279.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 279 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Increase ETH Wrapper Capacity 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2023-02-13 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x1cf48f2e059c02d1cbad3bbce3e0c3af38ba7025bb34b86bdf4268f008e9326b 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to increase the maxTokenAmount on the [ETH wrapper](https://etherscan.io/address/0xCea392596F1AB7f1d6f8F241967094cA519E6129) from 15k ETH to 20k ETH. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The `maxTokenAmount` is the max amount allowed to be used to issue a synth with a underlying specified in the wrapper contract, in this case it's WETH. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The main motivation is to lean against the positive skew ETH on the debt pool, which is around 45%. It is worth noting that currently ETH and DAI wrappers are at full capacity on the ethereum network and the sUSD/sETH pegs at a slight premium. Note that if the 5K ETH get wrapped and sent to sUSD the skew would be lowered to around 40%. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-280.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 280 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Increase the rateStalePeriod 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2023-02-13 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x181adf0fb66ce98866e72494ce5a85426b5a7ebbe6c2f72d61aa76014eb5a205 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to increase the `rateStalePeriod` on optimism from 5400 seconds to 86400 seconds. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The `rateStalePeriod` is the number of seconds since the last chainlink price push beyond which exchanges and perps interactions are disabled. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The main motivation is to accomodate the new perp markets that have a higher chainlink heartbeat. Note that the risk on the debt pool and traders is minimal due to the low deviations (20 bp) on all [chainlink feeds](https://docs.chain.link/data-feeds/price-feeds/addresses?network=optimism). 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-284.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 284 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Update ExchangeFeeRate - Non Atomic Trades 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2023-02-20 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x656c57c31e6e2ab0ec002c8a8e5e186df0305a6bf0d98cd72796448c57d8ddf5 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to increase the non-atomic `exchangeFeeRate` on trades to sETH and sBTC to 35 bp, from 10 bp and 25 bp respectively. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The `exchangeFeeRate` is the fee applied on trades into a given currency key. 20 | 21 | 22 | # Motivation 23 | 24 | The main motivation is the chainlink heartbeat of [50 bp](https://docs.chain.link/data-feeds/price-feeds/addresses), vis-a-vis the low trading fees being offered on exchanges to sETH and sBTC, opening up a gap for latency arbitrage. 25 | 26 | 27 | # Copyright 28 | 29 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-285.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 285 3 | network: Ethereum & Optimism 4 | title: Increase minimum C-ratio to 500% 5 | author: William87, Alpha003, poilk 6 | proposal: >- 7 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xf18142796286da1b7b686141b4ac8646d5490492801c19834a261bc3a19d1eab 8 | status: Implemented 9 | created: 2023-02-22 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | ## Simple Summary 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | Increase the minimum C-ratio to 500% for SNX stakers. 18 | 19 | ## Abstract 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | Increase the minimum C-ratio to 500% for SNX stakers. 24 | 25 | ## Motivation 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | In order to improve network health, the minimum C-ratio should be increased to 500% immediately. 30 | 31 | ## Copyright 32 | 33 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 34 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-287.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 287 3 | network: Optimism 4 | title: Increase OI Perp Caps on ETH and BTC 5 | author: KALEB (@kaleb-keny) 6 | proposal: >- 7 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x943b305d72065c1523053f7d86daae0d903117ceb1870e32efe711f2a595d9f1 8 | status: Implemented 9 | created: 2023-03-07 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | ## Simple Summary 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | Increase the `maxMarketValue` on ETH to 10,000 and BTC to 1,000, from 8,000 and 800 respectively. 18 | 19 | ## Abstract 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | The `maxMarketValue` is the maximum amount of open interest allowed on long and short positions in perp markets. 24 | 25 | ## Motivation 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | The main motivation is to increase the capacity on both the ETH and BTC markets as they are both near their current oi caps. 30 | 31 | ## Copyright 32 | 33 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 34 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-31.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 31 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Increase Commodity Fees 5 | author: Kaleb Keny (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2020-06-26T00:00:00.000Z 8 | type: Governance 9 | --- 10 | 11 | ## Simple Summary 12 | 13 | Increase the fees on commodities to 30 bp in order to make front-running less likely. 14 | 15 | ## Abstract 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | As per [sip-56](https://github.com/Synthetixio/SIPs/blob/master/SIPS/sip-56.md) each synth can now have its own fee levels. This SCCP suggest to raise the fees on commodity synths back to 30 bp. 20 | 21 | ## Motivation 22 | 23 | Fees were configured recently in [sccp-24](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-24) however analysis of the data showed that front-running opportunities were more accessible. Increasing fees to 30 bp, should decrease the chance of front-running until [sip-52](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-52) is implemented. 24 | 25 | Thank you `brian` for helping out the community and pointing it out. 26 | 27 | ## Copyright 28 | 29 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-317.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 317 3 | network: Base 4 | title: Update Perps V3 Gas Units 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x54a0f98ccd78624a9f5843f76df785c6197faf1ea44f5a56d38fa3dc2cc4c640 9 | created: 2024-04-05 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to increase the L2 gas units to 1.65m from 1.5m for settling orders. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | Keepers are compensated a specific amount of L2 gas units for settling orders. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The motivation is to continue to provide keepers with the necessary incentive to execute orders. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | 29 | 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-318.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 318 3 | network: Base 4 | title: Increase Max Perp Positions Per Account - Perps V3 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x710f81f959abe075e1697762e386af7ca4bd2c7c6fff1abf5198e1a5c89f867a 9 | created: 2024-04-05 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to increase the max number of positions per account from 2 to 3. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The max number of perp positions per account limits is a limitation put in place in order to limit the gas consumption per trade settle. With [SCCP-317](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-317/) in place, the cap can be lifted with no issue on the keeper compensation. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The motivation is to improve the user experience by allowing more positions to be opened per single account 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | 29 | 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-32.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 32 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Increase Fees on Stock Synths 5 | author: Kaleb Keny (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2020-07-03T00:00:00.000Z 8 | type: Governance 9 | --- 10 | 11 | ## Simple Summary 12 | 13 | Increase the fees on trades into stock synths to 30 bp. 14 | 15 | ## Abstract 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | As per [sip-56](https://github.com/Synthetixio/SIPs/blob/master/SIPS/sip-56.md) each synth can now have its own fee levels. This SCCP suggest to raise the fees on stocks synths (sFTSE and sNIKKEI) to 30 bp. 20 | 21 | ## Motivation 22 | 23 | Fees were configured recently in [sccp-24](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-24) . However, analysis of recent on-chain data showed that front-running opportunities were more accessible for stock synths due to the low trading fees levied. Increasing these back to 30 bp should shrink that window significantly and bolster the protection until [sip-52](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-52) is implemented. 24 | 25 | ## Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-321.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 321 3 | network: Base 4 | title: Update Perps V3 Parameters - MakerFee 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2024-04-16 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x813bf38e25b729f1dcbeec649a6959a60153113af34160b9469e6bc9ab4d8c55 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | [SCCP-320](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-320/) specified that ETH and BTC perp markets makerFee be set to zero. However, setting that parameter to zero causes prevents users from executing orders that increase the skew. Therefore this SCCP alters [SCCP-320](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-320/) by specifying that maker fee be set to 1/100th of a bp for the ETH and BTC perp market. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | `makerFee` is the fee paid to LP's when traders reduce the skew 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The proposed parameter changes were performed by PDAO in coordination with the spartan council in an emergency action, in order to continue to facilitate users orders. This SCCP ratifies this decision with a governance vote. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | 29 | 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-324.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 324 3 | network: Base 4 | title: Increase Max Perp Positions Per Account - Perps V3 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2024-04-16 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x050bf82f5ba6cdf4744d1cc7709ae1ada934b5ba5f4d74744e16699fbe4bb639 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to increase the max number of positions per account from 3 to 4. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The max number of perp positions per account limits is a limitation put in place in order to limit the gas consumption per trade settle. With [SCCP-325](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-325/) in place, the cap can be lifted with no issue on the keeper compensation. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The motivation is to improve the user experience by allowing more positions to be opened per single account 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | 29 | 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-329.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 329 3 | network: Base 4 | title: Increase Max Perp Positions Per Accounts - Perps V3 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x06e5b79c081b3965c3bb4486724df243bc636d5ab4e348c153fe8225849f58d1 9 | type: Governance 10 | --- 11 | 12 | # Simple Summary 13 | 14 | This SCCP proposes to implement following: 15 | - Increase the max number of positions per account from 4 to 10 16 | - Increase the l2 gas units from 1.7m to 2.45m gas units 17 | 18 | # Abstract 19 | 20 | The max number of perp positions per account is a limitation put in place in order to limit the gas consumption per trade settlement. 21 | The l2 gas units represents the compensation paid the keeper for executing pending orders. The larger is the number of potential positions, the higher is the gas paid in order to process a single transaction. 22 | 23 | # Motivation 24 | 25 | The motivation is to improve the user experience by allowing more positions to be opened per single account. 26 | 27 | # Copyright 28 | 29 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 30 | 31 | 32 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-333.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 333 3 | network: Arbitrum 4 | title: Increase Arbitrum LP caps 5 | author: Cavalier 6 | status: Rejected 7 | type: Governance 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x97aabccee172afe1fbea37e4d4aab91f0a04fa905f09d43da60de92b68689cf8 10 | --- 11 | 12 | # Simple Summary 13 | 14 | This SCCP proposes to increase the LP caps for Arbitrum as the system prepares to scale up; $10m for each collateral type and Wrapper. 15 | 16 | # Abstract 17 | 18 | The parameters configurations description is as follows: 19 | 20 | LP capacity approx $10m each 21 | - DAI 10m 22 | - USDC 10m 23 | - ETH 2700 24 | - ARB 10m 25 | 26 | Wrapper capacity 10m each 27 | - USDC 10m 28 | - DAI 10m 29 | 30 | # Motivation 31 | 32 | The Arbitrum deployment is ready to be configured for all collateral types as defined by [SIP-367](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-367). 33 | 34 | # Copyright 35 | 36 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 37 | 38 | 39 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-334.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 334 3 | network: Arbitrum 4 | title: Update name of Arbitrum Stablecoin 5 | author: Cavalier 6 | status: Rejected 7 | type: Governance 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xb13e36eebd93c6288f750161bd0b4243bae4dbf280e79f6194632341d1ca2edc 10 | --- 11 | 12 | # Simple Summary 13 | 14 | Update the name and symbol of the Synthetix stablecoin on Arbitrum to fit the standardized naming convention. 15 | 16 | # Abstract 17 | Update the Synthetix stablecoin on Arbitrum to have 18 | - Name: `Synthetix USD` 19 | - Symbol: `USDh` 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The original SIP-367 listed the stablecoin name/symbol on Arbitrum as: DollarWifHat / USDh which may cause confusion. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | 29 | 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-336.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 336 3 | network: Arbitrum 4 | title: Update Arbitrum LP caps 5 | author: Cavalier, Millie 6 | status: Implemented 7 | type: Governance 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x2807ee25aa897dbca13e72d44e287bddcf54b5b096a8fbb9c655658842d1e077 10 | --- 11 | 12 | # Simple Summary 13 | 14 | This SCCP proposes to reconfigure the LP caps for Arbitrum as the system prepares to scale up; $10m for ARB, ETH, USDC and aUSDC as collateral and Wrapper asset, and remove DAI as collateral and Wrapper asset. 15 | 16 | # Abstract 17 | 18 | The parameters configurations description is as follows: 19 | 20 | LP capacity in native units 21 | - USDC 10m 22 | - ETH 2700 23 | - ARB 10m 24 | - aUSDC (aaveUSDC) 10m 25 | - Remove DAI by setting cap to 0 26 | 27 | Wrappers 28 | - USDC Wrapper capacity 10m 29 | - Disable DAI wrapper by setting to 0 30 | 31 | # Motivation 32 | 33 | The Arbitrum deployment is ready to be configured for all collateral types as defined by [SIP-367](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-367), with the removal of DAI due to duplication with USDC market segment and replaced with yield-bearing aave wrapped USDC. 34 | 35 | # Copyright 36 | 37 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 38 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-337.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 337 3 | network: Arbitrum 4 | title: Update name of Arbitrum Stablecoin 5 | author: Cavalier 6 | status: Implemented 7 | type: Governance 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xdaf12da674b97b982dea16dd69f3dadfd17ae6e5b3b87965fff4929a84fcb393 10 | --- 11 | 12 | # Simple Summary 13 | 14 | Update the name and symbol of the Synthetix stablecoin on Arbitrum to a more fitting naming convention. 15 | 16 | # Abstract 17 | Update the Synthetix stablecoin on Arbitrum to have 18 | - Name: `Synthetix USD` 19 | - Symbol: `USDx` 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The original SIP-367 listed the stablecoin name/symbol on Arbitrum as: DollarWifHat / USDh which may cause confusion. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | 29 | 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-339.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 339 3 | title: Reconfigure sUSDe Issuance Ratio 4 | network: Arbitrum 5 | status: Implemented 6 | type: Governance 7 | author: Matt 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xba8d6e26fedc3c6b2b3fab0d6f1844f62d659d2776b9e55a78e2d2d9eed957ba 10 | --- 11 | 12 | # Simple Summary 13 | This SCCP proposes to reconfigure the issuance caps for sUSDe on Arbitrum. 14 | 15 | # Abstract 16 | The parameters configurations description is as follows: 17 | 18 | - Maximum LP amount: $50M 19 | - Issuance Ratio: 200% 20 | - Liquidation Ratio: 105% 21 | 22 | # Motivation 23 | 24 | The Arbitrum deployment is ready to be configured for yield-generating collateral types as defined by [SIP-371](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-371/). Issuance must be raised for sUSDe (and USDe) to ensure risk is properly handled for sUSDe/USDe. 25 | 26 | # Copyright 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | 29 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-341.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 341 3 | network: Base 4 | title: Lower maxMarketValue and maxMarketSize RNDR to zero 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2024-07-11 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x244fcdd9c8434190758dc1391845faa6ab785863ecdc83ec6c8f422937b8e74c 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to lower the `maxMarketValue` and `maxMarketSize` on RNDR to zero (i.e. close mode), given the upcoming token swap. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The `maxMarketValue` governs the US Dollar maximum open interest possible for that market. 20 | The `maxMarketSize` governs the maximum open interest denominated in the market's currencyKey. 21 | 22 | # Motivation 23 | 24 | The main motivation is the token swap and delisting of the legacy token by centralized exchanges. 25 | 26 | # References 27 | - [Binance](https://www.binance.com/en/support/announcement/binance-will-support-the-render-rndr-token-swap-and-rebranding-to-render-render-d1f2ae8d99b24439a7a900caa9bb6b3b?hl=en) 28 | - [RNDR](https://know.rendernetwork.com/general-render-network/rndr-to-render-what-you-need-to-know/render-network-upgrade-portal-faq) 29 | 30 | # Copyright 31 | 32 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 33 | 34 | 35 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-345.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 345 3 | title: Reconfigure Arbitrum Collateral Issuance Parameters 4 | network: Arbitrum 5 | status: Implemented 6 | type: Governance 7 | author: Matt 8 | created: 2024-07-31 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x4107db01b643da4ce4fb576b26ba642affc6ebab9af325daca4f879d0b57f111 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | This SCCP proposes to reconfigure collateral asset parameters on Arbitrum to limit USDx supply until there is sufficient demand for USDx once Perps trading is live. 15 | 16 | # Abstract 17 | The following issuance ratios are proposed: 18 | 19 | - wstETH: 350% 20 | - stataUSDT: 200% 21 | - stataUSDC: 200% 22 | - USDe: 200% 23 | - SUSDe: 200% 24 | - wEETH: 350% 25 | - USDC: 200% 26 | - ETH: 300% 27 | - ARB: 350% 28 | 29 | # Motivation 30 | These changes will limit USDx supply until sufficient trading activity exists to maintain the peg. Additionally, Ramses/Curve is being engaged alongside incentives to support deep USDx liquidity & the use of wrappers. 31 | 32 | # Copyright 33 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 34 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-348.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 348 3 | title: Update RNDR Feed 4 | network: Arbitrum 5 | status: Implemented 6 | type: Governance 7 | created: 2024-08-12 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xac627121160fecf00f5751b694e3ac9804c53a9fa7cd7d997cb5756351d86b23 10 | author: Kaleb 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to update the RNDR feed with the latest feedId `0x3d4a2bd9535be6ce8059d75eadeba507b043257321aa544717c56fa19b49e35d` 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The previously configured feedId had been deprecated following the RNDR token migration. This resulted in issues with the Perps V3 System given the abscence of a price update at the system level. The short-term solution was to replace the feed with the new feedId available from pyth which points to the new RENDER token. 20 | 21 | 22 | # Motivation 23 | 24 | The emergency action was executed last week and this sccp ratifies that action. Future iterations of Peprs V3 aims at tackling that risk by updating the feed to constant price feed that resolves the last available price. 25 | 26 | 27 | # Copyright 28 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 29 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-349.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 349 3 | network: Base 4 | title: Perps V3 - Deprecate MATIC Market 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xc24e8f82569eb592e8c5d4fec7933ed07c6fa10f2b2f026e68f792dad5104532 9 | created: 2024-08-29 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to lower the `maxMarketValue` and `maxMarketSize` parameters to zero on the MATIC market because of the [token swap](https://www.binance.com/en/support/announcement/binance-will-support-the-polygon-matic-token-swap-to-polygon-pol-6a6de383727f4659a3050f7982e1620f?hl=en) and as per oracle providers' recommendations. 16 | Furthermore, the price feed will be switched to the POL price feed, once it becomes available, to allow traders to close their positions. 17 | 18 | # Abstract 19 | `maxMarketValue` and `maxMarketSize` parameters determine the maximum open interest on the market, setting these parameters to zero effectively sets the market to close only. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The proposed change is in light of the recent token swap. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | 29 | 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-351.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 351 3 | title: Update Fee Structure - Promotional Period 4 | network: Arbitrum 5 | status: Implemented 6 | proposal: >- 7 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x9eadc47c5b77dced3871087776bfaf1216c1401ae9c6fbd8e0ce53595c831ed8 8 | type: Governance 9 | created: 2024-09-11 10 | author: Kaleb 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to decrease taker fees to 5 bp on all markets (aside from ETH and BTC) for a 2-week promotional period. Furthermore, in order to boost the LP APY, this SCCP proposes to divert the Treasury portion of fees (20%) towards LP's for a 1-month promotional period. 16 | The start date being the time when integrators launch their front-end 17 | 18 | # Motivation 19 | 20 | The main motivation is to launch arbitrum multicollateral perps v3 with a bang 💥. 21 | 22 | # Copyright 23 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 24 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-352.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 352 3 | title: Increase Issuance Ratios for LP Assets on Arbitrum 4 | network: Arbitrum 5 | status: Implemented 6 | proposal: >- 7 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xc252d640da2ff235a5d3555c1aa6ceabe70a7d1f551bc465263f9a76afd65f35 8 | type: Governance 9 | created: 2024-09-17 10 | author: Matt 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to increase demand for the USDx Stablecoin on Arbitrum by increasing issuance ratios to 1000% for all LP assets. 16 | 17 | # Motivation 18 | 19 | The primary motivation for this SCCP is to increase demand for USDx on Arbitrum, ensuring that users can enter and exit Perps V3 on Arbitrum. Currently, there is a large outstanding supply (due to low issuance ratios and 0% interest) without corresponding demand, as Perps V3 hasn't launched yet. 20 | 21 | Once demand increases, utilizing existing stable wrappers will provide further support for the USDx peg when demand outstrips supply. 22 | 23 | Note: Increasing issuance ratios does not affect liquidation risk for existing borrowers. Liquidation ratios will remain exactly the same. 24 | # Copyright 25 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 26 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-353.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 353 3 | title: Update Arbitrum Keeper Gas Costs 4 | network: Arbitrum 5 | status: Implemented 6 | proposal: >- 7 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xdf6585bf2337b4c4e1897669e51bb9d598c1833ba46cb3b90dd30b8b01197323 8 | type: Governance 9 | created: 2024-09-19 10 | author: Kaleb 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to update the keeper gas parameters, initially outlined in [SCCP-347](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-347/) to the below: 16 | 17 | ## Keeper Reward Parameters: 18 | 19 | | **Parameter** | **Value** | 20 | |:---------------------:|:---------:| 21 | | l1SettleGas | 30k | 22 | | l2SettleGas | 4M | 23 | | l1FlagGas | 5.5k | 24 | | l2FlagGas | 3.6M | 25 | | l1LiquidateGas | 34k | 26 | | l2LiquidateGas | 2.5M | 27 | 28 | 29 | # Abstract 30 | 31 | The parameters configurations above pertain to the gas compensation paid to keepers for settling orders and for executing liquidations. 32 | 33 | 34 | # Motivation 35 | 36 | The initial parameters were configured based on Arbitrum Sepolia testing, however, given the recent mainnet launch, the parameters were reviewed base on mainnet tests. 37 | 38 | # Copyright 39 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 40 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-354.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 354 3 | title: Update Arbitrum Max Lp Amount - sUSDe 4 | network: Arbitrum 5 | status: Implemented 6 | proposal: >- 7 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xe3634256bbf9e648c84f19eba3f308b97a9ad7045b2a0afc7122cc551060fd3c 8 | type: Governance 9 | created: 2024-09-19 10 | author: Kaleb 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to lower the sUSDe max lp amount to 10 million USD from the 50 million USD, previous voted on in [SCCP-339](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-339/). 16 | 17 | 18 | # Abstract 19 | 20 | The `maxMarketCollateralAmount` is the maximum amount that can be LP'd into the core system. 21 | 22 | 23 | # Motivation 24 | 25 | The initial parameters were initially configured with expectation that redemption based pricing would be feasible with the current v3 implementation. However reaching that state requires a bit more work that is yet to be completed from both Synthetix and Pyth side. Hence, it is recommended to lower the maximum amount that can be Lp'd until the redemption based pricing is possible. 26 | 27 | 28 | # Copyright 29 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-355.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 355 3 | title: Update Leverage on Spot Synths 4 | network: Arbitrum 5 | status: Implemented 6 | proposal: >- 7 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x5a47e36209dd41c66578a155fe3249cc184c78fad8d0747a5802c64b6ea0b797 8 | type: Governance 9 | created: 2024-10-03 10 | author: Kaleb 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to increase the leverage on Spot Synths to 10. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The `collateralLeverage` is the number that constrains the ability of liquidity providers to withdraw assets, depending on the size of the open interest of spot market synths. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The parameters were originally configured to be at `1` on all spot markets (i.e. sUSDC, swSOL, stBTC, sETH and sUSDe). However, given that these synths would be mostly wrapped representation of the underlying, in order to be used as margin in the perp markets, the leverage number can be relaxed. There is no material risk on the protocol, given that these synths won't be affecting the skew, since trading of spot synths is significantly restricted. 24 | 25 | 26 | # Copyright 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-359.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 359 3 | title: Update Perp Market Parameters - Max Funding Velocity 4 | network: Arbitrum 5 | status: Implemented 6 | type: Governance 7 | created: 2024-10-16 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xf9edb74411a559572e68f22f80aa0103530dc4b4bba8d7644b67755307d85d59 10 | author: Kaleb 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to lower the `maxFundingVelocity` to 4 on the `ETH` and `BTC` Markets and 9 on all other markets 16 | 17 | 18 | # Abstract 19 | 20 | The maxFundingVelocity is the main parameter that controls the extent of funding rate changes based on the persistency of a given skew. 21 | 22 | # Motivation 23 | 24 | The main motivation is to align the user experience on both Base and Arbitrum networks, taking into account users feedback. 25 | 26 | # Copyright 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-36.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 36 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Increase Fees on Stock Synths 50 bp 5 | author: Kaleb Keny (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2020-07-18T00:00:00.000Z 8 | type: Governance 9 | --- 10 | 11 | ## Simple Summary 12 | 13 | Increase the fees on trades into sNIKKEI and sFTSE. 14 | 15 | ## Abstract 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | As per [sip-56](https://github.com/Synthetixio/SIPs/blob/master/SIPS/sip-56.md) each synth can now have its own fee levels. This SCCP suggest to raise the fees on stock synths to 50 bp. 20 | 21 | ## Motivation 22 | 23 | Analysis of on-chain data showed that front-running opportunities were more accessible for stock synths. Increasing the fees to 50 bp should shrink that window significantly and bolster the protection until [sip-52](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-52) is implemented. 24 | 25 | ## Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-360.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 360 3 | network: Arbitrum & Base 4 | title: Creating referral code and tracking code for mass.money 5 | author: Robin (@robin2192), Rudy 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2024-09-25 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x4519112ecb368a1aab22f1f2cb48fcb7b2ba4a89650e90b003215c79047c5973 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | ## Simple Summary 14 | 15 | Mass is implementing Synthetix V3 to power its perps account on Base and Arbitrum. They need a referral code and tracking code to proceed with the implementation. 16 | 17 | ## Abstract 18 | 19 | The referral address is 0xf944069B489F1ebfF4C3C6a6014d58cBEf7C7009, and they would like to use the following tracking code: “MassDotMoney”. 20 | 21 | ## Motivation 22 | 23 | Whitelisting mass.money's referral address allows them to receive integrator rewards. 24 | 25 | ## Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-362.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 362 3 | title: Streamline governance presentations 4 | network: Ethereum 5 | status: Implemented 6 | proposal: >- 7 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xa25ebbbca24dd131a01424beb2c0a65b4ebc61df93cb949549e8b4b067789bb4 8 | type: Meta-Governance 9 | created: 2024-10-31 10 | author: Cavalier 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | To attract and retain high caliber Spartan Council members, reduce the quorum requirements for a governance presentation to 3 members. 15 | 16 | # Abstract 17 | Reduce the quorum requirement of governance presentations to 3 Spartan Council members, a reduction from n/2+1 to n/2-1. The author of the presentation must also be present, unless someone else is nominated to present on their behalf. 18 | 19 | # Motivation 20 | 21 | The requirement to have n/2+1 Spartan Council members attend every governance presentation is a hindrance for attracting and retaining high-impact, strategic Spartan Council members. The Spartan Council is able to discuss and vote on proposals without requiring majority attendance at presentations. It is the role of the operational seats of the Spartan Council to circulate and facilitate the discussion with the Spartan Council members, including feedback from the community. 22 | 23 | # Copyright 24 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 25 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-365.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 365 3 | title: Update Keeper Settlement Reward 4 | network: Arbitrum & Base 5 | status: Implemented 6 | type: Governance 7 | created: 2024-11-19 8 | author: Kaleb 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x2b464037de9824e79774dd122e87ffc938ba9cd0315bd777033394c2927172a7 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to decrease the settlement reward for settling perp trades from 1 USD to 40 cents per trade. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | The settlement reward is configured in the settlement strategy of the perp market and is currently configured to 1 USD. The reward represents the minimum reward paid to keepers on top of gas costs. 19 | 20 | # Motivation 21 | 22 | The parameter updates are in light of the recent review of profitability of keepers vis-a-vis transaction costs. The recently implemented [SCCP-364](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-364/) should help guarantee that keepers are compensated at all times for settling trades. This along with the compensation that scales as gas prices spike should ensure that keepers compensation increases as the cost of settle trades rises. 23 | 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 27 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-366.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 366 3 | title: Lower the minimum position margin 4 | network: Arbitrum & Base 5 | status: Implemented 6 | type: Governance 7 | created: 2024-11-19 8 | author: Kaleb 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x07161fe33af9f9efb780ad4093f2fcc4c7616e1fe5d2dbbc742b35f489b5e811 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to decrease the minimum initial margin on both the base and arbitrum implementations to 15 USD. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | The minimum position margin was specified during the pre-blob days, when trade settlement spiked for prolonged periods of time. This along with a review of the minimum keeper reward for executing liquidations and settling trades allows us to lower the minimum margin requirements without undue risk on the protocol. 19 | 20 | # Motivation 21 | The parameter change proposed in this SCCP was requested by one of our partner integrators in order to be able to onboard more traders on Arbitrum and Base. 22 | 23 | 24 | # Copyright 25 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 26 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-367.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 367 3 | title: Temporarily Lower the locked OI Ratio to 0.20 4 | network: Arbitrum 5 | status: Implemented 6 | type: Governance 7 | created: 2024-11-22 8 | author: Kaleb 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x2a190db6b1c38d2a5930f1efb4cec4af602e0eb8b697579edb6fe005543f60ad 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to temporarily reduce the locked oi ratio on all perp markets on arbitrum from 0.5 to 0.20. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The locked oi ratio determines the size of of oi allowed for a given LP backing. A ratio of 0.50 means that for each dollar of oi needs to be backed by 0.5 dollars of LP. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | The change is in light of upcoming changes to the core that better account for the amount of LP backing markets in the system. When Core is updated next week, the changes in this SCCP will be reverted back to the original state. 23 | 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 27 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-368.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 368 3 | title: Enable sUSDC to be used as margin on Arbitrum 4 | network: Arbitrum 5 | status: Implemented 6 | type: Governance 7 | created: 2024-11-22 8 | author: Kaleb 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x5db509f67489f8b0193629f19d4b4a36966a44ad07c06aff9b30abe30f8c20e5 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to enable `sUSDC` to be used as margin on Perps v3 with no discount being applied on the margin or slippage. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | Enabling USDC margin to be used on Perps V3 Arbitrum is done with the `setCollateralConfiguration` under PerpsMarketProxy, implemented under this [PR](https://github.com/Synthetixio/synthetix-deployments/pull/558). 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | Originally due to the USDx peg issues, this was not implemented in order to ensure that traders could get back their USDC margin after having wrapped the token to mint sUSDC. However, since LP's minting USDx had been restricted in [SCCP-352](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-352/) and the peg state of USDx is constrained to the point of allowing margining of USDC with low risk of wrapper liquidity being depleted by LPs. 24 | 25 | 26 | # Copyright 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-369.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 369 3 | network: Arbitrum 4 | title: Creating referral code and tracking code for Parifi 5 | author: Sudeep (@sudeepb02) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2024-11-22 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x1acadc5fd1fcc3c34dc5b3e5b39fd5c5b8f107c201c81b1fca2b473e55e24330 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | ## Simple Summary 14 | 15 | Parifi is implementing Synthetix V3 to power its perps trading platform on Arbitrum. They need a referral code and tracking code to proceed with the implementation. 16 | 17 | ## Abstract 18 | 19 | The referral address is `0x32A74B2cE1a0783A182f607D29207e571a1cDD4D`, and they would like to use the following tracking code: `PRF`. 20 | 21 | ## Motivation 22 | 23 | Whitelisting Parifi's referral address allows them to receive integrator rewards. 24 | 25 | ## Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-37.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 37 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Increase Fees on Silver to 50 bp 5 | author: Kaleb Keny (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2020-07-24T00:00:00.000Z 8 | type: Governance 9 | --- 10 | 11 | ## Simple Summary 12 | 13 | Increase the fees on trades into sXAG. 14 | 15 | ## Abstract 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | As per [sip-56](https://github.com/Synthetixio/SIPs/blob/master/SIPS/sip-56.md) each synth can now have its own fee levels. This SCCP suggest to raise the fees on sXAG to 50 bp. 20 | 21 | ## Motivation 22 | 23 | Analysis of on-chain data showed that front-running opportunities were more accessible for the commodity sXAG. Increasing the fees to 50 bp should shrink that window significantly and bolster the protection until [sip-52](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-52) is implemented. 24 | 25 | ## Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-371.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 371 3 | network: Arbitrum & Base 4 | title: Creating tracking code for Synthetix Exchange 5 | author: Robin (@robin2192) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x579911f893ca67464a0c103fa3974a858dd245baa02c334cb9478002a7c54b1a 9 | created: 2024-11-26 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | ## Simple Summary 14 | 15 | Create a new tracking code for Synthetix Exchange with the treasury multisafe as the beneficiary. 16 | 17 | ## Abstract 18 | 19 | The referral address is 0xd25215758734dd3ade497ce04de1c35820964126, and we would like to use the following tracking code: “SYNTHETIX_EXCHANGE”. 20 | 21 | ## Motivation 22 | 23 | Whitelisting our referral address allows the treasury to receive fees. 24 | 25 | ## Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-373.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 373 3 | title: Update Trading Fees Distribution 4 | network: Arbitrum & Base 5 | status: Implemented 6 | proposal: >- 7 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x39fd7f701e3ba18bee0418a738f0672c9a9309052a5a2473bcf83a41595b1f3d 8 | type: Governance 9 | created: 2024-12-09 10 | author: Kaleb 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to update the trading fee distribution split as per the below: 16 | 17 | | **Split** | **Existing Config.** | **New Config.** | 18 | |:----------------:|:--------------------:|:---------------:| 19 | | **v2 Debt Burn** | 40% | 20% | 20 | | **V3 LPs** | 40% | 60% | 21 | | **Integrators** | 20% | 20% | 22 | 23 | It is important to mention that Treasury, signaled their intention to help supplement the v3 lp apy, by using part of their integrator fees in order to partially settle the v3 lp's debt. This would be performed at Treasury's descrition. 24 | 25 | # Motivation 26 | 27 | The main motivation is to boost the LP apy by increasing their share of trading fees. 28 | 29 | # Copyright 30 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 31 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-374.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 374 3 | title: Update Oi Multiplier 4 | network: Arbitrum & Base 5 | status: Implemented 6 | proposal: >- 7 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x7e58ff657ba13e1e2baa1523ab8dfff33f96e00821487cd69b96617dd1f80a93 8 | type: Governance 9 | created: 2024-12-09 10 | author: Kaleb 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to reduce the locked oi ratio on all perp markets to 0.10. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The locked oi ratio determines the size of of oi allowed for a given LP backing. A ratio of 0.10 means that for each dollar of lp can back up to 10 dollars of oi. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The main motivation is to allow for larger open interest limits with the current size of the liquidity pool backing it. 24 | 25 | # Copyright 26 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 27 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-378.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 378 3 | network: Optimism & Base 4 | title: Update tracking code for Synthetix Exchange 5 | author: Robin (@robin2192) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2025-01-06 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x346cd4492dce960044e130ff441ab2d199a328688b046e8c16147ead48fc7fb9 11 | --- 12 | 13 | ## Simple Summary 14 | 15 | Update tracking code and beneficiary for Synthetix Exchange. 16 | 17 | ## Abstract 18 | 19 | The referral address is 0xebAC8Fc8752A267A36cE683A867000F69Fd0e73d (Perp Fee Safe), and we would like to use the following tracking code: “SNX_EXCHANGE”. 20 | 21 | ## Motivation 22 | 23 | Whitelisting our referral address allows the treasury to receive fees. Previous SCCP had wrong safe address tracking code was too long. 24 | 25 | ## Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-379.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 379 3 | network: Optimism & Base 4 | title: Creating tracking code for Synthetix Leverage 5 | author: Robin (@robin2192) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | type: Governance 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x43d598920c4f91805965e875bffb8a29ad4719b8c08fb6f4b24ef91d519843e0 10 | --- 11 | 12 | ## Simple Summary 13 | 14 | Create a new tracking code for Synthetix Leverage with the Treasury Perp Fee Safe as the beneficiary. 15 | 16 | ## Abstract 17 | 18 | The referral address is 0xebAC8Fc8752A267A36cE683A867000F69Fd0e73d, and we would like to use the following tracking code: “SNX_LEVERAGE”. 19 | 20 | ## Motivation 21 | 22 | Whitelisting our referral address allows the protocol to track the fees collected via Leverage products. 23 | 24 | ## Copyright 25 | 26 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 27 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-38.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 38 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Increase Fees on Silver and Gold to 100 bp 5 | author: Kaleb Keny (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2020-08-05T00:00:00.000Z 8 | type: Governance 9 | --- 10 | 11 | ## Simple Summary 12 | 13 | Increase fees on trades into sXAG and sXAU to 100 bp. 14 | 15 | ## Abstract 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | As per [sip-56](https://github.com/Synthetixio/SIPs/blob/master/SIPS/sip-56.md) each synth can now have its own fee levels. This SCCP suggests to raise fees on sXAG and sXAU to 100 bp. 20 | 21 | ## Motivation 22 | 23 | Analysis of on-chain data showed that front-running opportunities were more accessible for commodities. Increasing fees to 100 bp should make front-running quasi-impossible because of the update frequency of the chainlink oracles. That said when [sip-52](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-52) is implemented we should be able to lower these fees back to previous levels. 24 | 25 | ## Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-380.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 380 3 | network: Arbitrum 4 | title: Decrease OI Caps on Arbitrum Perps to Zero 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x03a88cd83d9387df8538c7bc71761620ccf3a94576b9551dd4574205e226128b 9 | type: Governance 10 | --- 11 | 12 | ## Simple Summary 13 | 14 | This SCCP proposes to lower the oi caps on all markets on arbitrum to zero. 15 | 16 | ## Abstract 17 | 18 | The cap can be lowered by reducing the `maxMarketValue` and `maxMarketSize` to zero. 19 | 20 | ## Motivation 21 | 22 | Intentions to wind down the arbitrum deploy requires that markets switch to close-only mode. Lowering the oi parameters to zero allows traders to exit their position at their leisure. 23 | 24 | ## Copyright 25 | 26 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 27 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-381.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 381 3 | network: Base 4 | title: Decrease OI Caps on the FTM Market to zero 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x84ca27a9fe1d27bf14c6c9975cf4a7c4d13b1d4a93e33a2015361090bc5a3ba6 9 | type: Governance 10 | --- 11 | 12 | ## Simple Summary 13 | 14 | This SCCP proposes to lower the oi caps on the FTM market to zero. 15 | 16 | ## Abstract 17 | 18 | The cap can be lowered by reducing the `maxMarketValue` and `maxMarketSize` to zero. 19 | 20 | ## Motivation 21 | 22 | Given the token swap and rebrand to [sonic](https://www.binance.com/en/support/announcement/binance-will-support-the-fantom-ftm-token-swap-and-rebranding-to-sonic-s-aec6fcbc84b749eeab6690e6bcac2f3d) and as oracle providers switch over to new feeds, it is necessary to deprecate these markets by switching the caps to zero (close only). 23 | 24 | ## Copyright 25 | 26 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 27 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-387.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 387 3 | network: Base 4 | title: Update Perps V3 Parameters 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | created: 2025-01-29 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xbb2a27e4a057af1e330759cec3544319b22a98d06dc518ff08fd95d476c5a016 9 | status: Implemented 10 | 11 | type: Governance 12 | --- 13 | 14 | ## Simple Summary 15 | 16 | This SCCP proposes to update the perps v3 parameters as per the below: 17 | 18 | ### Max Market Value 19 | 20 | | **Market** | **current m$** | **proposed m$** | **cex m$** | 21 | |:----------:|:--------------:|:---------------:|:----------:| 22 | | safe | 0.25 | 0.1 | 1.70 | 23 | | bal | 0.50 | 0.1 | 3.40 | 24 | | moodeng | 3.00 | 1 | 17.28 | 25 | 26 | ## Abstract 27 | 28 | The parameter descriptions are as follows: 29 | - The `maxMarketValue` is the parameter that determines the oi of a given market, specified in US Dollars. 30 | 31 | ## Motivation 32 | 33 | The main motivation is to be better align outstanding markets offered on synthetix with the data available available on centralized exchanges. 34 | 35 | ## Copyright 36 | 37 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 38 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-39.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 39 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Increase Forex Fees 5 | author: Spreek (@Spreek) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2020-08-01T00:00:00.000Z 8 | type: Governance 9 | --- 10 | 11 | ## Simple Summary 12 | 13 | Increase the fees on trades into currency synths. 14 | 15 | ## Abstract 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | As per [sip-56](https://github.com/Synthetixio/SIPs/blob/master/SIPS/sip-56.md) each synth can now have its own fee levels. This SCCP suggest to restore the fees on all currency synths (sUSD, sEUR sJPY, sAUD, sGBP, sCHF) to their old level of 0.3% 20 | 21 | ## Motivation 22 | 23 | Analysis of data shows continued danger from frontrunning in traditional synths. When we introduced differential fees in SIP 56, we chose to reduce fees on traditional synths, thinking that the lower volatility synths would be less risky. However, due to lag from chainlink oracles, we see continued profitable trading in these pairs. Therefore, until a new solution, we should at least temporarily restore fees to their old level of 0.3%. 24 | 25 | ## Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-390.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 390 3 | network: Base 4 | title: Update Perps V3 Parameters 5 | author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny) 6 | created: 2025-02-03 7 | status: Implemented 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x5a4d0c196e82f02b580df6c002aad1be8c10bdf0dbcbe9fe0df8efb45c4202df 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | ## Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to update the perps v3 parameters on the ETH and BTC Markets, as per the below: 16 | 17 | ### Skew Scale 18 | 19 | | **Market** | **Current** | **Proposed** | **Cex Slippage** | **Snx Slippage** | 20 | |:----------:|:-----------:|:------------:|:----------------:|:----------------:| 21 | | ETH | 350,000 | 300,000 | 2.25 | 3 | 22 | | BTC | 35,000 | 12,500 | 0.8 | 2 | 23 | 24 | *Slippage denoted above are on trades of size 500k$* 25 | 26 | ## Abstract 27 | 28 | The `skewScale` is the parameter that determines the slippage incurred by the market when a given skew prevails. 29 | 30 | ## Motivation 31 | 32 | The main motivation behind this SCCP is to increase the incentive on arbitrageurs to balance out a skew, given recent increased volatility of price moves. 33 | 34 | ## Copyright 35 | 36 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 37 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-395.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 395 3 | title: Disable Atomic Spot Trading on Spot Markets 4 | network: Base 5 | status: Implemented 6 | type: Governance 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xd4f05a9650cce6e3d9c57990e6d5ad937d70524b4ba6d90ee0baa7bc7a31fc13 9 | created: 2025-02-26 10 | author: Kaleb 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | Following the implementation of [SIP-406](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-406/), this sccp proposes to disable atomic trading on `scbBTC`, `scbETH`, `sWETH` and `swstETH`. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | Atomic trading fees have been set to 30% as per [SCCP-357](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-357/) given the lack of function to disable this kind of trading. This SCCP ensures that traders cannot atomically execute swap transaction, regardless of the fee imposed by switching `atomicOrdersEnabled` to a False state on these synths. 20 | 21 | # Motivation 22 | 23 | The main motivation is to ensure that traders who deposit cbBTC can always get back their margin when they want to exit the system, as all the `scbBTC` would be backed 1 to 1 by an underlying. 24 | 25 | 26 | # Copyright 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-397.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 397 3 | author: Kaleb 4 | network: Base 5 | title: Lower OI on KAITO Perp Market 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2025-03-05 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x4de1820162d55fb22577cd2d676f1e0742f1bc47ee80806108263f18ff155ee1 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | ## Simple Summary 14 | 15 | Lower the `maxMarketValue` on the KAITO perp market to 200k from 1.5m. 16 | 17 | ## Abstract 18 | 19 | `maxMarketValue` is the maximum open interest allowed on a given perp market, denominated in snxUSD, the protocols' native currency. 20 | 21 | ## Motivation 22 | 23 | Based on the latest market data and the volatility of the token, it is recommended to lower the oi on this market while keeping some room for traders to take on positions. 24 | 25 | ## Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-405.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 405 3 | network: Base 4 | title: Deprecate BAL Market 5 | author: Kaleb 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2025-04-14 8 | proposal: >- 9 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x6daf67bc31dfe325bd40a4b0bcac88d8339eea322f3015d4932f644788c336ef 10 | type: Governance 11 | --- 12 | 13 | ## Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This sccp proposes deprecate the BAL market. This is done by lowering the `maxMarketValue` and `marketMarketSize` parameters to zero. 16 | 17 | ## Abstract 18 | 19 | The parameters being updated are described below; 20 | - The `maxMarketValue` is the oi cap in dollar terms and the maxMarketSize represents the cap denominated by the market's underlying currency. 21 | - The `maxMarketValue` is the oi cap in the market's underlying currency. 22 | 23 | 24 | ## Motivation 25 | 26 | The main motivation is the recent [delisting](https://www.binance.com/en/support/announcement/detail/fac9c3e401da4cc8b604566fd261d70c) on the most liquid centralized markets. 27 | 28 | ## Copyright 29 | 30 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 31 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-408.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 408 3 | title: Deprecate EOS Perp Market 4 | network: Base 5 | status: Implemented 6 | type: Governance 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x00c394e18bbc45fafd8434791723f9e0900b646c12de0a2a07603427ef77dd0c 9 | created: 2025-05-20 10 | author: Kaleb 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to deprecate EOS market in light of the upcoming rebrand to [`A`](https://www.binance.com/en/support/announcement/detail/1e89a9ca957c4b0ca7502e60b993e201). 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | Removing these market entails setting the OI cap to zero and updating the price feed to the constant price (the latest available EOS market). 20 | 21 | 22 | # Motivation 23 | 24 | The motivation is the gradual deprecation of low utilization markets on V3, as Synthetix shifts focus to its roadmap priorities and reallocates resources away from legacy products. 25 | 26 | 27 | # Copyright 28 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 29 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-409.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 409 3 | title: Increase Jubilee ratio to 20% 4 | network: Ethereum 5 | status: Vote_Pending 6 | type: Governance 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0x2d5bccd8ef813230c313fa0d7a90179cdfa713ee63d20de6b73503f12c285458 9 | created: 2025-05-28 10 | author: Fenway 11 | --- 12 | 13 | # Simple Summary 14 | 15 | This SCCP proposes to increase the jubilee ratio (sUSD deposited in the 420 pool : Original debt in the 420 Pool) to 20%. 16 | 17 | # Abstract 18 | 19 | The parameters from [SIP-421](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-421/) being updated are described below; 20 | - Jubilee minimum ratio (`auxTokenInfo`) is being increased from 10% to 20% 21 | 22 | # Motivation 23 | 24 | Whilst the initial 10% was effective to get it to $0.96, this is not enough, the peg needs to return to above $0.99. The initial 10% configuration proved highly effective in supporting the sUSD peg, with 75% of stakers holding over 10,000 sUSD in debt meeting the requirement. Consequently, sUSD has stabilized at approximately $0.96 for about one week. While the 10% configuration successfully raised the peg to $0.96, further measures are necessary to restore it to $1.00. 25 | 26 | 27 | # Copyright 28 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 29 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-42.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 42 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: 'Lower rewards on Curve to SNX 8,000' 5 | status: Implemented 6 | author: KALEB (@KalebKeny) 7 | created: 2020-08-31T00:00:00.000Z 8 | type: Governance 9 | --- 10 | 11 | ## Simple Summary 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | Propose to decrease the SNX rewards paid to incentivize the Curve sUSD pool to SNX 8k per week. 16 | 17 | ## Abstract 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | There is currently a premium on sUSD compared to other stable coins on Curve. Decreasing the SNX incentive paid might slightly reduce the farming incentive on curve. 22 | 23 | ## Motivation 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | The recent premium on the sUSD peg on Curve calls for action as traders feel a disincentive in paying the premium to partake in trading. 28 | 29 | ## Copyright 30 | 31 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 32 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-47.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 47 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Raise Fees on Crypto Synths to 50 bp 5 | author: Kaleb Keny (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2020-09-14T00:00:00.000Z 8 | type: Governance 9 | --- 10 | 11 | ## Simple Summary 12 | 13 | Raise fees on synths sXTZ, sXRP, sLTC, sADA, sBCH, sBNB, sLINK, sETH and sBTC and their respective inverses to 50 bp from 30 bp. 14 | 15 | ## Abstract 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | Increase fees to 50 bp on synths which are pushed with a 1% deviation threshold. 20 | 21 | ## Motivation 22 | 23 | Analysis of on-chain data showed that front-running opportunities still exist with post migration to chainlink price oracles. 24 | Increasing fees to 50 bp on synths with a 1% deviation threshold push should help close this window while waiting for further changes to the oracle. 25 | 26 | ## Copyright 27 | 28 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 29 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-48.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 48 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Raise Fees on Crypto Synths to 100 bp 5 | author: Kaleb Keny (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2020-09-16T00:00:00.000Z 8 | type: Governance 9 | --- 10 | 11 | ## Simple Summary 12 | 13 | Raise fees on synths sXTZ, sXRP, sLTC, sADA, sBCH, sBNB, sLINK, sETH and sBTC and their respective inverses to 100 bp from 50 bp. 14 | 15 | ## Abstract 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | Increase fees to 100 bp on synths which are pushed with a 1% deviation threshold. 20 | 21 | ## Motivation 22 | 23 | Analysis of on-chain data showed that front-running opportunities continue to persist even with fees at 50 bp. 24 | Increasing fees to 100 bp on synths with a 1% deviation threshold push should help close that window significantly, while waiting for further changes to the oracle and L2 to be implemented. 25 | 26 | ## Copyright 27 | 28 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 29 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-49.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 49 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Distribute 16k SNX to iETH incentives 5 | author: Kain Warwick (@kaiynne) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2020-09-24T00:00:00.000Z 8 | type: Governance 9 | --- 10 | 11 | ## Simple Summary 12 | 13 | Distribute 16k SNX from inflationary supply to iETH incentives. 14 | 15 | ## Abstract 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | Set the default iETH incentive to 16k SNX 20 | 21 | ## Motivation 22 | 23 | We recently proposed to migrate the current iETH incentives from the sDAO to the protocol, based on the discord poll the consensus was for 16k SNX per week to be distributed, so this is being established as the initial value, but can be modified with future SCCPs. 24 | 25 | ## Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-58.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 58 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Increase Fees on DEFI and CEX to 100 bp 5 | author: Kaleb Keny (@kaleb-keny) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2020-11-11T00:00:00.000Z 8 | type: Governance 9 | --- 10 | 11 | ## Simple Summary 12 | 13 | Increase fees on trades into sDEFI, iDEFI, sCEX and iCEX to 100 bp. 14 | 15 | ## Abstract 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | This SCCP suggests to raise fees on sDEFI, iDEFI, sCEX and iCEX to counter front-running activities that have been noticed recently. 20 | 21 | ## Motivation 22 | 23 | Analysis of on-chain data showed that front-running opportunities were more accessible for these synths given the fees levied 30 bp while the threshold frequency by chainlink is 1%. 24 | 25 | ## Copyright 26 | 27 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-59.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 59 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Reduce the target Collateralisation Ratio for SNX stakers to 500% 5 | author: Akin Sawyerr (@nottrunner) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2020-11-11T00:00:00.000Z 8 | type: Governance 9 | --- 10 | 11 | ## Simple Summary 12 | 13 | Decrease the target Collateralisation Ratio for SNX stakers to 500% 14 | 15 | ## Abstract 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | The system is much more stable with the first successful set of liquidations executing without a hitch. Its a good time to further lower C-Ratios to increase the opportunity to mint more debt and increase returns for synth holders and traders 20 | 21 | ## Motivation 22 | 23 | - Liquidation process in place and working 24 | - Network and Active C-Ratio are a very health 783% and 635% respectfully, even with recent drop in SNX price 25 | - Increased liquidity will support increased use of the exchange(s) and transaction fees 26 | - Capital Efficiency 27 | - Increased demand for Synths will drive more integrations with other DeFi platforms 28 | 29 | ## Copyright 30 | 31 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 32 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-60.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 60 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Suspend sBCH and iBCH synths until after BCH hard fork 5 | author: Jackson Chan (@jacko125) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2020-11-14T00:00:00.000Z 8 | type: Governance 9 | --- 10 | 11 | ## Simple Summary 12 | 13 | Suspend sBCH and iBCH synths until after BCH hard fork on November 15, 2020 at approximately 4:00 AM PT (12:00 PM UTC). 14 | 15 | ## Abstract 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | Bitcoin Cash (BCH) will be undergoing a network protocol upgrade on November 15, 2020 at approximately 4:00 AM PT (12:00 PM UTC). 20 | 21 | In connection to the protocol upgrade, there has been a proposed chain-split between the two main BCH clients, Bitcoin Cash ABC (BCHA) and Bitcoin Cash Node (BCHN), making this a hard fork that may result in a chain split and additional token. 22 | 23 | sBCH and iBCH synths will be resumed when the price feed is stable and safe after the hard fork. 24 | 25 | ## Motivation 26 | 27 | - Upcoming hard fork of BCH could affect the BCH ticker's underlying prices which require the synths based on BCH to be suspended. 28 | 29 | ## Copyright 30 | 31 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 32 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sccp/sccp-9.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sccp: 9 3 | network: Ethereum 4 | title: Redeploy iXTZ and iBNB 5 | author: Garth Travers (@garthtravers) 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2019-12-17T00:00:00.000Z 8 | type: Governance 9 | --- 10 | 11 | ## Simple Summary 12 | 13 | I propose re-enabling iXTZ (Inverse Tezos) and iBNB (Inverse Binance Coin) with new limits. 14 | (n.b. originally this SIP only proposed re-enabling iXTZ but was updated before the release as during that time, iBNB also froze) 15 | 16 | ## Abstract 17 | 18 | iXTZ and iBNB allow traders to effectively take a short position on Tezos and Binance Coin respectively. Since they reached their limits as a result of Tezos appreciating and Binance Coin depreciating in price recently, they have both frozen. If people are to continue taking inverse positions on Tezos or Binance Coin, a new iXTZ and iBNB will need to be enabled. 19 | 20 | ## Motivation 21 | 22 | iXTZ and iBNB are two of our existing Synths, and our usual practice when an Inverse Synth gets frozen is to re-enable it in the next release. 23 | 24 | ## Implementation 25 | 26 | The iXTZ entry price is $1.57 and the limits will be $0.785 and $2.355. 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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sips/sip-193.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sip: 193 3 | title: Refactor SystemSettings into Library to reduce contract size 4 | network: Ethereum & Optimism 5 | status: Implemented 6 | type: Governance 7 | proposal: >- 8 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/QmSQFuU5JhaNBPtH7uREJ2UvRjmnUtjUA4wmFLV2JpPr5R 9 | author: Lecky Lao (@leckylao) 10 | implementor: Lecky Lao (@leckylao) 11 | release: Alsephina 12 | created: 2021-12-7T00:00:00.000Z 13 | --- 14 | 15 | ## Simple Summary 16 | 17 | Currently `SystemSettings` is a large contract, and it's hitting the max limit on the deployment contract size. 18 | 19 | ## Abstract 20 | 21 | This SIP is going to refactor the `SystemSettings` contract into a library in order to reduce contract size. 22 | 23 | ## Motivation 24 | 25 | `SystemSettings` is not able to add anymore configuration variables, and it's hitting the max limit on the deployment contract size. 26 | 27 | ### Technical Specification 28 | 29 | Refactor and deploy a new library for `SystemSettings` to reduce contract size. 30 | 31 | ### Test Cases 32 | 33 | Job compile CI task should pass. 34 | 35 | ## Copyright 36 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /content/sips/sip-386.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | --- 2 | sip: 386 3 | network: Base 4 | title: Bring perps v3 markets to parity with perps v2 5 | author: Millie 6 | status: Implemented 7 | created: 2024-05-28 8 | type: Governance 9 | proposal: >- 10 | https://snapshot.org/#/snxgov.eth/proposal/0xa457601dd50a95c5773d350d31aa705c0c7dede433dd9f98ca56271a863f50ae 11 | --- 12 | 13 | ## Abstract 14 | 15 | SIP-386 proposes to list all remaining active markets from perps v2 on perps v3 16 | 17 | ## Motivation 18 | 19 | Perps V3 on Base has seen significant growth since its deployment and has scaled effectively. With the fee rebate incentives now live, 20 | it's a good time to ensure that the incentive program has maximal impact with as many markets available to trade as supported by v2 on optimism. 21 | 22 | ## Specification 23 | 24 | list the following markets on perps V3: AAVE, ADA, ALGO, APT, ATOM, AXS, BAL, BCH, BLUR, COMP, CRV, DOT, DYDX, EOS, ETC, ETHBTC, FIL, FLOW, FXS, GRT, ICP, IMX, JTO, JUP, LDO, LTC, MATIC, MEME, NEAR, PYTH, RNDR, SEI, SHIB, STRK, SUSHI, TRX, UNI, XLM, XRP, YFI 25 | 26 | 27 | ## Configurable Values (Via SCCP) 28 | 29 | - the activation of listed markets 30 | - market parameters 31 | - risk configurations 32 | 33 | ## Copyright 34 | 35 | Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). 36 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /gatsby-browser.js: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | import './tailwind.css' 2 | import './old.css' 3 | 4 | // export const onRouteUpdate = ({ location }) => { 5 | // if (window.MathJax !== undefined) { 6 | // window.MathJax.Hub.Queue(['Typeset', window.MathJax.Hub]) 7 | // } 8 | // } 9 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /postcss.config.js: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | module.exports = () => ({ 2 | plugins: [require('tailwindcss')], 3 | }) 4 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /src/components/StatusLabel.tsx: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | import React from 'react' 2 | import { flow, split, join } from 'lodash/fp' 3 | 4 | interface Props { 5 | label: string 6 | } 7 | 8 | const StatusLabel: React.FC = ({ label }) => ( 9 |

{flow(split('_'), join(' '))(label)}

10 | ) 11 | 12 | export { StatusLabel } 13 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /src/components/utils.ts: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | import { flow, takeRight, join, split } from 'lodash/fp' 2 | 3 | export const getGithubLink = (fileAbsolutePath: string): string => { 4 | const relativePath = flow( 5 | split('/'), 6 | takeRight(3), 7 | join('/'), 8 | )(fileAbsolutePath) 9 | return `https://github.com/Synthetixio/SIPs/blob/master/${relativePath}` 10 | } 11 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /src/icons/DarkMode.tsx: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | import * as React from 'react' 2 | 3 | function SvgDarkMode( 4 | props: React.SVGProps, 5 | svgRef?: React.Ref, 6 | ) { 7 | return ( 8 | 16 | 17 | 18 | ) 19 | } 20 | 21 | const ForwardRef = React.forwardRef(SvgDarkMode) 22 | export default ForwardRef 23 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /src/icons/Github.tsx: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | import * as React from 'react' 2 | 3 | function SvgGithub( 4 | props: React.SVGProps, 5 | svgRef?: React.Ref, 6 | ) { 7 | return ( 8 | 19 | 20 | 21 | ) 22 | } 23 | 24 | const ForwardRef = React.forwardRef(SvgGithub) 25 | export default ForwardRef 26 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /src/icons/LightMode.tsx: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | import * as React from 'react' 2 | 3 | function SvgLightMode( 4 | props: React.SVGProps, 5 | svgRef?: React.Ref, 6 | ) { 7 | return ( 8 | 18 | 19 | 20 | ) 21 | } 22 | 23 | const ForwardRef = React.forwardRef(SvgLightMode) 24 | export default ForwardRef 25 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /src/icons/Source.tsx: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | import * as React from 'react' 2 | 3 | function SvgSource( 4 | props: React.SVGProps, 5 | svgRef?: React.Ref, 6 | ) { 7 | return ( 8 | 16 | 20 | 21 | ) 22 | } 23 | 24 | const ForwardRef = React.forwardRef(SvgSource) 25 | export default ForwardRef 26 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /src/icons/Twitter.tsx: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | import * as React from 'react' 2 | 3 | function SvgTwitter( 4 | props: React.SVGProps, 5 | svgRef?: React.Ref, 6 | ) { 7 | return ( 8 | 19 | 23 | 24 | ) 25 | } 26 | 27 | const ForwardRef = React.forwardRef(SvgTwitter) 28 | export default ForwardRef 29 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /src/pages/404.js: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | import * as React from 'react' 2 | 3 | // styles 4 | const pageStyles = { 5 | color: '#232129', 6 | padding: '96px', 7 | fontFamily: '-apple-system, Roboto, sans-serif, serif', 8 | } 9 | const headingStyles = { 10 | marginTop: 0, 11 | marginBottom: 64, 12 | maxWidth: 320, 13 | } 14 | 15 | const paragraphStyles = { 16 | marginBottom: 48, 17 | } 18 | const codeStyles = { 19 | color: '#8A6534', 20 | padding: 4, 21 | backgroundColor: '#FFF4DB', 22 | fontSize: '1.25rem', 23 | borderRadius: 4, 24 | } 25 | 26 | // markup 27 | const NotFoundPage = () => { 28 | return ( 29 |
30 | Not found 31 |

Page not found

32 |

33 | Sorry{' '} 34 | 35 | 😔 36 | {' '} 37 | we couldn’t find what you were looking for. 38 |
39 | {process.env.NODE_ENV === 'development' ? ( 40 | <> 41 |
42 | Try creating a page in src/pages/. 43 |
44 | 45 | ) : null} 46 |
47 | Go home. 48 |

49 |
50 | ) 51 | } 52 | 53 | export default NotFoundPage 54 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /static/favicon.ico: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Synthetixio/SIPs/7784610c661a7fb8c06fba68622801ae776413f6/static/favicon.ico -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /static/mathjax-config.js: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | // https://docs.mathjax.org/en/latest/web/configuration.html#using-a-local-file-for-configuration 2 | window.MathJax = { 3 | tex: { 4 | inlineMath: [['\\(', '\\)']], 5 | displayMath: [['\\[', '\\]']], 6 | }, 7 | svg: { 8 | fontCache: 'global', 9 | }, 10 | } 11 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /static/sip-workflow.png: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Synthetixio/SIPs/7784610c661a7fb8c06fba68622801ae776413f6/static/sip-workflow.png -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /tailwind.config.js: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | module.exports = { 2 | purge: ['./src/**/*.jsx', './src/**/*.tsx'], 3 | darkMode: false, // or 'media' or 'class' 4 | corePlugins: { 5 | preflight: false, 6 | }, 7 | theme: { 8 | extend: {}, 9 | }, 10 | variants: { 11 | extend: {}, 12 | }, 13 | plugins: [], 14 | } 15 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /tailwind.css: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | @tailwind base; 2 | @tailwind components; 3 | @tailwind utilities; 4 | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------