├── cpa.pdf ├── Duelfer.pdf ├── bs4_slides.pdf ├── README.md ├── download_w_wget.py ├── pdfminer.py ├── liberia.py ├── cpa.txt ├── presidential_res.csv ├── step-by-step.py ├── Duelfer_text.txt └── Duelfer.html /cpa.pdf: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aristotle-tek/BeautifulSoup_pres/HEAD/cpa.pdf -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Duelfer.pdf: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aristotle-tek/BeautifulSoup_pres/HEAD/Duelfer.pdf -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /bs4_slides.pdf: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aristotle-tek/BeautifulSoup_pres/HEAD/bs4_slides.pdf -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /README.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | BeautifulSoup_pres 2 | ================== 3 | 4 | Apr9_NYU 5 | 6 | A few simple examples of extracting data from html tables using BeautifulSoup4 and extracting text from pdfs using pdfminer. 7 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /download_w_wget.py: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | import os 2 | 3 | 4 | os.chdir("/home/andrew/Dropbox/python/7/") 5 | 6 | os.system("wget --convert-links --no-clobber \ 7 | --wait=4 \ 8 | --limit-rate=10K \ 9 | --random-wait -r --no-parent http://www.necliberia.org/results2011/results.html") 10 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /pdfminer.py: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # PDFMiner 2 | 3 | import pdfminer 4 | import os 5 | 6 | os.system("pdf2txt.py -o /home/andrew/Dropbox/python/BeautifulSoup_pres/pdfs/Duelfer_text2.txt /home/andrew/Dropbox/python/BeautifulSoup_pres/pdfs/Duelfer.pdf") 7 | 8 | os.system("pdf2txt.py -o /home/andrew/Dropbox/python/BeautifulSoup_pres/pdfs/cpa.txt /home/andrew/Dropbox/python/BeautifulSoup_pres/pdfs/cpa.pdf") 9 | 10 | # (can also run from the bash shell): 11 | pdf2txt.py -o /home/andrew/Dropbox/python/BeautifulSoup_pres/pdfs/Duelfer_text.txt /home/andrew/Dropbox/python/BeautifulSoup_pres/pdfs/Duelfer.pdf 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /liberia.py: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Liberia election results 2 | 3 | import sys 4 | sys.path.append('/usr/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/') 5 | from bs4 import BeautifulSoup 6 | 7 | import urllib2 8 | import csv 9 | import os 10 | import re 11 | 12 | os.chdir("/home/andrew/Dropbox/python/presentation/") 13 | 14 | ######## Pres/VP ##################### 15 | f= csv.writer(open("presidential_res.csv", "w")) 16 | f.writerow(["PresVPcand","lastname","party","votes","county","precinct"]) # Write column headers as the first line 17 | 18 | #orig 19 | page1 = urllib2.urlopen("http://www.necliberia.org/results2011/pp_results/03002.html") 20 | page2 = urllib2.urlopen("http://www.necliberia.org/results2011/pp_results/09006.html") 21 | 22 | pages = [page1, page2] 23 | 24 | for page in pages: 25 | soup = BeautifulSoup(page) 26 | 27 | # h2 - has county 28 | h2 = soup.find_all("h2") 29 | county = str(h2[0].get_text()) 30 | 31 | #h4 has voting precinct. 32 | h4 = soup.find_all("h4") 33 | precinct = str(h4[0].get_text()) 34 | 35 | # get the results tables 36 | res = soup.findAll('div', {'class': 'res'}) 37 | 38 | pres = res[0] 39 | 40 | for row in pres.find_all("tr"): 41 | tds = row.find_all("td") 42 | try: 43 | a = str(tds[0].get_text()) 44 | b = str(tds[1].get_text()) 45 | 46 | except: 47 | print "bad string" 48 | continue 49 | 50 | m = re.search(r'\(([A-Z]+)\)', a) 51 | if m: 52 | party = m.group(1) 53 | 54 | else: 55 | party = '' 56 | 57 | m = re.search(r'([A-Z]+),', a) 58 | if m: 59 | lastname = m.group(1) 60 | else: 61 | lastname = '' 62 | 63 | f.writerow([a, lastname, party, b, county, precinct]) 64 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /cpa.txt: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | COALITON PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 1 2 | 3 | DE-BA`ATHIFICATION OF IRAQI SOCIETY 4 | 5 | 6 | Pursuant to my authority as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), 7 | relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, and the laws and usages of war, 8 | 9 | Recognizing that the Iraqi people have suffered large scale human rights abuses and 10 | depravations over many years at the hands of the Ba`ath Party, 11 | 12 | Noting the grave concern of Iraqi society regarding the threat posed by the continuation 13 | of Ba`ath Party networks and personnel in the administration of Iraq, and the intimidation 14 | of the people of Iraq by Ba`ath Party officials, 15 | 16 | Concerned by the continuing threat to the security of the Coalition Forces posed by the 17 | Iraqi Ba`ath Party, 18 | 19 | I hereby promulgate the following: 20 | 21 | 22 | Section 1 23 | Disestablishment of the Ba`ath Party 24 | 25 | 26 | 1) On April 16, 2003 the Coalition Provisional Authority disestablished the Ba`ath 27 | Party of Iraq. This order implements the declaration by eliminating the party’s 28 | structures and removing its leadership from positions of authority and 29 | responsibility in Iraqi society. By this means, the Coalition Provisional Authority 30 | will ensure that representative government in Iraq is not threatened by Ba`athist 31 | elements returning to power ant that those in positions of authority in the future 32 | are acceptable to the people of Iraq. 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 2) Full members of the Ba`ath Party holding the ranks of ‘Udw Qutriyya (Regional 37 | Command Member), ‘Udw Far’ (Branch Member). ‘Udw Shu’bah (Section 38 | Member), and ‘Udw Firqah (Group Member) (together, “Senior Party Members”) 39 | are herby removed from their positions and banned from future employment in 40 | the public sector. These Senior Party Members shall be evaluated for criminal 41 | conduct or threat to the security of the Coalition. Those suspected of criminal 42 | conduct shall be investigated and, if deemed a threat to security or a flight risk, 43 | detained or placed under house arrest. 44 | 45 | 46 | 3) Individuals holding positions in the top three layers of management in every 47 | national government ministry, affiliated corporations and other government 48 | institutions (e.g., universities and hospitals) shall be interviewed for possible 49 | affiliation with the Ba`ath Party, and subject to investigation for criminal conduct 50 | and risk to security. Any such persons detained to be full members of the Ba`ath 51 | Party shall be removed from their employment. This includes those 52 | 53 | CPA/ORD/16 May 2003/01 54 | 1 55 | 56 | 1 57 | 58 | 59 | 60 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /presidential_res.csv: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | PresVPcand,lastname,party,votes,county,precinct 2 | "BEYAN, Gladys G. Y. (GDPL)",BEYAN,GDPL,6,Bomi County,Voting Precinct 03002 3 | "BRUMSKINE, Charles Walker (LP)",BRUMSKINE,LP,1,Bomi County,Voting Precinct 03002 4 | "CHEAPOO, SR., Chea Job (PPP)",CHEAPOO,PPP,0,Bomi County,Voting Precinct 03002 5 | "CHELLEY, James Kpa (OCPOL)",CHELLEY,OCPOL,1,Bomi County,Voting Precinct 03002 6 | "FREEMAN, Simeon (MPC)",FREEMAN,MPC,1,Bomi County,Voting Precinct 03002 7 | "GUSEH, James Sawalla (CUP)",GUSEH,CUP,1,Bomi County,Voting Precinct 03002 8 | "JOHNSON, Prince Yormie (NUDP)",JOHNSON,NUDP,0,Bomi County,Voting Precinct 03002 9 | "JOHNSON-SIRLEAF, Ellen (UP)",SIRLEAF,UP,264,Bomi County,Voting Precinct 03002 10 | "JONES, Marcus Roland (VCP)",JONES,VCP,2,Bomi County,Voting Precinct 03002 11 | "MASON, Jonathan A. (ULD)",MASON,ULD,0,Bomi County,Voting Precinct 03002 12 | "MAYSON, Dew Tuan-Wleh (NDC)",MAYSON,NDC,0,Bomi County,Voting Precinct 03002 13 | "NDEBE, Manjerngie Cecelia (LRP)",NDEBE,LRP,0,Bomi County,Voting Precinct 03002 14 | "SANDY, Kennedy Gbleyah (LTP)",SANDY,LTP,0,Bomi County,Voting Precinct 03002 15 | "TIPOTEH, Togba-Nah (FAPL)",TIPOTEH,FAPL,0,Bomi County,Voting Precinct 03002 16 | "TUBMAN, Winston A. (CDC)",TUBMAN,CDC,31,Bomi County,Voting Precinct 03002 17 | "ZOE, Hananiah (LEP)",ZOE,LEP,0,Bomi County,Voting Precinct 03002 18 | Total Valid,,,307,Bomi County,Voting Precinct 03002 19 | Invalid,,,9,Bomi County,Voting Precinct 03002 20 | Total,,,316,Bomi County,Voting Precinct 03002 21 | "BEYAN, Gladys G. Y. (GDPL)",BEYAN,GDPL,1,Grand Bassa County,Voting Precinct 09006 22 | "BRUMSKINE, Charles Walker (LP)",BRUMSKINE,LP,50,Grand Bassa County,Voting Precinct 09006 23 | "CHEAPOO, SR., Chea Job (PPP)",CHEAPOO,PPP,1,Grand Bassa County,Voting Precinct 09006 24 | "CHELLEY, James Kpa (OCPOL)",CHELLEY,OCPOL,3,Grand Bassa County,Voting Precinct 09006 25 | "FREEMAN, Simeon (MPC)",FREEMAN,MPC,2,Grand Bassa County,Voting Precinct 09006 26 | "GUSEH, James Sawalla (CUP)",GUSEH,CUP,3,Grand Bassa County,Voting Precinct 09006 27 | "JOHNSON, Prince Yormie (NUDP)",JOHNSON,NUDP,67,Grand Bassa County,Voting Precinct 09006 28 | "JOHNSON-SIRLEAF, Ellen (UP)",SIRLEAF,UP,0,Grand Bassa County,Voting Precinct 09006 29 | "JONES, Marcus Roland (VCP)",JONES,VCP,0,Grand Bassa County,Voting Precinct 09006 30 | "MASON, Jonathan A. (ULD)",MASON,ULD,2,Grand Bassa County,Voting Precinct 09006 31 | "MAYSON, Dew Tuan-Wleh (NDC)",MAYSON,NDC,2,Grand Bassa County,Voting Precinct 09006 32 | "NDEBE, Manjerngie Cecelia (LRP)",NDEBE,LRP,0,Grand Bassa County,Voting Precinct 09006 33 | "SANDY, Kennedy Gbleyah (LTP)",SANDY,LTP,0,Grand Bassa County,Voting Precinct 09006 34 | "TIPOTEH, Togba-Nah (FAPL)",TIPOTEH,FAPL,0,Grand Bassa County,Voting Precinct 09006 35 | "TUBMAN, Winston A. (CDC)",TUBMAN,CDC,30,Grand Bassa County,Voting Precinct 09006 36 | "ZOE, Hananiah (LEP)",ZOE,LEP,0,Grand Bassa County,Voting Precinct 09006 37 | Total Valid,,,161,Grand Bassa County,Voting Precinct 09006 38 | Invalid,,,0,Grand Bassa County,Voting Precinct 09006 39 | Total,,,161,Grand Bassa County,Voting Precinct 09006 40 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /step-by-step.py: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Liberia election results 2 | 3 | import sys 4 | sys.path.append('/usr/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/') 5 | from bs4 import BeautifulSoup 6 | 7 | import urllib2 8 | import csv 9 | import os 10 | import re 11 | 12 | # set working directory: 13 | os.chdir("/home/andrew/Dropbox/python/presentation/") 14 | 15 | ##### Open a website ################## 16 | 17 | # from the web: 18 | page1 = urllib2.urlopen("http://www.necliberia.org/results2011/pp_results/09006.html") 19 | 20 | # stored locally: 21 | page2 = urllib2.urlopen("file:///home/andrew/Liberia/data/pp_1/03002.html") 22 | 23 | soup = BeautifulSoup(page2) 24 | 25 | print(soup.prettify()) 26 | print(soup.get_text()) 27 | 28 | # To get the county - find

tag 29 | h2 = soup.find_all("h2") 30 | county = str(h2[0].get_text()) 31 | print county 32 | 33 | # To get the precinct - find

34 | h4 = soup.find_all("h4") 35 | precinct = str(h4[0].get_text()) 36 | print precinct 37 | 38 | 39 | ## Now let's get the election results 40 | 41 | res = soup.findAll('div', {'class': 'res'}) 42 | len(res) # so there are 3 results tables. 43 | 44 | # the first results are the presidential/VP: 45 | pres = res[0] # (python is 0 indexed) 46 | 47 | ########### 2 ways to proceed. 48 | 49 | #### (1) use attributes to identify candidates, votes. 50 | # Use the css class to identify candidates (note underscore): 51 | cand = pres.find_all("td", class_="n") 52 | print cand[7] 53 | 54 | # For votes we could look for width="35" 55 | vts = pres.find_all("td", width="35") 56 | print vts[7] 57 | print vts[7].get_text() 58 | 59 | #### (2) using the table structure itself 60 | # we can get the rows of the table: 61 | rows = pres.find_all("tr") 62 | 63 | # let's look at the 8th row: 64 | print rows[7] 65 | 66 | print rows[7].get_text() # just the text 67 | 68 | # Within this row, we'll separate the cells. 69 | # Now let's loop over rows, cols: 70 | for row in pres.find_all("tr"): 71 | tds = row.find_all("td") 72 | try: 73 | a = str(tds[0].get_text()) 74 | b = str(tds[1].get_text()) 75 | print "Candidate:" + a 76 | print "votes:" + b + "\n" 77 | except: 78 | print "bad string" 79 | continue 80 | 81 | 82 | ################################################################################# 83 | 84 | ### Regular expressions 85 | s = """Before the Freedom of Information Act, I used to say at meetings, 'The illegal we do immediately; the unconstitutional takes a little longer. Kissinger, 1975""" 86 | 87 | re.search(r'illegal', s) 88 | 89 | # get the first undercase 90 | word = re.search(r'[a-z]+', s) 91 | word.group(0) 92 | 93 | # use of pipe | for or 94 | pc = re.search(r'(Act|longer,)', s) 95 | pc.group(1) 96 | 97 | # get the first word: 98 | pc = re.search(r'([A-Za-z]+)',s) 99 | pc.group(1) 100 | 101 | # $ match from end 102 | # get the last word 103 | pc = re.search(r'([A-Za-z]+)[\w\s,]+$', s) 104 | pc.group(1) 105 | 106 | ######### Returning to our example 107 | # We want to get the candidate's party, lastname 108 | 109 | ex = rows[7].get_text() 110 | 111 | # the last name is the first all caps 112 | m = re.search(r'([A-Z]+),', ex) 113 | # group(0) has the full matched string 114 | print(m.group(0)) 115 | # group(1) has the first string in parentheses: 116 | lastname = m.group(1) 117 | print lastname 118 | 119 | # Now let's get the party, in caps b/w parentheses: 120 | re.search(r'\(([A-Z]+)\)', ex) 121 | 122 | m=re.search(r'\(([A-Z]+)\)', ex) 123 | party = m.group(1) 124 | print party 125 | 126 | 127 | ### Finally, we want to write to csv: 128 | f= csv.writer(open("example1.csv", "w")) 129 | f.writerow(["PresVPcand","lastname","party","votes","county","precinct"]) # Write column headers as the first line 130 | 131 | 132 | rowout = [a, lastname, party, b, county, precinct] 133 | print rowout 134 | 135 | 136 | ######## Other 137 | 138 | print soup.head 139 | print soup.title 140 | print soup.body 141 | 142 | 143 | 144 | 145 | f.writerow([a, lastname, party, b, county, precinct]) 146 | 147 | 148 | 149 | 150 | #### House #################################### 151 | f= csv.writer(open("house.csv", "w")) 152 | f.writerow(["HouseCandidate", "votes"]) # Write column headers as the first line 153 | 154 | house = res[2] 155 | 156 | for row in house.find_all("tr"): 157 | tds = row.find_all("td") 158 | try: 159 | a = str(tds[0].get_text()) 160 | b = str(tds[1].get_text()) 161 | 162 | except: 163 | print "bad string" 164 | continue 165 | 166 | f.writerow([a, b]) 167 | 168 | 169 | 170 | 171 | 172 | ######## Senate ##################### 173 | f= csv.writer(open("house.csv", "w")) 174 | f.writerow(["HouseCandidate", "votes"]) # Write column headers as the first line 175 | 176 | sen = res[1] 177 | 178 | for row in sen.find_all("tr"): 179 | tds = row.find_all("td") 180 | try: 181 | a = str(tds[0].get_text()) 182 | b = str(tds[1].get_text()) 183 | # c = str(tds[2].get_text()) 184 | # d = str(tds[3].get_text()) 185 | except: 186 | print "bad string" 187 | continue 188 | 189 | f.writerow([a, b]) 190 | 191 | ########################## 192 | 193 | for res in soup.findAll('div', {'class': 'res'}): 194 | for row in res.find_all("tr"): 195 | tds = row.find_all("td") 196 | try: 197 | a = str(tds[0].get_text()) 198 | b = str(tds[1].get_text()) 199 | c = str(tds[2].get_text()) 200 | d = str(tds[3].get_text()) 201 | except: 202 | print "bad string" 203 | continue 204 | 205 | print ([a, b, c, d]) 206 | f.writerow([a, b, c, d]) 207 | 208 | 209 | 210 | ###################################################################### 211 | #################################################################### 212 | # approach 2 213 | 214 | tbls = soup.find_all('table') 215 | len(tbls) 216 | 217 | tables = soup.find_all('table') 218 | 219 | len(tables) 220 | 221 | # look at: 222 | tables[0].get_text() 223 | tables[2].get_text() 224 | tables[3].get_text() 225 | tables[4].get_text() 226 | tables[5].get_text() 227 | 228 | 229 | # useful tables are 0, 2, 4, 6-9 as content and 5 as header 230 | 231 | 232 | res = tbls[-2] 233 | 234 | 235 | t0 = tables[0] 236 | rows = t0.find_all("tr") #find all of the table rows 237 | 238 | for row in rows: 239 | tds = row.find_all("td") 240 | 241 | try: 242 | a = str(tds[0].get_text()) 243 | b = str(tds[1].get_text()) 244 | c = str(tds[2].get_text()) 245 | d = str(tds[3].get_text()) 246 | except: 247 | print "bad string" 248 | continue 249 | 250 | print ([a, b, c, d]) 251 | f.writerow([a, b, c, d]) 252 | 253 | 254 | 255 | 256 | ################################################### 257 | 258 | #rogue = soup.find(width="950") 259 | #rogue.decompose() 260 | 261 | #dat = [ map(str, row.findAll("td")) for row in res.findAll("tr") ] 262 | 263 | 264 | 265 | 266 | 267 | 268 | 269 | f.writerow(["a", "b", "c", "d"]) # Write column headers as the first line 270 | 271 | ###### decompose unneeded tables (no unique identifying chars) 272 | 273 | final_link = soup.p.a 274 | final_link.decompose() 275 | 276 | rows = soup.find_all("tr") #find all of the table rows 277 | 278 | for row in rows: 279 | tds = row.find_all("td") 280 | 281 | try: #we are using "try" because the table is not well formatted. This allows the program to continue after encountering an error. 282 | a = str(tds[0].get_text()) 283 | b = str(tds[1].get_text()) 284 | c = str(tds[2].get_text()) 285 | d = str(tds[3].get_text()) 286 | # e = tds[4].get_text() 287 | # f = tds[5].get_text() 288 | # g = tds[6].get_text() 289 | # h = tds[7].get_text() 290 | # i = tds[8].get_text() 291 | except: 292 | print "bad string" 293 | continue 294 | 295 | print ([a, b, c, d]) 296 | f.writerow([a, b, c, d]) 297 | 298 | 299 | 300 | ################################################################### 301 | width="100%" 302 | 303 | rows = soup.find_all("tr") #find all of the table rows 304 | 305 | for row in rows: 306 | tds = row.find_all("td") 307 | 308 | try: #we are using "try" because the table is not well formatted. This allows the program to continue after encountering an error. 309 | first = str(tds[0].get_text()) # This structure isolate the item by its column in the table and converts it into a string. 310 | second = str(tds[1].get_text()) 311 | third = str(tds[2].get_text()) 312 | fourth = str(tds[3].get_text()) 313 | fifth = str(tds[4].get_text()) 314 | sixth = tds[5].get_text() 315 | 316 | except: 317 | print "bad string" 318 | continue 319 | 320 | 321 | for tr in trs: 322 | for link in tr.find_all('a'): 323 | #this is a bit tricky - you are combining the search for anchor tags and the for loop in one step 324 | fullLink = link.get('href') #get the value of the href 325 | 326 | tds = tr.find_all("td") #run another search for all of the table data 327 | 328 | try: #we are using "try" because the table is not well formatted. This allows the program to continue after encountering an error. 329 | names = str(tds[0].get_text()) # This structure isolate the item by its column in the table and converts it into a string. 330 | years = str(tds[1].get_text()) 331 | positions = str(tds[2].get_text()) 332 | parties = str(tds[3].get_text()) 333 | states = str(tds[4].get_text()) 334 | congress = tds[5].get_text() 335 | 336 | 337 | except: 338 | print "bad tr string" 339 | continue #This tells the computer to move on to the next item after it encounters an error 340 | 341 | f.writerow([names, years, positions, parties, states, congress, fullLink]) 342 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Duelfer_text.txt: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 |   2 |   3 |   4 |   5 |   6 |   7 |   8 |   9 |   10 |   11 |   12 | 13 |   14 |   15 | 16 |   17 |   18 |   19 |   20 |   21 | Comprehensive Report 22 | of the Special Advisor to the DCI on 23 | Iraq’s WMD With 24 | Addendums 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | [Excerpted Key Findings from the “Duelfer Report”] 33 | 34 | [30 September 2004] 35 | 30 September 2004 36 | 37 | 38 | 39 | c 40 | i 41 | g 42 | e 43 | t 44 | a 45 | t 46 | r 47 | n 48 | t 49 | e 50 | S 51 | t 52 | 53 | n 54 | e 55 | I 56 | m 57 | 58 | i 59 | g 60 | e 61 | R 62 | 63 | Regime Strategic Intent 64 | 65 | Key Findings 66 | 67 | Saddam Husayn so dominated the Iraqi Regime that its strategic intent was his alone. He wanted to end 68 | sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when 69 | sanctions were lifted. 70 | 71 | (cid:127) Saddam totally dominated the Regime’s strategic decision making. He initiated most of the strategic 72 | thinking upon which decisions were made, whether in matters of war and peace (such as invading Kuwait), 73 | maintaining WMD as a national strategic goal, or on how Iraq was to position itself in the international com- 74 | munity. Loyal dissent was discouraged and constructive variations to the implementation of his wishes on 75 | strategic issues were rare. Saddam was the Regime in a strategic sense and his intent became Iraq’s strategic 76 | policy. 77 | 78 | (cid:127) Saddam’s primary goal from 1991 to 2003 was to have UN sanctions lifted, while maintaining the security 79 | of the Regime. He sought to balance the need to cooperate with UN inspections—to gain support for lifting 80 | sanctions—with his intention to preserve Iraq’s intellectual capital for WMD with a minimum of foreign 81 | intrusiveness and loss of face. Indeed, this remained the goal to the end of the Regime, as the starting of any 82 | WMD program, conspicuous or otherwise, risked undoing the progress achieved in eroding sanctions and 83 | jeopardizing a political end to the embargo and international monitoring. 84 | 85 | (cid:127) The introduction of the Oil-For-Food program (OFF) in late 1996 was a key turning point for the Regime. 86 | OFF rescued Baghdad’s economy from a terminal decline created by sanctions. The Regime quickly came 87 | to see that OFF could be corrupted to acquire foreign exchange both to further undermine sanctions and to 88 | provide the means to enhance dual-use infrastructure and potential WMD-related development. 89 | 90 | (cid:127) By 2000-2001, Saddam had managed to mitigate many of the effects of sanctions and undermine their 91 | international support. Iraq was within striking distance of a de facto end to the sanctions regime, both in 92 | terms of oil exports and the trade embargo, by the end of 1999. 93 | 94 | Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq’s WMD capability—which was essentially destroyed in 1991—after sanc- 95 | tions were removed and Iraq’s economy stabilized, but probably with a different mix of capabilities to that 96 | which previously existed. Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capability—in an incremental fashion, 97 | irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risks—but he intended to focus on ballistic 98 | missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities. 99 | 100 | (cid:127) Iran was the pre-eminent motivator of this policy. All senior level Iraqi offi cials considered Iran to be Iraq’s 101 | principal enemy in the region. The wish to balance Israel and acquire status and infl uence in the Arab world 102 | were also considerations, but secondary. 103 | 104 | (cid:127) Iraq Survey Group (ISG) judges that events in the 1980s and early 1990s shaped Saddam’s belief in the 105 | value of WMD. In Saddam’s view, WMD helped to save the Regime multiple times. He believed that during 106 | the Iran-Iraq war chemical weapons had halted Iranian ground offensives and that ballistic missile attacks 107 | on Tehran had broken its political will. Similarly, during Desert Storm, Saddam believed WMD had deterred 108 | Coalition Forces from pressing their attack beyond the goal of freeing Kuwait. WMD had even played a role 109 | in crushing the Shi’a revolt in the south following the 1991 cease-fi re. 110 | 111 | (cid:127) The former Regime had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions. Neither 112 | was there an identifi able group of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam. Instead, his lieu- 113 | tenants understood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with Saddam and his infrequent, 114 | but fi rm, verbal comments and directions to them. 115 | 116 | 1 117 | 118 | Note on Methodological Approach 119 | 120 | Interviews with former Regime offi cials who were active in Iraq’s governing, economic, security, and intel- 121 | ligence structures were critical to ISG’s assessment of the former Regime’s WMD strategy. While some 122 | detainees’ statements were made to minimize their involvement or culpability leading to potential prosecution, 123 | in some cases those who were interviewed spoke relatively candidly and at length about the Regime’s strategic 124 | intent. 125 | 126 | (cid:127) ISG analysts—because of unprecedented access to detainees—undertook interviews of national policy 127 | makers, the leadership of the intelligence and security services, and Qusay’s inner circle, as well as concen- 128 | trated debriefs of core Regime leaders in custody, to identify cross-Regime issues and perceptions. 129 | 130 | (cid:127) As part of the effort aimed at the core leadership, analysts also gave detainees “homework” to give them 131 | more opportunity to discuss in writing various aspects of former Regime strategy. Many of these responses 132 | were lengthy and detailed. Secretary of the President, ‘Abd Hamid Al Khatab Al Nasiri, Deputy Prime 133 | Minister Tariq ‘Aziz ‘Aysa, and Minister of Military Industry ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh 134 | answered questions in writing several times, providing information on both the former Regime and the mind- 135 | set of those who ran it. 136 | 137 | (cid:127) Saddam’s debriefer was fully aware of ISG’s information needs and developed a strategy to elicit candid 138 | answers and insights into Saddam’s personality and role in strategy-related issues. Remarks from the 139 | debriefer are included. 140 | 141 | (cid:127) Analysts also used working groups to study themes and trends—such as intelligence and security service 142 | activity, weaponization, dual-use/break-out capabilities and timeline analysis—that cut across ISG’s func- 143 | tional teams, as well as to pool efforts to debrief members of the core leadership. 144 | 145 | Analysts used subsource development and document exploitation to crosscheck detainee testimony, lever- 146 | age detainees in debriefs, and to fi ll gaps in information. For example, analysts interviewing Huwaysh gained 147 | insights into his personality from subsources, while translated technical and procurement-related documents 148 | were critical to verifying the accuracy of his testimony. Likewise, we confronted Vice President Taha Yasin 149 | Ramadan Al Jizrawi with a captured document indicating his major role in allocating oil contracts and he 150 | divulged details on corruption stemming from the UN’s OFF program. 151 | 152 | Nonetheless, the interview process had several shortcomings. Detainees were very concerned about their fate 153 | and therefore would not be willing to implicate themselves in sensitive matters of interest such as WMD, in 154 | light of looming prosecutions. Debriefers noted the use of passive interrogation resistance techniques collec- 155 | tively by a large number of detainees to avoid their involvement or knowledge of sensitive issues; place blame 156 | or knowledge with individuals who were not in a position to contradict the detainee’s statements, such as 157 | deceased individuals or individuals who were not in custody or who had fl ed the country; and provide debrief- 158 | ers with previously known information. However, the reader should keep in mind the Arab proverb: “Even a 159 | liar tells many truths.” 160 | 161 | Some former Regime offi cials, such as ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid Al Tikriti (Chemical ‘Ali), never gave substantial 162 | information, despite speaking colorfully and at length. He never discussed actions, which would implicate him 163 | in a crime. Moreover, for some aspects of the Regime’s WMD strategy, like the role of the Military Industri- 164 | alization Commission (MIC), analysts could only speak with a few senior-level offi cials, which limited ISG’s 165 | assessment to the perspectives of these individuals. 166 | 167 | 2 168 | 169 | Former Iraqi Regime Offi cials Varied in Their Level of Cooperation 170 | 171 | The quality of cooperation and assistance provided to ISG by former senior Iraqi Regime offi cials in custody 172 | varied widely. Some obstructed all attempts to elicit information on WMD and illicit activities of the former 173 | Regime. Others, however, were keen to help clarify every issue, sometimes to the point of self-incrimination. 174 | The two extremes of cooperation are epitomized by ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid—a key Presidential Adviser and RCC 175 | member—and Sabir ‘Abd-al-Aziz Husayn Al Duri, a former Lieutenant General who served in both the Direc- 176 | torate of General Military Intelligence and the Iraqi Intelligence Service. ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid was loquacious 177 | on many subjects, but remained adamant in denying any involvement in the use of CW in attacks on the Kurds 178 | and dissembling in any discussion of the subject. His circumlocution extends to most other sensitive subjects of 179 | Regime behavior. By contrast, Sabir has been forthcoming to the point of direct association with a wide range 180 | of Iraqi activities, including the management of Kuwaiti prisoners, the organization of assassinations abroad 181 | by the former Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), and the torture of political prisoners. 182 | 183 | c 184 | i 185 | g 186 | e 187 | t 188 | a 189 | t 190 | r 191 | n 192 | t 193 | e 194 | S 195 | t 196 | 197 | n 198 | e 199 | I 200 | m 201 | 202 | i 203 | g 204 | e 205 | R 206 | 207 | 3 208 | 209 | t 210 | e 211 | n 212 | c 213 | e 214 | n 215 | m 216 | a 217 | e 218 | n 219 | r 220 | i 221 | u 222 | F 223 | c 224 | 225 | e 226 | o 227 | m 228 | r 229 | P 230 | i 231 | g 232 | 233 | d 234 | e 235 | n 236 | R 237 | a 238 | 239 | Regime Finance 240 | and Procurement 241 | 242 | Key Findings 243 | 244 | Throughout the 1990s and up to OIF (March 2003), Saddam focused on one set of objectives: the survival of 245 | himself, his Regime, and his legacy. To secure those objectives, Saddam needed to exploit Iraqi oil assets, to 246 | portray a strong military capability to deter internal and external threats, and to foster his image as an Arab 247 | leader. Saddam recognized that the reconstitution of Iraqi WMD enhanced both his security and image. Conse- 248 | quently, Saddam needed to end UN-imposed sanctions to fulfi ll his goals. 249 | 250 | Saddam severely under estimated the economic and military costs of invading Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 251 | 1990, as well as underestimating the subsequent international condemnation of his invasion of Kuwait. He did 252 | not anticipate this condemnation, nor the subsequent imposition, comprehensiveness, severity, and longev- 253 | ity of UN sanctions. His initial belief that UN sanctions would not last, resulting in his country’s economic 254 | decline, changed by 1998 when the UNSC did not lift sanctions after he believed resolutions were fulfi lled. 255 | Although Saddam had reluctantly accepted the UN’s Oil for Food (OFF) program by 1996, he soon recog- 256 | nized its economic value and additional opportunities for further manipulation and infl uence of the UNSC Iraq 257 | 661 Sanctions Committee member states. Therefore, he resigned himself to the continuation of UN sanctions 258 | understanding that they would become a “paper tiger” regardless of continued US resolve to maintain them. 259 | 260 | Throughout sanctions, Saddam continually directed his advisors to formulate and implement strategies, poli- 261 | cies, and methods to terminate the UN’s sanctions regime established by UNSCR 661. The Regime devised an 262 | effective diplomatic and economic strategy of generating revenue and procuring illicit goods utilizing the Iraqi 263 | intelligence, banking, industrial, and military apparatus that eroded United Nations’ member states and other 264 | international players’ resolve to enforce compliance, while capitalizing politically on its humanitarian crisis. 265 | 266 | • From Saddam’s perspective, UN sanctions hindered his ability to rule Iraq with complete authority and 267 | autonomy. In the long run, UN sanctions also interfered with his efforts to establish a historic legacy. 268 | According to Saddam and his senior advisors, the UN, at the behest of the US, placed an economic 269 | strangle hold on Iraq. The UN controlled Saddam’s main source of revenue (oil exports) and determined 270 | what Iraq could import. 271 | 272 | • UN sanctions curbed Saddam’s ability to import weapons, technology, and expertise into Iraq. Sanctions also 273 | limited his ability to fi nance his military, intelligence, and security forces to deal with his perceived and real 274 | external threats. 275 | 276 | • In short, Saddam considered UN sanctions as a form of economic war and the UN’s OFF program and 277 | Northern and Southern Watch Operations as campaigns of that larger economic war orchestrated by the US 278 | and UK. His evolving strategy centered on breaking free of UN sanctions in order to liberate his economy 279 | from the economic strangle-hold so he could continue to pursue his political and personal objectives. 280 | 281 | One aspect of Saddam’s strategy of unhinging the UN’s sanctions against Iraq, centered on Saddam’s efforts 282 | to infl uence certain UN SC permanent members, such as Russia, France, and China and some nonpermanent 283 | (Syria, Ukraine) members to end UN sanctions. Under Saddam’s orders, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 284 | (MFA) formulated and implemented a strategy aimed at these UNSC members and international public 285 | opinion with the purpose of ending UN sanctions and undermining its subsequent OFF program by diplo- 286 | matic and economic means. At a minimum, Saddam wanted to divide the fi ve permanent members and foment 287 | international public support of Iraq at the UN and throughout the world by a savvy public relations campaign 288 | and an extensive diplomatic effort. 289 | 290 | Another element of this strategy involved circumventing UN sanctions and the OFF program by means of 291 | “Protocols” or government-to-government economic trade agreements. Protocols allowed Saddam to gener- 292 | ate a large amount of revenue outside the purview of the UN. The successful implementation of the Protocols, 293 | continued oil smuggling efforts, and the manipulation of UN OFF contracts emboldened Saddam to pursue his 294 | military reconstitution efforts starting in 1997 and peaking in 2001. These efforts covered conventional arms, 295 | dual-use goods acquisition, and some WMD-related programs. 296 | 297 | 1 298 | 299 | • Once money began to fl ow into Iraq, the Regime’s authorities, aided by foreign companies and some foreign 300 | governments, devised and implemented methods and techniques to procure illicit goods from foreign suppli- 301 | ers. 302 | 303 | • To implement its procurement efforts, Iraq under Saddam, created a network of Iraqi front companies, some 304 | with close relationships to high-ranking foreign government offi cials. These foreign government offi cials, in 305 | turn, worked through their respective ministries, state-run companies and ministry-sponsored front compa- 306 | nies, to procure illicit goods, services, and technologies for Iraq’s WMD-related, conventional arms, and/or 307 | dual-use goods programs. 308 | 309 | • The Regime fi nanced these government-sanctioned programs by several illicit revenue streams that 310 | amassed more that $11 billion from the early 1990s to OIF outside the UN-approved methods. The most 311 | profi table stream concerned Protocols or government-to-government agreements that generated over $7.5 312 | billion for Saddam. Iraq earned an additional $2 billion from kickbacks or surcharges associated with the 313 | UN’s OFF program; $990 million from oil “cash sales” or smuggling; and another $230 million from other 314 | surcharge impositions. 315 | 316 | Analysis of Iraqi Financial Data 317 | 318 | The Iraqi revenue analysis presented in this report is based on government documents and fi nancial databases, 319 | spreadsheets, and other records obtained from SOMO, the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, and the Central Bank of Iraq 320 | (CBI), and other Ministries. These sources appear to be of good quality and consistent with other pre- and 321 | post-Operation Iraqi Freedom information. All Iraqi revenue data and derived fi gures in this report have been 322 | calculated in current dollars. 323 | 324 | Saddam directed the Regime’s key ministries and governmental agencies to devise and implement strategies, 325 | policies, and techniques to discredit the UN sanctions, harass UN personnel in Iraq, and discredit the US. At 326 | the same time, according to reporting, he also wanted to obfuscate Iraq’s refusal to reveal the nature of its 327 | WMD and WMD-related programs, their capabilities, and his intentions. 328 | 329 | • Saddam used the IIS to undertake the most sensitive procurement missions. Consequently, the IIS facili- 330 | tated the import of UN sanctioned and dual-use goods into Iraq through countries like Syria, Jordan, 331 | Belarus and Turkey. 332 | 333 | • The IIS had representatives in most of Iraq’s embassies in these foreign countries using a variety of offi cial 334 | covers. One type of cover was the “commercial attaches” that were sent to make contacts with foreign busi- 335 | nesses. The attaches set up front companies, facilitated the banking process and transfers of funds as deter- 336 | mined, and approved by the senior offi cials within the Government. 337 | 338 | • The MFA played a critical role in facilitating Iraq’s procurement of military goods, dual-use goods pertain- 339 | ing to WMD, transporting cash and other valuable goods earned by illicit oil revenue, and forming and 340 | implementing a diplomatic strategy to end UN sanctions and the subsequent UN OFF program by nefarious 341 | means. 342 | 343 | • Saddam used the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientifi c Research (MHESR) through its universities 344 | and research programs to maintain, develop, and acquire expertise, to advance or preserve existent research 345 | projects and developments, and to procure goods prohibited by UN SC sanctions. 346 | 347 | • The Ministry of Oil (MoO) controlled the oil voucher distribution program that used oil to infl uence UN 348 | members to support Iraq’s goals. Saddam personally approved and removed all names of voucher recipi- 349 | 350 | 2 351 | 352 | ents. He made all modifi cations to the list, adding or deleting names at will. Other senior Iraqi leaders 353 | could nominate or recommend an individual or organization to be added or subtracted from the voucher list, 354 | and ad hoc allocation committees met to review and update the allocations. 355 | 356 | Iraq under Saddam successfully devised various methods to acquire and import items prohibited under UN 357 | sanctions. Numerous Iraqi and foreign trade intermediaries disguised illicit items, hid the identity of the end 358 | user, and/or changed the fi nal destination of the commodity to get it to the region. For a cut of the profi ts, 359 | these trade intermediaries moved, and in many cases smuggled, the prohibited items through land, sea, and air 360 | entry points along the Iraqi border. 361 | 362 | By mid-2000 the exponential growth of Iraq’s illicit revenue, increased international sympathy for Iraq’s 363 | humanitarian plight, and increased complicity by Iraqi’s neighbors led elements within Saddam’s Regime to 364 | boast that the UN sanctions were slowly eroding. In July 2000, the ruling Iraqi Ba’athist paper, Al-Thawrah, 365 | claimed victory over UN sanctions, stating that Iraq was accelerating its pace to develop its national economy 366 | despite the UN “blockade.” In August 2001, Iraqi Foreign Minister Sabri stated in an Al-Jazirah TV interview 367 | that UN sanctions efforts had collapsed at the same time Baghdad had been making steady progress on its eco- 368 | nomic, military, Arab relations, and international affairs. 369 | 370 | • Companies in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, UAE, and Yemen assisted Saddam with the acquisition of pro- 371 | hibited items through deceptive trade practices. In the case of Syria and Yemen, this included support from 372 | agencies or personnel within the government itself. 373 | 374 | • Numerous ministries in Saddam’s Regime facilitated the smuggling of illicit goods through Iraq’s borders, 375 | ports, and airports. The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and the Military Industiralization Commission (MIC), 376 | however, were directly responsible for skirting UN monitoring and importing prohibited items for Saddam. 377 | 378 | t 379 | e 380 | n 381 | c 382 | e 383 | n 384 | m 385 | a 386 | e 387 | n 388 | r 389 | i 390 | u 391 | F 392 | c 393 | 394 | e 395 | o 396 | m 397 | r 398 | P 399 | i 400 | g 401 | 402 | d 403 | e 404 | n 405 | R 406 | a 407 | 408 | 3 409 | 410 | Delivery Systems 411 | 412 | Key Findings 413 | 414 | Since the early 1970s, Iraq has consistently sought to acquire an effective long-range weapons delivery 415 | capability, and by 1991 Baghdad had purchased the missiles and infrastructure that would form the basis 416 | for nearly all of its future missile system developments. The Soviet Union was a key supplier of missile hard- 417 | ware and provided 819 Scud-B missiles and ground support equipment. 418 | 419 | Iraq’s experiences with long-range delivery systems in the Iran/Iraq war were a vital lesson to Iraqi Presi- 420 | dent Saddam Husayn. The successful Iraqi response to the Iranian long-range bombardment of Baghdad, lead- 421 | ing to the War of the Cities, probably saved Saddam. 422 | 423 | By 1991, Iraq had successfully demonstrated its ability to modify some of its delivery systems to increase 424 | their range and to develop WMD dissemination options, with the Al Husayn being a fi rst step in this direc- 425 | tion. The next few years of learning and experiments confi rmed that the Regime’s goal was for an effective 426 | long-range WMD delivery capability and demonstrated the resourcefulness of Iraq’s scientists and technicians. 427 | 428 | Iraq failed in its efforts to acquire longer-range delivery systems to replace inventory exhausted in the 429 | Iran/Iraq war. This was a forcing function that drove Iraq to develop indigenous delivery system production 430 | capabilities. 431 | 432 | Desert Storm and subsequent UN resolutions and inspections brought many of Iraq’s delivery system 433 | programs to a halt. While much of Iraq’s long-range missile inventory and production infrastructure was 434 | eliminated, Iraq until late 1991 kept some items hidden to assist future reconstitution of the force. This deci- 435 | sion and Iraq’s intransigence during years of inspection left many UN questions unresolved. 436 | 437 | • Coalition airstrikes effectively targeted much of Iraq’s delivery systems infrastructure, and UN inspections 438 | dramatically impeded further developments of long-range ballistic missiles. 439 | 440 | • It appears to have taken time, but Iraq eventually realized that sanctions were not going to end quickly. 441 | This forced Iraq to sacrifi ce its long-range delivery force in an attempt to bring about a quick end to the sanc- 442 | tions. 443 | 444 | • After the fl ight of Husayn Kamil in 1995, Iraq admitted that it had hidden Scud-variant missiles and compo- 445 | nents to aid future reconstitution but asserted that these items had been unilaterally destroyed by late 1991. 446 | The UN could not verify these claims and thereafter became more wary of Iraq’s admissions and instituted a 447 | Regime of more intrusive inspections. 448 | 449 | • The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) has uncovered no evidence Iraq retained Scud-variant missiles, and debrief- 450 | ings of Iraqi offi cials in addition to some documentation suggest that Iraq did not retain such missiles 451 | after 1991. 452 | 453 | While other WMD programs were strictly prohibited, the UN permitted Iraq to develop and possess delivery 454 | systems provided their range did not exceed 150 km. This freedom allowed Iraq to keep its scientists and tech- 455 | nicians employed and to keep its infrastructure and manufacturing base largely intact by pursuing programs 456 | nominally in compliance with the UN limitations. This positioned Iraq for a potential breakout capability. 457 | 458 | • Between 1991 and 1998, Iraq had declared development programs underway for liquid- and solid-propellant 459 | ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). 460 | 461 | Iraq’s decisions in 1996 to accept the Oil-For-Food program (OFF) and later in 1998 to cease coopera- 462 | tion with UNSCOM and IAEA spurred a period of increased activity in delivery systems development. The 463 | 464 | s 465 | m 466 | e 467 | t 468 | s 469 | y 470 | S 471 | 472 | y 473 | r 474 | e 475 | v 476 | i 477 | l 478 | e 479 | D 480 | 481 | 1 482 | 483 | pace of ongoing missile programs accelerated, and the Regime authorized its scientists to design missiles with 484 | ranges in excess of 150 km that, if developed, would have been clear violations of UNSCR 687. 485 | 486 | • By 2002, Iraq had provided the liquid-propellant Al Samud II—a program started in 2001—and the solid- 487 | propellant Al Fat’h to the military and was pursuing a series of new small UAV systems. 488 | 489 | • ISG uncovered Iraqi plans or designs for three long-range ballistic missiles with ranges from 400 to 1,000 490 | km and for a 1,000-km-range cruise missile, although none of these systems progressed to production and 491 | only one reportedly passed the design phase. ISG assesses that these plans demonstrate Saddam’s continu- 492 | ing desire—up to the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)—for a long-range delivery capability. 493 | 494 | Procurements supporting delivery system programs expanded after the 1998 departure of the UN inspectors. 495 | Iraq also hired outside expertise to assist its development programs. 496 | 497 | • ISG uncovered evidence that technicians and engineers from Russia reviewed the designs and assisted devel- 498 | opment of the Al Samud II during its rapid evolution. ISG also found that Iraq had entered into negotiations 499 | with North Korean and Russian entities for more capable missile systems. 500 | 501 | • According to contract information exploited by ISG, Iraq imported at least 380 SA-2/Volga liquid-propellant 502 | engines from Poland and possibly Russia or Belarus. While Iraq claims these engines were for the Al Samud 503 | II program, the numbers involved appear in excess of immediate requirements, suggesting they could have 504 | supported the longer range missiles using clusters of SA-2 engines. Iraq also imported missile guidance and 505 | control systems from entities in countries like Belarus, Russia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). 506 | (Note: FRY is currently known as Serbia and Montenegro but is referred to as FRY in this section.) 507 | 508 | In late 2002 Iraq was under increasing pressure from the international community to allow UN inspectors 509 | to return. Iraq in November accepted UNSCR 1441 and invited inspectors back into the country. In Decem- 510 | ber Iraq presented to the UN its Currently Accurate, Full, and Complete Declaration (CAFCD) in response to 511 | UNSCR 1441. 512 | 513 | • While the CAFCD was judged to be incomplete and a rehash of old information, it did provide details on the 514 | Al Samud II, Al Fat’h, new missile-related facilities, and new small UAV designs. 515 | 516 | • In February 2003 the UN convened an expert panel to discuss the Al Samud II and Al Fat’h programs, which 517 | resulted in the UN’s decision to prohibit the Al Samud II and order its destruction. Missile destruction began 518 | in early March but was incomplete when the inspectors were withdrawn later that month. 519 | 520 | The CAFCD and United Nations Monitoring, Verifi cation, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) inspec- 521 | tions provided a brief glimpse into what Iraq had accomplished in four years without an international presence 522 | on the ground. 523 | 524 | Given Iraq’s investments in technology and infrastructure improvements, an effective procurement network, 525 | skilled scientists, and designs already on the books for longer range missiles, ISG assesses that Saddam 526 | clearly intended to reconstitute long-range delivery systems and that the systems potentially were for WMD. 527 | 528 | • Iraq built a new and larger liquid-rocket engine test stand capable, with some modifi cation, of supporting 529 | engines or engine clusters larger than the single SA-2 engine used in the Al Samud II. 530 | 531 | • Iraq built or refurbished solid-propellant facilities and equipment, including a large propellant mixer, an 532 | aging oven, and a casting pit that could support large diameter motors. 533 | 534 | • Iraq’s investing in studies into new propellants and manufacturing technologies demonstrated its desire for 535 | more capable or effective delivery systems. 536 | 537 | 2 538 | 539 | Nuclear 540 | 541 | Key Findings 542 | 543 | Iraq Survey Group (ISG) discovered further evidence of the maturity and signifi cance of the pre-1991 544 | Iraqi Nuclear Program but found that Iraq’s ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program progres- 545 | sively decayed after that date. 546 | 547 | (cid:127) Saddam Husayn ended the nuclear program in 1991 following the Gulf war. ISG found no evidence to sug- 548 | gest concerted efforts to restart the program. 549 | 550 | (cid:127) Although Saddam clearly assigned a high value to the nuclear progress and talent that had been developed up 551 | to the 1991 war, the program ended and the intellectual capital decayed in the succeeding years. 552 | 553 | Nevertheless, after 1991, Saddam did express his intent to retain the intellectual capital developed 554 | during the Iraqi Nuclear Program. Senior Iraqis—several of them from the Regime’s inner circle—told ISG 555 | they assumed Saddam would restart a nuclear program once UN sanctions ended. 556 | 557 | (cid:127) Saddam indicated that he would develop the weapons necessary to counter any Iranian threat. 558 | 559 | Initially, Saddam chose to conceal his nuclear program in its entirety, as he did with Iraq’s BW pro- 560 | gram. Aggressive UN inspections after Desert Storm forced Saddam to admit the existence of the pro- 561 | gram and destroy or surrender components of the program. 562 | 563 | In the wake of Desert Storm, Iraq took steps to conceal key elements of its program and to preserve 564 | what it could of the professional capabilities of its nuclear scientifi c community. 565 | 566 | (cid:127) Baghdad undertook a variety of measures to conceal key elements of its nuclear program from successive 567 | UN inspectors, including specifi c direction by Saddam Husayn to hide and preserve documentation associ- 568 | ated with Iraq’s nuclear program. 569 | 570 | (cid:127) ISG, for example, uncovered two specifi c instances in which scientists involved in uranium enrichment kept 571 | documents and technology. Although apparently acting on their own, they did so with the belief and anticipa- 572 | tion of resuming uranium enrichment efforts in the future. 573 | 574 | (cid:127) Starting around 1992, in a bid to retain the intellectual core of the former weapons program, Baghdad 575 | transferred many nuclear scientists to related jobs in the Military Industrial Commission (MIC). The work 576 | undertaken by these scientists at the MIC helped them maintain their weapons knowledge base. 577 | 578 | As with other WMD areas, Saddam’s ambitions in the nuclear area were secondary to his prime objec- 579 | tive of ending UN sanctions. 580 | 581 | (cid:127) Iraq, especially after the defection of Husayn Kamil in 1995, sought to persuade the IAEA that Iraq had met 582 | the UN’s disarmament requirements so sanctions would be lifted. 583 | 584 | ISG found a limited number of post-1995 activities that would have aided the reconstitution of the 585 | nuclear weapons program once sanctions were lifted. 586 | 587 | (cid:127) The activities of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission sustained some talent and limited research with poten- 588 | tial relevance to a reconstituted nuclear program. 589 | 590 | r 591 | a 592 | e 593 | l 594 | c 595 | u 596 | N 597 | 598 | 1 599 | 600 | (cid:127) Specifi c projects, with signifi cant development, such as the efforts to build a rail gun and a copper vapor 601 | laser could have been useful in a future effort to restart a nuclear weapons program, but ISG found no indica- 602 | tions of such purpose. As funding for the MIC and the IAEC increased after the introduction of the Oil-for- 603 | Food program, there was some growth in programs that involved former nuclear weapons scientists and 604 | engineers. 605 | 606 | (cid:127) The Regime prevented scientists from the former nuclear weapons program from leaving either their jobs or 607 | Iraq. Moreover, in the late 1990s, personnel from both MIC and the IAEC received signifi cant pay raises in 608 | a bid to retain them, and the Regime undertook new investments in university research in a bid to ensure that 609 | Iraq retained technical knowledge. 610 | 611 | 2 612 | 613 | Chemical 614 | 615 | Key Findings 616 | 617 | Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a CW effort when sanctions were lifted and conditions 618 | were judged favorable: 619 | 620 | (cid:127) Saddam and many Iraqis regarded CW as a proven weapon against an enemy’s superior numerical strength, a 621 | weapon that had saved the nation at least once already—during the Iran-Iraq war—and contributed to deter- 622 | ring the Coalition in 1991 from advancing to Baghdad. 623 | 624 | While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have been discovered, ISG judges that Iraq 625 | unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991. There are no credible indications 626 | that Baghdad resumed production of chemical munitions thereafter, a policy ISG attributes to Baghdad’s desire 627 | to see sanctions lifted, or rendered ineffectual, or its fear of force against it should WMD be discovered. 628 | 629 | (cid:127) The scale of the Iraqi conventional munitions stockpile, among other factors, precluded an examination of 630 | the entire stockpile; however, ISG inspected sites judged most likely associated with possible storage or 631 | deployment of chemical weapons. 632 | 633 | Iraq’s CW program was crippled by the Gulf war and the legitimate chemical industry, which suffered under 634 | sanctions, only began to recover in the mid-1990s. Subsequent changes in the management of key military 635 | and civilian organizations, followed by an infl ux of funding and resources, provided Iraq with the ability to 636 | reinvigorate its industrial base. 637 | 638 | (cid:127) Poor policies and management in the early 1990s left the Military Industrial Commission (MIC) fi nancially 639 | unsound and in a state of almost complete disarray. 640 | 641 | (cid:127) Saddam implemented a number of changes to the Regime’s organizational and programmatic structures after 642 | the departure of Husayn Kamil. 643 | 644 | (cid:127) Iraq’s acceptance of the Oil-for-Food (OFF) program was the foundation of Iraq’s economic recovery and 645 | sparked a fl ow of illicitly diverted funds that could be applied to projects for Iraq’s chemical industry. 646 | 647 | The way Iraq organized its chemical industry after the mid-1990s allowed it to conserve the knowledge-base 648 | needed to restart a CW program, conduct a modest amount of dual-use research, and partially recover from 649 | the decline of its production capability caused by the effects of the Gulf war and UN-sponsored destruction 650 | and sanctions. Iraq implemented a rigorous and formalized system of nationwide research and production 651 | of chemicals, but ISG will not be able to resolve whether Iraq intended the system to underpin any CW- 652 | related efforts. 653 | 654 | l 655 | a 656 | c 657 | i 658 | m 659 | e 660 | h 661 | C 662 | 663 | (cid:127) The Regime employed a cadre of trained and experienced researchers, production managers, and weaponiza- 664 | tion experts from the former CW program. 665 | 666 | (cid:127) Iraq began implementing a range of indigenous chemical production projects in 1995 and 1996. Many of 667 | these projects, while not weapons-related, were designed to improve Iraq’s infrastructure, which would have 668 | enhanced Iraq’s ability to produce CW agents if the scaled-up production processes were implemented. 669 | 670 | (cid:127) Iraq had an effective system for the procurement of items that Iraq was not allowed to acquire due to sanc- 671 | tions. ISG found no evidence that this system was used to acquire precursor chemicals in bulk; however 672 | documents indicate that dual-use laboratory equipment and chemicals were acquired through this system. 673 | 674 | 1 675 | 676 | Iraq constructed a number of new plants starting in the mid-1990s that enhanced its chemical infra- 677 | structure, although its overall industry had not fully recovered from the effects of sanctions, and had not 678 | regained pre-1991 technical sophistication or production capabilities prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom 679 | (OIF). 680 | 681 | (cid:127) ISG did not discover chemical process or production units confi gured to produce key precursors or CW 682 | agents. However, site visits and debriefs revealed that Iraq maintained its ability for reconfi guring and 683 | ‘making-do’ with available equipment as substitutes for sanctioned items. 684 | 685 | (cid:127) ISG judges, based on available chemicals, infrastructure, and scientist debriefi ngs, that Iraq at OIF probably 686 | had a capability to produce large quantities of sulfur mustard within three to six months. 687 | 688 | (cid:127) A former nerve agent expert indicated that Iraq retained the capability to produce nerve agent in signifi cant 689 | quantities within two years, given the import of required phosphorous precursors. However, we have no 690 | credible indications that Iraq acquired or attempted to acquire large quantities of these chemicals through its 691 | existing procurement networks for sanctioned items. 692 | 693 | In addition to new investment in its industry, Iraq was able to monitor the location and use of all existing dual- 694 | use process equipment. This provided Iraq the ability to rapidly reallocate key equipment for proscribed activi- 695 | ties, if required by the Regime. 696 | 697 | (cid:127) One effect of UN monitoring was to implement a national level control system for important dual-use pro- 698 | cess plants. 699 | 700 | Iraq’s historical ability to implement simple solutions to weaponization challenges allowed Iraq to retain the 701 | capability to weaponize CW agent when the need arose. Because of the risk of discovery and consequences 702 | for ending UN sanctions, Iraq would have signifi cantly jeopardized its chances of having sanctions lifted or 703 | no longer enforced if the UN or foreign entity had discovered that Iraq had undertaken any weaponization 704 | activities. 705 | 706 | (cid:127) ISG has uncovered hardware at a few military depots, which suggests that Iraq may have prototyped experi- 707 | mental CW rounds. The available evidence is insuffi cient to determine the nature of the effort or the time- 708 | frame of activities. 709 | 710 | (cid:127) Iraq could indigenously produce a range of conventional munitions, throughout the 1990s, many of which 711 | had previously been adapted for fi lling with CW agent. However, ISG has found ambiguous evidence of 712 | weaponization activities. 713 | 714 | Saddam’s Leadership Defense Plan consisted of a tactical doctrine taught to all Iraqi offi cers and included 715 | the concept of a “red-line” or last line of defense. However, ISG has no information that the plan ever 716 | included a trigger for CW use. 717 | 718 | (cid:127) Despite reported high-level discussions about the use of chemical weapons in the defense of Iraq, informa- 719 | tion acquired after OIF does not confi rm the inclusion of CW in Iraq’s tactical planning for OIF. We believe 720 | these were mostly theoretical discussions and do not imply the existence of undiscovered CW munitions. 721 | 722 | Discussions concerning WMD, particularly leading up to OIF, would have been highly compartmentalized 723 | within the Regime. ISG found no credible evidence that any fi eld elements knew about plans for CW use 724 | during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 725 | 726 | 2 727 | 728 | (cid:127) Uday—head of the Fedayeen Saddam—attempted to obtain chemical weapons for use during OIF, according 729 | to reporting, but ISG found no evidence that Iraq ever came into possession of any CW weapons. 730 | 731 | ISG uncovered information that the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) maintained throughout 1991 to 2003 732 | a set of undeclared covert laboratories to research and test various chemicals and poisons, primarily for 733 | intelligence operations. The network of laboratories could have provided an ideal, compartmented platform 734 | from which to continue CW agent R&D or small-scale production efforts, but we have no indications this was 735 | planned. (See Annex A.) 736 | 737 | (cid:127) ISG has no evidence that IIS Directorate of Criminology (M16) scientists were producing CW or BW agents 738 | in these laboratories. However, sources indicate that M16 was planning to produce several CW agents 739 | including sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and Sarin. 740 | 741 | (cid:127) Exploitations of IIS laboratories, safe houses, and disposal sites revealed no evidence of CW-related research 742 | or production, however many of these sites were either sanitized by the Regime or looted prior to OIF. Inter- 743 | views with key IIS offi cials within and outside of M16 yielded very little information about the IIS’ activities 744 | in this area. 745 | 746 | (cid:127) The existence, function, and purpose of the laboratories were never declared to the UN. 747 | 748 | (cid:127) The IIS program included the use of human subjects for testing purposes. 749 | 750 | ISG investigated a series of key pre-OIF indicators involving the possible movement and storage of chemi- 751 | cal weapons, focusing on 11 major depots assessed to have possible links to CW. A review of documents, 752 | interviews, available reporting, and site exploitations revealed alternate, plausible explanations for activities 753 | noted prior to OIF which, at the time, were believed to be CW-related. 754 | 755 | (cid:127) ISG investigated pre-OIF activities at Musayyib Ammunition Storage Depot—the storage site that was 756 | judged to have the strongest link to CW. An extensive investigation of the facility revealed that there was no 757 | CW activity, unlike previously assessed. 758 | 759 | l 760 | a 761 | c 762 | i 763 | m 764 | e 765 | h 766 | C 767 | 768 | 3 769 | 770 | Biological 771 | 772 | Key Findings 773 | 774 | The Biological Warfare (BW) program was born of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and this service 775 | retained its connections with the program either directly or indirectly throughout its existence. 776 | 777 | (cid:127) The IIS provided the BW program with security and participated in biological research, probably for its own 778 | purposes, from the beginning of Iraq’s BW effort in the early 1970s until the fi nal days of Saddam Husayn’s 779 | Regime. 780 | 781 | In 1991, Saddam Husayn regarded BW as an integral element of his arsenal of WMD weapons, and would 782 | have used it if the need arose. 783 | 784 | (cid:127) At a meeting of the Iraqi leadership immediately prior to the Gulf war in 1991, Saddam Husayn personally 785 | authorized the use of BW weapons against Israel, Saudi Arabia and US forces. Although the exact nature of 786 | the circumstances that would trigger use was not spelled out, they would appear to be a threat to the leader- 787 | ship itself or the US resorting to “unconventional harmful types of weapons.” 788 | 789 | (cid:127) Saddam envisaged all-out use. For example, all Israeli cities were to be struck and all the BW weapons at his 790 | disposal were to be used. Saddam specifi ed that the “many years” agents, presumably anthrax spores, were 791 | to be employed against his foes. 792 | 793 | ISG judges that Iraq’s actions between 1991 and 1996 demonstrate that the state intended to preserve its 794 | BW capability and return to a steady, methodical progress toward a mature BW program when and if the 795 | opportunity arose. 796 | 797 | (cid:127) ISG assesses that in 1991, Iraq clung to the objective of gaining war-winning weapons with the strategic 798 | intention of achieving the ability to project its power over much of the Middle East and beyond. Biologi- 799 | cal weapons were part of that plan. With an eye to the future and aiming to preserve some measure of its 800 | BW capability, Baghdad in the years immediately after Desert Storm sought to save what it could of its BW 801 | infrastructure and covertly continue BW research, hide evidence of that and earlier efforts, and dispose of its 802 | existing weapons stocks. 803 | 804 | (cid:127) From 1992 to 1994, Iraq greatly expanded the capability of its Al Hakam facility. Indigenously produced 5 805 | cubic meter fermentors were installed, electrical and water utilities were expanded, and massive new con- 806 | struction to house its desired 50 cubic meter fermentors were completed. 807 | 808 | (cid:127) With the economy at rock bottom in late 1995, ISG judges that Baghdad abandoned its existing BW program 809 | in the belief that it constituted a potential embarrassment, whose discovery would undercut Baghdad’s ability 810 | to reach its overarching goal of obtaining relief from UN sanctions. 811 | 812 | In practical terms, with the destruction of the Al Hakam facility, Iraq abandoned its ambition to obtain 813 | advanced BW weapons quickly. ISG found no direct evidence that Iraq, after 1996, had plans for a new BW 814 | program or was conducting BW-specifi c work for military purposes. Indeed, from the mid-1990s, despite 815 | evidence of continuing interest in nuclear and chemical weapons, there appears to be a complete absence of 816 | discussion or even interest in BW at the Presidential level. 817 | 818 | Iraq would have faced great diffi culty in re-establishing an effective BW agent production capability. Nev- 819 | ertheless, after 1996 Iraq still had a signifi cant dual-use capability—some declared—readily useful for BW 820 | if the Regime chose to use it to pursue a BW program. Moreover, Iraq still possessed its most important BW 821 | asset, the scientifi c know-how of its BW cadre. 822 | 823 | (cid:127) Any attempt to create a new BW program after 1996 would have encountered a range of major hurdles. 824 | The years following Desert Storm wrought a steady degradation of Iraq’s industrial base: new equipment 825 | and spare parts for existing machinery became diffi cult and expensive to obtain, standards of maintenance 826 | 827 | 1 828 | 829 | l 830 | a 831 | c 832 | i 833 | g 834 | o 835 | l 836 | o 837 | i 838 | B 839 | 840 | declined, staff could not receive training abroad, and foreign technical assistance was almost impossible to 841 | get. Additionally, Iraq’s infrastructure and public utilities were crumbling. New large projects, particularly 842 | if they required special foreign equipment and expertise, would attract international attention. UN monitor- 843 | ing of dual-use facilities up to the end of 1998, made their use for clandestine purpose complicated and risk 844 | laden. 845 | 846 | Depending on its scale, Iraq could have re-established an elementary BW program within a few weeks to a 847 | few months of a decision to do so, but ISG discovered no indications that the Regime was pursuing such a 848 | course. 849 | 850 | (cid:127) In spite of the diffi culties noted above, a BW capability is technically the easiest WMD to attain. Although 851 | equipment and facilities were destroyed under UN supervision in 1996, Iraq retained technical BW know- 852 | how through the scientists that were involved in the former program. ISG has also identifi ed civilian facilities 853 | and equipment in Iraq that have dual-use application that could be used for the production of agent. 854 | 855 | ISG judges that in 1991 and 1992, Iraq appears to have destroyed its undeclared stocks of BW weapons 856 | and probably destroyed remaining holdings of bulk BW agent. However ISG lacks evidence to document 857 | complete destruction. Iraq retained some BW-related seed stocks until their discovery after Operation Iraqi 858 | Freedom (OIF). 859 | 860 | (cid:127) After the passage of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 in April 1991, Iraqi leaders decided not 861 | to declare the offensive BW program and in consequence ordered all evidence of the program erased. Iraq 862 | declared that BW program personnel sanitized the facilities and destroyed the weapons and their contents. 863 | 864 | (cid:127) Iraq declared the possession of 157 aerial bombs and 25 missile warheads containing BW agent. ISG 865 | assesses that the evidence for the original number of bombs is uncertain. ISG judges that Iraq clandestinely 866 | destroyed at least 132 bombs and 25 missiles. ISG continued the efforts of the UN at the destruction site but 867 | found no remnants of further weapons. This leaves the possibility that the fragments of up to 25 bombs may 868 | remain undiscovered. Of these, any that escaped destruction would probably now only contain degraded 869 | agent. 870 | 871 | (cid:127) ISG does not have a clear account of bulk agent destruction. Offi cial Iraqi sources and BW personnel, state 872 | that Al Hakam staff destroyed stocks of bulk agent in mid 1991. However, the same personnel admit con- 873 | cealing details of the movement and destruction of bulk BW agent in the fi rst half of 1991. Iraq continued to 874 | present information known to be untrue to the UN up to OIF. Those involved did not reveal this until several 875 | months after the confl ict. 876 | 877 | (cid:127) Dr. Rihab Rashid Taha Al ‘Azzawi, head of the bacterial program claims she retained BW seed stocks until 878 | early 1992 when she destroyed them. ISG has not found a means of verifying this. Some seed stocks were 879 | retained by another Iraqi offi cial until 2003 when they were recovered by ISG. 880 | 881 | ISG is aware of BW-applicable research since 1996, but ISG judges it was not conducted in connection with 882 | a BW program. 883 | 884 | (cid:127) ISG has uncovered no evidence of illicit research conducted into BW agents by universities or 885 | research organizations. 886 | 887 | (cid:127) The work conducted on a biopesticide (Bacillus thuringiensis) at Al Hakam until 1995 would serve to main- 888 | tain the basic skills required by scientists to produce and dry anthrax spores (Bacillus anthracis) but ISG has 889 | not discovered evidence suggesting this was the Regime’s intention. However in 1991, research and produc- 890 | tion on biopesticide and single cell protein (SCP) was selected by Iraq to provide cover for Al Hakam’s role 891 | in Iraq’s BW program. Similar work conducted at the Tuwaitha Agricultural and Biological Research Center 892 | (TABRC) up to OIF also maintained skills that were applicable to BW, but again, ISG found no evidence to 893 | suggest that this was the intention. 894 | 895 | 2 896 | 897 | (cid:127) Similarly, ISG found no information to indicate that the work carried out by TABRC into Single Cell Protein 898 | (SCP) was a cover story for continuing research into the production of BW agents, such as C. botulinum and 899 | B. anthracis, after the destruction of Al Hakam through to OIF. 900 | 901 | (cid:127) TABRC conducted research and development (R&D) programs to enable indigenous manufacture of bacte- 902 | rial growth media. Although these media are suitable for the bulk production of BW agents, ISG has found 903 | no evidence to indicate that their development and testing were specifi cally for this purpose. 904 | 905 | (cid:127) Although Iraq had the basic capability to work with variola major (smallpox), ISG found no evidence that it 906 | retained any stocks of smallpox or actively conducted research into this agent for BW intentions. 907 | 908 | The IIS had a series of laboratories that conducted biological work including research into BW agents for 909 | assassination purposes until the mid-1990s. ISG has not been able to establish the scope and nature of the 910 | work at these laboratories or determine whether any of the work was related to military development of BW 911 | agent. 912 | 913 | (cid:127) The security services operated a series of laboratories in the Baghdad area. Iraq should have declared these 914 | facilities and their equipment to the UN, but they did not. Neither the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) 915 | nor the UN Monitoring, Verifi cation, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) were aware of their existence 916 | or inspected them. 917 | 918 | (cid:127) Some of the laboratories possessed equipment capable of supporting research into BW agents for military 919 | purposes, but ISG does not know whether this occurred although there is no evidence of it. The laboratories 920 | were probably the successors of the Al Salman facility, located three kilometers south of Salman Pak, which 921 | was destroyed in 1991, and they carried on many of the same activities, including forensic work. 922 | 923 | (cid:127) Under the aegis of the intelligence service, a secretive team developed assassination instruments using 924 | poisons or toxins for the Iraqi state. A small group of scientists, doctors and technicians conducted secret 925 | experiments on human beings, resulting in their deaths. The aim was probably the development of poisons, 926 | including ricin and afl atoxin to eliminate or debilitate the Regime’s opponents. It appears that testing on 927 | humans continued until the mid 1990s. There is no evidence to link these tests with the development of BW 928 | agents for military use. 929 | 930 | In spite of exhaustive investigation, ISG found no evidence that Iraq possessed, or was developing BW agent 931 | production systems mounted on road vehicles or railway wagons. 932 | 933 | (cid:127) Prior to OIF there was information indicating Iraq had planned and built a breakout BW capability, in the 934 | form of a set of mobile production units, capable of producing BW agent at short notice in suffi cient quanti- 935 | ties to weaponize. Although ISG has conducted a thorough investigation of every aspect of this information, 936 | it has not found any equipment suitable for such a program, nor has ISG positively identifi ed any sites. No 937 | documents have been uncovered. Interviews with individuals suspected of involvement have all proved 938 | negative. 939 | 940 | l 941 | a 942 | c 943 | i 944 | g 945 | o 946 | l 947 | o 948 | i 949 | B 950 | 951 | (cid:127) ISG harbors severe doubts about the source’s credibility in regards to the breakout program. 952 | 953 | (cid:127) ISG thoroughly examined two trailers captured in 2003, suspected of being mobile BW agent production 954 | units, and investigated the associated evidence. ISG judges that its Iraqi makers almost certainly designed 955 | and built the equipment exclusively for the generation of hydrogen. It is impractical to use the equipment 956 | for the production and weaponization of BW agent. ISG judges that it cannot therefore be part of any BW 957 | program. 958 | 959 | 3 960 | 961 | 962 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Duelfer.html: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
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Comprehensive Report 25 |
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Iraq’s WMD With 27 |
Addendums 28 |
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[Excerpted Key Findings from the “Duelfer Report”] 33 |
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[30 September 2004] 35 |
30 September 2004 36 |
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Regime Strategic Intent 65 |
Key Findings 66 |
Saddam Husayn so dominated the Iraqi Regime that its strategic intent was his alone. He wanted to end 67 |
sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when 68 |
sanctions were lifted. 69 |
(cid:127) Saddam totally dominated the Regime’s strategic decision making. He initiated most of the strategic 70 |
thinking upon which decisions were made, whether in matters of war and peace (such as invading Kuwait), 71 |
maintaining WMD as a national strategic goal, or on how Iraq was to position itself in the international com- 72 |
munity. Loyal dissent was discouraged and constructive variations to the implementation of his wishes on 73 |
strategic issues were rare. Saddam was the Regime in a strategic sense and his intent became Iraq’s strategic 74 |
policy. 75 |
(cid:127) Saddam’s primary goal from 1991 to 2003 was to have UN sanctions lifted, while maintaining the security 76 |
of the Regime. He sought to balance the need to cooperate with UN inspections—to gain support for lifting 77 |
sanctions—with his intention to preserve Iraq’s intellectual capital for WMD with a minimum of foreign 78 |
intrusiveness and loss of face. Indeed, this remained the goal to the end of the Regime, as the starting of any 79 |
WMD program, conspicuous or otherwise, risked undoing the progress achieved in eroding sanctions and 80 |
jeopardizing a political end to the embargo and international monitoring. 81 |
(cid:127) The introduction of the Oil-For-Food program (OFF) in late 1996 was a key turning point for the Regime. 82 |
OFF rescued Baghdad’s economy from a terminal decline created by sanctions. The Regime quickly came 83 |
to see that OFF could be corrupted to acquire foreign exchange both to further undermine sanctions and to 84 |
provide the means to enhance dual-use infrastructure and potential WMD-related development. 85 |
(cid:127) By 2000-2001, Saddam had managed to mitigate many of the effects of sanctions and undermine their 86 |
international support. Iraq was within striking distance of a de facto end to the sanctions regime, both in 87 |
terms of oil exports and the trade embargo, by the end of 1999. 88 |
Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq’s WMD capability—which was essentially destroyed in 1991—after sanc- 89 |
tions were removed and Iraq’s economy stabilized, but probably with a different mix of capabilities to that 90 |
which previously existed. Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capability—in an incremental fashion, 91 |
irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risks—but he intended to focus on ballistic 92 |
missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities. 93 |
(cid:127) Iran was the pre-eminent motivator of this policy. All senior level Iraqi offi cials considered Iran to be Iraq’s 94 |
principal enemy in the region. The wish to balance Israel and acquire status and infl uence in the Arab world 95 |
were also considerations, but secondary. 96 |
(cid:127) Iraq Survey Group (ISG) judges that events in the 1980s and early 1990s shaped Saddam’s belief in the 97 |
value of WMD. In Saddam’s view, WMD helped to save the Regime multiple times. He believed that during 98 |
the Iran-Iraq war chemical weapons had halted Iranian ground offensives and that ballistic missile attacks 99 |
on Tehran had broken its political will. Similarly, during Desert Storm, Saddam believed WMD had deterred 100 |
Coalition Forces from pressing their attack beyond the goal of freeing Kuwait. WMD had even played a role 101 |
in crushing the Shi’a revolt in the south following the 1991 cease-fi re. 102 |
(cid:127) The former Regime had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions. Neither 103 |
was there an identifi able group of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam. Instead, his lieu- 104 |
tenants understood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with Saddam and his infrequent, 105 |
but fi rm, verbal comments and directions to them. 106 |
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Note on Methodological Approach 111 |
Interviews with former Regime offi cials who were active in Iraq’s governing, economic, security, and intel- 112 |
ligence structures were critical to ISG’s assessment of the former Regime’s WMD strategy. While some 113 |
detainees’ statements were made to minimize their involvement or culpability leading to potential prosecution, 114 |
in some cases those who were interviewed spoke relatively candidly and at length about the Regime’s strategic 115 |
intent. 116 |
(cid:127) ISG analysts—because of unprecedented access to detainees—undertook interviews of national policy 117 |
makers, the leadership of the intelligence and security services, and Qusay’s inner circle, as well as concen- 118 |
trated debriefs of core Regime leaders in custody, to identify cross-Regime issues and perceptions. 119 |
(cid:127) As part of the effort aimed at the core leadership, analysts also gave detainees “homework” to give them 120 |
more opportunity to discuss in writing various aspects of former Regime strategy. Many of these responses 121 |
were lengthy and detailed. Secretary of the President, ‘Abd Hamid Al Khatab Al Nasiri, Deputy Prime 122 |
Minister Tariq ‘Aziz ‘Aysa, and Minister of Military Industry ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh 123 |
answered questions in writing several times, providing information on both the former Regime and the mind- 124 |
set of those who ran it. 125 |
(cid:127) Saddam’s debriefer was fully aware of ISG’s information needs and developed a strategy to elicit candid 126 |
answers and insights into Saddam’s personality and role in strategy-related issues. Remarks from the 127 |
debriefer are included. 128 |
(cid:127) Analysts also used working groups to study themes and trends—such as intelligence and security service 129 |
activity, weaponization, dual-use/break-out capabilities and timeline analysis—that cut across ISG’s func- 130 |
tional teams, as well as to pool efforts to debrief members of the core leadership. 131 |
Analysts used subsource development and document exploitation to crosscheck detainee testimony, lever- 132 |
age detainees in debriefs, and to fi ll gaps in information. For example, analysts interviewing Huwaysh gained 133 |
insights into his personality from subsources, while translated technical and procurement-related documents 134 |
were critical to verifying the accuracy of his testimony. Likewise, we confronted Vice President Taha Yasin 135 |
Ramadan Al Jizrawi with a captured document indicating his major role in allocating oil contracts and he 136 |
divulged details on corruption stemming from the UN’s OFF program. 137 |
Nonetheless, the interview process had several shortcomings. Detainees were very concerned about their fate 138 |
and therefore would not be willing to implicate themselves in sensitive matters of interest such as WMD, in 139 |
light of looming prosecutions. Debriefers noted the use of passive interrogation resistance techniques collec- 140 |
tively by a large number of detainees to avoid their involvement or knowledge of sensitive issues; place blame 141 |
or knowledge with individuals who were not in a position to contradict the detainee’s statements, such as 142 |
deceased individuals or individuals who were not in custody or who had fl ed the country; and provide debrief- 143 |
ers with previously known information. However, the reader should keep in mind the Arab proverb: “Even a 144 |
liar tells many truths.” 145 |
Some former Regime offi cials, such as ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid Al Tikriti (Chemical ‘Ali), never gave substantial 146 |
information, despite speaking colorfully and at length. He never discussed actions, which would implicate him 147 |
in a crime. Moreover, for some aspects of the Regime’s WMD strategy, like the role of the Military Industri- 148 |
alization Commission (MIC), analysts could only speak with a few senior-level offi cials, which limited ISG’s 149 |
assessment to the perspectives of these individuals. 150 |
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Former Iraqi Regime Offi cials Varied in Their Level of Cooperation 155 |
The quality of cooperation and assistance provided to ISG by former senior Iraqi Regime offi cials in custody 156 |
varied widely. Some obstructed all attempts to elicit information on WMD and illicit activities of the former 157 |
Regime. Others, however, were keen to help clarify every issue, sometimes to the point of self-incrimination. 158 |
The two extremes of cooperation are epitomized by ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid—a key Presidential Adviser and RCC 159 |
member—and Sabir ‘Abd-al-Aziz Husayn Al Duri, a former Lieutenant General who served in both the Direc- 160 |
torate of General Military Intelligence and the Iraqi Intelligence Service. ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid was loquacious 161 |
on many subjects, but remained adamant in denying any involvement in the use of CW in attacks on the Kurds 162 |
and dissembling in any discussion of the subject. His circumlocution extends to most other sensitive subjects of 163 |
Regime behavior. By contrast, Sabir has been forthcoming to the point of direct association with a wide range 164 |
of Iraqi activities, including the management of Kuwaiti prisoners, the organization of assassinations abroad 165 |
by the former Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), and the torture of political prisoners. 166 |
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Key Findings 228 |
Throughout the 1990s and up to OIF (March 2003), Saddam focused on one set of objectives: the survival of 229 |
himself, his Regime, and his legacy. To secure those objectives, Saddam needed to exploit Iraqi oil assets, to 230 |
portray a strong military capability to deter internal and external threats, and to foster his image as an Arab 231 |
leader. Saddam recognized that the reconstitution of Iraqi WMD enhanced both his security and image. Conse- 232 |
quently, Saddam needed to end UN-imposed sanctions to fulfi ll his goals. 233 |
Saddam severely under estimated the economic and military costs of invading Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 234 |
1990, as well as underestimating the subsequent international condemnation of his invasion of Kuwait. He did 235 |
not anticipate this condemnation, nor the subsequent imposition, comprehensiveness, severity, and longev- 236 |
ity of UN sanctions. His initial belief that UN sanctions would not last, resulting in his country’s economic 237 |
decline, changed by 1998 when the UNSC did not lift sanctions after he believed resolutions were fulfi lled. 238 |
Although Saddam had reluctantly accepted the UN’s Oil for Food (OFF) program by 1996, he soon recog- 239 |
nized its economic value and additional opportunities for further manipulation and infl uence of the UNSC Iraq 240 |
661 Sanctions Committee member states. Therefore, he resigned himself to the continuation of UN sanctions 241 |
understanding that they would become a “paper tiger” regardless of continued US resolve to maintain them. 242 |
Throughout sanctions, Saddam continually directed his advisors to formulate and implement strategies, poli- 243 |
cies, and methods to terminate the UN’s sanctions regime established by UNSCR 661. The Regime devised an 244 |
effective diplomatic and economic strategy of generating revenue and procuring illicit goods utilizing the Iraqi 245 |
intelligence, banking, industrial, and military apparatus that eroded United Nations’ member states and other 246 |
international players’ resolve to enforce compliance, while capitalizing politically on its humanitarian crisis. 247 |
• From Saddam’s perspective, UN sanctions hindered his ability to rule Iraq with complete authority and 248 |
autonomy. In the long run, UN sanctions also interfered with his efforts to establish a historic legacy. 249 |
According to Saddam and his senior advisors, the UN, at the behest of the US, placed an economic 250 |
strangle hold on Iraq. The UN controlled Saddam’s main source of revenue (oil exports) and determined 251 |
what Iraq could import. 252 |
• UN sanctions curbed Saddam’s ability to import weapons, technology, and expertise into Iraq. Sanctions also 253 |
limited his ability to fi nance his military, intelligence, and security forces to deal with his perceived and real 254 |
external threats. 255 |
• In short, Saddam considered UN sanctions as a form of economic war and the UN’s OFF program and 256 |
Northern and Southern Watch Operations as campaigns of that larger economic war orchestrated by the US 257 |
and UK. His evolving strategy centered on breaking free of UN sanctions in order to liberate his economy 258 |
from the economic strangle-hold so he could continue to pursue his political and personal objectives. 259 |
One aspect of Saddam’s strategy of unhinging the UN’s sanctions against Iraq, centered on Saddam’s efforts 260 |
to infl uence certain UN SC permanent members, such as Russia, France, and China and some nonpermanent 261 |
(Syria, Ukraine) members to end UN sanctions. Under Saddam’s orders, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 262 |
(MFA) formulated and implemented a strategy aimed at these UNSC members and international public 263 |
opinion with the purpose of ending UN sanctions and undermining its subsequent OFF program by diplo- 264 |
matic and economic means. At a minimum, Saddam wanted to divide the fi ve permanent members and foment 265 |
international public support of Iraq at the UN and throughout the world by a savvy public relations campaign 266 |
and an extensive diplomatic effort. 267 |
Another element of this strategy involved circumventing UN sanctions and the OFF program by means of 268 |
“Protocols” or government-to-government economic trade agreements. Protocols allowed Saddam to gener- 269 |
ate a large amount of revenue outside the purview of the UN. The successful implementation of the Protocols, 270 |
continued oil smuggling efforts, and the manipulation of UN OFF contracts emboldened Saddam to pursue his 271 |
military reconstitution efforts starting in 1997 and peaking in 2001. These efforts covered conventional arms, 272 |
dual-use goods acquisition, and some WMD-related programs. 273 |
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• Once money began to fl ow into Iraq, the Regime’s authorities, aided by foreign companies and some foreign 278 |
governments, devised and implemented methods and techniques to procure illicit goods from foreign suppli- 279 |
ers. 280 |
• To implement its procurement efforts, Iraq under Saddam, created a network of Iraqi front companies, some 281 |
with close relationships to high-ranking foreign government offi cials. These foreign government offi cials, in 282 |
turn, worked through their respective ministries, state-run companies and ministry-sponsored front compa- 283 |
nies, to procure illicit goods, services, and technologies for Iraq’s WMD-related, conventional arms, and/or 284 |
dual-use goods programs. 285 |
• The Regime fi nanced these government-sanctioned programs by several illicit revenue streams that 286 |
amassed more that $11 billion from the early 1990s to OIF outside the UN-approved methods. The most 287 |
profi table stream concerned Protocols or government-to-government agreements that generated over $7.5 288 |
billion for Saddam. Iraq earned an additional $2 billion from kickbacks or surcharges associated with the 289 |
UN’s OFF program; $990 million from oil “cash sales” or smuggling; and another $230 million from other 290 |
surcharge impositions. 291 |
Analysis of Iraqi Financial Data 292 |
The Iraqi revenue analysis presented in this report is based on government documents and fi nancial databases, 293 |
spreadsheets, and other records obtained from SOMO, the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, and the Central Bank of Iraq 294 |
(CBI), and other Ministries. These sources appear to be of good quality and consistent with other pre- and 295 |
post-Operation Iraqi Freedom information. All Iraqi revenue data and derived fi gures in this report have been 296 |
calculated in current dollars. 297 |
Saddam directed the Regime’s key ministries and governmental agencies to devise and implement strategies, 298 |
policies, and techniques to discredit the UN sanctions, harass UN personnel in Iraq, and discredit the US. At 299 |
the same time, according to reporting, he also wanted to obfuscate Iraq’s refusal to reveal the nature of its 300 |
WMD and WMD-related programs, their capabilities, and his intentions. 301 |
• Saddam used the IIS to undertake the most sensitive procurement missions. Consequently, the IIS facili- 302 |
tated the import of UN sanctioned and dual-use goods into Iraq through countries like Syria, Jordan, 303 |
Belarus and Turkey. 304 |
• The IIS had representatives in most of Iraq’s embassies in these foreign countries using a variety of offi cial 305 |
covers. One type of cover was the “commercial attaches” that were sent to make contacts with foreign busi- 306 |
nesses. The attaches set up front companies, facilitated the banking process and transfers of funds as deter- 307 |
mined, and approved by the senior offi cials within the Government. 308 |
• The MFA played a critical role in facilitating Iraq’s procurement of military goods, dual-use goods pertain- 309 |
ing to WMD, transporting cash and other valuable goods earned by illicit oil revenue, and forming and 310 |
implementing a diplomatic strategy to end UN sanctions and the subsequent UN OFF program by nefarious 311 |
means. 312 |
• Saddam used the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientifi c Research (MHESR) through its universities 313 |
and research programs to maintain, develop, and acquire expertise, to advance or preserve existent research 314 |
projects and developments, and to procure goods prohibited by UN SC sanctions. 315 |
• The Ministry of Oil (MoO) controlled the oil voucher distribution program that used oil to infl uence UN 316 |
members to support Iraq’s goals. Saddam personally approved and removed all names of voucher recipi- 317 |
2 318 |
319 | 320 |
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321 |
ents. He made all modifi cations to the list, adding or deleting names at will. Other senior Iraqi leaders 322 |
could nominate or recommend an individual or organization to be added or subtracted from the voucher list, 323 |
and ad hoc allocation committees met to review and update the allocations. 324 |
Iraq under Saddam successfully devised various methods to acquire and import items prohibited under UN 325 |
sanctions. Numerous Iraqi and foreign trade intermediaries disguised illicit items, hid the identity of the end 326 |
user, and/or changed the fi nal destination of the commodity to get it to the region. For a cut of the profi ts, 327 |
these trade intermediaries moved, and in many cases smuggled, the prohibited items through land, sea, and air 328 |
entry points along the Iraqi border. 329 |
By mid-2000 the exponential growth of Iraq’s illicit revenue, increased international sympathy for Iraq’s 330 |
humanitarian plight, and increased complicity by Iraqi’s neighbors led elements within Saddam’s Regime to 331 |
boast that the UN sanctions were slowly eroding. In July 2000, the ruling Iraqi Ba’athist paper, Al-Thawrah, 332 |
claimed victory over UN sanctions, stating that Iraq was accelerating its pace to develop its national economy 333 |
despite the UN “blockade.” In August 2001, Iraqi Foreign Minister Sabri stated in an Al-Jazirah TV interview 334 |
that UN sanctions efforts had collapsed at the same time Baghdad had been making steady progress on its eco- 335 |
nomic, military, Arab relations, and international affairs. 336 |
• Companies in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, UAE, and Yemen assisted Saddam with the acquisition of pro- 337 |
hibited items through deceptive trade practices. In the case of Syria and Yemen, this included support from 338 |
agencies or personnel within the government itself. 339 |
• Numerous ministries in Saddam’s Regime facilitated the smuggling of illicit goods through Iraq’s borders, 340 |
ports, and airports. The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and the Military Industiralization Commission (MIC), 341 |
however, were directly responsible for skirting UN monitoring and importing prohibited items for Saddam. 342 |
t 343 |
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n 345 |
c 346 |
e 347 |
n 348 |
m 349 |
a 350 |
e 351 |
n 352 |
r 353 |
i 354 |
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F 356 |
c 357 |
358 |
e 359 |
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m 361 |
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P 363 |
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g 365 |
366 |
d 367 |
e 368 |
n 369 |
R 370 |
a 371 |
3 372 |
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377 |
Delivery Systems 378 |
Key Findings 379 |
Since the early 1970s, Iraq has consistently sought to acquire an effective long-range weapons delivery 380 |
capability, and by 1991 Baghdad had purchased the missiles and infrastructure that would form the basis 381 |
for nearly all of its future missile system developments. The Soviet Union was a key supplier of missile hard- 382 |
ware and provided 819 Scud-B missiles and ground support equipment. 383 |
Iraq’s experiences with long-range delivery systems in the Iran/Iraq war were a vital lesson to Iraqi Presi- 384 |
dent Saddam Husayn. The successful Iraqi response to the Iranian long-range bombardment of Baghdad, lead- 385 |
ing to the War of the Cities, probably saved Saddam. 386 |
By 1991, Iraq had successfully demonstrated its ability to modify some of its delivery systems to increase 387 |
their range and to develop WMD dissemination options, with the Al Husayn being a fi rst step in this direc- 388 |
tion. The next few years of learning and experiments confi rmed that the Regime’s goal was for an effective 389 |
long-range WMD delivery capability and demonstrated the resourcefulness of Iraq’s scientists and technicians. 390 |
Iraq failed in its efforts to acquire longer-range delivery systems to replace inventory exhausted in the 391 |
Iran/Iraq war. This was a forcing function that drove Iraq to develop indigenous delivery system production 392 |
capabilities. 393 |
Desert Storm and subsequent UN resolutions and inspections brought many of Iraq’s delivery system 394 |
programs to a halt. While much of Iraq’s long-range missile inventory and production infrastructure was 395 |
eliminated, Iraq until late 1991 kept some items hidden to assist future reconstitution of the force. This deci- 396 |
sion and Iraq’s intransigence during years of inspection left many UN questions unresolved. 397 |
• Coalition airstrikes effectively targeted much of Iraq’s delivery systems infrastructure, and UN inspections 398 |
dramatically impeded further developments of long-range ballistic missiles. 399 |
• It appears to have taken time, but Iraq eventually realized that sanctions were not going to end quickly. 400 |
This forced Iraq to sacrifi ce its long-range delivery force in an attempt to bring about a quick end to the sanc- 401 |
tions. 402 |
• After the fl ight of Husayn Kamil in 1995, Iraq admitted that it had hidden Scud-variant missiles and compo- 403 |
nents to aid future reconstitution but asserted that these items had been unilaterally destroyed by late 1991. 404 |
The UN could not verify these claims and thereafter became more wary of Iraq’s admissions and instituted a 405 |
Regime of more intrusive inspections. 406 |
• The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) has uncovered no evidence Iraq retained Scud-variant missiles, and debrief- 407 |
ings of Iraqi offi cials in addition to some documentation suggest that Iraq did not retain such missiles 408 |
after 1991. 409 |
While other WMD programs were strictly prohibited, the UN permitted Iraq to develop and possess delivery 410 |
systems provided their range did not exceed 150 km. This freedom allowed Iraq to keep its scientists and tech- 411 |
nicians employed and to keep its infrastructure and manufacturing base largely intact by pursuing programs 412 |
nominally in compliance with the UN limitations. This positioned Iraq for a potential breakout capability. 413 |
• Between 1991 and 1998, Iraq had declared development programs underway for liquid- and solid-propellant 414 |
ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). 415 |
Iraq’s decisions in 1996 to accept the Oil-For-Food program (OFF) and later in 1998 to cease coopera- 416 |
tion with UNSCOM and IAEA spurred a period of increased activity in delivery systems development. The 417 |
s 418 |
m 419 |
e 420 |
t 421 |
s 422 |
y 423 |
S 424 |
425 |
y 426 |
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v 429 |
i 430 |
l 431 |
e 432 |
D 433 |
1 434 |
435 | 436 | 437 |
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pace of ongoing missile programs accelerated, and the Regime authorized its scientists to design missiles with 439 |
ranges in excess of 150 km that, if developed, would have been clear violations of UNSCR 687. 440 |
• By 2002, Iraq had provided the liquid-propellant Al Samud II—a program started in 2001—and the solid- 441 |
propellant Al Fat’h to the military and was pursuing a series of new small UAV systems. 442 |
• ISG uncovered Iraqi plans or designs for three long-range ballistic missiles with ranges from 400 to 1,000 443 |
km and for a 1,000-km-range cruise missile, although none of these systems progressed to production and 444 |
only one reportedly passed the design phase. ISG assesses that these plans demonstrate Saddam’s continu- 445 |
ing desire—up to the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)—for a long-range delivery capability. 446 |
Procurements supporting delivery system programs expanded after the 1998 departure of the UN inspectors. 447 |
Iraq also hired outside expertise to assist its development programs. 448 |
• ISG uncovered evidence that technicians and engineers from Russia reviewed the designs and assisted devel- 449 |
opment of the Al Samud II during its rapid evolution. ISG also found that Iraq had entered into negotiations 450 |
with North Korean and Russian entities for more capable missile systems. 451 |
• According to contract information exploited by ISG, Iraq imported at least 380 SA-2/Volga liquid-propellant 452 |
engines from Poland and possibly Russia or Belarus. While Iraq claims these engines were for the Al Samud 453 |
II program, the numbers involved appear in excess of immediate requirements, suggesting they could have 454 |
supported the longer range missiles using clusters of SA-2 engines. Iraq also imported missile guidance and 455 |
control systems from entities in countries like Belarus, Russia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). 456 |
(Note: FRY is currently known as Serbia and Montenegro but is referred to as FRY in this section.) 457 |
In late 2002 Iraq was under increasing pressure from the international community to allow UN inspectors 458 |
to return. Iraq in November accepted UNSCR 1441 and invited inspectors back into the country. In Decem- 459 |
ber Iraq presented to the UN its Currently Accurate, Full, and Complete Declaration (CAFCD) in response to 460 |
UNSCR 1441. 461 |
• While the CAFCD was judged to be incomplete and a rehash of old information, it did provide details on the 462 |
Al Samud II, Al Fat’h, new missile-related facilities, and new small UAV designs. 463 |
• In February 2003 the UN convened an expert panel to discuss the Al Samud II and Al Fat’h programs, which 464 |
resulted in the UN’s decision to prohibit the Al Samud II and order its destruction. Missile destruction began 465 |
in early March but was incomplete when the inspectors were withdrawn later that month. 466 |
The CAFCD and United Nations Monitoring, Verifi cation, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) inspec- 467 |
tions provided a brief glimpse into what Iraq had accomplished in four years without an international presence 468 |
on the ground. 469 |
Given Iraq’s investments in technology and infrastructure improvements, an effective procurement network, 470 |
skilled scientists, and designs already on the books for longer range missiles, ISG assesses that Saddam 471 |
clearly intended to reconstitute long-range delivery systems and that the systems potentially were for WMD. 472 |
• Iraq built a new and larger liquid-rocket engine test stand capable, with some modifi cation, of supporting 473 |
engines or engine clusters larger than the single SA-2 engine used in the Al Samud II. 474 |
• Iraq built or refurbished solid-propellant facilities and equipment, including a large propellant mixer, an 475 |
aging oven, and a casting pit that could support large diameter motors. 476 |
• Iraq’s investing in studies into new propellants and manufacturing technologies demonstrated its desire for 477 |
more capable or effective delivery systems. 478 |
2 479 |
480 |
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481 |
Nuclear 482 |
Key Findings 483 |
Iraq Survey Group (ISG) discovered further evidence of the maturity and signifi cance of the pre-1991 484 |
Iraqi Nuclear Program but found that Iraq’s ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program progres- 485 |
sively decayed after that date. 486 |
(cid:127) Saddam Husayn ended the nuclear program in 1991 following the Gulf war. ISG found no evidence to sug- 487 |
gest concerted efforts to restart the program. 488 |
(cid:127) Although Saddam clearly assigned a high value to the nuclear progress and talent that had been developed up 489 |
to the 1991 war, the program ended and the intellectual capital decayed in the succeeding years. 490 |
Nevertheless, after 1991, Saddam did express his intent to retain the intellectual capital developed 491 |
during the Iraqi Nuclear Program. Senior Iraqis—several of them from the Regime’s inner circle—told ISG 492 |
they assumed Saddam would restart a nuclear program once UN sanctions ended. 493 |
(cid:127) Saddam indicated that he would develop the weapons necessary to counter any Iranian threat. 494 |
Initially, Saddam chose to conceal his nuclear program in its entirety, as he did with Iraq’s BW pro- 495 |
gram. Aggressive UN inspections after Desert Storm forced Saddam to admit the existence of the pro- 496 |
gram and destroy or surrender components of the program. 497 |
In the wake of Desert Storm, Iraq took steps to conceal key elements of its program and to preserve 498 |
what it could of the professional capabilities of its nuclear scientifi c community. 499 |
(cid:127) Baghdad undertook a variety of measures to conceal key elements of its nuclear program from successive 500 |
UN inspectors, including specifi c direction by Saddam Husayn to hide and preserve documentation associ- 501 |
ated with Iraq’s nuclear program. 502 |
(cid:127) ISG, for example, uncovered two specifi c instances in which scientists involved in uranium enrichment kept 503 |
documents and technology. Although apparently acting on their own, they did so with the belief and anticipa- 504 |
tion of resuming uranium enrichment efforts in the future. 505 |
(cid:127) Starting around 1992, in a bid to retain the intellectual core of the former weapons program, Baghdad 506 |
transferred many nuclear scientists to related jobs in the Military Industrial Commission (MIC). The work 507 |
undertaken by these scientists at the MIC helped them maintain their weapons knowledge base. 508 |
As with other WMD areas, Saddam’s ambitions in the nuclear area were secondary to his prime objec- 509 |
tive of ending UN sanctions. 510 |
(cid:127) Iraq, especially after the defection of Husayn Kamil in 1995, sought to persuade the IAEA that Iraq had met 511 |
the UN’s disarmament requirements so sanctions would be lifted. 512 |
ISG found a limited number of post-1995 activities that would have aided the reconstitution of the 513 |
nuclear weapons program once sanctions were lifted. 514 |
(cid:127) The activities of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission sustained some talent and limited research with poten- 515 |
tial relevance to a reconstituted nuclear program. 516 |
r 517 |
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527 |
(cid:127) Specifi c projects, with signifi cant development, such as the efforts to build a rail gun and a copper vapor 528 |
laser could have been useful in a future effort to restart a nuclear weapons program, but ISG found no indica- 529 |
tions of such purpose. As funding for the MIC and the IAEC increased after the introduction of the Oil-for- 530 |
Food program, there was some growth in programs that involved former nuclear weapons scientists and 531 |
engineers. 532 |
(cid:127) The Regime prevented scientists from the former nuclear weapons program from leaving either their jobs or 533 |
Iraq. Moreover, in the late 1990s, personnel from both MIC and the IAEC received signifi cant pay raises in 534 |
a bid to retain them, and the Regime undertook new investments in university research in a bid to ensure that 535 |
Iraq retained technical knowledge. 536 |
2 537 |
538 |
Page 14
539 |
Chemical 540 |
Key Findings 541 |
Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a CW effort when sanctions were lifted and conditions 542 |
were judged favorable: 543 |
(cid:127) Saddam and many Iraqis regarded CW as a proven weapon against an enemy’s superior numerical strength, a 544 |
weapon that had saved the nation at least once already—during the Iran-Iraq war—and contributed to deter- 545 |
ring the Coalition in 1991 from advancing to Baghdad. 546 |
While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have been discovered, ISG judges that Iraq 547 |
unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991. There are no credible indications 548 |
that Baghdad resumed production of chemical munitions thereafter, a policy ISG attributes to Baghdad’s desire 549 |
to see sanctions lifted, or rendered ineffectual, or its fear of force against it should WMD be discovered. 550 |
(cid:127) The scale of the Iraqi conventional munitions stockpile, among other factors, precluded an examination of 551 |
the entire stockpile; however, ISG inspected sites judged most likely associated with possible storage or 552 |
deployment of chemical weapons. 553 |
Iraq’s CW program was crippled by the Gulf war and the legitimate chemical industry, which suffered under 554 |
sanctions, only began to recover in the mid-1990s. Subsequent changes in the management of key military 555 |
and civilian organizations, followed by an infl ux of funding and resources, provided Iraq with the ability to 556 |
reinvigorate its industrial base. 557 |
(cid:127) Poor policies and management in the early 1990s left the Military Industrial Commission (MIC) fi nancially 558 |
unsound and in a state of almost complete disarray. 559 |
(cid:127) Saddam implemented a number of changes to the Regime’s organizational and programmatic structures after 560 |
the departure of Husayn Kamil. 561 |
(cid:127) Iraq’s acceptance of the Oil-for-Food (OFF) program was the foundation of Iraq’s economic recovery and 562 |
sparked a fl ow of illicitly diverted funds that could be applied to projects for Iraq’s chemical industry. 563 |
The way Iraq organized its chemical industry after the mid-1990s allowed it to conserve the knowledge-base 564 |
needed to restart a CW program, conduct a modest amount of dual-use research, and partially recover from 565 |
the decline of its production capability caused by the effects of the Gulf war and UN-sponsored destruction 566 |
and sanctions. Iraq implemented a rigorous and formalized system of nationwide research and production 567 |
of chemicals, but ISG will not be able to resolve whether Iraq intended the system to underpin any CW- 568 |
related efforts. 569 |
l 570 |
a 571 |
c 572 |
i 573 |
m 574 |
e 575 |
h 576 |
C 577 |
(cid:127) The Regime employed a cadre of trained and experienced researchers, production managers, and weaponiza- 578 |
tion experts from the former CW program. 579 |
(cid:127) Iraq began implementing a range of indigenous chemical production projects in 1995 and 1996. Many of 580 |
these projects, while not weapons-related, were designed to improve Iraq’s infrastructure, which would have 581 |
enhanced Iraq’s ability to produce CW agents if the scaled-up production processes were implemented. 582 |
(cid:127) Iraq had an effective system for the procurement of items that Iraq was not allowed to acquire due to sanc- 583 |
tions. ISG found no evidence that this system was used to acquire precursor chemicals in bulk; however 584 |
documents indicate that dual-use laboratory equipment and chemicals were acquired through this system. 585 |
1 586 |
587 | 588 |
Page 15
589 |
Iraq constructed a number of new plants starting in the mid-1990s that enhanced its chemical infra- 590 |
structure, although its overall industry had not fully recovered from the effects of sanctions, and had not 591 |
regained pre-1991 technical sophistication or production capabilities prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom 592 |
(OIF). 593 |
(cid:127) ISG did not discover chemical process or production units confi gured to produce key precursors or CW 594 |
agents. However, site visits and debriefs revealed that Iraq maintained its ability for reconfi guring and 595 |
‘making-do’ with available equipment as substitutes for sanctioned items. 596 |
(cid:127) ISG judges, based on available chemicals, infrastructure, and scientist debriefi ngs, that Iraq at OIF probably 597 |
had a capability to produce large quantities of sulfur mustard within three to six months. 598 |
(cid:127) A former nerve agent expert indicated that Iraq retained the capability to produce nerve agent in signifi cant 599 |
quantities within two years, given the import of required phosphorous precursors. However, we have no 600 |
credible indications that Iraq acquired or attempted to acquire large quantities of these chemicals through its 601 |
existing procurement networks for sanctioned items. 602 |
In addition to new investment in its industry, Iraq was able to monitor the location and use of all existing dual- 603 |
use process equipment. This provided Iraq the ability to rapidly reallocate key equipment for proscribed activi- 604 |
ties, if required by the Regime. 605 |
(cid:127) One effect of UN monitoring was to implement a national level control system for important dual-use pro- 606 |
cess plants. 607 |
Iraq’s historical ability to implement simple solutions to weaponization challenges allowed Iraq to retain the 608 |
capability to weaponize CW agent when the need arose. Because of the risk of discovery and consequences 609 |
for ending UN sanctions, Iraq would have signifi cantly jeopardized its chances of having sanctions lifted or 610 |
no longer enforced if the UN or foreign entity had discovered that Iraq had undertaken any weaponization 611 |
activities. 612 |
(cid:127) ISG has uncovered hardware at a few military depots, which suggests that Iraq may have prototyped experi- 613 |
mental CW rounds. The available evidence is insuffi cient to determine the nature of the effort or the time- 614 |
frame of activities. 615 |
(cid:127) Iraq could indigenously produce a range of conventional munitions, throughout the 1990s, many of which 616 |
had previously been adapted for fi lling with CW agent. However, ISG has found ambiguous evidence of 617 |
weaponization activities. 618 |
Saddam’s Leadership Defense Plan consisted of a tactical doctrine taught to all Iraqi offi cers and included 619 |
the concept of a “red-line” or last line of defense. However, ISG has no information that the plan ever 620 |
included a trigger for CW use. 621 |
(cid:127) Despite reported high-level discussions about the use of chemical weapons in the defense of Iraq, informa- 622 |
tion acquired after OIF does not confi rm the inclusion of CW in Iraq’s tactical planning for OIF. We believe 623 |
these were mostly theoretical discussions and do not imply the existence of undiscovered CW munitions. 624 |
Discussions concerning WMD, particularly leading up to OIF, would have been highly compartmentalized 625 |
within the Regime. ISG found no credible evidence that any fi eld elements knew about plans for CW use 626 |
during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 627 |
2 628 |
629 |
Page 16
630 |
(cid:127) Uday—head of the Fedayeen Saddam—attempted to obtain chemical weapons for use during OIF, according 631 |
to reporting, but ISG found no evidence that Iraq ever came into possession of any CW weapons. 632 |
ISG uncovered information that the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) maintained throughout 1991 to 2003 633 |
a set of undeclared covert laboratories to research and test various chemicals and poisons, primarily for 634 |
intelligence operations. The network of laboratories could have provided an ideal, compartmented platform 635 |
from which to continue CW agent R&D or small-scale production efforts, but we have no indications this was 636 |
planned. (See Annex A.) 637 |
(cid:127) ISG has no evidence that IIS Directorate of Criminology (M16) scientists were producing CW or BW agents 638 |
in these laboratories. However, sources indicate that M16 was planning to produce several CW agents 639 |
including sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and Sarin. 640 |
(cid:127) Exploitations of IIS laboratories, safe houses, and disposal sites revealed no evidence of CW-related research 641 |
or production, however many of these sites were either sanitized by the Regime or looted prior to OIF. Inter- 642 |
views with key IIS offi cials within and outside of M16 yielded very little information about the IIS’ activities 643 |
in this area. 644 |
(cid:127) The existence, function, and purpose of the laboratories were never declared to the UN. 645 |
(cid:127) The IIS program included the use of human subjects for testing purposes. 646 |
ISG investigated a series of key pre-OIF indicators involving the possible movement and storage of chemi- 647 |
cal weapons, focusing on 11 major depots assessed to have possible links to CW. A review of documents, 648 |
interviews, available reporting, and site exploitations revealed alternate, plausible explanations for activities 649 |
noted prior to OIF which, at the time, were believed to be CW-related. 650 |
(cid:127) ISG investigated pre-OIF activities at Musayyib Ammunition Storage Depot—the storage site that was 651 |
judged to have the strongest link to CW. An extensive investigation of the facility revealed that there was no 652 |
CW activity, unlike previously assessed. 653 |
l 654 |
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c 656 |
i 657 |
m 658 |
e 659 |
h 660 |
C 661 |
3 662 |
663 | 664 |
Page 17
665 | 666 |
Page 18
667 |
Biological 668 |
Key Findings 669 |
The Biological Warfare (BW) program was born of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and this service 670 |
retained its connections with the program either directly or indirectly throughout its existence. 671 |
(cid:127) The IIS provided the BW program with security and participated in biological research, probably for its own 672 |
purposes, from the beginning of Iraq’s BW effort in the early 1970s until the fi nal days of Saddam Husayn’s 673 |
Regime. 674 |
In 1991, Saddam Husayn regarded BW as an integral element of his arsenal of WMD weapons, and would 675 |
have used it if the need arose. 676 |
(cid:127) At a meeting of the Iraqi leadership immediately prior to the Gulf war in 1991, Saddam Husayn personally 677 |
authorized the use of BW weapons against Israel, Saudi Arabia and US forces. Although the exact nature of 678 |
the circumstances that would trigger use was not spelled out, they would appear to be a threat to the leader- 679 |
ship itself or the US resorting to “unconventional harmful types of weapons.” 680 |
(cid:127) Saddam envisaged all-out use. For example, all Israeli cities were to be struck and all the BW weapons at his 681 |
disposal were to be used. Saddam specifi ed that the “many years” agents, presumably anthrax spores, were 682 |
to be employed against his foes. 683 |
ISG judges that Iraq’s actions between 1991 and 1996 demonstrate that the state intended to preserve its 684 |
BW capability and return to a steady, methodical progress toward a mature BW program when and if the 685 |
opportunity arose. 686 |
(cid:127) ISG assesses that in 1991, Iraq clung to the objective of gaining war-winning weapons with the strategic 687 |
intention of achieving the ability to project its power over much of the Middle East and beyond. Biologi- 688 |
cal weapons were part of that plan. With an eye to the future and aiming to preserve some measure of its 689 |
BW capability, Baghdad in the years immediately after Desert Storm sought to save what it could of its BW 690 |
infrastructure and covertly continue BW research, hide evidence of that and earlier efforts, and dispose of its 691 |
existing weapons stocks. 692 |
(cid:127) From 1992 to 1994, Iraq greatly expanded the capability of its Al Hakam facility. Indigenously produced 5 693 |
cubic meter fermentors were installed, electrical and water utilities were expanded, and massive new con- 694 |
struction to house its desired 50 cubic meter fermentors were completed. 695 |
(cid:127) With the economy at rock bottom in late 1995, ISG judges that Baghdad abandoned its existing BW program 696 |
in the belief that it constituted a potential embarrassment, whose discovery would undercut Baghdad’s ability 697 |
to reach its overarching goal of obtaining relief from UN sanctions. 698 |
In practical terms, with the destruction of the Al Hakam facility, Iraq abandoned its ambition to obtain 699 |
advanced BW weapons quickly. ISG found no direct evidence that Iraq, after 1996, had plans for a new BW 700 |
program or was conducting BW-specifi c work for military purposes. Indeed, from the mid-1990s, despite 701 |
evidence of continuing interest in nuclear and chemical weapons, there appears to be a complete absence of 702 |
discussion or even interest in BW at the Presidential level. 703 |
Iraq would have faced great diffi culty in re-establishing an effective BW agent production capability. Nev- 704 |
ertheless, after 1996 Iraq still had a signifi cant dual-use capability—some declared—readily useful for BW 705 |
if the Regime chose to use it to pursue a BW program. Moreover, Iraq still possessed its most important BW 706 |
asset, the scientifi c know-how of its BW cadre. 707 |
(cid:127) Any attempt to create a new BW program after 1996 would have encountered a range of major hurdles. 708 |
The years following Desert Storm wrought a steady degradation of Iraq’s industrial base: new equipment 709 |
and spare parts for existing machinery became diffi cult and expensive to obtain, standards of maintenance 710 |
1 711 |
l 712 |
a 713 |
c 714 |
i 715 |
g 716 |
o 717 |
l 718 |
o 719 |
i 720 |
B 721 |
722 | 723 |
Page 19
724 |
declined, staff could not receive training abroad, and foreign technical assistance was almost impossible to 725 |
get. Additionally, Iraq’s infrastructure and public utilities were crumbling. New large projects, particularly 726 |
if they required special foreign equipment and expertise, would attract international attention. UN monitor- 727 |
ing of dual-use facilities up to the end of 1998, made their use for clandestine purpose complicated and risk 728 |
laden. 729 |
Depending on its scale, Iraq could have re-established an elementary BW program within a few weeks to a 730 |
few months of a decision to do so, but ISG discovered no indications that the Regime was pursuing such a 731 |
course. 732 |
(cid:127) In spite of the diffi culties noted above, a BW capability is technically the easiest WMD to attain. Although 733 |
equipment and facilities were destroyed under UN supervision in 1996, Iraq retained technical BW know- 734 |
how through the scientists that were involved in the former program. ISG has also identifi ed civilian facilities 735 |
and equipment in Iraq that have dual-use application that could be used for the production of agent. 736 |
ISG judges that in 1991 and 1992, Iraq appears to have destroyed its undeclared stocks of BW weapons 737 |
and probably destroyed remaining holdings of bulk BW agent. However ISG lacks evidence to document 738 |
complete destruction. Iraq retained some BW-related seed stocks until their discovery after Operation Iraqi 739 |
Freedom (OIF). 740 |
(cid:127) After the passage of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 in April 1991, Iraqi leaders decided not 741 |
to declare the offensive BW program and in consequence ordered all evidence of the program erased. Iraq 742 |
declared that BW program personnel sanitized the facilities and destroyed the weapons and their contents. 743 |
(cid:127) Iraq declared the possession of 157 aerial bombs and 25 missile warheads containing BW agent. ISG 744 |
assesses that the evidence for the original number of bombs is uncertain. ISG judges that Iraq clandestinely 745 |
destroyed at least 132 bombs and 25 missiles. ISG continued the efforts of the UN at the destruction site but 746 |
found no remnants of further weapons. This leaves the possibility that the fragments of up to 25 bombs may 747 |
remain undiscovered. Of these, any that escaped destruction would probably now only contain degraded 748 |
agent. 749 |
(cid:127) ISG does not have a clear account of bulk agent destruction. Offi cial Iraqi sources and BW personnel, state 750 |
that Al Hakam staff destroyed stocks of bulk agent in mid 1991. However, the same personnel admit con- 751 |
cealing details of the movement and destruction of bulk BW agent in the fi rst half of 1991. Iraq continued to 752 |
present information known to be untrue to the UN up to OIF. Those involved did not reveal this until several 753 |
months after the confl ict. 754 |
(cid:127) Dr. Rihab Rashid Taha Al ‘Azzawi, head of the bacterial program claims she retained BW seed stocks until 755 |
early 1992 when she destroyed them. ISG has not found a means of verifying this. Some seed stocks were 756 |
retained by another Iraqi offi cial until 2003 when they were recovered by ISG. 757 |
ISG is aware of BW-applicable research since 1996, but ISG judges it was not conducted in connection with 758 |
a BW program. 759 |
(cid:127) ISG has uncovered no evidence of illicit research conducted into BW agents by universities or 760 |
research organizations. 761 |
(cid:127) The work conducted on a biopesticide (Bacillus thuringiensis) at Al Hakam until 1995 would serve to main- 762 |
tain the basic skills required by scientists to produce and dry anthrax spores (Bacillus anthracis) but ISG has 763 |
not discovered evidence suggesting this was the Regime’s intention. However in 1991, research and produc- 764 |
tion on biopesticide and single cell protein (SCP) was selected by Iraq to provide cover for Al Hakam’s role 765 |
in Iraq’s BW program. Similar work conducted at the Tuwaitha Agricultural and Biological Research Center 766 |
(TABRC) up to OIF also maintained skills that were applicable to BW, but again, ISG found no evidence to 767 |
suggest that this was the intention. 768 |
2 769 |
770 |
Page 20
771 |
(cid:127) Similarly, ISG found no information to indicate that the work carried out by TABRC into Single Cell Protein 772 |
(SCP) was a cover story for continuing research into the production of BW agents, such as C. botulinum and 773 |
B. anthracis, after the destruction of Al Hakam through to OIF. 774 |
(cid:127) TABRC conducted research and development (R&D) programs to enable indigenous manufacture of bacte- 775 |
rial growth media. Although these media are suitable for the bulk production of BW agents, ISG has found 776 |
no evidence to indicate that their development and testing were specifi cally for this purpose. 777 |
(cid:127) Although Iraq had the basic capability to work with variola major (smallpox), ISG found no evidence that it 778 |
retained any stocks of smallpox or actively conducted research into this agent for BW intentions. 779 |
The IIS had a series of laboratories that conducted biological work including research into BW agents for 780 |
assassination purposes until the mid-1990s. ISG has not been able to establish the scope and nature of the 781 |
work at these laboratories or determine whether any of the work was related to military development of BW 782 |
agent. 783 |
(cid:127) The security services operated a series of laboratories in the Baghdad area. Iraq should have declared these 784 |
facilities and their equipment to the UN, but they did not. Neither the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) 785 |
nor the UN Monitoring, Verifi cation, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) were aware of their existence 786 |
or inspected them. 787 |
(cid:127) Some of the laboratories possessed equipment capable of supporting research into BW agents for military 788 |
purposes, but ISG does not know whether this occurred although there is no evidence of it. The laboratories 789 |
were probably the successors of the Al Salman facility, located three kilometers south of Salman Pak, which 790 |
was destroyed in 1991, and they carried on many of the same activities, including forensic work. 791 |
(cid:127) Under the aegis of the intelligence service, a secretive team developed assassination instruments using 792 |
poisons or toxins for the Iraqi state. A small group of scientists, doctors and technicians conducted secret 793 |
experiments on human beings, resulting in their deaths. The aim was probably the development of poisons, 794 |
including ricin and afl atoxin to eliminate or debilitate the Regime’s opponents. It appears that testing on 795 |
humans continued until the mid 1990s. There is no evidence to link these tests with the development of BW 796 |
agents for military use. 797 |
In spite of exhaustive investigation, ISG found no evidence that Iraq possessed, or was developing BW agent 798 |
production systems mounted on road vehicles or railway wagons. 799 |
(cid:127) Prior to OIF there was information indicating Iraq had planned and built a breakout BW capability, in the 800 |
form of a set of mobile production units, capable of producing BW agent at short notice in suffi cient quanti- 801 |
ties to weaponize. Although ISG has conducted a thorough investigation of every aspect of this information, 802 |
it has not found any equipment suitable for such a program, nor has ISG positively identifi ed any sites. No 803 |
documents have been uncovered. Interviews with individuals suspected of involvement have all proved 804 |
negative. 805 |
l 806 |
a 807 |
c 808 |
i 809 |
g 810 |
o 811 |
l 812 |
o 813 |
i 814 |
B 815 |
(cid:127) ISG harbors severe doubts about the source’s credibility in regards to the breakout program. 816 |
(cid:127) ISG thoroughly examined two trailers captured in 2003, suspected of being mobile BW agent production 817 |
units, and investigated the associated evidence. ISG judges that its Iraqi makers almost certainly designed 818 |
and built the equipment exclusively for the generation of hydrogen. It is impractical to use the equipment 819 |
for the production and weaponization of BW agent. ISG judges that it cannot therefore be part of any BW 820 |
program. 821 |
3 822 |
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