├── README.md ├── notes ├── 20190620-meeting-governance-cn.md ├── 20190620-meeting-governance-en.md ├── 20190623-meeting-governance-cn.md ├── 20190623-meeting-governance-en.md ├── 20190630-meeting-governance-cn.md ├── 20190630-meeting-governance-en.md ├── 20190703-meeting-governance-cn.md ├── 20190703-meeting-governance-en.md ├── 20190707-meeting-governance-cn.md ├── 20190707-meeting-governance-en.md ├── 20190710-meeting-governance-cn.md ├── 20190710-meeting-governance-en.md ├── 20190714-meeting-governance-cn.md ├── 20190714-meeting-governance-en.md ├── 20190717-meeting-governance-cn.md ├── 20190717-meeting-governance-en.md ├── 20190721-meeting-governance-cn.md ├── 20190721-meeting-governance-en.md ├── 20190728-meeting-governance-cn.md ├── 20190728-meeting-governance-en.md ├── 20190801-meeting-governance-cn.md ├── 20190801-meeting-governance-en.md ├── 20190819-meeting-governance-cn.md ├── 20190819-meeting-governance-en.md ├── 20190826-meeting-governance-cn.md ├── 20190826-meeting-governance-en.md ├── 20190828-meeting-governance-cn.md ├── 20190828-meeting-governance-en.md ├── 20190924-wtfmeeting-governance-en.md ├── 20190929-wtfmeeting-governance-en.md ├── A_Response_to_YellowHat_Gov_Call_20191201.md ├── DeFi.WTF Banner.jpg ├── DeFiHackathonRecap.md ├── MacroWTF_Archive.md └── images │ └── apache-arch.png └── research ├── BME.md ├── DeFi.WTF Agenda Working Draft-2.png ├── DeFi.WTF_Agenda.md ├── DeFi.WTF_KV_Banner.jpg ├── Difficulty future market size.xlsx ├── HashedgeAuctionMarket.md ├── Honeylemon ├── HoneyLemonWhitepaper.md ├── MarketProtocolV2Approach.md ├── TechnicalDesign_img1_OverallFlow.png ├── TechnicalDesign_img2_OrderFlow.png ├── TechnicalSpec.md └── WhitePaper_BMRIformula_LaTex.png ├── LSDai.md ├── LSDao.md ├── TokenizedSyntheticMiningContract.md ├── Updated DEFI.wtf Agenda.png ├── f1-1.png ├── f1.png ├── f2-1.png ├── f2.png ├── f3-1.png ├── f3.png ├── f4-1.png ├── f4.png ├── f5-1.png ├── f5.png ├── f6.png ├── f7.png ├── hashrate-derivative-cn.md └── hashrate-derivative-en.md /README.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Yellow Hat DAO (aka Pi-rate $HIP) 2 | Keepers of free capital market, starting from blockchain infrastructure. 3 | 4 | We are the Yellow Hats who play with decentralized financial primitives to experiment with crypto-native problems, in such way that tests the limit of cryptoeconomics. We wear Yellow Hats as construction workers, who make the infrastructure more robust by building the inevitables that may break the weaker ones. 5 | 6 | The Yellow Hat DAO is a social experiment itself, emerged out of the need to pool research and capital across interesting independent initiatives. Interdisciplinary collaboration on Community GitHub can and will be recorded at the present and accounted for in the future. The Yellow Hats participate in the community on an individual bases, projects compete for resources within the organization, retain independence from each other, and maintain their own value-capture models. 7 | 8 | Our GitHub Organization is a common co-creation space for the Yellow Hats in ideation and prototyping experiments. New project ideas, or research directions that fit the Yellow Hat Dao mission, may be posted as an [Issues](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues) . You may also post your comments or questions on existing project or research as [Issues](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues) or directly create a Pull Request. Outstanding Issues will be addressed in the Yellow Hats Community Semi-weekly Governance Call. 9 | 10 | Documentation and updates on Yellow Hats' live projects may be found in **Project Management Resources and Docs** below. We are soliciting suggestions from the Community on **Contribution Guideline** and **Community Governance**. 11 | 12 | 13 | ## Project Management Resources and Docs 14 | 15 | ### Buidl (Community Projects) 16 | 17 | #### 1. HoneyLemon (Hashedge) 18 | ##### Phase 2: HoneyLemon Mining Revenue Contract & dApp: Liquid Mining Derivatives 19 | - **A16Z Crypto Startup School Project / SF FlashGirls Pi-rate $HIP Flash Org** 20 | - Core Contributors: 21 | - @talrasha007 @carboclanc @jin10086 : [www.honeylemon.market](https://www.honeylemon.market/) 22 | - @andrei-aisimov @chrismaree @carboclanc @FSM1 @dmvt : 23 | - [28-Day BTC Mining Revenue Contract](https://github.com/carboclan/dapp.honeylemon.market/blob/master/Docs/BTCMiningRevenueContract.md) 24 | - [Technical Documentation](https://github.com/carboclan/dapp.honeylemon.market/blob/master/design/technical-architecture.md) 25 | - @andrei-aisimov @jie85 @longyunlyd: Market Making Strategies & Pricing 26 | 27 | ##### Phase 1: HoneyLemon.market: Cloud Mining Contract Aggregator 28 | - **Consensys Tachyon Accelerator / NY FlashGirls Pi-rate $HIP Flash Org** 29 | - Core Contributors: @talrasha007 @carboclanc @jin10086 30 | - Website: [www.honeylemon.market](https://www.honeylemon.market/) 31 | 32 | ##### Phase 0 33 | **Hashedge: Decentralized Marketplace for Generalized Mining** 34 | - **Winning hack @EthSingapore 2018, 0x prize @EthNY 2019** 35 | - Core Contributors: @talrasha007 @CarboClanC @nyuspc @tzhan28 36 | - Introduction [to be updated] 37 | - Website: [www.hashedge.io](https://www.hashedge.io/) 38 | - Product Demo: [Hashedge Alpha v0.3](http://demo.hashedge.io/) on Ropsten Testnet, for testnet tokens please sign up follow instruction on [www.hashedge.io](https://www.hashedge.io/) 39 | **BME(Bitcoin Mining Earnings) Index Futures: Tokenized Synthetic PoW Mining Contract** 40 | - Core Contributors: @jie85 @CarboClanC @Mikefotiaoqing @tzhan28 41 | - Introduction [en](research/hashrate-derivative-en.md) [cn](research/hashrate-derivative-cn.md) 42 | - [BME data](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/blob/master/research/BME.md) 43 | **CoinCow: Fair Coin Mining, Fun Cow Milking! (A crypto social satire born out of a dream.)** 44 | - Core Contributors: @CarboClanC @talrasha007 @Xi0ng 45 | - Concept Video: [CoinCow in 60 Seconds](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x6eRwmhyLt4&feature=youtu.be) 46 | 47 | #### 2. Liqui3D: Fomo3D x Liquidity Mining 48 | - **Grand Prize @DeFi Hackathon San Francisco Blockchain Week 2019, 1st Place in Cosmos Tendermint Challenge** 49 | - Core Contributors: @Dominator008 @ShrutiAppiah @alanywang @CarboClanC 50 | - Introduction: [Devpost](https://devpost.com/software/liqui3d-by-team-adjust) | [Slides](https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1HWbNjYh7EQNKyv4GThJrusJsMEPzdDp3BQrK3pemikw/edit) | [Doc](https://docs.google.com/document/d/14VyCw5Ir7mJ9DbZzCXVJHuzJhVoUgr9Jbe2cWkHTe_Y/edit?usp=sharing) 51 | - [Github Repo](https://github.com/carboclan/liqui3d) 52 | - [DeFi Hackathon Recap](notes/DeFiHackathonRecap.md) 53 | 54 | #### 3. LSDai: Get high on Interest! 55 | - **Winning hack @ETHBerlinZwei 2019** 56 | - Core Contributor: @dmvt @hellwolf @kobuta23 @CarboClanC @leafcutterant 57 | - Introduction [en](research/LSDai.md) 58 | - Product Demo: www.LSDai.market 59 | 60 | #### 4. $HIP: 61 | - Core Contributors: @renchuqiao @jenil04 @Carboclanc 62 | - Intro Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G56CZ12M1WY 63 | - Demo: https://hip-app-api.herokuapp.com/ 64 | - Repo: https://github.com/carboclan/hip 65 | 66 | ### Ask (Experiments) 67 | 68 | #### 1. .WTFdao 69 | - Macro.WTF Summit: http://macro.wtf/ 70 | - [Archive for Slides & Video](notes/MacroWTF_Archive.md) 71 | - DeFi.WTF Summit: www.DeFi.wtf 72 | - Core Contributor: 21-Day Flashmob Collective that Dissolves on 10/8/2019 73 | - [Agenda](research/DeFi.WTF_Agenda.md) 74 | - [Archive for Slides & Videos](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/69) 75 | - "A DeFi Billboard" Harberger Tax Social Experiment: [Repo]( https://github.com/carboclan/billboards-admin) 76 | - Quadratic Voting Toolkit: [Repo](https://github.com/carboclan/QVToolkit) 77 | 78 | #### 2. DAO & Decentralized Governance Research 79 | - [Accountability in Decentralized Networks: The MolochDAO Case](https://link.medium.com/8QB9u3KEfZ) by @Arikan 80 | 81 | #### 3. PoW vs. PoS Network Cartel Formation Analysis (Coming Soon!) 82 | 83 | #### 4. Cost of Liquidity Attacks (Coming Soon!) 84 | 85 | ### Meeting Notes 86 | 87 | #### 2019 88 | 89 | Date | Topic | Agenda | Notes | Summary | 90 | |:---|:---|---|---|:---| 91 | Dec 01 | Governance | - | [cn](notes/A_Response_to_YellowHat_Gov_Call_20191201.md) | 黄帽联盟进化论 Evolution of the YellowHats - A Letter to Community | 92 | Sept 29 | Governance | [Agenda](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/69) | [en](notes/20190929-wtfmeeting-governance-en.md) [cn (tbc)](notes/20190929-wtfmeeting-governance-cn.md) | defi.wtf summit preparation | 93 | Sept 24 | Governance | [Agenda](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/69) | [en](notes/20190924-wtfmeeting-governance-en.md) [cn (tbc)](notes/20190924-wtfmeeting-governance-cn.md) | defi.wtf summit preparation | 94 | Aug 28 | Governance | [Agenda](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/60) | [en (tbc)](notes/20190828-meeting-governance-en.md) [cn (tbc)](notes/20190828-meeting-governance-cn.md) | Hashrate Derivative product design, governence | 95 | Aug 26 | Governance | [Agenda](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/65) | [en (tbc)](notes/20190826-meeting-governance-en.md) [cn](notes/20190826-meeting-governance-cn.md) | Hashrate Derivative product design, governence | 96 | Aug 19 | Governance | [Agenda](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/60) | [en (tbc)](notes/20190819-meeting-governance-en.md) [cn](notes/20190819-meeting-governance-cn.md) | Hashrate Derivative product design, governence | 97 | Aug 1 | Governance | [Agenda](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/56) | [en](notes/20190801-meeting-governance-en.md) [cn (tbc)](notes/20190801-meeting-governance-cn.md) | Hashrate Derivative product design, governence | 98 | Jul 28 | Governance | [Agenda](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/54) | [en (tbc)](notes/20190728-meeting-governance-en.md) [cn (tbc)](notes/20190728-meeting-governance-cn.md) | Hashrate Derivative product design | 99 | Jul 21 | Governance | [Agenda](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/43) | [en (tbc)](notes/20190721-meeting-governance-en.md) [cn (tbc)](notes/20190721-meeting-governance-cn.md) | Index & Contract Design, product design | 100 | Jul 17 | Governance | [Agenda](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/41) | [en](notes/20190717-meeting-governance-en.md) [cn](notes/20190717-meeting-governance-cn.md) | Index & Contract Design, product design | 101 | Jul 14 | Governance | [Agenda](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/28) | [en (tbc)](notes/20190714-meeting-governance-en.md) [cn](notes/20190714-meeting-governance-cn.md) | Index & Contract Design, product design | 102 | Jul 10 | Governance | [Agenda](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/27) | [en](notes/20190710-meeting-governance-en.md) [cn](notes/20190710-meeting-governance-cn.md) | Index & Contract Design | 103 | Jul 7 | Governance | [Agenda](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/13) | [en](notes/20190707-meeting-governance-en.md) [cn](notes/20190707-meeting-governance-cn.md) | Community Governance and "Yellow Hat DAO" proposal, Index & Contract Design | 104 | Jul 3 | Governance | [Agenda](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/7) | [en (tbc)](notes/20190703-meeting-governance-en.md) [cn (tbc)](notes/20190703-meeting-governance-cn.md) | | 105 | Jun 30 | Governance | [Agenda](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/6) | [en (tbc)](notes/20190630-meeting-governance-en.md) [cn](notes/20190630-meeting-governance-cn.md) | Hashrate Derivative v1.0 White Paper Draft, Trade Offs of MARKET Protocol Integration | 106 | Jun 23 | Governance | [Agenda](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/1) | [en (tbc)](notes/20190623-meeting-governance-en.md) [cn](notes/20190623-meeting-governance-cn.md) | Mission, Organization Principle, Hashrate Derivative v1.0, Reconciliation with Hashedge | 107 | Jun 20 | Governance | | [en](notes/20190620-meeting-governance-en.md) [cn](notes/20190620-meeting-governance-cn.md) | Carbo Clan Community vision, UMA and Other Derivative Protocols | 108 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190620-meeting-governance-cn.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # 会议纪要：管理会议，2019年6月20日 2 | 3 | 社区管理会议于北京时间2019年6月20日22点在北京线下召开，历时3小时。 4 | 5 | **社区与会人员有：** 6 | 7 | - 天然 8 | - Tina 9 | - Liu Jie 10 | - 驴子 11 | - Mike 12 | 13 | ## 议程及行动 14 | 15 | ### 1. 议程评审 16 | 17 | 本次会议临时召开没有事先沟通议程。 18 | 19 | ### 2. 过往会议后续行动跟进 20 | 21 | 无 22 | 23 | ### 3. 社区愿景 24 | 25 | - _Tina:_ 社区内有POW和POS这两类参与者，可能存在一致的目标和不一致的路径。POW方偏向项目落地和可执行，认为当下POW入手算力衍生品更加容易落地。POS方认同长远目标但认为算力衍生品在POS上可以更优雅的实现且可以解决POS质押的流动性问题。为了最大化的吸引PoS和PoW的资源，社区的愿景应该涵盖这两类目标，统一PoW和PoS需求，为Web3下的基础设施提供保障。 26 | - _Liu Jie:_ 虽然不反对PoS，但PoS的流动性问题不是因为缺少衍生品造成，而是本身的共识不够大造成的。 27 | - _Mike:_ 同意 _Liu Jie_ 的观点 28 | - _Tina:_ 在统一个社区内，可以细分为各个小组做不同的方向，又可以相互借鉴资源。 29 | - _Liu Jie:_ 同意类似GNU组织下，可以有不同的项目 30 | 31 | - _Tina:_ 我们提出过的使命是让天下没有难挖的矿。 32 | - _天然:_ 觉得这个使命很好 33 | - _Liu Jie:_ 这个目标是否过大，如果是这个目标，那么算力衍生品只能算是其中很小的一个方向，诸如搞一个开源的BTC ASIC芯片可能是这个目标中更重要的方向。 34 | - _Tina:_ 我们提出这个更大的目标，竖起大旗，但可以从我们资源能及的方向起步做起来。 35 | 36 | - _Liu Jie:_ 我研究算力衍生品的初衷是因为看到算力投资人投入了大量资金，却承受了与之不匹配的超额风险，而矿机厂商和矿场经营者获取无风险收益且拿走了挖矿中的大部分利润。我个人研究算算力衍生品的目标是：通过金融衍生品，剥离挖矿风险，让投资挖矿的资金和风险相匹配，让挖矿市场更有效。 37 | - _Mike:_ _Liu Jie_ 提出的目标强调风险揭示和形成有效市场，Tina的目标强调降低挖矿门槛让更多人可以进入挖矿。 38 | - _Tina:_ 不矛盾，风险揭示后自然可以导向降低门槛的目标。 39 | 40 | ### 4. 算力合约v1.0 41 | - _Tina:_ 目前的版本可以称为v0.5，我们需要逐步向Liu Jie提出的架构发展。 42 | - _Liu Jie:_ UMA是一个很接近我们需求的底层协议，然而目前有两个严重的问题。1. UMA缺少投资组合保证金，造成不能关闭头寸，也不能做市。2.UMA的合约因一方保证金不足终止合约时守约方的利益不能保障继续执行，缺少转移合约及兜底的功能，实践中无法使用。我们有三个选择：1. 是否就在当前UMA上发展算力合约，暂时忍受上述问题。 2. 在UMA合约上完善补充这两个功能 3. 与UMA团队一起或者Fork一个版本完善UMA合约。 43 | - _驴子:_ UMA确实有这些问题。 44 | - _Tina:_ UMA团队进展较慢，我们需要自己搞或者再向其他团队学习。 45 | - _Liu Jie:_ 我有几个问题向UMA团队咨询后再做判断。 46 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190620-meeting-governance-en.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Meeting Notes: Governance, June 20 2019 2 | 3 | Governance meeting held @ 2PM [UTC](http://www.timebie.com/std/utc.php) in Beijing. 4 | 5 | **Community attendance:** 6 | 7 | - Tian Ran (Talyor) 8 | - Tina 9 | - Liu Jie 10 | - Lvzi (TAL) 11 | - Mike 12 | 13 | ## Agenda points & Actions 14 | 15 | ### 1. Agenda review 16 | 17 | The meeting was temporarily held without an advance communication agenda. 18 | 19 | ### 2. Action point follow ups from previous meetings 20 | 21 | None 22 | 23 | ### 3. Community vision 24 | 25 | - _Tina:_ POW and POS supporters coexist, they might have similar goal but disimilar path to achieve the goal. POW is more executable, as the hashrate derivative could become a executable legit business. POS side agrees on the longterm goal but think hashrate derivative could be conducted more elegantly on POS and could solve the liquidity issue of POS Staking. In order to maximize both POS and POW support and their resources, the community should be inclusive and compatible to both goals, and provide infrastucture to Web3 26 | - _Jie:_ Not a big fan of POS. POS liquidity problem is a lack of general concensus, not a lack of derivatives. 27 | - _Mike:_ seconded. 28 | - _Tina:_ Within one community, there can be several distinct groups focusing on different directions and share resources. 29 | - _Jie:_ Like GNU and Linux structure, different projects can coexist. 30 | 31 | - _Tina:_ Our Mission is to make all coins easily minable. 32 | - _Taylor:_ seconded. 33 | - _Jie:_: is this goal too grandeurs. If this mission is set, then hashrate derivative is only one of the many directions worth exploring. An opensource BTC ASIC mining chip could be more important. 34 | - _Tina:_ We could raise a big flag but focus on things with in our reach first. 35 | 36 | - _Jie:_ My initial impulse to dive in on hashrate derivative is that I saw many investor invested tons of money but bear supersized risks. On the other hand, mining rig manufacturers and mining field operators earned most of the profits without bearing much risks. My goal is to separate mining risks using derivatives so that risk and return corresponds. 37 | - _Mike:_ Jie wanted arisk revelation and efficient market. Tina wanted to lower the barrier to mine so that more people can access mining. 38 | - _Tina:_ Both goals can coexist. A revelation of risk can naturally lower the barrier. 39 | 40 | ### 4.Hashrate contract v1.0 41 | 42 | - _Tina:_ the current version should be named v0.5. We should gradually move toward the architechure Jie proposed. 43 | - _Jie:_ UMA is a protocol that fit our needs closely. However, two serious problems still lies between. 1.UMA lacks portfolio margin, which makes closing position and further, marketmaking impossible. 2. UMA 's contract will terminate when one side lacks margin, thereby cutting into the other side's interest. The contract with the lack of both transferability and gurantee of interest, has rendered unusable in practice. We have 3 choices: 1. use UMA as is, live with the problems. 2. Rectify UMA to fix the two aforementioned problems ourselves. 3. work with UMA to fix the problems or fork UMA 44 | - _TAL:_ UMA has those problems indeed 45 | - _Tina:_ UMA team progress slowly, we might need to do it ourselves or learn from other teams. 46 | - _Jie:_ I have a few questions that I need to ask UMA before make any further judgement 47 | 48 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190623-meeting-governance-cn.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # 会议纪要：管理会议，2019年6月23日 2 | 3 | 社区管理会议于北京时间2019年6月23日10点-12点、22点-24点，在微信群线上召开。 4 | 5 | **社区与会人员有：** 6 | 7 | - 天然 8 | - Tina 9 | - Liu Jie 10 | - 驴子 11 | - Mike 12 | - ZT 13 | 14 | ## 议程及行动 15 | 16 | ### 1. 议程评审 17 | 18 | [提议的议案](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/1)被会议接受。 19 | 20 | ### 2. 过往会议后续行动跟进 21 | 22 | 使命 23 | 在之前会议的基础上提出社区的使命： 让天下没有难挖的矿 24 | 25 | 讨论成果： 26 | 让天下没有难挖的矿是否合适做社区的目标？ 27 | mike觉得可能对用户不够直观，矿工会有其他困难，刘杰也同意 28 | 叫公平挖矿如何，总之可以加形容词 29 | 刘杰：建立一套简单的挖矿的金融基础设施。 30 | mike&jie：使命可以务虚一点 31 | 新浩：公平也不太好 32 | 33 | 每个人想一个使命再评论 34 | 35 | 社区的组织原则 36 | 这是一个开放的社区，任何人只要认同社区使命都可以加入社区贡献力量。社区是非盈利性的，社区及社区成员都可以接受捐赠，但不接受任何以商业回报为目的的投资。在社区使命下，社区将发起若干项目。这些项目将有独立的经济模型，因项目需要也可以接受公平的商业投资。社区成员可以以个人名义投资这些项目。社区负责审核项目的投资人资质。社区是高度独立的，社区不对投资人负责也不对投资人做任何承诺。社区可以接受来自项目收益的捐赠以持续发展。 37 | 38 | 讨论成果： 39 | 问题：很多项目想交还给社区，结果发现交不回去还是原来一群人 40 | 早期共识不够大，后面也做不大 41 | 42 | 希望：社区接受捐赠但是不接受商业投资。底下的项目可以考虑接受投资，但要确保公平。社区成员可以投。社区可以审核投资人要提供资源，（需要界定权力边界）。投资人的收益权和投票管理权完全剥离。项目的商业收益可以还给社区。类似非盈利的concensus。 43 | 44 | tina觉得和原来设想相比没有矛盾点：coincow是第一个项目，hashedge是第二个 45 | 46 | 算力衍生品项目目标 47 | 算力衍生品项目是社区的第一批项目之一。算力衍生品项目的目标是：剥离挖矿风险，让投资挖矿的资金和风险相匹配，让挖矿市场更有效。 48 | 49 | 讨论成果： 50 | 选项 1难度 2算力单位产出，觉得2更合适矿工 51 | 52 | 投资者风险高，矿场矿机厂风险低收益高，希望变得匹配。做法是提供难度衍生品 53 | 剥离改成揭示（待议） 54 | zt：像vix，封装成独立产品 。利用算力难度衍生品向使用者提供关于算力难度的风险敞口（provide exposure to hashrate volatility） 55 | 56 | 算力衍生品项目的经济模式 57 | 算力衍生品项目在运营过程中的需要三类资源： 58 | 1. 流动性提供方。包括矿工、矿场、矿机厂商、区块链资管团队、交易所、OTC Broker 等等。流动性提供方的贡献度是以成交量衡量的，很难在初期确定资源方的贡献度。 59 | 2. 用于强行平仓兜底的资金。 60 | 3. 向社区捐赠用于后续发展的资金。 61 | 62 | 算力衍生品项目可能的商业收益来源： 63 | 1. 交易手续费，与之相关的是第一类资源。 64 | 2. 强行平仓罚金，与之相关的是第二类资源。 65 | 66 | 总体上，有两种分配收益的经济模式 67 | 1. 集中化的类股权方式。 68 | 流动性提供方也作为兜底资金提供方也作为捐赠资金提供方。由流动性提供方公平认购股权（或股权币），认购资金进入资金池用于强行平仓兜底和向社区捐赠。项目的收益不直接分配给股权投资人，而是进入资金池。 69 | 股权模式下，平台的核心参数（保证金比例、罚金比例等）由股权投资人决定。 70 | 2. 分散的方式。 71 | 分散方式没有类似股权的机制。交易手续费的全部或部分分配给提供流动性的资源方，类似销售渠道。任何人都可以对保证金不足的合约进行兜底，并获取强行平仓罚金。社区可以从上述收益中强行划分一定比例用于后续发展，也可以不设置硬性比例而是由收益人主动捐赠。 72 | 分散模式下，平台的核心参数（保证金比例、罚金比例等）由社区决定。 73 | 需要对上述经济模型进行讨论 74 | 75 | 讨论成果： 76 | 保障运营的资源 77 | 三类资源中的2很像bitmex的穿仓保险。 78 | zt说可以做成完全不会穿仓的，计算可以少一道 79 | 刘杰非常希望能给守约方以足够的保障。 80 | zt：找不到接盘的还是就爆仓就行了，不能强迫接盘，守约方会得到一些罚金。另一个保障的模式是保险，类似cds 81 | 82 | 罚金vs卖保险模型：在一方爆仓的情况下，另一方不同的人对保险的需求不一样，有些人有真实算力的真的要对冲必须买，trader不一定觉得需要，拿罚金就够了。 83 | 84 | 重要新成果：算力期货和cds。有了这两个工具以后挖矿就可以打包做成固收了 85 | 86 | 分配收益的经济模式 87 | tina：流转是否代币化现在不敢设计， 88 | zt：有币可以，但希望不止是股权，还得有点用。 89 | jie：mkr有点为了让币有用有点搞复杂了。是否有币。用户体验是否over utility币，这是不是硬标准 90 | tina觉得币的问题1脑子里都是炒币 2法律成本贵， 91 | 92 | 结论暂时搁置股权币问题 93 | 94 | 算力衍生品的早期交易模式 95 | OTC还是集合竞价。需要考虑流动性特点和技术上的难度。可以从OTC做起来，现在的UX应该也有大量可以直接用。 96 | 97 | 讨论成果： 98 | otc还是orderbook 99 | zt： orderbook合约必须一样，这样才能二级交易，坏处是撮合引擎大概率在链下 100 | otc可以定制，用不了统一的保证金，只能抵押物 101 | jie：往orderbook走的前提是标准化 102 | zt ：场内效率高多了，占比40%+。大银行之间交易必须otc无法场外，我们做的场内的事情应该是兼容所有的需求的，没必要去搞场外了。 103 | 场内broker network可以自己做市。之前非标，不存在头寸代币化。现在标准化，头寸可以考虑代币化。但空头头寸估计不行因为敞口无限大。 104 | 成交以后可以mint token（这句前后文需要补充，没啥印象了） 105 | 驴子：新做一个otc代码相比我们现在的otc版本复用性很低， 106 | otc不存在cds，难在设计信用体系，default概率和之后定价。otc无监管风险，越像交易所越有合规风险 107 | 108 | 开个新issue，标准化的层次 109 | 如何达成交易层，头寸达成，orderbook otc还是程序化 110 | 保险/cds层 111 | 这个问题需要列出整个设计的结构以后才能综合讨论比较 112 | 113 | 114 | 新老交接和延续 115 | 讨论成果： 116 | 开发会议讨论：全力做新的？还是一起做 117 | 运营会议：运营目标，任务分解 118 | 119 | 交接方式：做成一个大文档，补上工程层面已经做的更领先的东西比如挖矿指数计算 120 | 游戏几十万能搞定，最近应该不重视 121 | web3 summit是重要时间点，观点是pos cartel formation，不公平。观点和数据要检查一下 122 | 123 | 算力衍生品项目的roadmap 124 | 讨论成果： 125 | 有0.5 1.0和2.0版本 126 | 设计目标：是能方便平仓又维持履约 127 | cds定义：期货没有cds，这里指减少穿仓的机制 128 | 保险定义1 爆仓不终止 2爆仓拿罚金。三种付钱垫底的人：买家 第三方 平台 129 | 用户端：都不是很关心，要保险的人听不懂cds，要罚金的不在乎cds。两种体验太不一样了，反正看需求 130 | 131 | 关于1.0版本：做项目不要依赖别的项目的进度，而uma挺慢的。另，1.0版本没用。。。因为买家也能跑路，双方都能跑的体验很差 132 | 133 | 文档结构问题：deribit文档很好 trader很关心。文档结构，搞清楚目地，tech导向还是金融导向。对码农来说二级交易没意义，只要标准肯定可以。刘杰这边会出一个新版 134 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190623-meeting-governance-en.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | 2 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190630-meeting-governance-cn.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | 2 | **630关于初版白皮书的讨论整理** 3 | 4 | # 白皮书 5 | ## 2.1. 6 | index公式让驴子发出来。 7 | Pps pay per share 矿池模式，买家不为矿池运气不好没出块而承担风险。zt有个平滑公式可能也需要用上 8 | 9 | 合约大小：1eth吗？现在没有传统的必须1份起或者一手起的问题，token随意分割。根据交易者习惯，把指数弄简单，放大到大家看着舒服的数。合约和头寸的单位必须一致 10 | 11 | 交割时间：到期区块高度比实际时间更准确。同时写出期望时间。 12 | Tina：整点交割符合trader习惯。 13 | Jie：可以先定期，但如果还没挖到跨调整的块，则自动延期。btc确实2016个块这样算周期比较重要。平台官方可以鼓励社区集中流动性到一些相对标准的合约上。避免augur这样的流动性过于分散。 14 | tina：加个像veil一样的ui 15 | 16 | ## 3.0. 17 | market拆开的思路很好，uma揉起来不一定是好事，不符合分层解决问题的逻辑。 18 | 19 | ## 3.2. 预言机 20 | btc没法插针，延时也不怕。可以自己跑个btc节点，这样数据来自链。 21 | 22 | mike：防我们自己中心化出错。有争议的话能解决吗 23 | uma设计了，分散oracle，投票，代理投票。预言机就投票和交叉验证两种。延迟交割的使用体验就不太好。可以考虑以后单独加强 24 | 25 | ## 3.3&3.4 26 | dydx问题1 27 | dydx不能直接对接，但暂时不会成为主要障碍 28 | dydx问题类似erc20 vs 721问题 29 | dydx在erc20外面又包了一层，所以别的交易所没法交易。 30 | 可以做个类似makerdao的机制，eth押着，dai可以交易，dydx可以做差不多的事情。 31 | 32 | Market mint的币肯定可以在dydx内流转，但是不能进入别的交易所。token在dydx合约地址里面。 33 | 34 | dydx问题2，market合约到期分红给dydx合约就懵逼了 35 | jie：有一招，到期前先全都平仓，尤其是带有dydx的market 合约token。需要对手方配合 36 | 37 | 38 | 如果dydx没空配合我们改，我们自己分叉dydx的话，就没有dydx生态内的流动性了。另外也可以看看ddex的做的怎么样。ddex上次称和dydx的主要区别是可以对接链下的做市商。 39 | 40 | 如果我们不想赚钱的话就把人拉进来就行。或者做流动性池子。可以把market生成的token直接丢进uniswap里面。makerdao早期的Oasis dex可以参考 41 | 42 | ## 4. 43 | 场景得补上做市商等。补ui，比如加个一键配资。封装不同的场景。需要讨论哪些是一个层面的 44 | 45 | 46 | # Governance相关： 47 | 以后双周会，周日上午1000，周三晚上1000。 48 | 49 | # 任务： 50 | 改进并翻译白皮书：标题要定好，部分专有名词和有歧义名词如swap的翻译问题，参考dharma，也多看别的各家defi白皮书。 51 | dydx的几个问题找对方聊 52 | 驴子发指数公式，大家对指数公式形成共识 53 | 讨论各场景分别位于哪个层面，哪些更重要，需要更优先的做 54 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190630-meeting-governance-en.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | 2 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190703-meeting-governance-cn.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | 2 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190703-meeting-governance-en.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | 2 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190707-meeting-governance-cn.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | 2 | # 会议纪要：管理会议，2019年7月07日 3 | 社区管理会议于北京时间2019年7月07日10点-12点30、在微信群线上召开。 4 | 5 | ## 社区与会人员有： 6 | 天然 7 | Tina 8 | Liu Jie 9 | 驴子 10 | Mike 11 | ZT 12 | xinhao 13 | 笑脸哥 14 | 15 | 16 | ## 1.1 指数设计 17 | 18 | 类似期权交易的iv。交易挖矿指数就旁边标注隐含难度 19 | 20 | 这个指数本质是难度分之一，其他都是常数。 21 | 22 | 每个随机量一个标的，不要混起来。所以不想带入挖矿手续费，block time等其他变量。 23 | 24 | 有实际意义的指数在挖矿世界可能会在小数点后面五六个零很不雅观。 25 | 常数两个层面，一是赋予实际意义，比如1t挖一天的产出。二是也看起来舒服，是一个小数点之前有三四位的正常数字。 26 | 27 | 另一个选项是直接用科学记数法来表示，这样把小数点后面的零都放入了科学记数法里面。 28 | 29 | 30 | ## 2.1 GNU/linux以及阿帕奇的组织架构 by Mike 31 | 32 | ![阿帕奇的思维导图](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/blob/master/notes/images/apache-arch.png) 33 | 34 | Apache运营的基本原则： 35 | 36 | 1精英主义（需要确认是不是meritocracy），主要反映在管理方式上，由各层级的精英小组，对议题进行投票决策，绝大多数人服从执行 37 | 38 | ——投票为3种，赞成，弃权，反对，投反对票的人，需要提出替补方案，否则反对无效 39 | 40 | ——精英小组面，投票权相等，没有权重 41 | 42 | ——任务认领采用类似google，或者说google借鉴了Apache的方式，由精英小组分解并评估任务，项目成员认领，完成后提交并维护，再由精英小组评估完成质量，给出评定 43 | 44 | 45 | 2按贡献值自下而上的晋升机制 46 | 47 | ——按贡献值进行由用户——》开发者——》提交者——》项目管理委员会 或者 会员——》基金会（ASF）——》董事会（具体贡献值计算方法，可以进一步了解，以衡量执行的效果） 48 | 49 | ——很少空降，Apache文化也不赞同空降 50 | 51 | 52 | 3基础设施完善 53 | 54 | ——基金会提供完善的项目管理，技术管理，品牌，公关，法务等服务，保证开发者顺畅参与，而不必为非技术层面的问题困扰 55 | 56 | ——项目孵化流程高效，Mike认为是Apache基金会的核心流程 57 | 58 | 59 | 60 | 面临的问题： 61 | 62 | 1项目补充新开发资源困难 63 | 64 | ——相当比例的高评级项目，是由商业组织支持的，比如hadoo由雅虎支持，个人开发者参与不足，导致项目进入Apache孵化流程后，无法补充新开发者，比较尴尬 65 | 66 | 67 | 2决策集中化 68 | 69 | ——大V抱团，因为会员的晋升，除贡献值外，也依赖于老用户的推荐，且在决策时不分权重，所以容易造成大V抱团，通过对自己有利的决议 70 | 71 | 72 | 73 | 讨论汇总： 74 | 75 | 1需要获得什么样的资源？由谁提供？（Mike） 76 | 77 | ——需要先回答本组织的目标是什么？实现此目标需要的资源是什么？ 78 | 79 | ——如果目标是个人开发者无法参与的，比如linux基金会，主要是以linux的商业化为目标，依赖于大厂商的参与，所以会员以大厂商为主 80 | 81 | ——落实到本组织，比如目标是没有难挖的矿，那主要参与者应该是与挖矿产业链相关人员，但这里又分单纯挖矿，单纯交易，挖矿交易三类，需要考虑首先要引入什么资源 82 | 83 | ——提个思路供参考，比如主要做挖矿金融衍生品，那是不是设计一个通道，把具有金融能力的人，接入挖矿背景的技术团队（类似Tina+刘杰），这样本组织卖点明确，服务方式的设计，也有依据 84 | 85 | 86 | 2开发者参与研发流程是相对明确的，但推广，运营，市场的参与流程是不明确的？（刘杰） 87 | 88 | ——金融产品需要推广，但具有专业能力的人如何参与？如何计算贡献值，这个流程Apache没有给出范例（刘杰） 89 | 90 | ——提个思路，建议可计量的推广工作，由参与者承担，但不可计量的推广工作，由全职或兼职工作人员承担，Apache基金会的品牌推广，是这样操作的（Mike） 91 | 92 | 93 | 3 token的经济模型如何设计？（Tina) 94 | 95 | ——在核心流程的各环节上，做价值捕获，并尝试进行计量(Tina) 96 | 97 | —— token的获得如何与组织权益相结合，有收益的同时，也要有荣誉（Mike） 98 | 99 | 100 | 101 | 102 | 103 | ## 2.2 yellow hat dao by tina 104 | 相信自由市场奥派做空的人，需要组织联盟，是非主流观点。需要群策群力。 105 | 106 | Tina跟几个老外吃饭以后一起提出，成员包括near protocol的创始人乌克兰小哥illia ，曾提出用smart contract做跨连delegate pos，会break所有bft concensus。还有James prestwich设计过hashrate derivative，storj的联创。pow都nichehashable 107 | 总之基础设施不安全，需要为基础设施建立有效的市场。 108 | Yellow hat 之于carboclan有点像共产国际&中国共产党。我们是在中国主力干活的组织，外援们也需要有归属，方便大家一起做事 109 | 110 | Jie：名字有点怪，白帽黑帽只是tag不是名字，不会这么自称。 111 | 112 | ## 2.3 文档协作 113 | 三个级别的改动 114 | 第一层：简单修改直接改 115 | 第二层：表述调整就pull request 然后三个人review 116 | 第三层：大修改要开会讨论 117 | 118 | 目前三个人权限，tina 刘杰和天然 119 | 120 | 提issue要让所有人都看得懂，符合开源社区通用惯例 121 | 开源社区标准高于公司 122 | 123 | 提pull request以后可以再提问评论， 124 | 取决于问题级别，来决定要多少人来对这事情决策，小事情一两个人就够了，大事情要让更多人参与 125 | 126 | 127 | ## 进度 128 | 2讨论完了，1只讨论了1.1.1和1.1.3，剩余的下次再讨论 129 | 下次控制在2小时以内 130 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190707-meeting-governance-en.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | 2 | # Meeting minutes：Governance meeting，2019/7/07 3 | The community governance meeting took place on 10 am July 7th 2019 4 | 5 | ## attendees： 6 | tzhan28 7 | carboclanc 8 | BigTreeLiuJie 9 | Talrasha007 10 | Mikefotiaoqing 11 | longyunlyd 12 | juqiangl 13 | 14 | ## 1.1-1.3 Index Design & Contract Specs (issue #9) 15 | 16 | Note: Issue 9 is essentially about the trade off of Index scale, and Contract Size (which affects position tokens). 17 | The key considerations: ease of understanding of Index, v.s. ease of referring to Index, v.s. ease of understanding of how many contract tokens to buy given a certain need for hedging. 18 | 19 | Trading Mining Index could be similar to trading options, where Implied volatility is displayed on the side. Here the implied difficulty could be displayed next to the Index. 20 | 21 | 算力收益指数本质是难度分之一，其他都是常数。 22 | 23 | The nature of the Mining Index is the inverse of the difficulty. All else is constant. 24 | 25 | 每个随机量一个标的，不要混起来。所以不应该带入挖矿手续费，block time等其他变量。 26 | 27 | Variables (risks) should be decoupled. So the Mining Index doesnt include variables like transcation fees and block times. 28 | 29 | 有实际意义的指数在挖矿世界可能会在小数点后面五六个零很不雅观。 30 | 31 | Mining Index with real world meanings could have many decimals which looks messy. i.e 0.00000325btc for 1 Th/s per day. 32 | 33 | 常数两个层面，一是赋予实际意义，比如1t挖一天的产出。二是也看起来舒服，是一个小数点之前有三四位的正常数字。 34 | 另一个选项是直接用科学记数法来表示，这样把小数点后面的零都放入了科学记数法里面。 35 | 36 | The constant here has two levels of implications: 37 | 1. Give the Index a real world meaning (i.e. output per unit input). 38 | 2. Make the number a 3-4 digits number in the integer part so that traders can easily refer to it. 39 | 40 | The other option is to use scientific notation so that all the zeros go into the later part (10^x) 41 | 42 | 43 | ## 2.1 GNU/linux and Apache Software Foundation 44 | 45 | ![阿帕奇的思维导图](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/blob/master/notes/images/apache-arch.png) 46 | 47 | 对于参与者来说：自下而上，没有空降兵，被推选成为领导是一种个人荣誉，能力至上 48 | Among contributors it is meritocracy based, voted up by members, and it is an honor to be selected as a leader in Apache. 49 | 50 | 刘杰：做的doris捐给apache了。开源组织一个问题还是外部参与者太少，公司主导的项目很难社区化。如何承接是个问题。代码方面这么多年发展下来还比较方便，营销方面等就比较难 51 | 52 | Jie: worked on a project called Doris in Baidu, that was donated to Apache in the end. One problem with open source organization is lack of freelance participants outside of major organizations. Company oriented projects can hardly turn into community driven. Difficult to onboard new participants. Apache's organizational structure is good for code contribution. It's harder to quantify contribution from the business side. 53 | 54 | tina：解决方法是领任务然后各自去做。设计token赏罚机制，组织价值捕获与项目价值捕获两个层面要协调好。 55 | Mike: 我们需要先定原则，实践中完善 56 | 57 | Tina: To quantify and reward non-coding contribution, will entail clear definition of tasks and mechanism that encourages partcipation. It will likely involve token reward and punishment mechanism. Design token economics to reward and slash participants. Value capture in organization level and project level need to be aligned 58 | Mike: let's set ground rules first, then figure out the mechanisms based on these ground rules 59 | 60 | ### 2.3 principles of Apache 61 | 1. 精英主义（需要确认是不是meritocracy）对参与者要求严格，强自驱力 62 | 2. 自下而上的晋升机制 63 | 3. 能力和贡献值至关重要 64 | 65 | 1. meritocracy-based, high requirement of participation, self-driven; 66 | 2. bottom up internal promotion mechanism; 67 | 3. quantified contribution & capability 68 | 69 | 参与方式，晋升通道：b的参与和c的参与，要看到底我们需要什么资源，谁来提供资源和价值，他们之间什么关系。针对他们设计机制。 70 | 71 | Ways to participate: participation from both Businesses and individuals. It depends on what kind of resources does this organization need, who can contribute. How participants are related. Design mechanisms for them. 72 | 73 | Mike：linux和apache里面大部分都是商业组织完成，个人开发者比例一般。另外精英抱团比较严重。新人晋升仍然不容易，需要跟老人搞好关系 74 | 75 | Mike: most of the works in Linux and apache are done by companys. Percentage of individual developers is not high. Old members of the community tend to work together and block promotion passage for new members. 76 | 77 | Tina：精英主义和面向大b不可取。可取的是奖励阶梯，畅通的晋升方式。无法评论的：商业组织赞助为主是时代产物 78 | 79 | Tina: aganist elitism, pro meritocracy. Don't want the organization to be mainly facing businesses. Clear path to promotion should be adopted. Apache turned out to heavily rely on corporate donation or sponsorship may be a product of the past. We can do things differently now. 80 | 81 | mike：管理方式：人都很强，认领了就自己搞定，会自驱 82 | tina：三原则有点像pow+pos的结合。盈利组织可以参考steam/valve，consensys 83 | 84 | Mike: Something to learn from Apache, how to manage: self-driven. 85 | Tina: the 3 principles are like a combo of pow and pos. Refer to Valve and Consensys. 86 | 87 | ## 2.2 Proposal of "Yellow Hat DAO" - to build an efficient capital market for blockchain infrastructure 88 | 89 | 创建区块链基础设施的衍生品金融市场，因为会影响协议为保障其安全所设计的经济机制，就如同做空这个概念会是非主流的，可能会得罪项目方。但我们实则通过创建有效的金融市场，通过杠杆，做空，让好的协议更好的胜出，让共识小的协议的安全性问题暴露。有争议的世界最大的算力交易市场Nicehash是有价值的，在为矿工和算力需求方提供一个高效的交易市场的同时，也让人可通过付出成本购买算力的形式指定算力来攻击其他公链获利（为此社区计算出了各公链基础设施的“Nichehash-able”攻击成本），但是也让社区更清晰认知各链协议的安全性问题。需要凝聚一群奥派经济学相信自由市场力量的伙伴群策群力。 90 | Creating derivatives on PoW and PoS effectively is creating external incentives that can threaten the economics of some weaker protocols. Many protocol foundations may not like us. Just like shorting, it is not popular amongst mainstream. However, what we are doing is accelerating the market process, and create pressure on protocols to create defense against these attacks. The largest Hashrate spot market Nicehash has always been controversial. While having created an efficient trading marketplace for miners and their counterparties, it enable people to buy hashrate and conduct attacks on other chains at a cost (so-called Nicehash-able cost), but also raised awareness regarding the security issues that the protocols are facing. We should band together with other folks who believe in Austrian School of Economics and the free market. 91 | 92 | 黄帽联盟这个组织是在Tina跟几位公链协议创始人和意见领袖独立日聚会提出的。其中Near Protocol的创始人，曾提出用智能合约创建通过类衍生品机制实现跨链代理质押，这个机制会有可能break所有bft concensus。另外，参与者当中，Summa的创始人，原Storj联合创始人James Prestwich设计过算力保险。 93 | 94 | “Yellow Hat DAO” idea is created during a meetup with a few protocol founders/architects. Amongst the participants, Illia, co-founder of Near Protocol, has written a piece on "Staking & Delegation via Smart Contract", using smart contract and derivative like approach to achieve cross-chain delegation network, which can threaten essentially the weaker BFT consensus. Other participant include founder of Summa One and co-founder of Storj James Prestwich, who has designed Hashrate Insurance in the past. 95 | 96 | 黄帽联盟相对于碳基部落CarboClan，部落是发起方，黄帽联盟是国际组织？ 97 | Yellow hat vs carbonclan : international & loosely organized vs initiator？ 98 | 99 | Jie：名字有点怪，白帽黑帽只是tag不是名字，不会这么自称。 100 | 101 | Jie: the name yellow hat is weird, Black Hat and White Hat are tags not names. They don't call themself that. May need to verify the name with other hackers. 102 | 103 | ## 2.3 collaboration on documents 104 | 105 | 三个级别的改动 106 | 第一层：简单修改直接改 107 | 第二层：表述调整就pull request 然后三个人review 108 | 第三层：大修改要开会讨论 109 | 110 | 目前三个人权限，tina 刘杰和天然 111 | 112 | Three levels are modifications 113 | 1. simple grammar of typo, just change it 114 | 2. different wording. Use pull request and review by 3 people 115 | 3. major changes need to be discussed in governance calls 116 | 117 | 3 people have write access: Tina, Jie and Tianran 118 | 119 | 提issue要让所有人都看得懂，符合开源社区通用惯例 120 | 开源社区标准高于公司 121 | 122 | Issues need to be written clearly. Follow the common practice of mature open source projects. Their standard is higher than that of companies 123 | 124 | 提pull request以后可以再提问评论， 125 | 取决于问题级别，来决定要多少人来对这事情决策，小事情一两个人就够了，大事情要让更多人参与 126 | 127 | Pull request can be commented. Loop in necesary people to make decision on different subjects. Major issue require more participation 128 | 129 | ## Progress 130 | 131 | Finish with 2. Only done with 1.1.1 and 1.1.3. Propose new ideas and comment on 1.1.1 &1.1.3. The rest are up for discussions next time 132 | Keep the meeting under 2 hours next time 133 | 134 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190710-meeting-governance-cn.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # 会议纪要：管理会议，2019年7月10日 2 | 3 | 社区管理会议于北京时间2019年7月10日22点-24点，在微信群线上召开。 4 | 5 | **社区与会人员有：** 6 | 7 | - 天然 8 | - Tina 9 | - Liu Jie 10 | - 驴子 11 | - Mike 12 | - ZT 13 | 14 | ## 议程及行动 15 | 16 | ### 1. 议程评审 17 | 18 | [提议的议案](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/27)被会议接受。 19 | 20 | ## 1.1 指数设计和合约参数 21 | ### 1.1.0 指数公式 22 | 看 [issue9](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/9) candidate 4 23 | 24 | 结论：指数如果支持精度的化就用btc，不支持就用聪。Contract size 如果聪，那么contract size这边要除以10^8 25 | 26 | 对冲30天的时候，不能直接乘30，以前可以这么做是因为之前non fungible，应该买一部分一个月，一部分2个月，一部分3个月？也不准确。 27 | 28 | 由于要对冲的是一系列连续的每天波动的单位算力产出，所以得用一段周期内的现金流的平均值。 29 | 这样产品已经过于复杂了，必须是专业人士才能操作，不直接给散户/矿工 30 | 31 | ### 组织形式 32 | 33 | 1. 基金会，底下几个不同项目可以盈利交税。认购折扣 34 | 2. 社团不institutionalize，只有各项目 35 | 36 | 过往成功的经验都是先一个核心项目，再带起来其他项目。consensys的直属项目叫bespoke，外围叫hub 37 | 38 | 一致意见是前期要花经费的就出; 39 | 但对于**钱的来源**: 40 | * jie：只拿不求回报的钱 41 | * mike：可以拿长线融资 42 | 43 | ### 总结：有预算审批制，一事一议，原则是要长线的钱，不能有无法兑现的承诺 44 | 45 | ### 提议：微信群内增加每日讨论，以缓解每次的开会讨论和决策压力。 46 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190710-meeting-governance-en.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Meeting minutes：Governance meeting，2019/7/10 2 | The community governance meeting took place on 10 pm Beijing time July 10th 2019 3 | 4 | ## Attendees： 5 | tzhan28 6 | carboclanc 7 | BigTreeLiuJie 8 | Talrasha007 9 | Mikefotiaoqing 10 | longyunlyd 11 | juqiangl 12 | 13 | ## Agenda Review 14 | The [agenda](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/27) has been approved 15 | 16 | ## 1.1 index design and contract specs 17 | ### 1.1.0 The index formula 18 | See [issue9](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/9) Candidate 4 19 | 20 | **Conclusion**: if market protocol support enough number of digits (probably need 12 digitss) then use btc as unit of account. If not, then use satoshi. In terms of contract size, if using satoshi, then the contract size need to be divided by 10^8 21 | 22 | In order to hedge 30 days of difficulty fluctuation, one cannot simply multiply by 30. It used to work since it was non-fungible. Buy partly 1 month, partly 2 month partly 3 month doesn’t work either. 23 | 24 | Since we are hedging a series of fluctuating unit hashrate daily mining output, an average of the cashflows within a period should be used. Therefore, this product is too complicated so that only professional traders can understand. It likely will not be miner or retail friendly. 25 | 26 | ## Organization & budgeting 27 | 28 | 1. Foundation with a few for-profit projects under the arch. 29 | 2. Do not institutionalize the organization, leave only the projects. 30 | Past expereince suggests that a core successful project could lead to a batch of new projects. 31 | The core projects in Consensys is called bespoke while the peripheral ones are called hub. 32 | 33 | **Concensus**: Budget approval . Discussion on every major proposal. Prinficle for funding is to only take long term money without promising anything that cannot be accomplished. The opinion diverge here with Jie suggesting only taking grants while mike is ok with long term investments. 34 | 35 | **Proposal**: add daily selected topic discussion on wechat group to alleviate pressure for the biweekly meeting. 36 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190714-meeting-governance-cn.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # 会议纪要：管理会议，2019年7月14日 2 | 3 | 社区管理会议于北京时间2019年7月14日10点-12点在微信群线上召开。 4 | 5 | **社区与会人员有：** 6 | 7 | - 天然 8 | - Tina 9 | - Liu Jie 10 | - 驴子 11 | - Mike 12 | 13 | 14 | ## 1. 议程评审 15 | 16 | [提议的议案](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/28)被会议接受。 17 | 18 | 会议议题： 19 | 20 | 1合约的设计 21 | 22 | ——目标：阶段性对合约的设计达成一致 23 | 24 | 2确定合约产品的设计要素（https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/32） 25 | 26 | ——目标：充份讨论，消除信息盲点，为实际进行产品设计做前期准备 27 | 28 | 3优化会议流程（https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/33） 29 | 30 | ——目标：通过有效决议，并实际执行 31 | 32 | 33 | ## 2 合约的设计 by Liu jie 34 | 35 | ZT于会议前，在微信中参与讨论 36 | 37 | 对合约设计达成共识，并关闭对应issues 38 | 39 | ——Synthetic PoW Mining Index formula #9(https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/9) 40 | 41 | ——Use Trading Days v.s. Block Height for Expiration? #19（https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/19） 42 | 43 | ——Trade off between Index Unit and Contract Size #20（https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/20） 44 | 45 | 46 | ## 3 确定产品要素 by Mike 47 | 48 | 1目标人群 49 | 50 | ——对冲者（矿工或云算力购买者）：从事或了解挖矿业务，对风险有认知，需要对冲难度波动带来的收益风险，主要需求是锁定收益 51 | 52 | ——对冲者（固收基金）：因为无法控制风险，导致不能入场，同样需要锁定收益 53 | 54 | ——投机者：了解行业，通过收集信息或技术分析，对全网算力和难度增长有预判的人，主要需求是获取收益，同时希望通过杠杆，扩大收益 55 | 56 | ——做市商：专业用户，使用能力强，只要有足够交易量，难用也会来 57 | 58 | ——问题：目前判断主要人群是对冲者，实际是对冲者出让部分利益，引来投机者和做市商 59 | 60 | 61 | 2核心价值 62 | 63 | ——剥离挖矿风险，让风险倾向型的资金承担风险并最大化收益，让风险规避型的资金回避风险 64 | 65 | 66 | 3目标场景 67 | ——对冲者：在买入，或意识到难度变化可能造成损失时，会产生控制风险的想法 68 | 69 | ——投机者：当自己了解的信息与多数对难度趋势判断不一致时，会产生投机的想法 70 | 71 | ——问题：如何插入用户场景？最好是能长期连接，当有收益下降，难度上升，算力增加的时候，能实时对用户主动推送，并做简报，类似于订阅，比如定位于，矿工人手一份的收益简报，在简报里加交易入口 72 | 73 | 74 | 4预期的使用方式 75 | 76 | ——保险：好处是能够匹配矿工要对冲的风险，覆盖风险敞口，可以完美嵌入挖矿业务，缺点是不标准，对非矿工用户友好度低 77 | 78 | ——交易市场：对赌，标准化，参与方便，缺点是不容易跟矿工要对冲的风险完全匹配 79 | 80 | ——问题：标准合约形式与个性化的挖矿风险不匹配，是否可以以交易市场为基础，尝试匹配对冲者需求，比如市场可以交易标准品，但对冲者也可以输入时间和算力，显示匹配的合约，然后一键交易 81 | 82 | 83 | 5预期的目标 84 | 85 | ——未讨论 86 | 87 | 6需要解决的运营难点 88 | 89 | ——未讨论 90 | 91 | ——更新问题：目标用户群有互补，可以通过运营控制不同类型用户的数量，以提高交易效率，但是不是初期做市商不好搞定？ 92 | 93 | 94 | ## 4 优化会议流程 by Mike 95 | 96 | ——未讨论 97 | 98 | 99 | ## 5 进度 100 | 1，2.1,2.2.3,2.4讨论完成，2.5，2.6以及3未讨论 101 | 102 | 103 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190714-meeting-governance-en.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Meeting minutes：Governance meeting，2019/7/14 2 | The community governance meeting took place on 10 am Beijing time July 14th 2019 3 | 4 | ## attendees： 5 | Taylor 6 | carboclanc 7 | BigTreeLiuJie 8 | Talrasha007 9 | Mikefotiaoqing 10 | longyunlyd 11 | juqiangl 12 | 13 | ## Agenda Review 14 | The [agenda](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/28) has been approved 15 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190717-meeting-governance-cn.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # 会议纪要：管理会议，2019年7月17日 2 | 3 | 社区管理会议于北京时间2019年7月17日22点-24点在微信群线上召开。 4 | 5 | **社区与会人员有：** 6 | 7 | - 天然 8 | - Tina 9 | - Liu Jie 10 | - 驴子 11 | - Mike 12 | - ZT 13 | 14 | ## 议程及行动 15 | 16 | ### 1. 议程评审 17 | 18 | [提议的议案](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/41)被会议接受。 19 | 20 | 21 | ## 1. 指数设计和参数设计 22 | 关于wbtc小数点位数不够, [详见issue46，已提供4种方案](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/46)和 [pr48](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/pull/48) 23 | 24 | ## 2. 产品定位和初步设计 25 | [详见issue32](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/32) 26 | 27 | 难度期货的市场规模：天然做, [详见这个表格](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/blob/master/research/Difficulty%20future%20market%20size.xlsx) 28 | 29 | 各参与方的决策流程和收益计算 [详见issue49](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/49) 30 | 31 | mike估算产品工期 32 | 33 | ## 3. 治理 34 | Restructure our meeting format. Add daily discussion in specific topic on wechat. Shorten biweekly discussion length. [详见 issue33](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/33) 35 | 36 | 剩余issue由天然分配讨论 37 | 38 | 39 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190717-meeting-governance-en.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Meeting minutes：Governance meeting，2019/7/17 2 | The community governance meeting took place on 10 pm Beijing time July 17th 2019 3 | 4 | ## Attendees： 5 | Taylor 6 | carboclanc 7 | BigTreeLiuJie 8 | Talrasha007 9 | Mikefotiaoqing 10 | longyunlyd 11 | juqiangl 12 | 13 | ## Agenda Review 14 | The [agenda](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/41) has been approved 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | ## 1. Index design and contract specs, 19 | Lack of precision in WBTC, [see issue46，4 proposals have been provided](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/46) 20 | 21 | ## 2. Product positioning and initial design 22 | Basic elements of the product [see issue32](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/32) 23 | 24 | Market size of Difficulty futures：by Taylor, [see spreadsheet](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/blob/master/research/Difficulty%20future%20market%20size.xlsx) 25 | 26 | Decision process and earnings calculation of each participants [see issue49](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/49) 27 | 28 | Mike to give estimates on time requirement to finish the product 29 | 30 | ## 3. Governance 31 | Restructure our meeting format. Add daily discussion in specific topic on wechat. Shorten biweekly discussion length. [详见 issue33](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/33) 32 | 33 | Taylor to delegate rest of the topics/issues to members 34 | 35 | 36 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190721-meeting-governance-cn.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # 会议纪要：管理会议，2019年7月21日 2 | 3 | 社区管理会议于北京时间2019年7月21日10点-12点在微信群线上召开。 4 | 5 | **社区与会人员有：** 6 | 7 | - 天然 8 | - Tina 9 | - Liu Jie 10 | - 驴子 11 | - Mike 12 | - ZT 13 | 14 | ## 议程及行动 15 | 16 | ### 1. 议程评审 17 | 18 | [提议的议案](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/43)被会议接受。 19 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190721-meeting-governance-en.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Meeting minutes：Governance meeting，2019/7/21 2 | The community governance meeting took place on 10 am Beijing time July 21th 2019 3 | 4 | ## attendees： 5 | Taylor 6 | carboclanc 7 | BigTreeLiuJie 8 | Talrasha007 9 | Mikefotiaoqing 10 | longyunlyd 11 | juqiangl 12 | 13 | ## Agenda Review 14 | The [agenda](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/43) has been approved 15 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190728-meeting-governance-cn.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # 会议纪要：管理会议，2019年7月28日 2 | 3 | 社区管理会议于北京时间2019年7月28日10点-12点在微信群线上召开。 4 | 5 | **社区与会人员有：** 6 | 7 | - 天然 8 | - Tina 9 | - Liu Jie 10 | - 驴子 11 | - Mike 12 | - ZT 13 | 14 | ## 议程及行动 15 | 16 | ### 1. 议程评审 17 | 18 | [提议的议案](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/54)被会议接受。 19 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190728-meeting-governance-en.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Meeting minutes：Governance meeting，2019/7/28 2 | The community governance meeting took place on 10 am Beijing time July 28th 2019 3 | 4 | ## attendees： 5 | Taylor 6 | carboclanc 7 | BigTreeLiuJie 8 | Talrasha007 9 | Mikefotiaoqing 10 | longyunlyd 11 | juqiangl 12 | 13 | ## Agenda Review 14 | The [agenda](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/54) has been approved 15 | 16 | Presentation mainly by Taylor on the existing four things we've created so far. 17 | Remaining major issues please see [issue 57](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/57) and [issue 58](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/58) 18 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190801-meeting-governance-cn.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # 会议纪要：管理会议，2019年8月1日 2 | 3 | 社区管理会议于北京时间2019年8月1日晚上10点-12点在微信群线上召开。 4 | 5 | **社区与会人员有：** 6 | 7 | - 天然 8 | - Tina 9 | - Liu Jie 10 | - 驴子 11 | - Mike 12 | - ZT 13 | 14 | ## 议程及行动 15 | 16 | ### 1. 议程评审 17 | 18 | [提议的议案](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/56)被会议接受。 19 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190801-meeting-governance-en.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Meeting minutes：Governance meeting，2019/8/1 2 | The community governance meeting took place on 10 am Beijing time August 1st 2019 3 | 4 | ## Attendees： 5 | Taylor 6 | carboclanc 7 | BigTreeLiuJie 8 | Talrasha007 9 | Mikefotiaoqing 10 | longyunlyd 11 | juqiangl 12 | 13 | ## Agenda Review 14 | The [agenda](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/56) has been approved 15 | 16 | ## Logic to combine the 4 trading actions on market protocol [issue 57](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/56) 17 | 18 | Buy long= sell short 19 | Buy short = sell long 20 | Buy long and buy short both occur=mint new pair 21 | Sell long and sell short both occur=redeem 22 | 23 | The combined effect: a future like derivative that has lower and upper bound. Can be long or shorted. 24 | Has a fixed collateral that cannot be topped up. The nominal price of the contract should be the index, which is essentially the long token price + the floor. The long token price* quantity in effect is the maintenance margin 25 | 26 | Jie is developing the combined version of market protocol on a forked hydro protocol. 27 | Logic can be given but a detailed product document won't be available until later. 28 | The combined version of market protocol can also be deployed on other centralized exchanges easily. 29 | 30 | 31 | ## Target User 32 | The prerequiste of designing a product must include identifiing the right target user. 33 | For hedging it could include mid to high level miner. For trading and speculation, the expertise required is significant. Casual trader and miner like Xinhao won't participate. Has to be Tal or Jie or ZT level trader. 34 | 35 | Tal as a arbitrage trader would like to see more third party data like the nicehash spot price 36 | Jie stated three major parameters before: implied difficulty, implied average difficulty increase in each cycle, implied profit margin 37 | 38 | ## On how to predict next difficulty. 39 | Two ways to calculate: 40 | 1. Use the past 2016 blocks. 41 | 2. Use the current cycle blocks (grow from 0 to 2016) 42 | Both have sound logic that should be considered. 43 | 44 | The hashrate 2016 1008 and 504 can also be taken into consideration. 45 | 46 | ## Data that should be displayed alongside the orderbook: 47 | Implied difficulty 48 | 49 | Implied average difficulty increase 50 | 51 | Implied leverage 52 | 53 | ## Calculator: 54 | At least two ways to appraoch 55 | 1. Input average difficulty increase 56 | 2. Input each of the diffciulty change included in the contract 57 | 58 | Data item like premium/discount, profit margin, should be secondary if not completely gone. 59 | 60 | 61 | ## Other Projects under Yellow hat dao 62 | 63 | Projects from our own: hashedge the cloudmining platform, coincow the game. 64 | 65 | Projects by Professor Burak 66 | 67 | Project with radical market 68 | 69 | Project by Suji and Minaji 70 | 71 | The consititution of this organization need to be formulated. Then the rules for admission and rules for projects to gain resources from the organization can be set. 72 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190819-meeting-governance-cn.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # 会议纪要：管理会议，2019年8月19日 2 | 3 | 社区管理会议于北京时间2019年8月19日晚上10点-12点在微信群线上召开。 4 | 5 | **社区与会人员有：** 6 | 7 | - 天然 8 | - Tina 9 | - Liu Jie 10 | - 驴子 11 | - Mike 12 | - ZT 13 | - 明明 14 | 15 | ## 议程及行动 16 | 17 | ### 1. 议程评审 18 | 19 | [提议的议案](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/60)被会议接受。 20 | 21 | 22 | 欢迎明明加入 23 | 24 | 产品版本号Product version specification: 25 | Mike: we should start with v0.2 26 | MM: we should use v0.2.0 27 | Conclusion with Consensus: v0.2.0 28 | 29 | 版本定义Version Definition: 30 | Mike: k线，order book，交易撮合，买卖，持仓 31 | MM: 32 | 1. 投资者入金方式？-第三方插件， 33 | 2. 入金币种？WBTC， 34 | 3. 合约发布前（Mint）发行流程？已简化没有发行角色，只有看多、看空两个角色。 35 | 第三方钱包 支持那些 明确出来0.2.0 这个版本 36 | 37 | 0.2.0目标：核心交易功能跑通 38 | 39 | 重要更新： 40 | 刘杰受启发，会让蒙特卡洛公司。做基于market protocol的类期货交易所，难度期货会是其中一个交易对。 41 | 42 | 界定清楚双方的边界以后，hashedge的重心将会落在提供指数上 43 | 一种是bme142884指数 44 | 另一头是每个block产出的指数 45 | 理论上要跑五个节点再随机用schnorr 46 | 才能让大家都信是个去中心化的 47 | 48 | 49 | 关于黄帽初衷： 50 | 提供做空渠道来实现整个区块链基础设施的有效市场 51 | Efficient mkt hypo 有效市场有三个要素 52 | 初期风险揭示，后期降低准入门槛 53 | 54 | 关于保险产品 55 | isda美国衍生品标准规范 56 | out of money call 就像insurance 57 | 控制住结构化产品的设计，让三方去卖保险和固收 58 | 59 | 60 | 组织mission价值观，边界定义清晰然后分内部外部，要有取舍 61 | 62 | 下次讨论wbtc 63 | 和整个集团名字和logo和slogan 64 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190819-meeting-governance-en.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Meeting minutes：Governance meeting，2019/8/19 2 | The community governance meeting took place on 10 am Beijing time August 18th 2019 3 | 4 | ## Attendees： 5 | Taylor 6 | carboclanc 7 | BigTreeLiuJie 8 | Talrasha007 9 | Mikefotiaoqing 10 | longyunlyd 11 | juqiangl 12 | 13 | ## Agenda Review 14 | 15 | ###Hashrate Derivative Product Initial Design 16 | ####1. Product version 17 | a. Mike: POC v0.2 18 | b. XMM: two-digit v0.2.0 19 | Conclusion with Consensus: start with v0.2.0 20 | 21 | ####2. Version definition 22 | a. Mike: 23 | i. v0.2.0 features: chart, order book, matching engine, trading interface, margins 24 | b. MM: 25 | i. Wallet supported? browser extensions (Metamask) 26 | ii. Currency for collateral accepted? WBTC， 27 | iii. Issuance process? Through modification of the MARKET protocol, the minter position has been simplified away, there is only long or short position two roles. 28 | 29 | ####3. The Practical Matters 30 | a. Jie’s proposal: 31 | i. Jie’s company Monte Carlo is currently designing and developing a full-functioning decentralized exchange on Ethereum, the MCDex, expected to launch in Oct 2019, which can list BME Futures. 32 | ii. Propose to merge Yellow Hat Community’s effort in building a DEX for BME Futures into Monte Carlo’s MCDex. 33 | iii. To concentrate liquidity, Monte Carlo’s MCDex should be the only interface for trading BME Futures. 34 | b. Tina’s concerns: 35 | i. Limiting trading interface for BME Futures only to MCDex is against the spirit of decentralization, tokenized long-short position pairs should be able to free float. 36 | ii. Given the specialized nature of BME Futures, Bitmex-like generalized trading interface of MCDex may not be user-friendly enough for miners’ and traders’ to understand the instrument. 37 | c. Conclusion with consensus: 38 | i. MCDex will incorporate a BME Index calculator for miners and traders, as specified in earlier community product discussion. 39 | ii. Yellow Hat Community can create an intro marketing page for BME Futures on community product “Hashedge”, and links to MCDex. 40 | iii. Jie will send over the latest UIUX design of MCDex for Yellow Hat community this week for review. 41 | 42 | ###Governance: 43 | Community project portfolio and organization: thoughts and feedbacks on the summary of current community project portfolio in the updated README: 44 | a. Mike: What are the criteria for community project selection? Project CoinCow seems a bit out of place. 45 | b. Tina: a simple governance scheme for the Yellow Hat Community will be proposed soon, after closing research on comparable organizations’ governance scheme. The proposal will incorporate the following aspects: 46 | i. Community Mission 47 | ii. Core values of Community 48 | iii. Governance process: 49 | 1. Community members’ entry and exit, induction process 50 | 2. Community project criteria, proposals, selection and QA 51 | 3. Peer review of members’ contribution 52 | iv. How does the Yellow Hat community contributors capture value from contribution to projects and research. 53 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190826-meeting-governance-cn.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | 2 | # 会议纪要：管理会议，2019年8月26日 3 | 4 | 社区管理会议于北京时间2019年8月26日晚上10点-12点在微信群线上召开。 5 | 6 | **社区与会人员有：** 7 | 8 | - 天然 9 | - Tina 10 | - Liu Jie 11 | - 驴子 12 | - Mike 13 | - ZT 14 | 15 | ## 议程及行动 16 | 17 | ### 1. 议程评审 18 | 19 | [提议的议案](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/65)被会议接受。 20 | 21 | 22 | 期货产品首页UI几个小问题 23 | 首页k线图不够突出。已解决 24 | order和transcation打算怎么区分？按标配的来 25 | wallet是我们自己提供菜单还是直接靠metamask的？靠metamsk 26 | 27 | 后两个实际看刘杰这边怎么做 28 | tina的lsdai会成为mcdex上面又一个交易对 29 | 30 | 31 | 做一个大首页，底下包括云算力产品，期货产品，奶牛游戏，未来可能的保险产品。 32 | 33 | 视觉风格要统一一下，看起来像母子品牌，要有一个统一的slogan 34 | 35 | 天然出大首页的文字稿，然后明明简单做一个wordpress 36 | 37 | 另，天然填bitgo wbtc merchant的问卷https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1y-yQzUN8ym2Kzt0AQ2__Y8-FADvC-XiZcZizYU7-S9s/viewform?edit_requested=true%C2%A0 38 | 39 | 刘杰建议这些放到开发会议上，不要放在治理会议上 40 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190826-meeting-governance-en.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Meeting minutes：Governance meeting，2019/8/26 2 | The community governance meeting took place on 10 am Beijing time August 26th 2019 3 | 4 | ## Attendees： 5 | Taylor 6 | carboclanc 7 | BigTreeLiuJie 8 | Talrasha007 9 | Mikefotiaoqing 10 | longyunlyd 11 | juqiangl 12 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190828-meeting-governance-cn.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # 会议纪要：管理会议，2019年8月28日 2 | 3 | 社区管理会议于北京时间2019年8月28日晚上10点-12点在微信群线上召开。 4 | 5 | **社区与会人员有：** 6 | 7 | - 天然 8 | - Tina 9 | - Liu Jie 10 | - 驴子 11 | - Mike 12 | - ZT 13 | 14 | ## 议程及行动 15 | 16 | ### 1. 议程评审 17 | 18 | [提议的议案](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/60)被会议接受。 19 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190828-meeting-governance-en.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Meeting minutes：Governance meeting，2019/8/28 2 | The community governance meeting took place on 10 am Beijing time August 28th 2019 3 | 4 | ## Attendees： 5 | Taylor 6 | carboclanc 7 | BigTreeLiuJie 8 | Talrasha007 9 | Mikefotiaoqing 10 | longyunlyd 11 | juqiangl 12 | 13 | ## Agenda Review 14 | The [agenda](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/56) has been approved 15 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190924-wtfmeeting-governance-en.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Meeting minutes：WTF Governance meeting，2019/9/24 2 | The community governance meeting took place on 1030 pm Beijing time Sept 24th 2019 3 | 4 | ## Attendees： 5 | Taylor 6 | carboclanc 7 | Bowen 8 | Diane 9 | Shruti 10 | Future from blockbeats 11 | Toya 12 | Suji 13 | Minako 14 | Xiangxiang 15 | 16 | ## Agenda Review 17 | Gather all possible resources to host Defi.WTF Summit 18 | Will discuss in subsections 19 | 20 | ## Summit Agenda & Speaker 21 | 22 | ### Type 1 curated sections 23 | We have 7 curated sections, 2-4 subsections udner each section. mostly still flexible. 24 | 25 | ### Type 2 WTF talks, 26 | similar to lightning talks. ie 8 minutes each. 27 | WTF talks are self proposed 28 | Option1 spread wtf talks whole day 29 | Option2 condense all wtf talks into 1 hour. 30 | 31 | ### Type 3: Solicit questions on online (twitter/github) 32 | questions could be added to curated topics or wtf talks 33 | Need a standard format for question submission 34 | Poll of best questions will also be conducted through the quadratic voting system. 35 | 36 | ### Update Sept 29 37 | We now have 10 Type 1 curated sections. WTF talks will be hosted at lunch all together instead of spreading whole day. Therefore we need catering. Some of the Type 3 questions have already been added to Type 1 and Type 2 talks. Some other Type 3 questions will be asked at different panels 38 | 39 | 70% of the Type 1 talks have been finalized? 40 | Type 2 self proposal have amounted to 4 ? We have a limit of 6? 41 | 42 | 43 | 44 | ## Online Marketing 45 | 46 | ### Twitter 47 | #### A specialized social media volunteer subgroup that inculdes Toya, Camila Bowen,Diane, Maybe Taylor, Xingxing? 48 | #### Camila will create some content to be twitted 49 | #### Twitter Campaign could be conducted together with the Type 3 questions above 50 | #### Bowen suggested creating some hashtag for the event to stimulate social media engagement. 51 | #### Diane suggested creating some posters to be spread around 52 | ——Taylor has already created the gif version of some of the posters with the lips moving 53 | 54 | ### Newsletter 55 | Bowen has a list. Some newsletters are every Friday, some are Monday. 56 | Proof of Work by Eric Meltzer on this Friday has already been sent out. 57 | 58 | ### Reddit 59 | Popular subreddits are r/ethereum, r/ethtrader, r/ethfinance, r/makerdao 60 | Bowen post threads Taylor be the first guy to upvote and reply? 61 | 62 | ### Telegram 63 | Telegram group has already been created 64 | 65 | 66 | ## Coverage 67 | 68 | Taylor will be the photographer if he makes it to Japan 69 | 70 | Chainnews will provide coverage including audio recording, audio-to-transcript, video live coverage, post-event video documentary. Some could be outsourced to other media partners like Blockbeats or Real Satoshi. 71 | 72 | Catering? 73 | 74 | 75 | ## Developments 76 | ### Website Update 77 | Mingming will be the designer 78 | 79 | ### BillBoard 80 | Minako will be in charge of the billboard，both back and front end? 81 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/20190929-wtfmeeting-governance-en.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Meeting minutes：Governance meeting，2019/9/29 2 | The community governance meeting took place on 1000 pm Beijing time Sept 29th 2019 3 | 4 | ## Attendees： 5 | Taylor 6 | carboclanc 7 | Bowen 8 | Diane 9 | Shruti 10 | Future from blockbeats 11 | Toya 12 | Suji 13 | Minako 14 | Xiangxiang 15 | 16 | ## Agenda Review 17 | Gather all possible resources to host Defi.WTF Summit 18 | Will discuss in subsections 19 | 20 | ## Summit Agenda & Speaker 21 | 22 | 23 | ### Update Sept 29 24 | We now have 10 Type 1 curated sections. WTF talks will be hosted at lunch all together instead of spreading whole day. Therefore we need catering. Some of the Type 3 questions have already been added to Type 1 and Type 2 talks. Some other Type 3 questions will be asked at different panels 25 | 26 | 70% of the Type 1 talks have been finalized? 27 | Type 2 self proposal have amounted to 4 ? We have a limit of 6? 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | ## Online Marketing 32 | 33 | ### Twitter 34 | 35 | 36 | ### Newsletter 37 | 38 | ### Reddit 39 | 40 | 41 | ### Telegram 42 | 43 | 44 | 45 | ## Coverage 46 | 47 | 48 | 49 | ## Developments 50 | ### Website Update 51 | 52 | 53 | ### BillBoard 54 | 55 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/A_Response_to_YellowHat_Gov_Call_20191201.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | 黄帽联盟协作实验进化论 12.1.2019 2 | 3 | 碳这种元素的王者性质，乃是源于其平凡：碳做了大部分的事情，又不走极端，借助这种节制的本质，碳主宰了自然。 4 | -「Atoms, Electrons & Changes」by Peter Atkins 5 | 6 | 就今天的讨论，我思考了一下。个人意见是YellowHat社区与利益之间，我希望能够保持社区的真诚，希望真正能以开放心态，像@小岛美奈子@matataki.io 这样的小伙伴，在贡献中学习沉淀，认可有价值内容的分享，而不是给大家带来一种这里都是牛人我来功利social climb，或者我很牛我在牺牲自我过来帮你的这样的心态。这个社区里我希望没有一个人觉得自己在被消耗，被消费，而是一种在互相吸取和学习的过程。 7 | 8 | 这是一个价值观与文化层面的定位，是关乎于发起黄帽的初衷，这个社区（目前只是一个zoom电话会、微信群和GitHub作为沟通载体的群体，还不是一个严格意义上的组织）是在发起后大家在参与项目过程中沉淀的组织。 9 | 10 | 现在的黄帽社区的出现，是涌现的过程。因为出于对自由人自组织形态的探索欲望，开始痴迷研究挖矿mining和staking机制设计当中利益与治理的关系，有形与无形力量的市场博弈（tyranny of powerlessness），用利益协同的机制设计把公共品变成社会化公众品(turn public goods into common goods）。开始逐渐形成我自己对于通过机制设计提升异构资本协同效率（coordination of heterogeneous capital）的一些想法。 11 | 12 | 也是因为日有所思夜有所想，想到了算力上链，做梦梦到了荒谬而dystopia的算力🐄游戏CoinCow。 13 | 14 | 没有人能够预判曾经的来自一个梦到的奶牛🐄项目，能从一次失败的黑客马拉松开始。挖矿的金融衍生品领域太晦涩，奶牛游戏这个idea太雷了，找了一线的VC最后没过投委会。我们没有全职团队能做出来奶牛游戏的产品原型，我于是拉着我认为在技能值上🈶“超能力”却埋没在大公司打工和在各自项目上疲于奔命的小伙伴@talrasha007 @longyunlyd ，还有半道merge过来的Sigmenfault北京黑客马拉松的冠军团队汤包他们，组队去圣何塞参加Dorahacks的全球黑客马拉松。那是我们第一次的自由人的自由联盟快闪组织，也是在那里认识了同样飞去打比赛的@小岛美奈子@matataki.io 。 15 | 16 | 我记得我们在比赛后一起去冲浪了，去感受被海浪（像生活和市场一样）暴扁的痛和乐趣。那个时候我们第一次注了我们大家的GitHub组织，把黑客松的🐄代码放了进去，组织名叫CarboClan。Carbo碳基是Carbon的拉丁词根（寓意是人类文明），Clan是部落(Clan是爱打游戏的黑客松参赛小伙伴全票选择的名词，之前被大家否掉的词是lab）。也许，终有一天当碳基文明被硅基文明完全侵蚀，我们能找到一种组织形态留存碳基文明的火种，以一种新的形态繁衍下去。 17 | 18 | 为了不放弃一个玩具一样可笑的idea背后的商业价值，这是我和大家仅有的共同果实，我们把这个奶牛游戏的idea掰开了揉碎了一次又一次参加黑客马拉松，从碰壁失败到开始屡战屡胜，到以及没有初始黄帽小伙伴还能打得动黑客马拉松，所以只好到现场碰运气临时组队，意外收获是每次都能沉淀下来具备某种超能力但却无的放矢的新“黄帽”的小伙伴。每次比赛都是0资源启动、收益未知、36小时自由人利益联合体的快闪组织社会实验，身体心理在极端疲惫的高度不确定下最后几小时的推进、是不断需要自我暗示、相互signal、抓大放小、临时应变，最终才有可能完成所谓的“不可能”。 19 | 20 | 大家可能只能看到的是我们现在的各种进程中的项目，可是只有一起选择经历过的人，才知道一点点我们现在玩笑无数次曾被拒绝的故事。 21 | 22 | 在熊市创业的小伙伴都知道，在湾区、三番、纽约经常是多少次无数小时的等待结果后才换来一次投资人见面，然后没有下文。当时在“等待戈多”般的漫长不确定状态中，我有反复思考，如果能够社区互助的形式，让有只有少数人能看到其“超能力”但都不足以单枪匹马在国际战场上胜出能够不脱离自己的安全网（大公司的工作、自己的项目、自己的生活方式）还能取长补短自愿组队在自己感兴趣的方向进行实验，给自己留下至少一个由社区共同创造出来的选择权(option)，那该多好。 23 | 24 | 创业九死一生的概率，而在区块链领域nothing has quite worked 的状态，对于参与者风险更高。即便这个选择权没有成功兑现，那么至少这个大家自嘲我们是在交易上失利的“负可敌国”小分队、创业间歇的“肥宅俱乐部”能在自己的人生过度和迷茫阶段能找到一个短暂的寄托，学到一点技能，交到一些朋友。 25 | 26 | 这中间经历过的故事，大家都是碎片化的视角，可能只有我一个人看到了全程。谁又真的在一年半前有信心，哪个方向的付出一定会开花结果？ 27 | 28 | 我不知道别人怎么看，对于我唯一确定性的就是，我不会放弃这个想法，和这群一起上过战场的小伙伴，以后一定会给大家一个交代，不管大家在不在意我们能给予的仅有一点点。不能从资本家手中套利给到有贡献的小伙伴现金，那么我希望能至少过程中能给大家带来一种不同的人生体验，冲浪、开飞机、海盗船，说不定某一天这些也能计入human capital无形资产的一种？ 29 | 30 | 难免每个组织随着时间的演变，参与个体或多或少都会在过程中从主观视角只看到自己付出的一面，而容易遗忘曾经获得的乐趣、友谊和知识。 31 | 32 | 我们在4月份也是因为由奶牛游戏脱生出来的，在EthSingapore获奖的Hashedge项目与@Jie85 偶遇。有了成熟开源社区参与者，CarboClan由一个自由人的自由联盟组织，演变成了现在的构建并维护区块链基础设施自由市场的黄帽社区。有了新成员，新视角，我们也尝试了更规范的社区流程，比如固定周例会，议程、会议纪要、GitHub流程。 33 | 34 | 没人想到我们最初迫于无奈通过参加黑客马拉松打造快闪组织打磨产品原型，能让我们的口碑加速度发酵。以至于这半年我们每两周都在有通过新的黑客马拉松加入黄帽的新成员和新项目。而且没有想到我们每一次都意外制造了一定范围内的行业爆款，从LSDai到WTF。其实从本质上看这些小爆款产品和我们这些新快闪组织及影响力，都与黄帽社区当时的小伙伴没有任何关系，但是我对自己有一个不成文的要求，不放在黄帽的GitHub中的项目，我个人不参与，如果不能给黄帽品牌组织带来口碑我不去折腾。而这些项目与黄帽社区的唯一连结，就是我们的周例会或者拉入项目群，向大家分享我们的进展。 35 | 36 | 在黄帽社区没有一个合理准入、分配、奖惩机制的时候，我们已经快要接不住了。而且更要命的是语言障碍、文化隔阂和信息同步的成本，更进一步降低了我们内部成员的认同感。 37 | 38 | 作为一个身体力行去实验研究组织形态有效性的人，我其实从一开始就渴望明确制定规则。但是恰恰是看到了高度不确定的环境下，太多的规则导致组织失去生命力的先例，且一直以来我们想要做的事在眼前的远方，如同滴满雨滴模糊的磨砂玻璃外的灯塔光晕一般闪烁，我知道那在哪里，却难以用语言准确捕捉所看到的景象。我希望保留最多的可能性，所以只是从价值观和我可控的维度来steer而没有制定黑白分明的rule。我想看看究竟我们会自我进化成一个什么样的组织。 39 | 40 | 所以，我们不得不变。当YellowHat社群升级为一个DAO的时候（首先我们在一月份要先设计出来这个DAO的机制），机制要严谨要能够形成强自选择以及价值观的正向循环。从效率导向角度来讲，希望黄帽社区的规则能简单易懂明确，准入机制明确，奖惩分明。各个子项目（各类快闪组织）描述清晰标准，社区投票筛选机制明确，进度分享清晰，需要的资源明确，等等（还有很多需要明确的）。 41 | 42 | 海盗Pirates DAO是一次黄帽精神的分叉，也是吸取了黄帽体外另一个爆款小实验WTFdao作为有倒计时期限的快闪组织的成功与其作为组织缺乏可持续momentum失败经验（作为品牌和meme，WTF成功了，作为一个可持续的组织，我们还没真正迈出第一步）。 43 | 44 | 原本是致敬海盗党Pirate Party，以及关于“create infinite inflation within a tx"的一种小众DeFi攻击策略的梗。为了能制造冬天在纽约的契机，通过长大版奶牛Hashedge给说服自己更好的一个理由坚持下去，我们不会有黄帽小伙伴从世界各地飞过来纽约用自己的剩余精力帮我们的Hashedge，入驻我们的海盗船。黄帽小伙伴有了黑客松战场上的革命友谊与事后协作的基础，而又经过反向自选择后的human capital的基数，才有了头部效应，才有了在昂贵的纽约租大airbnb的机会，让这么多human capital能在一个屋檐下，才有可能重组这群人不可被其工作项目完全捕获的人才剩余价值（surplus human capital），才有了浪迹各大洲打完比赛不知何时再见的海盗hacker们组织一起出海的机会。有了Pirate Party即便分开后不再相见，也会留下又一场社会实验的经验与教训，带着这份记忆各自承载彼此的印记，life goes on。 45 | 46 | 我很喜欢的一本书叫做Finite and Infinite Game。CoinCow、Hashedge、LSDai、WTF、Pi-Rate Party，这些narrative都是进化过程中的组织母体的产物与载体，是我们有意识的创造的给自己与给大家的🈶正向反馈回路的finite game。 47 | 48 | 我无法预知黄帽联盟这个社会协作实验会manifest成为什么形态，但至少是会是我们在遥远的未来无限逼近universal consciousness的一些渺小但不可抹去的尝试。 49 | 50 | 或许，对于社会组织形态的实验本身，就是我们为了生存而被动选择的infinite game。 51 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/DeFi.WTF Banner.jpg: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/carboclan/pm/177fe4f82577091d7c3d7303dc64dd5d42d6da84/notes/DeFi.WTF Banner.jpg -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/DeFiHackathonRecap.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # SF Blockchain Week - Defi Hackathon Recap 2 | ## TL;DR 3 | - The Defi Hackathon capped 2019 San Francisco Blockchain Week, with a total of 56 project submissions from over 400 hackers. Check out all submissions on [Devpost](https://defi-hackathon.devpost.com/submissions). 4 | - DeFi product innovation is getting sophisticated and fun! At least 3 projects building DeFi options/insurance, and 5 gamified DeFi constructs. 5 | - DeFi beyond Ethereum: 31 projects built on Cosmos. 6 | - Our project, [Liqui3D (Game of DEXes)](https://github.com/carboclan/liqui3d), won the Best project - Grand prize & Tier 1 prize for the Tendermint Cosmos Chanllenge. 7 | 8 | ## About Defi Hackathon 2019 @ SF Blockchain Week 9 | San Francisco Blockchain week is a week packed of talks, project showtimes and workshops. One of the unexpected highlight of the blockchain week has been an "unconference" - [Macro.WTF](http://macro.wtf/), which explored macroeconomic perspectives on crypto. 10 | 11 | SFBW climaxed with a Defi hackathon that attracted more than 400 hackers from all over the world who aim to transform the traditional financial products into transparent and permissionless solutions built upon decentralized networks. 12 | 13 | About 56 projects have been submitted at Defi Hackathon 2019. Cosmos attracted the greatest number of teams - a total of 31 projects competes for three tiers of the Cosmos challenges. The pie chart below shows the number of submissions by sponsors' challenge categories. 14 | 15 | ![Submission by Challenge Category](https://i.imgur.com/T4Biufp.png) 16 | 17 | Besides all the sponsor prizes, there is a grand prize that honors the best team who built the best product at this hackathon (yes, that's us!). This made us the only team who won both Tendermint Cosmos Challenge Tier 1 and the Grand Prize. 18 | 19 | ## Project Highlights - Top 5 20 | (Let me know if we missed anything) -> chuqiao: Is this part of the article or just a message to me? - article 21 | 22 | * ### [Liqui3D: Game of Dexes](https://github.com/carboclan/liqui3d) (Grand Prize Winner + Tendermint Cosmos Challenge Tier 1 Winner) 23 | 24 | #### Fomo3D x Liquidity Mining ([Devpost](https://devpost.com/software/liqui3d-by-team-adjust) | [Doc](https://docs.google.com/document/d/14VyCw5Ir7mJ9DbZzCXVJHuzJhVoUgr9Jbe2cWkHTe_Y/edit?usp=sharing) | [Github Repo](https://github.com/carboclan/liqui3d)) 25 | Liqui3D: Game of DEXes is a gamification of trading activity on a DEX in order to increase liquidity. Inspired by the "War of Attrition" game behind FOMO3D, we built this game to allow for the bottom-up emergence of liquidity, particularly among less popular cryptoasset pairs that fall in the long-tail of all traded cryptoasset pairs on a DEX. 26 | ![](https://i.imgur.com/FDoehxC.jpg) 27 | 28 | ### How does it work 29 | #### Game Start 30 | Multiple players place trades of a given trading pair (like ETH-BTC, DOGE-ETH). The transaction fees - typically a percentage of the traded amount - associated with their trades are collected in the pot. 31 | 32 | In the beginning, the POT contains the sum of all transaction fees from all players who have placed trades of this specific trading pair. Depending on how big is your order and how liquid this trading pair is, there will be some transaction fees. The transaction fees is directly proportional to the amount being traded The transaction fees is inversely proportional to the liquidity of the trading pair. 33 | 34 | For example, the initial transaction fee is 1%, if only 10 trades happened in the last 5 mins, we are going to increase the transaction fee, because traders would be willing to pay a little more to make the trade happen faster. If the trading pair is very popular, like ETH/BTC, the transaction fee will be very low, because there is no need to increase liquidity at this point. 35 | 36 | The POT smart contract details the amount of transaction fees that belongs to each player. A portion of the Amount in POT continuously remains in the POT, and the remaining portion of it is given as a contribution to the global lottery pool. 37 | 38 | ![](https://i.imgur.com/Ct2yTz4.png) 39 | 40 | 41 | #### Game Timer 42 | The countdown will start after a certain pot size. The init countdown is 1 minute. When any trade happens, the countdown timer will accumulate a little more time. The max countdown time is 1 hour. If there is no trade happen when the countdown comes to 0, this round ends. 43 | 44 | ![](https://i.imgur.com/Vuzxg5X.png) 45 | 46 | #### Dividend Model 47 | The trading transaction fees collected from all players is pooled into the local_lottery_pool. 10% of the cumulative amount from the pot gets assigned as the lottery_prize. 48 | 49 | Every 24 hours, one player out of all the existing players is randomly chosen. The chosen player wins the lottery_prize. 50 | 51 | The likelihood of winning is proportional to the player’s relative contributions to the pot. i.e. the amount of transaction fees they contributed to the pot cumulatively. 52 | 53 | P(Player1 wins) = (Player1's total contributions to the POT) / (Total amount in POT) 54 | 55 | #### End of game 56 | When round ends, the last person who made the trade will take 50% of the pot, the 25% of the pot money goes back to the participants, the last 25% goes to the next round. 57 | 58 | If the game just goes on forever, at some point, we will distribute some of the pot money back to the participants. 59 | 60 | 61 | 62 | * ### [Delta Protocol](https://devpost.com/software/delta-protocol) 63 | #### Inspiration 64 | Any products built in the decentralized finance ecosystem are susceptible to risks from the protocols they are built on top of. This includes both hack risk and systemic financial risk in the case of black swan events like runs on money markets, stablecoins losing their peg etc. These risks have the potential to collapse this entire ecosystem currently worth ~$600M. 65 | 66 | #### What Delta Protocol do 67 | The details of Delta Protocol is described in [this paper](https://github.com/aparnakr/OptionsProtocol/blob/master/Options_Protocol-2.pdf). In general, delta is an insurance marketplace. Insurance providers earn premiums on their collateral and insurance buyers pay upfront for the right to protect their DeFi assets. In the case of a crisis, the insurance buyer can give up their claims on Compound / Maker in exchange for the collateral that the Insurance providers have locked up in our smart contracts. The options protocol serves as insurance against DeFi hacks and risks, specifically against Dai collapsing and Compound collapsing. 68 | 69 | Delta protocol is built on the Ethereum blockchain in the form of smart contract. We drew inspiration from Maker, Compound and Yield designs to design our insurance protocol. We built an insurance protocol that uses put options. 70 | 71 | (**Comment**: the Delta Protocol hackathon team has since published a whitepaper on the detailed design) 72 | 73 | 74 | * ### [MultiDAO](https://devpost.com/software/test-hb94ki) 75 | ![](https://i.imgur.com/goXOpSp.jpg) 76 | 77 | #### Why MultiDao 78 | Stable coins become more and more important as they have the advantages as cryptocurrencies while eliminate volatility. Currently, a stable coin collateralizes, to the best, assets on one same chain. Now with the power of IBC, we can extend collateral to different chains, which improves the stability and adoption of the generated stable coin. 79 | 80 | #### How does it work 81 | MultiDao is a dappchain that maintains a stable coin that is backed by multi-chain assets. Assets from different chains can be transferred to MultiDao through IBC and put into collateralized debt positions (CDPs). This is similiar to a multi-chain multi-collateral version of MakerDao. MultiDao uses Substrate as the dappchain development framework and wrote runtime logic of MultiDao. Frontend is built with Polkadot-js framework. We also built a primitive IBC over substrate with message proof along with a relayer system. 82 | 83 | * ### Kevin 84 | ![](https://i.imgur.com/7jX1Pr2.jpg) 85 | Kevin is a project inspired by trading on Margin for stock securities. Kevin has the ability to buy any digital securities on Margin with a p2p platform. Individuals can serve as brokers whom provide crypto to be used as margin loan. Users can purchase digital securities on margin and use their portfolio of digital assets (crypto, security tokens, cryptokitties) as the equity collateral. 86 | 87 | * ### [Rainbolt](https://devpost.com/software/rainbolt) 88 | Rainbolt is a privacy preserving decentralized exchange for derivatives, built on anonymous payment channels. This project is inspired by [Dan Robinson's paper](https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/03b0/35bc6fea62caef3455ad383cd7f8164adf2f.pdf?_ga=2.150270324.311835667.1572664300-1273586131.1572664300) and [anonymous payment channels research](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/701.pdf) done by ZCash foundation. 89 | 90 | Users of Rainbolt can join the network as a maker. They will look for and enter bets with someone anonymously. This is accomplished by placing funds on-chain (Cosmos) in an escrow account. On the other hand, an anonymous counterparty will commit to enter in the contract which leads to trading! 91 | 92 | (**Comment**: How can payments on a Rainbow Channel be anonymous when you need to know whether a particular counterparty made the settlement payment?) 93 | 94 | #### Future Work 95 | - Implement multi-asset payment channels by leveraging IBC to integrate with coins like Terra and Agoric. 96 | - Improve upon the on-chain privacy guarantees. - Create a friendly GUI. 97 | 98 | ## Shout Out to Cool Hacks 99 | 100 | * #### [Burning Bitcoin](https://devpost.com/software/burning-bitcoin) 101 | **Opt out of Bitcoin's monetary supply with a 1-way peg, never see your bitcoin again.** 102 | 103 | Using CosmosSDK, Buring Bitcoin is a module that can validate stateless SPV proofs. Submit a stateless SPV proof to a cosmos based chain that Bitcoin was sent to an unspendable address. This mints new Bitcoin on a cosmos based chain. To enable a form of tail emission while incentivizing users to migrate, a user who submits a SPV proof of burn will receive inflation for every additional user that submits a SPV proof of burn. 104 | 105 | * #### [Hotpot](https://devpost.com/software/hotpot-azcu7l) 106 | Hotpot is inspired by a common Chinese rotational lending game called “和会“, meaning “Rotating Credit and Savings Association (ROSCA)" (these can also be called a 'susu' or 'tanda') , which is made of a group of close friends or family members. The game is heavily reliant on the trust and relationship among members because there is no central authority recording or implementing the transactions. The smart contract manages the ROSCA including accepting payments, tracking multiple Susu's, and managing the number of players in each. 107 | 108 | * #### [COVEN - A Credit Union for Witches](https://devpost.com/software/coven) 109 | If DAO's like Moloch and MetaCartel DAO's can be used to pool funds and direct them to grants, why not create a Moloch like structure where deposits earn interest, and the membership can loan it out. Creating an economic benefit for members and allowing the system to grow. 110 | 111 | 112 | * #### [Agoric in MetaMask in Agoric](https://devpost.com/software/agoric-in-metamask-in-agoric) 113 | This is the core integration of Agoric's SecureJS blockchain platform with the MetaMask wallet to enable developers to create seamless, secure Dapps. 114 | 115 | 116 | * #### [BoR // Book of Reputation](https://devpost.com/software/bor) 117 | Inspired by the notorious Warcraft 3 app "WC3 Banlist", BoR is a game agnostic whitelist / blacklist app and unbundle reputation from game publishers & merge it back with the user. 118 | 119 | 120 | 121 | * #### [Everett: Reloaded](https://devpost.com/software/everett-reloaded) 122 | With the use of Everett, delegators of the Cosmos Hub are able to mint bATOMs, a secondary shadow token backed by one’s delegation position. Two important features of bATOMs - Soft Peg with ATOM and validator fungibility, ensures them as an effective solution to the problems mentioned above. 123 | 124 | 125 | 126 | * #### [ASC Protocol](https://devpost.com/software/asc-protocol) 127 | Inspired by GSN, which enables one to pay for another's transactions, ASC Protocol team decided to generalize the concept of mutually beneficial transactions further. ASC Protocol = Active Smart Contract/Active State Change (for Cosmos) Protocol. At a high level, ASC allows you to specify conditions under which transactions can be made on your behalf, and economically incentivizes others to fund these transactions when these conditions are met. This opens up a new paradigm of possibility within blockchains. 128 | 129 | ## Conclusion 130 | Defi Hackthon 2019 was intense. We are seeing DeFi experimentations extend beyond the Ethereum network. As the community grows, we hope to see more and more communication and collaboration within the hacker group which inspires more collective ideas/projects. 131 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/MacroWTF_Archive.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Macro.WTF | The Power of Asking 2 | - Macro.WTF is a community-driven event as part of a concerted effort of modern resurrection of the Pynx, a supportive space for open, inclusive, informed, and thoughtful exchanges of ideas. Brought to you by a 21-Day Flash Organization: the WTF Collective. 3 | - San Francisco, USA, 2019.10.30 4 | - If you like what we do, here is our Community ENS for Donation: defiwtf.eth 5 | 6 | 7 | ## WTF Vault: Archive of Speakers' Slides & Video Recaps (Updating) 8 | 9 | 10 | |Time |Topic |Speaker / Panelist / Moderator * |Slides & Video | 11 | |-----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 12 | |9:00-9:30 |Sign-in & Opening Remarks | | | 13 | |9:30-11:30 |Macro and Cryptoeconomics | | | 14 | |1.1 |Grand Unifying Theory of Cryptoeconomics |Shruti Appiah |[Slides](https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1uMP_NVB5MKZx5ZoQrfXclAgobjWAztmgasnruljnSU8/edit?usp=sharing) [Video](https://youtu.be/dZ0jF8LrtLU)| 15 | |1.2 |Balancing Order and Chaos: Universality in Cryptoeconomics |Tarun Chitra (Gauntlet Network) |[Slides](https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/10pGORFLO8y7BZ0WSoNvWJPv1egA_PMogPJnAjeXSJyI/edit?usp=sharing) [Video](https://youtu.be/_-_3RnFKtc8)| 16 | |1.3 |WTF is Stability? |Haseeb Qureshi (Dragonfly Capital) |[Slides](https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1i2hHt7vIZG3v4wzzfKQ6iZ9qC8WBBZ-pa1jvu-cOqwQ/edit?usp=sharing) [Video](https://youtu.be/yPmazA1fnfU)| 17 | |1.4 |WTF is Capital: How to Fix Capitalism |Joel Monegro (Placeholder) |[Slides](https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/12QNElYa956SyfT6bbYZDUs9hnYtmseZOoXkx2nM7q08/edit?usp=sharing) [Video](https://youtu.be/7mbIvCc89jM)| 18 | |1.5 |Does an Economy Actually Work with Rational Actors? - Rationality is Self-Defeating in Permissionless Systems? - Will programmability eventually result in incentive misalignment / conflict between those socializing platform secruity and the application layer? - Obscure Attacks on Protocols|Charlie Noyes (Paradigm) * Nic Carter (Castle Island Ventures) Zaki Manian (Cosmos) James Prestwich (Summa, tBTC) |[Video](https://youtu.be/ulOWMBhXwso)| 19 | |1.6 |How Has Crypto Changed Economics? |Don Tapscott (Blockchain Research Institute) |[Slides](https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1b74iOAe2gJ0lTo-5mmXl5oQCGIR5LP_c62MOqjThaQs/edit?usp=sharing) [Video](https://youtu.be/_BdbV3gBBXc)| 20 | |11:30-13:00|Macro Case for Crypto | | | 21 | |2.1 |Bitcoin as the Flag of Technology |Balaji S. Srinivasan |[Slides](https://drive.google.com/file/d/17jB-TVJyo1E7OzVmLB0Payt8fB-T1Xhz/view?usp=sharing) [Video](https://youtu.be/kestsp_zB_s) | 22 | |2.2 |What Kinds of Assets are Cryptocurrencies: An Empirical Evaluation |Nic Carter (Castle Island Ventures) |[Slides](https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1JB99c35q0efvMTYhH_CJA247Pf3sgxjgIqpu3BlFy7Q/edit?usp=sharing) [Video](https://youtu.be/0uC08ra1JH0)| 23 | |2.3 |Analyzing Macro Trends and the Impact on Bitcoin |Matt D'Souza (Blockchain Opportunity Fund) |[Slides](https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1ahgO4BMpV_GK95PDDBRaM_69YTAmrgHI2t8-SSE9UJc/edit?usp=sharing) [Video](https://youtu.be/kSnNaq6dZnY)| 24 | |2.4 |Macro Case for Bitcoin - Risk On or Risk Off asset? - Gold vs. Bitcoin - Is Digital Gold counter to Digital Money? - Performance of Asset in Economic Downturn |Vanessa Grellet (Consensys) * Will Wolf (Polychain) Matt D'Souza (Blockchain Opportunity Fund) Tom Kineshanko (Protos Asset Management)| [Video](https://youtu.be/zCkEmYE_6ng)| 25 | |13:00-13:30|(Lunch Break) | | | 26 | |13:30-14:30|A Non-Strawmanned Intro to Fiat | | | 27 | |3.1 |Like Uber, But For Slavery — The Power of Fiat Money |Steve Waldman (Interfluidity) |[Slides](https://drive.google.com/file/d/12CYhupkvf0-UMCH4oIyZxYj8Qrl92gDi/view?usp=sharing) [Video](https://youtu.be/8UgexlYU7uw) | 28 | |3.2 |Lessons from History: Fiat Money and the French Revolution |Claire Belmont (Celo) |[Slides](https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1k-4qNGnhycSzKSANXWK5cpo0LruLjlcfM_6sM2Hb5B8/edit?usp=sharing) [Video](https://youtu.be/9QxQ8ZlNGWY)| 29 | |3.3 |Unplugging from the Fiat Matrix (Game Theory of Fiat Currency) |Varun Vruddhula (Hashflow) |[Slides](https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/10TVXyMrfyoFXTR7YCGbQ7qPj4OuVge1gk2uHUynwmY4/edit?usp=sharing) [Video](https://youtu.be/iCbDp20UTmU)| 30 | |14:30-16:30|Experimentations in Monetary Theory | | | 31 | |4.1 |Overview of Monetary Policy across Each Crypto Economies |Arjun Balaji (Paradigm) |[Slides](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1XLNnf2ib9mVlmKFlRI8I1OXe5o6v5RK6/view?usp=sharing) [Video](https://youtu.be/Cwcws7Pp3CI) | 32 | |4.2 |Algorithmic Monetary Policy |John P. Conley (Vanderbilt University, Geeq) |[Slides](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1tpB4NaLfWEU5NwoVhetVhUG7rNtrxY4p/view?usp=sharing) [Video](https://youtu.be/x0LlLcREuYA) | 33 | |4.3 |The Case for Negative Interest Rates |Marek Olszewski (Celo) |[Slides](https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/18CYJ8a1_QGnUBb5rhigqijkNm5FtkjKzrDC63Os4AAY/edit?usp=sharing) [Video](https://youtu.be/j4Cn9JcvYzc)| 34 | |4.4 |Fiscal & Monetary Policy Interaction in a Stablecoin Economy |Nicolas Andreoulis (Terra) |[Slides](https://drive.google.com/file/d/17Kyah4KLWfrYxqfGIyJujfyDKqEO1BsT/view?usp=sharing) [Video](https://youtu.be/Id2JRqkm2wk) | 35 | |4.5 |Staking in Perpetuity: Explorations in Monetary Policy |Jeremiah Andrews (Blockchain at Berkeley) |[Slides](https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1KxOr6E-8U_hvADnBraUzErWKsxGxlIUddeWSCWLBjCw/edit?usp=sharing) [Video](https://youtu.be/ca8lxVUv5T8)| 36 | |4.6 |Evolution of Debt in the Crypto Ecosystem |Brent Xu (Cosmos) |[Slides](https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1NWTc3NnF1WGQW12eN3iIdQW5CBjA4q7RolWdvyT2HjM/edit?usp=sharing) [Video](https://youtu.be/rZHMby-p65Q)| 37 | |16:30-19:00|Reshaping International Political Economy | | | 38 | |5.1 |Money in an International Context - Rodrik's Trilemma - Fixing the Euro - What to do about Libra? - Why recreate the Gold Standard? |Sunny Aggarwal (Cosmos)* Jae Kwon (Cosmos) John P. Conley (Vanderbilt University, Geeq) Baek Kim (Hashed) Steve Waldman (Interfluidity) |[Video](https://youtu.be/psj6mUbSAiM)| 39 | |5.2 |Petro: A Failed Trojan Horse |Gabriel Jimenez (Petro) | | 40 | |5.3 |Cryptocurrency Adoption in Latin America - Bitcoin in Developing Countries - Do people want USD or Bitcoin? - Government takeover of Petro |Qiao Wang (Messari) * Jill Carlson (Open Money Initiative) Nevin Freeman (Reserve) Gabrie Jimenez (Petro) Joel Monegro (Placeholder) |[Video](https://youtu.be/MIa9dEaxSFc)| 41 | |5.4 |Central Bank Digital Currency |Dovey Wan (Primitive) |[Slides](https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/19NhpGFVPYMNOpfccIz7ZND6gvjLvFt5CbHyeXn8znKA/edit?usp=sharing) [Video](https://youtu.be/e_Xz48qJJNI)| 42 | |5.5 |The Third Party Candidate |Lily Liu (Independent) |[Slides](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1NdWgDWkCX29mjkeVGNZamcbYtpF6mYhA/view?usp=sharing) [Video](https://youtu.be/J22-TQLbDlU) | 43 | |5.6 |Geopolitical Game Theory (Panel) - United States vs. China in battle for global hegemony - Petrodollar - How do capital controls affect crypto? - Are we actually nation-state resistant? - Crypto vs Nation States vs Corporations |Lily Liu (Independent) * Lasse Clausen (1kx) Jae Kwon (Cosmos) Hart Lambur (UMA) Tina Zhen (YellowHatDAO) |[Video](https://youtu.be/BBbh7if2OXs)| 44 | |5.7 |WTF Initiative: Call for Research and Experimentations |The WTF Collective |[Slides](https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1OEEeWnvk7_nGkf4lROGhuj0bVjTJUSaHUZdLMYM-jps/edit?usp=sharing)| 45 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /notes/images/apache-arch.png: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/carboclan/pm/177fe4f82577091d7c3d7303dc64dd5d42d6da84/notes/images/apache-arch.png -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /research/DeFi.WTF Agenda Working Draft-2.png: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/carboclan/pm/177fe4f82577091d7c3d7303dc64dd5d42d6da84/research/DeFi.WTF Agenda Working Draft-2.png -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /research/DeFi.WTF_Agenda.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | ## Please refer to [Issue#69](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/69) for Archive of DeFi.WTF video recaps, speakers' slides, and post your questions and comments under [Issue#69](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/69). 2 | 3 | ## DeFi.WTF | The Power of Asking 4 | - DeFi.WTF is a purely community-driven event as part of a concerted effort of modern resurrection of the Pynx, a supportive space for open, inclusive, informed, and thoughtful exchanges of ideas. 5 | - Event will be streamed real time. Content transcript will be published upon permission, in English, Japanese and Chinese. 6 | - Time: 2019/10/07 (Monday, the day before DevCon) 7 | - Location: Osaka, Japan 8 | 9 | ![DeFi WTF_KV_Banner](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/50804295/65270524-32b0a180-dad0-11e9-9d44-2cfb24e635e5.jpg) 10 | 11 | ## Agenda: 12 | ![DeFi.WTF Agenda Working Draft as of 2019.10.06](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/carboclan/pm/master/research/Updated%20DEFI.wtf%20Agenda.png) 13 | 14 | ## DeFi.WTF Community Participation: 15 | 16 | ### 1. "A DeFi Billboard" Harberger Taxes Social Experiment (Coming Soon) 17 | - This is the only place you’ll see logos, REALLY LOUD LOGOS. We are creating “A DeFi Billboard” specifically to take shilling off the serious discussions. 18 | 19 | - “A DeFi Billboard” is both physical and virtual: We will conduct a continuous auction for 10 display slots on www.Defi.wtf with a Harberger Tax mechanism. In a Harberger Taxation model, the buyer/advertiser sets the price, then the next buyer accepts the price, and pays a tax until he/she is bought out by another buyer, or he stops paying taxes. The tax goes to the event’s ENS address: defiwtf.eth. The proceeds will go into funding the event and funding research that comes out of the event. 20 | 21 | - Auction starts Oct 7, 2019 22 | 23 | - Participating in the continuous auction may result in: 24 | - 1. Logo showing on a virtual DeFi Billboard on DeFi.WTF website. 25 | - 2. Logo showing on a physical retro-style neon billboard will also be presented at the event venue based on a snapshot taken of the on-chain auction (snapshot time to be announced). 26 | 27 | - "A DeFi Billboard" is inspired by previous experiments on Harberger Taxes: 28 | - ["This Artwork Is Always On Sale (TAIAOS)"](https://github.com/simondlr/thisartworkisalwaysonsale) by Simon de la Rouviere; 29 | - [Harberger Ads](https://devpost.com/software/harberger-ads) a 2018 ETHSanFrancisco winning hack; 30 | - [一块广告牌 An Advertisement Board](http://anadvertisementboard.com) by China's BES Studio; 31 | - [一块广告牌-橙皮书分叉版 An Advertisement Board- OrangePaper Edition](https://organge.xyz/orange-board/#/main) by Chinese media OrangePaper. 32 | 33 | We need more help with design and implementation of the Harberger Taxes social experiment! (DM @CarboClanC on GitHub or Telegram @TinaZhen) 34 | 35 | ### 2. Donation to Community ENS: defiwtf.eth 36 | - If you love what we’re doing and want to help make it a success, consider donating!As an OG supporter, you’ll instantly enter the WTF events’ hall of fame. 37 | - You can include a 140-word message about why you’re donating or anything you want to say to the DeFi community, and your name and comment will be displayed on community website (www.DeFi.WTF), Twitter (@WTFdao), and at the event. 38 | 39 | ### 3. Pop-up Collective - Dissolves after 21 Days 40 | - If you are a thinker/creative/hacker, join our pop-up collective of volunteers in preparation of that will exist for 21 days then dissolve. The collective will determine the spending of the donations and "A DeFi Billboard" proceeds, and publish the financials once the collective dissolves. 41 | - The collective will determine which research streams gets the remaining balance. Prior to dissolving, the collective also decides whether to turn into a loosely-organized community or a more institutionalized DAO with clear governing mechanism. 42 | - We need your brain power in helping us come up with the toughest questions that YOU care. Comment directly under this thread if you have a proposal or comments, and don't forget to VOTE when voting period begins. More details, coming soon! 43 | - We need more help with design and implementation of the Quadratic Voting tool, and the Harberger Taxes social experiment! (DM me @CarboClanC on GitHub or Telegram @TinaZhen) 44 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /research/DeFi.WTF_KV_Banner.jpg: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/carboclan/pm/177fe4f82577091d7c3d7303dc64dd5d42d6da84/research/DeFi.WTF_KV_Banner.jpg -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /research/Difficulty future market size.xlsx: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/carboclan/pm/177fe4f82577091d7c3d7303dc64dd5d42d6da84/research/Difficulty future market size.xlsx -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /research/HashedgeAuctionMarket.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | **Open request for comments. Please refer to [Issues](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues) for most updated discussions, and post your questions and comments as an Issue. You may follow the best practice set by reviewer @anthonyleezhang in this brilliant thread of dicussion on Issue #39 [Thoughts on MARKET vs UMA protocols](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/39) .** 2 | 3 | # Hashedge: A Decentralized Marketplace for Crypto Mining & Staking Output 4 | 5 | ## 1. Motivation 6 | 7 | Generalized mining is a big yet primitive market. In 2018, a total of over US$ 9 billion worth of POW mining rewards (BTC 698,448 worth US$ 5.4 billion & ETH 7,431,815 worth 3.6 billion) were awarded to miners as block rewards and transaction fees. In 2019, with the gradual launch of POS networks, existing market for generalized mining is estimated to be over US$ 10 billion (an estimated US$ 2.5 billion worth of cryptos are POS network rewards according to Staked.us). 8 | 9 | Miners have accounted for significant demands for liquidity for years due to the capital-intensive nature of the business. Hedging demand emerges recently as more institutional investors enter the market after the latest crypto winter. Current financial services for these keepers of the blockchain network (mainly miners and validators) depend heavily on trust and personal connection. 10 | 11 | PoW miners have traditionally resorted to selling cloud mining contracts to hedge risk by locking in future mining rewards ahead of time or earning premium for performing mining services. However, there have been few credible choices available for miners and validators of small to medium size operations to list their mining services. 12 | 13 | On the other hand, investors who are interested in mining and staking cashflow without having to deal with the hassle of actual mining, only have the choice of centralized cloud mining or staking platforms that leave them with little pricing power or choice of cryptocurrencies. Moreover, prevalent cloud mining contract design which requires investors to put up full collateral upfront but no collateral for the issuers, exposing investors to significant counterparty risk. 14 | 15 | Despite the scam-prone nature of the market, cloud mining contract market leader Genesis Mining retained over 2 million registered users. Hashrate spot marketplace Nicehash has over 100K DAU even in a bear market. Existing cloud mining market is far from standardized or efficient. Price disparities of 30-80% for the same type of mining contract underwritten by different platforms is common. 16 | 17 | Therefore, we are building Hashedge, a peer-to-peer marketplace where contracts of future mining and staking outputs can be freely traded. We would like to offer investors services provided by collateralized keepers of the network, in a permissionless market with pricing transparency and trust-minimized infrastructures. 18 | 19 | ## 2. Hashedge Overview 20 | 21 | HashEdge is a peer-to-peer marketplace where contracts of future mining/staking cash flows can be traded. It is a one-stop-shop for anyone who would like to earn protocol-governed passive income through participating in a blockchain network, without the hassle of setting up mining or staking operations, or the worry about platform scam or counterparty risks. 22 | 23 | Any blockchain network service provider (e.g. a miner or a validator) can “sell” their output to earn service fee, obtain capital to scale up operation or lock in potential profit in advance to hedge their risk, all by simply listing a mining contract. 24 | 25 | Anyone who buys the contract can expect mining/staking payout directly from a miner or validator. The contractual agreement between the buyer and seller are enforced via smart contracts. All transactions will be settled on chain with immutable records. Counterparty risks are strictly managed with on-chain collateralization. 26 | 27 | A credit system built around decentralized identities systematically rewards “good actors”: longer transaction history and better track record of a seller would translate directly into higher rankings of his/her listing and less margin/collateral requirements. This helps create a virtuous positive-feedback loop. 28 | 29 | ## 3. Synthetic Mining & Staking Cashflow Contract 30 | 31 | ### 3.1 Generalized Mining Index 32 | 33 | HashEdge Generalized Mining Indices are a series of generalized reference Indices that capture the average mining yields over certain periods of time for various minable cryptos. These indices also serve as referencing indices for the settlements of generalized standard synthetic mining contracts on HashEdge. 34 | 35 | The following is an illustration of the algorithm to calculate the ETH Index. 36 | 37 | #### 3.1.1 Configurable Parameters 38 | 39 | Int N: Size of the rolling window (in terms of number of blocks) 40 | 41 | #### 3.1.2 Data 42 | 43 | Di: Difficulty of the ith most recently generated block, with D0 being the latest block 44 | BRi: Block reward of the ith most recent block 45 | 46 | #### 3.1.3 Calculation 47 | 48 | Index = C * sum(Di * BRi * wi) / sum(wi) , i from 0 to N-1, 49 | wi = (N – i)/N, 50 | and C is the normalizing factor set to 20 (since 1GH/s of total network hashrate approximately translates into 20 TH of difficulty). 51 | 52 | #### 3.1.4 Meaning and Observations 53 | 54 | - The index approximately depicts how many ETH 1GH/s of mining power can produce per block. 55 | - The index is smoothed over a period of N blocks. 56 | - The index is a simple time-weighted average assigning more weight on more recent blocks. 57 | - The index refreshes itself every block rather than per fixed time length. 58 | - All data can be found on-chain (thru etherscan.io for example) and thus the data are 100% transparent without any possible adulteration. 59 | - The value of N needs to be determined according to (perhaps) the convention of miners or pools. However, since the index is used for derivative contract settlement, it cannot be changed for the same contract once set. 60 | 61 | ### 3.2 Cashflow Swap 62 | 63 | A swap is a typical derivative contract through which the counterparties exchange (swap) cashflows or financial instruments. A common example of a swap contract is the interest rate swap. 64 | 65 | A HashEdge mining/staking contract entitles the payer (buyer) the floating leg of future cash flows from the receiver (the issuer) and the receiver the fixed leg, in accordance with a predetermined set of schedules and rules. 66 | 67 | The fixed leg and the floating leg may not be (and are usually not, in our case) denominated in the same currency. 68 | 69 | These contracts are hashrate swaps in nature. (See Contract Specs and Margin) 70 | 71 | On the other hand, to mitigate counterparty risk (credit risk), HashEdge may adopt a pseudo margin system to ensure the actual exchange of cashflows. With such mechanism, some cashflows may happen upfront as margin deposits. 72 | 73 | ### 3.3 Contract Specs 74 | 75 | - Fixed leg denominator: DAI 76 | - Floating leg denominator: DAI, ERC tokens 77 | - Contract size unit: hashrate unit of the underlying floating leg token 78 | - Quote unit: DAI (tokenized swap contracts are purchased with or sold for DAI) 79 | - Tenure structure: 3-month long contracts rolling every month, expiring on the 28th of each month. 80 | - Payment (cashflow) schedule: every 1 day starting from 24 hr after the kickoff of each contract. The last cashflow happens on the expiration date. 81 | - Reference Index: Average Total Hashrate*. Reference Index are used to determine the size of the payment of the floating leg. 82 | - Actual payment of the floating leg at each exchange of cashflow: Contract Size/Average Total Hashrate 83 | 84 | ## 4. Margins & Trading 85 | 86 | ### 4.1 Margin Overview 87 | 88 | HashEdge adopts a pseudo-margin system to ensure the cashflows of contracts happen in accordance with its original schedule. This pseudo-margin system could be implemented either as part of a centralized exchange, or with smart contracts by leveraging the features of ERC721 tokens. 89 | 90 | In the rest of this literature, we describe the latter approach. HashEdge swap contracts are embedded in ERC721 tokens and the margin system are implemented with smart contracts. 91 | 92 | Swaps are often traded OTC. HashEdge provides an auction marketplace for the ERC721 tokens embedding the hashrate swap. 93 | A HashEdge swap token entitles its owner to receive the floating leg of the contract, also entitles the issuer the fixed leg. 94 | 95 | ### 4.2 Issuance 96 | 97 | An initial margin of x% of the expectation of all future cashflows (on both sides) are locked in the smart contract to mitigate credit risk. 98 | 99 | When the token is issued, the initial (first) buyer pays to own the token which generates future floating cashflows. The schedule of such cashflows are described in Contract Specs. 100 | 101 | The payment of the initial buyer does NOT go to the seller directly but instead locked in the smart contract as initial margin and will be released to the seller at each cashflow. The issuer (the seller) also locks the expected value of total future floating leg payments into the smart contract. 102 | 103 | For the initial offering, a Dutch Auction mechanism similar to the one for US treasuries are used. 104 | 105 | ### 4.3 Cashflows & Margining 106 | 107 | A standard swap contract (contract) is a swap contract according to which cashflows are exchanged based on some synthetical reference rate. 108 | 109 | The contract holder who pays the fixed leg is referred to as the buyer, the buyer’s counterparty who pays the floating leg the seller. 110 | 111 | #### 4.3.1 The Margin System 112 | 113 | To enter into a position of such contract, a margin system is required. The margin system consists of the following components. 114 | 115 | ##### 4.3.1.1 A place (may be a smart contract etc.) to hold the buyer’s margin. 116 | 117 | ##### 4.3.1.2 A place to hold the seller’s margin. 118 | 119 | ##### 4.3.1.3 Margin calculation (e.g. Initial Margin and Maintenance Margin) logic. 120 | 121 | For simplicity we assume the platform allow for a max leverage ratio of L for one leg, then for that leg the initial margin. 122 | = Max(expected next payoff * (1+buffer), /L * total expected payoff of the next n payments) 123 | ,where buffer, L, and n are configurable parameters (perhaps only by the platform) 124 | 125 | The maintenance margin 126 | = Max(expected next payoff * (1+buffer2), p * 1/L * total expected payoff of the next n payments) 127 | ,where buffer2, p are parameters. 128 | 129 | For illustration purpose, we hereafter use the following value for these parameters. 130 | - buffer = 0.5 131 | - buffer2 = 0.5 132 | - l = 5 133 | - n = 10 134 | - p = 0.5 135 | 136 | ##### 4.3.1.4 Liquidation logic. 137 | 138 | If for some reason the remaining margin of any leg of a contract falls below the maintenance margin, the contract position shall be liquidated in favor of the payer of the other leg. 139 | 140 | During the process of a liquidation, part or all of the remaining balance of each leg shall be returned to the payer or paid to the receiver (rule and parameters to be further discussed). 141 | 142 | Liquidation is performed every x seconds and are timed individually for each contract. 143 | x = 7200 in our example. 144 | 145 | ##### 4.3.1.5 Swap payoff (cashflow exchange) logic. 146 | 147 | At each payoff time, a smart contract automatically distributes payoffs to their corresponding receivers according to predetermined schedule and the reference rate at that time. 148 | 149 | #### 4.3.2 The margin system also supports secondary market trading. 150 | 151 | Now we illustrate how a holder of the contract can transfer his/her position to another. 152 | 153 | Note 1. that this document only describe how margin works during a position transfer. How orders are matched are not within the scope of the document (order book might be one solution however). 154 | Note 2. Currently we only support the buyer of the contract to transfer (sell) his/her position. The issuer of the contract currently is not able to transfer his obligation. 155 | 156 | - During the process of a position transfer, the margin of the floating leg does not change at all. 157 | - The price of the transfer is determined by the market. 158 | - Any extra fixed leg margin locked in the contract above the maintenance margin will be returned to the current owner of the contract before the transfer, in addition to the price paid. 159 | 160 | This means that after each successful transfer, the contract would only have a fixed leg margin value equal to the maintenance margin. 161 | 162 | - Once a contract’s ownership transfers, the liquidation timer resets, giving the new owner x seconds to deposit extra margin. 163 | 164 | ### 4.4 Secondary Market 165 | 166 | The token can be traded in a secondary market, provided by Hashedge. Buying the token transfers the ownership to the buyer (the new owner) who now enjoys the right to receive all unpaid cash flows from the issuer according to the original schedule of the swap. Any cashflow happens before the transfer of ownership does not affect the new owner. In this case, we see the value of such tokens decreases as cash flows happen. The theoretical value of these tokens may not be monotonically decreasing due to other factors such as interest rates and hashrate volatility etc. 167 | 168 | For the secondary market, Hashedge may provide a simple auction marketplace like Ebay or a full-fledged exchange with order books + matching algorithm. 169 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /research/Honeylemon/HoneyLemonWhitepaper.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | **Open request for comments. Please refer to [Issues](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues) for most updated discussions, and post your questions and comments as an Issue. You may follow the best practice set by reviewer @anthonyleezhang in this brilliant thread of dicussion on Issue #39 [Thoughts on MARKET vs UMA protocols](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/39) .** 2 | 3 | # Tokenized Synthetic PoW Mining Contract 4 | 5 | ## 1. Motivation 6 | 7 | Establishing a healthy and efficient capital market for cryptocurrency mining & staking is crucial for the security of the foundation of our decentralized world. In 2019, a total of over US$ 9 billion worth of Proof-of-Work coins/tokens were distributed to miners as block rewards and transaction fees. Crypto mining often requires upfront capex investment to purchase hardware in order to receive certain amount of cryptocurrency as reward. There is significant risk involved in mining investment. Aside from operational risk in the construction and maintenance of mining and power facility, adverse weather condition and policy risks, there are two major risks associated with crypto mining: market price of cryptocurrencies and the fluctuation of network mining difficulties. 8 | 9 | There are financial instruments readily available to hedge against the market price movements of cryptocurrencies, such as the CME Bitcoin futures. Our goal is to provide miners and other market participants instruments with exposure to the volatility of mining difficulties, enabling them to hedge against the underlying risks. 10 | 11 | In Proof-of-Work mining, block rewards are specified by the protocol, and the total amount can be considered as fixed over a period of time. More miners joining the network will drive up the network hashrate, leading to a higher difficulty level of mining, which would in turn reduce the economic return of mining investment. 12 | 13 | The current crypto mining market is inefficient. Absence of instruments to express forward-looking views without direct exposure, investors have only two choices: 1. Taking an illiquid long position via invest in mining hardware or mining operation; 2. Choose to sit out by not investing. 14 | 15 | Miners sometimes resort to selling "cloud mining" contracts as an imperfect hedge against both difficulty and price movements. Typical cloud mining contracts require investors to pay to the issuer (cloud mining platform or a miner) in full upfront and receive a stream of cashflow over an indefinite period of time. It is a proxy for non-miners to gain indirect exposure to mining cashflow, while miners can offload some of the systematic risks. However, this instrument subjects investors to significant counterparty risks, and has been hotbed for scams. 16 | 17 | Lack of effective instrument leaves miners unhedged in the wild swings in mining return. Miners tend to rush to market as coin price rises, driving up network difficulty which in turn results in less coins mined; as cryptocurrency prices fall, declining mining revenue may not cover the operational costs denominated in fiat, and the already illiquid mining assets becomes even harder to liquidate, leaving miners with little downside protection. 18 | 19 | We hereby propose the Tokenized Synthetic PoW Mining Contract, which offers token holders synthetic exposure to mining payoff. Through trading this instrument, miners can hedge against difficulty, investors can be rewarded for bearing the risk. By filling in a market void via decoupling risks associated with network difficulty from that of market price of cryptocurrency, POW Mining Contract Tokens enable a more efficient mining market, and unlock possibilities of creating more crypto-native financial products that serve the blockchain infrastructure. 20 | 21 | 22 | ## 2. Contract Specification 23 | 24 | After analysis across DeFi stack, and considering the various stages of development of existing derivatives protocols, the following contract is designed based upon [Market Protocol](https://marketprotocol.io). 25 | 26 | ### 2.1 Synthetic BTC Mining Contract 27 | #### 2.1.1 Index 28 | 29 | ##### Design Considerations 30 | - The index MUST has a clear physical meaning. 31 | - The index SHOULD be able to reflect miner's payoff in reality 32 | - The index SHOULD make the contract easy for miners (hedgers) to trade. Thus, the miners could hedge the mining risk of a period of time by entering into a position of this contract. 33 | - The index SHOULD be consistent with mining industry conventional practice 34 | 35 | ##### Naming 36 | The index names "Mining Revenue Index N days", short for _MRI{N}_, for example MRI28 and so on. We will publish the 1-day Mining Revenue Index daily, and abbreviate it as MRI. 37 | 38 | ##### Meaning 39 | The BTC Mining Revenue Index (_BMRI_) represents **average daily block reward plus fees with 1Th/s hashrate over 1 Day**. 40 | 41 | 1Th/s = 1012 h/s (Hashes per second) 42 | 43 | ##### Formula 44 | _BMRI_ is calculated as following: 45 | 46 | ![BMRI Formula](WhitePaper_BMRIformula_LaTex.png) 47 | 48 | ##### Examples 49 | Height | Time | Difficulty | BMRI14 | BMRI28 | BMRI84 50 | --------| --------------------|-------------------|-----------|-----------|-------- 51 | 572,544 | 2019-04-21 09:54:28 | 6,353,030,562,983 | 3.958E-05 |   |   52 | 574,560 | 2019-05-04 16:32:13 | 6,702,169,884,349 | 3.752E-05 | 3.855E-05 |   53 | 576,576 | 2019-05-18 16:31:36 | 6,704,632,680,587 | 3.750E-05 | 3.751E-05 |   54 | 578,592 | 2019-05-31 06:43:04 | 7,459,680,720,542 | 3.371E-05 | 3.561E-05 |   55 | 580,608 | 2019-06-14 09:03:50 | 7,409,399,249,090 | 3.394E-05 | 3.382E-05 |   56 | 582,624 | 2019-06-27 10:59:30 | 7,934,713,219,630 | 3.169E-05 | 3.281E-05 | 3.566E-05 57 | 584,640 | 2019-07-09 17:17:48 | 9,064,159,826,491 | 2.774E-05 | 2.972E-05 | 3.368E-05 58 | 59 | More [BMRI Data](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/blob/master/research/BME.md) 60 | 61 | #### 2.1.2 Index Cap & Floor 62 | 63 | According to Market Protocol's design, each Synthetic BTC Mining Contract will specify its valid range, _Cap_ represents the upper bound, and _Floor_ represents the lower bound. Index reaching the upper or lower bound prior to expiration will trigger contract settlement. 64 | 65 | Two principles to consider when setting the index range: 66 | - In order to reduce the demand for margin and increase leverage, a smaller index range is preferred. 67 | - On the other hand, a relatively safe (wide) index range will be set to prevent the early settelment triggered if the index reaches the bounds early. 68 | 69 | #### 2.1.3 Contract Size 70 | 71 | The value of one contract = Multiplier * The index value 72 | 73 | Multiplier = 106 WBTC 74 | 75 | #### 2.1.4 Expiration 76 | 77 | Each Synthetic BTC Mining Contract will specify an expiration date. The contract expires at 02:00:00 (UTC) on the expiration date. In order to avoid the impact of block time volatility, the expiration time is usually choosen to be 7 days after the estimated time of a difficulty adjustment. According to the requirement of Market Protocol, the expired contract can be settled one day after expiration. 78 | 79 | #### 2.1.5 Settlement 80 | 81 | At settlement, Market Protocol smart contract will send WBTC to addresses that hold contract position tokens. Long token holder will receive ( _BMRI_ - _Floor_ ) * _Multiplier_ in WBTC per Contract, short token holder will receive ( _Cap_ - _BME_ ) * _Multiplier_ in WBTC per Contract. 82 | 83 | #### 2.1.6 Margin 84 | 85 | Issuer of the Tokenized Synthetic BTC Mining Contract needs to send ( _Cap_ - _Floor_ ) * _Multiplier_ amount in WBTC to the Market Protocol smart contract as collateral in order to mint contract position tokens. Contract positions are fully collateralized with no need to top up margins prior to settlement. 86 | 87 | #### 2.1.7 Naming Convention for Contract Position Tokens 88 | 89 | \BMRI\-\-\-\ 90 | 91 | - L: long position 92 | - S: short position 93 | - N: N days of the index 94 | - Floor: index lower bound, in the unit of 1E-7 95 | - Cap: index upper bound, in the unit of 1E-7 96 | - YYMMDD: Date of exiration 97 | 98 | Example: SBME84-250-300-190718 token corresponds to a short position on a Synthetic BTC Mining Contract with BME84 Index valid range of [2.50E-5, 3.00E-5], expires on 02:00:00(UTC) at 2019/07/18. 99 | 100 | ## 3. Smart Contract Stack 101 | 102 | Synthetic PoW Mining Contract token issuance, trading, on-chain collateralization, and settlement are executed via smart contracts enforced by ethereum blockchain consensus. Trust is minimized in the process, which lowers the entry barrier for trading and improves liquidity. 103 | 104 | ### 3.1 Tokenization Layer 105 | 106 | Issuers can easily issue Synthetic PoW Mining Contract by minting position tokens via [Market Protocol](https://marketprotocol.io) and traders can easily build up long or short positions by buying these position tokens, which are standard ERC20s that can be stored off-exchange in user wallets and are tradeable on both centralized and decentralized exchanges. 107 | 108 | Contract issuers mint sets of long and short position tokens pairs by sending collateral to Market Protocol smart contracts according to contract specifications. Once minted, contract issuers is market neutral by holding both long and short position tokens. For each contract, the outstanding long position tokens will be equal to short position tokens, as in pairs. Issuer wishing to enter into long position can sell its short position tokens, and vice versa. 109 | 110 | Traders can buy position tokens to gain long or short exposure without becoming an issuer. Holders of position tokens can close the position and take profit any time by selling the tokens in the market without having to wait till settlement at contract expiration. 111 | 112 | The contract specifications pre-define the cap and floor of the Index, and issuer pays full collateral according to the position ranges, there will be no liquidation prior to expiration as long as the Index falls within the ranges. To provide effective hedges for actual mining, miners would prefer not to face arbitrary liquidation prior to expiration. Position ranges in contract specifications must be defined wide enough to cover volatility in difficulty. 113 | 114 | Although contracts are fully collateralized upon issuance, the position range specification provides implicit leverage. When Index fluctuates, the rate of change in contract positions often will exceed that of the Index. The amount of leverage depends on the width of the position ranges relative to the Index, and the price of the position relative to the price range. 115 | 116 | Example 1. The BMRI84 Index is at 5.52E-5 now, Carboclan Community specifies a new Synthetic BTC Mining Contract will expire in 84 days later. The contract specifications are as follow: 117 | - Cap: 6.00E-5 118 | - Floor: 4.50E-5 119 | - Expiration: 2019-05-11 02:00:00 UTC 120 | 121 | Alice would like to mint 1.0 units of contract position token pair. She sends (6E-5 - 4.5E-5) * 1E6 * 1.0 = 15WBTC to the Market smart contract as collateral, and minted 1.0 long position token and 1.0 short position token. A long token is worth (5.52E-5 - 4.50E-5) * 1e6 = 10.2 WBTC, a short token is worth (6.00E-5 - 5.52E-5) * 1e6 = 4.8 WBTC. 122 | 123 | Later on, the Index falls to 5.50E-5, a long token is worth (5.50E-5 - 4.50E-5) * 1E6 = 10 WBTC, a short token is worth (6.00E-5 - 5.50E-5) * 1E6 = 5 WBTC. Alice would like to enter into a short position, so she lists her 1.0 long position in the market. Bob would like to enter into a long position, so he bought the 1.0 long position token, at a price of 9.8 WBTC. Bob paid to Alice 9.8 WBTC and received 1.0 long token. 124 | 125 | While the actual price of the position token may be above or below the Index, in this example actual price of the long position token (9.8 WBTC) may be priced below the theoretical price (10 WBTC) calculated from the current Index, which may be caused by market expectation that the Index may drop further by expiration. On the other hand, while Index drops (5.52E-5 - 5.50E-5) / 5.52E-5 = 0.36%, but theoretical price for the long position token calculated from the Index drops (10.2 - 10) / 10.2 = 1.9%, which reflects 5.28 implicit leverage from the Index floor. 126 | 127 | The contract expires on 2019-05-11 02:00:00 UTC and can be settled 1 day later. The Index is at 5.25E-5. Market Protocol smart contract pays Bob (5.25E-5 - 4.50E-5) * 1E6 * 1.0 = 7.5 WBTC, and (6.00E-5 - 5.25E-5) * 1E6 * 1.0 = 7.5 WBTC to short position token owner Alice. Alice's earnings: -15 + 9.8 + 7.5 = 2.3 WBTC, Bob's earnings: -9.8 + 7.5 = -2.3 WBTC. 128 | 129 | ### 3.2 Oracle 130 | Market Protocol relies on oracle to provide the Index for settlement. Oracle is the only part in the entire system that is not completely decentralized. 131 | 132 | Calculating BMRI requires off-chain data. Bitcoin mining difficulty data needs to be obtained from third party provider. The difficulty data is then processed by the oracle smart contract. The good news is that bitcoin mining difficulty only change every 14 days on average. Since the difficulty data is recorded on the bitcoin chain, all people can validate the authenticity of the data. 133 | 134 | ### 3.3 Trading Layer 135 | 136 | Since the position tokens issued by Market Protocol are fully collateralized and fit ERC-20 standard, the position tokens can be traded on any centralized exchange (i.e. Binance and Bitstamp), and decentralized exchanges (i.e. 0x and Uniswap). Thus, tokenized Synthetic PoW Mining Contract is readily tradeable without having to develop new infrastructure or technology. 137 | 138 | 139 | 140 | ## 4. Use Cases 141 | 142 | Tokenized Synthetic PoW Mining Contract has multiple use cases. 143 | 144 | ### 4.1 Risk Exposure 145 | 146 | Before purchasing mining rigs and start mining, investors need to estimate ROI. Purchasing mining rigs is a onetime investment. Electricity cost for mining is relatively stable as well. Therefore, investment for mining can be considered fixed over some period of time. The only factors affecting mining return is the price movement of the underlying coin(s) mined and their mining difficulties. Various financial product (futures, perpetual swaps and options) can be utilized to hedge against price fluctuation. Synthetic POW Mining Contract fills the market void by providing a financial instrument with exposure to risks associated with mining difficulty fluctuation. Investors could observe the market price for mining contract of various terms, reflecting market’s collective projection on mining earnings, similar to that of the term structure of interest rates or that of the volatility surface of options. 147 | 148 | i.e On May 1st, 2019, BMRI14 Index is 3.95E-5. The following table indicates the market price for Tokenized Synthetic PoW Mining Contracts in various terms. 149 | 150 | Contract position token | Expiration date | Market price | Implied mining earnings 151 | ------------------------|-----------------|---------------|----- 152 | LBMRI28-300-500-190526 | 19-05-26 | 8 WBTC | 3.8E-5 BTC / 1T\*24H 153 | SBMRI28-300-500-190526 | 19-05-26 | 12 WBTC | 3.8E-5 BTC / 1T\*24H 154 | LBMRI84-200-400-190716 | 19-07-16 | 12 WBTC | 3.2E-5 BTC / 1T\*24H 155 | SBMRI84-200-400-190716 | 19-07-16 | 8 WBTC | 3.2E-5 BTC / 1T\*24H 156 | 157 | Long position token prices reflect market view on expected average daily mining earnings within 1T hash/s during N days before the contract expires. The implied mining earnings = the market price of the long position token / _Multiplier_ + the floor of the index. 158 | The market believes that under same amount of hashrate, the mining earnings will gradually decrease. Investors could figure out that expected mining earnings gradually decreases, thereby estimating their own mining ROI more rationally. 159 | 160 | ### 4.2 Hedging 161 | 162 | The synthetic POW mining contract can hedge mining risks in addition to revealing them. Similarly, we set aside the cryptocurrency price movement here, since there already exist derivatives for price hedges. Investors could enter a short position in said contract to hedge difficulty related risks when mining. When difficulty goes up, mining earnings goes down, the profit on the short position could negate the decrease in actual mining earnings. When difficulty goes down, mining earnings goes up, the loss on the short position could negate the increase in actual mining earnings. The hedging process thus locked in mining earnings. The earnings is (cap of the Index * _Multiplier_ - the price when entering the position). 163 | 164 | For example, on May 1st, 2019, Alice purchased a batch of mining rigs that clocks 100T hash/s. She wanted to lock in mining earnings for the next 6 mining difficulty adjustment cycles (about 84 days, from 2019-5-4 to 2019-7-27). Therefore, Alice purchased 100 * 84 / 1E6 = 0.0084 short position tokens of SBME84-200-400-190716. The following table reflects her P&L. 165 | 166 | Position Token | Entry Price | Index when settled | P&L / Token | Position P&L | Mining income | Comprehensive income 167 | ---------------------|:-----------:|:------------------:|:------------:|:--------------:|:-------------:|:-------------------: 168 | SBMRI84-200-400-190716| 8 | 3.36E-5 | -1.6 | -0.01344 | 0.28224 | 0.26880 169 | SBMRI84-200-400-190716| 8 | 2.86E-5 | 3.4 | 0.02856 | 0.24024 | 0.26880 170 | 171 | _\* Currency in above table is WBTC_ 172 | 173 | ### 4.3 Fixed-income Investment 174 | 175 | The Synthetic POW Mining Contract decouples risks from mining difficulty fluctuation and risks from underlying price movements, thereby enabling new financial instruments such as fixed income products. Investors can at the same time purchase or lease physical mining rigs and start mining, and entering short positions to hedge risks regarding difficulty. If the investor’s base currency is USD, then he could also enter a short position in futures to hedge away exchange rate risk. The above-mentioned portfolio could be structured into a fixed income product with streams of cashflows, which would allow for major capital injection into the mining space. Fixed-income investors are required to manage the mining farm and mining rigs so that the mining operation runs smoothly. Their role is pivotal in connecting the synthetic mining derivatives and physical mining operations. 176 | 177 | ### 4.4 Finance Leasing 178 | 179 | The major pain point for miners has been the lack of capital for expansion. Due to the difficulty of hedging mining risk, there is little incentive for lenders to provide capital to miners. Miners now can lease mining capacity to risk-free fixed income investors on demand, or mortgage the rigs to lenders so that they can receive cashflow and expand. Capital provider could require the borrowers to enter short position in both mining contract and token exchange rate, thereby stabilize their projected cashflows and increase their ability to repay loans. 180 | 181 | ### 4.5 Cloud Mining 182 | 183 | A synthetic cloud mining service can be easily built upon the mining contract. The synthetic cloud mining service targets users who already understand how cloud mining works. 184 | 185 | Traditionally, investing in cloud mining has the following economic model: User invests a certain amount of money to purchase cloud mining capacity and receives mining earnings (netted of maintainence fees) daily in the period following the investment. The investor hopes that the total return would be greater than the initial investment. Disregarding token exchange rate fluctuation (or fully hedging exchange rate), cloud mining return only depends on mining difficulty. 186 | 187 | Mining contract can easily realize the above process: User purchases an array of same-sized long positions of mining contract that settle in chronological order, with the lower bound of the Index being 0. This process is very similar to cloud mining. The user will receive settlement amount from the mining contract in chronological order. The process of receiving the earnings mimics mining cashflow. The amount of hashrate user purchased corresponds to the long position of the Index. For example, the bitcoin mining contract use 1T hash/s as the basic unit. Therefore, purchasing (1 / _Multiplier_) long position tokens is equivalent to purchasing 1T hash/s of cloud mining capacity. Since the lower bound of the Index is 0, long position will never be liquidated, which is similar to mining. 188 | 189 | 190 | ### 4.6 Speculation 191 | 192 | Synthetic PoW Mining Contract forms a two-sided market. In this market, an investor could long or short PoW Mining Index. If the investor chooses to enter into a long position, then he/she effectively becomes the counterparty of the hedging miner, and should be rewarded for bearing mining difficulty risks. 193 | 194 | ### 4.7 Margin Funding 195 | 196 | For longer-term mining contracts, the Index could fluctuate in a wider range. In order for the Index not to touch the boundaries, the boundaries need to be set to a wider range. Thus, more collateral is needed in the Market Protocol smart contract for both long and short tokens, and drives up both tokens’ price, in turn reducing capital efficiency. The market for hedging could also go down if both fixed investment for mining rigs and hedging require large amount of capital commitment. Therefore, we introduce variable margin via margin protocols such as dydx's. 197 | 198 | Under variable margin, a new business model arises. Lenders can fund margin traders and gain risk free earnings. Investors or market makers create long/short token pairs via Market Protocol smart contract. They do not trade the tokens but maintain net position neutral. Margin funding lenders can lend both long and short tokens to the liquidity pool of financing platform like dydx. When margin traders borrow long or short token from dydx, margin funding lenders can gain risk-free interests. 199 | 200 | ### 4.8 Market Maker 201 | 202 | Market maker exists in all two-sided markets. Market maker makes profit by providing liquidity and bear market making risks. Since position tokens are all standard ERC-20 tokens. All market making mechanisms in the crypto world could be recalibrated to be utilized in this market. Market makers can follow the traditional buy-low, sell-high strategy by observing the orderbook. They can also profit from creating position token pairs and lend it to automatic liquidity pool like Uniswap. 203 | 204 | ## 5. Pricing 205 | Synthetic PoW Mining Contract is a new hashrate derivative, and the way to price it remains to be explored. Here are a few simple technical indicators. It is hoped that these indicators will help the counterparty to price the contract. 206 | 207 | ### 5.1 Implied Difficulty 208 | The price of each contract implies an expected daily average mining earnings within 1T/s hashrate. Implied Earnings can be calculated by the following two formulas: 209 | 210 | 211 | 212 | 213 | 214 | From the implied earnings, the corresponding implied difficulty can be calculated. The implied difficulty is calculated by the following formula: 215 | 216 | 217 | 218 | Where _K_ is the _K_ used by the formula in 2.1.1. 219 | 220 | Example: Referring to the example in 4.1, on May 1, 2019, the difficulty is 6.35T and the BMI14 index corresponding is 3.95E-5. The table below shows the implied difficulty and implied difficulty growth rate (IDGR, see 5.2). 221 | 222 | Position Token | Market Price | Implied Earnings | Implied Difficulty | IDGR 223 | ----------------------|--------------|------------------|--------------------|-------- 224 | LBME28-300-500-190526 | 8 WBTC | 38 BTC / 1T\*24H | 6.62T | 2.82% 225 | SBME28-300-500-190526 | 12 WBTC | 38 BTC / 1T\*24H | 6.62T | 2.82% 226 | LBME84-200-400-190716 | 12 WBTC | 32 BTC / 1T\*24H | 7.86T | 6.46% 227 | SBME84-200-400-190716 | 8 WBTC | 32 BTC / 1T\*24H | 7.86T | 6.46% 228 | 229 | Traders can predict the change of difficulty over time and give an predicted value of the implied difficulty, thus launching their corresponding bid. 230 | 231 | ### 5.2 Implied Difficulty Growth Rate 232 | The calculation of the BME index refers to a set of continuous difficulty data. The market price of the contract also reflects the prediction of the change of difficulty. Implied Difficulty Growth Rate (IDGR) is the average growth rate of difficulty after each difficulty adjustment implied from the contract price. The relationship between implied difficulty growth rate and implied mining earnings has the following relationship: 233 | 234 | 235 | 236 | Where, 237 | - _K_ and _T_ are the values used by the formula in 2.1.1 238 | - _Difficulty0_ is the difficulty after the T+1th last difficulty adjustment before the contract expires 239 | 240 | Substituting the above formula into the implicit difficulty formula can give the relationship between the implied difficulty and the implied difficulty growth rate as: 241 | 242 | 243 | 244 | When T is large, the analytical solution of the implied difficulty growth rate cannot be easily obtained from the implicit difficulty. At this time, the numerical solution can be obtained by Newton iteration method. 245 | 246 | See the example in 5.1 for an example. 247 | 248 | Traders can calculate the corresponding contract price by predicting a reasonable implied difficulty growth rate. 249 | 250 | ### 5.3 Decomposition pricing 251 | Since the index of the contract is only related to the difficulty, by predicting the mining difficulties of the feture difficulty cycles one by one, the corresponding predicted settlement index can be derived to price the position token. 252 | 253 | An example is used to illustrate this method. On May 20, 2019, LBME84-200-400-190716 is priced using a decomposition pricing method. Note that there are 6 difficulty adjustments in the contract period at this time, and 2 difficulty adjustments have been made before May 20th. We will price the contract by separately predicting another 4 difficulty adjustments. The table below gives several different forecast data and corresponding token prices: 254 | 255 | 256 | Difficulty 1|Difficulty 2|Predicted Difficulty 3|Predicted Difficulty 4|Predicted Difficulty 5|Predicted Difficulty 6|Predicted Settlement Index|Price 257 | ----|-----|--------|---------|--------|--------|-----------|-------- 258 | 6.7|6.7|6.9|7.1|7.3|7.9|3.55E-05|15.5 259 | 6.7|6.7|7.4|7.6|7.9|8.3|3.40E-05|14.0 260 | 6.7|6.7|6.5|6.4|6.3|6.2|3.89E-05|18.9 261 | 262 | _The difficulty unit in the above table is T (1012)_ 263 | 264 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /research/Honeylemon/MarketProtocolV2Approach.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | **Open request for comments. Please refer to [Issues](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues) for most updated discussions, and post your questions and comments as an Issue. You may follow the best practice set by reviewer @anthonyleezhang in this brilliant thread of dicussion on Issue #39 [Thoughts on MARKET vs UMA protocols](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/39) .** 2 | 3 | ## Honeylemon Economic Specification - Market Protocol V2.0 Approach 4 | The economic specifications for all HoneyLemon transactions. 5 | 6 | Contract Creation, performed by the Honeylemon Bot. 7 | 8 | 12 hours before the beginning of a new day, the Honeylemon Bot deploys the Market protocol contract for the next trading day. The contract of the day will be used by miners and traders to execute derivative trades. 9 | 10 | Parameters: 11 | Collateral Currency = imBTC 12 | Lower Bound = 0.00 imBTC 13 | Upper Bound = Miner Payoff Index * (1 + Necessary Collateral Ratio) 14 | Necessary Collateral Ratio = 35% 15 | Necessary Collateral = Upper Bound * Multiplier 16 | Multiplier = 28 17 | 18 | Necessary Collateral Ratio determined empirically by looking at historical data. Can be re-examined in the future. 19 | Multiplier will be set to the number of days in the settlement window. 20 | imBTC is used as an example ERC20 representation of BTC.. 21 | 22 | Limit offer, performed by Miner 23 | 24 | Miner approves Initial Collateral (imBTC) to offer the mining payout contracts with an offer price denominated in USDT and quantity. We do not yet know whether “offer book” (no bids on our orderbook) will be onchain or offchain. 25 | 26 | Parameters: 27 | Offer Currency = USDT 28 | Initial Approval Amount = Quantity * Mining Revenue Index * (1 + Initial Approval Ratio) * Multiplier 29 | Initial Approval Ratio = 50% 30 | 31 | USDT is used as an example ERC20 stablecoin 32 | Initial Approval Amount the miner approves the smart contract to withdraw this amount in the future when the offer is bought by an investor. 33 | 34 | Cancel offer, performed by Miner 35 | 36 | Miner sends a message to cancel the remaining size on a specific offer in the orderbook 37 | 38 | Take offer, performed by Investor 39 | 40 | This is written as if we have the onchain orderbook. 41 | 42 | Investor would like to buy synthetic mining contracts, so they execute a multipart transaction from a proxy contract. The transaction has the following steps: 43 | Withdraw imBTC from Miner’s address. 44 | Mints Long/Short Tokens with Miner’s imBTC 45 | Sends USDT to miner(s) 46 | Receives Long Token 47 | Forwards Short token to miner 48 | 49 | Withdraw Long Payout, performed by Investor 50 | Investor withdraws Long Payout 51 | 52 | Parameters: 53 | Long Payout = Quantity * Multiplier * Min(Upper Bound, MRI Settlement Value - Lower Bound) 54 | MRI Settlement Value = average of Mining Revenue Index over the Settlement Window 55 | Settlement Window = 28 day period starting on the trade date 56 | 57 | Withdraw Short Payout, performed by Miner 58 | Miner withdraws Short Payout 59 | 60 | Parameters: 61 | Short Payout = Quantity * Multiplier * Max(Upper Bound - MRI Settlement Value, Lower Bound) 62 | 63 | 64 | Mining Revenue Index (MRI) 65 | Theoretical (https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/9 Candidate 5) vs. Empirical , Coinbase Block Reward excluding Tx Fee vs . Coinbase Block Reward including Tx Fee 66 | 67 | For MVP, suggest we choose the Block Reward including Tx Fee (FPPS-like) 68 | 69 | 70 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /research/Honeylemon/TechnicalDesign_img1_OverallFlow.png: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/carboclan/pm/177fe4f82577091d7c3d7303dc64dd5d42d6da84/research/Honeylemon/TechnicalDesign_img1_OverallFlow.png -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /research/Honeylemon/TechnicalDesign_img2_OrderFlow.png: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/carboclan/pm/177fe4f82577091d7c3d7303dc64dd5d42d6da84/research/Honeylemon/TechnicalDesign_img2_OrderFlow.png -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /research/Honeylemon/TechnicalSpec.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | **Open request for comments. Please refer to [Issues](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues) for most updated discussions, and post your questions and comments as an Issue. You may follow the best practice set by reviewer @anthonyleezhang in this brilliant thread of dicussion on Issue #39 [Thoughts on MARKET vs UMA protocols](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/39) .** 2 | 3 | # Honeylemon Alpha Technical Design 4 | repo: https://github.com/carboclan/dapp.honeylemon.market 5 | 6 | ## High-level flow 7 | 8 | ![Overall Flow](TechnicalDesign_img1_OverallFlow.png) 9 | 10 | There are 3 main roles in the protocol: the Honeylemon admin, Miner and Investor. Below are scenarios that each of them perform. 11 | 12 | 13 | ### Honeylemon Admin 14 | * Everyday we deploy a new MarketContract, PositionTokenShort and PositionTokenLong. We register the latest MarketContract in MarketContractProxy in order to make it easier to interact with the latest deployed MarketContract. 15 | * In addition MarketContractProxy should implement a `balanceOf` method that will return the balance of the current-day PositionTokenLong (it can get its address from the current MarketContract). This is required in order to trick 0x protocol into believing that we transferred a token to the buyer (it has an assertion in the code). 16 | * Honeylemon adminteam maintains an Oracle that posts daily BTC payoffs per 1Th on-chain. This data is used by the modified Market protocol contracts to calculate payoffs at settlement. The oracle provides several indexes for various purposes: 17 | * Current hashrate index - used to calculate collateral requirements at contract start (this value doesn’t need to be onchain, it is used only when deploying daily Market contracts. 18 | * Last 28 days payoff index - used to calculate payoffs at contract settlement 19 | 20 | ### Miner 21 | 1. Miner goes to the UI 22 | 2. Miner enters the sale price and amount of TH they want to sell. The UI shows required imBTC collateral and whether there’s enough in the wallet (otherwise order can’t be created) 23 | 3. Gives approval to draw the collateral token (imBTC) from their wallet. MetaMask popup with ETH transaction - once per address, 0x should provide js libs to simplify this. 24 | 4. The UI constructs a 0x order, opens MetaMask to sign it (no transaction, just signature) 25 | 5. Order is sent to the server to be stored in a DB (0x relayer / mesh node) 26 | 6. The miner optionally can ask the server to remove/modify the order. I propose for the MVP only allow to delete an order and create a new one, not modify. We need to cancel order on-chain with 0x protocol. 27 | 7. Miners see their contracts with status: not filled, filled, partially filled, settled. The data for the list is read from chain checking all PositionTokens in the wallet as well as from the API using open 0x orders created by the current wallet. 28 | 8. After contract settlement miner can withdraw excess collateral from MarketCollateralPool contract by calling `MarketCollateralPool.settleAndClose` 29 | 30 | ### Investor 31 | 1. Investor goes to the UI, sees the best price based on all current orders 32 | 2. Investor enters TH amount they want to buy. The UI recalculates the final price (in case multiple orders are required to fill the size). 33 | 3. Gives approval to draw USDT token from their wallet. MetaMask popup with ETH transaction - once per address. 34 | 4. Investor submits Ethereum transaction to fill the order with 0x protocol 35 | 5. Once the tx is mined both miner and investor receive Market position tokens in their corresponding DSProxy contracts - the trade is on 36 | 6. After contract settlement investor can claim imBTC reward from MarketCollateralPool contract by calling `MakerCollateralPool.settleAndClose` 37 | 38 | ## Early Redemption 39 | Market protocol supports early contract redemption if an address owns both short and long position tokens for the same daily contract. This is useful for market makers to be able to net out their long/short exposure in the daily contract and unlock the collateral. The `redeemPositionTokens` transaction should be executed directly on the deployed instance of `MarketCollateralPool` contract. See implementation [here](https://github.com/MARKETProtocol/MARKETProtocol/blob/master/contracts/MarketCollateralPool.sol#L146). 40 | 41 | ## 0x ERC20Bridge contract + Market protocol 42 | ### High-level order flow 43 | 44 | ![Overall Flow](TechnicalDesign_img2_OrderFlow.png) 45 | 46 | 0x v3 ERC20Bridge contract enables custom logic execution on order fill. That logic can mint Market protocol position tokens (see here) and distribute them to buyer and seller atomically within a single 0x ‘fillOrder’ transaction. Such orders are fully-compatible with the rest of 0x infrastructure and libraries. 47 | 48 | ### Smart Contracts 49 | * [MarketContractProxy](https://github.com/carboclan/dapp.honeylemon.market/blob/master/contracts/honeylemon/MarketContractProxy.sol) - responsible for deploying, settlement and keeping the list of daily MarketContract and PositionToken instances. Proxies market protocol position token minting to the daily contract. Emits an event that our indexer captures to keep track of all entered contracts and their prices. 50 | * [MinterBridge](https://github.com/carboclan/dapp.honeylemon.market/blob/master/contracts/honeylemon/MinterBridge.sol) - an implementation of 0x [ERC20Bridge](https://github.com/0xProject/0x-protocol-specification/blob/master/asset-proxy/erc20-bridge-proxy.md#writing-an-erc20bridge-contract) that enables custom logic execution on 0x order fill. Interacts with MarketContractProxy to mint position tokens. 51 | * [DSProxy](https://github.com/carboclan/dapp.honeylemon.market/blob/master/contracts/honeylemon/DSProxy.sol) - an instance is deployed for each user to enable redemption of multiple position tokens at once. Position tokens are minted to DSProxy, this allows users to redeem multiple contracts in a single transaction, without having to give approval for each position token (this is particularly useful for miners who are likely to hold multiple contracts). 52 | 53 | ### Backend Components 54 | * 0x API - used by the front-end to store signed 0x orders. Keeps track of order state and fillable amounts. Returns a sorted order book of fillable orders. Interacts with 0x Mesh instance to perform some of the functions. We use the API docker image as-is. 55 | * 0x Mesh - is used by 0x API to keep track of order states and fillable amounts. We had to fork the code and modify the logic that calculates order fillable amount. 56 | * Graph Protocol node - indexes on-chain events and provides a GraphQL API to query them. Is used by the front-end to get the list of current/expired contracts. 57 | * Postgres DB - stores data for 0x API and the Graph Node. 58 | * IPFS node - is used by the graph node. 59 | 60 | See [docker-compose](https://github.com/carboclan/dapp.honeylemon.market/blob/master/docker/docker-compose-local.yml) for details. 61 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /research/Honeylemon/WhitePaper_BMRIformula_LaTex.png: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/carboclan/pm/177fe4f82577091d7c3d7303dc64dd5d42d6da84/research/Honeylemon/WhitePaper_BMRIformula_LaTex.png -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /research/LSDai.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | **Open request for comments. Please refer to [Issues](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues) for most updated discussions, and post your questions and comments as an Issue. You may follow the best practice set by reviewer @anthonyleezhang in this brilliant thread of dicussion on Issue #39 [Thoughts on MARKET vs UMA protocols](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/39).** 2 | 3 | # LSDai: Get High on Interest! 4 | An EthBerlinZwei hackathon winning project. 5 | www.LSDai.Market 6 | 7 | ![Technical overview of how the LSDai system works](https://challengepost-s3-challengepost.netdna-ssl.com/photos/production/software_photos/000/829/681/datas/gallery.jpg) 8 | 9 | ## Inspiration 10 | In a world of roller-coaster crypto volatility, we turned to Dai for stability. With the emergence of interest generating instruments born through layers of collateralization on crypto native synthetic assets, we are entering a phase of interest rate volatility. Introducing LSDai, for your escape to a peace of mind: earn Compound interest on your collateral with rDai, while providing liquidity for hedges against variable Compound interest. 11 | 12 | Empirical studies from traditional finance have shown the adverse impact of variability in interest rates (the “price” of money) on the real economy. Accordingly, interest rate swap, used by non-financial firms in the management of the interest rate risk of their debt, is one of the most important fixed-income instrument in the trading and hedging of interest rate risk. An alternative to interest rate swap, Eurodollar futures, is the biggest and most liquid futures market traded in the US by volume. 13 | 14 | We have seen recent wild swings of Compound interest on Dai, going from 5% to peaking over 16% within a month. With the emergence of DeFi stack, more synthetic crypto assets composed of native assets are created and then rebundled on the Ethereum tech stack, enabling new possibilities while introducing complex interdependencies into the system. This is why we are creating LSDai.market, for hedgers and speculators to take leveraged long and short positions on Dai interest rates without borrowing by simply buying and selling LongDi and ShortDi tokens. 15 | 16 | ## What it does 17 | LSDai creates a [Eurodollar](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurodollar)-style derivative that is a future on the Dai lending rate on Compound over the duration of the contract. By leveraging [Market Protocol](https://marketprotocol.io), LSDai takes the approach of de-coupling the risk of the two sides. 18 | 19 | LSDai creates a [Eurodollar](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurodollar) like construct, that is a future on the Compound Dai lending rate over the duration of the contract. By leveraging Market Protocol which takes on the approach of constructing index futures via "iron-cross options" approach, LSDai de-couples the risk of the two sides via long and short position tokens. 20 | It enables three different types of users to gain the kind of exposure to the interest rate fluctuation that fits their profile, while aligns incentives. 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | It enables three different types of users to gain the kind of exposure to the interest rate fluctuation that fits their profile, while also aligning their incentives: 25 | 26 | * **Hedgers**: Hedgers are lending out their Dai on Compound and earn interest, but fear that the interest rate — thus, their passive income — will drop. LSDai’s Market Makers mint and sell them **Short** **D**ai **i**nterest tokens (*ShortDi*) in exchange for Dai, enabling Hedgers to hedge their interest-earning position. This means they will offset the rate fluctuation through gains in ShortDi: if the interest rate drops, they profit from the short position. If the rate goes up, the extra interest makes up for their loss of value in ShortDi. In essence, hedgers can insure themselves against a loss of income, reaching an altered state of peace. 27 | 28 | * **Speculators**: These players have no stake in the lending business, they just want to bet on the changes in the interest rate. Speculators expect Dai’s lending interest rate on Compound to either to go up or down, and buy Long or Short Dai interest tokens (*LongDi* or *ShortDi*) from the LSDai Market Makers. They gain or lose, depending on where the interest rate goes and how clear their mind was when they made their bet. *(feature coming soon)* 29 | 30 | * **Market Makers**: Market Makers enable the whole LSDai flow. They provide the initial capital to seed market liquidity. They also manage the minting and selling of the LongDi and ShortDi tokens to Hedgers and Speculators. In exchange for their role in supplying, Market Makers sell the tokens at a slight premium and earn the spread. They also earn the interest on the whole collateral pool. But sharing is caring: Market Makers can easily set someone else as the beneficiary of that interest (such as a rehabilitation center). *(feature coming soon)* 31 | 32 | ## How we built it 33 | We took a decentralized approach, adopting Market Protocol in decoupling the interest rate swap positions into margin-embedded long and short position tokens, LongDi and ShortDi. We used Airswap to aid the price discovery of these tokens. Given the importance of liquidity in the model, we programmed a bot to arbitrage the spread across the Market Makers of the token pairs and the Hedgers/Speculators. 34 | 35 | Lastly, in order to create a virtuous loop to further incentivize the Market Makers, we implemented rDai as the collateral in Market Protocol backing the position token pair. Thus, Market Makers will be able to earn interest from the rDai collateral in addition to earning the spread. 36 | 37 | During the EthBerlinZwei hackathon we started from scratch and were able to launch LSDai on the Ethereum mainnet. Since we are the first Market Maker in this product, we have decided to donate the interest accrued from rDai in the collateral pool to EthBerlin. (This is not to imply that EthBerlin is a rehab. Okay, well, in some sense it is.) 38 | 39 | ## Challenges we ran into 40 | We had to figure out how to make a contract that is written to provide assets priced in dollars, and invent a pricing structure for the interest rate swap. We also had to think about how the pricing structure may fit into the existing Market Protocol smart contract that we have already deployed on Kovan. 41 | 42 | In addition, we encountered a hard-coded Infura key in the Airswap widget that hit its rate limit on the day of the hackathon submission, and the widget code is not open source. We downloaded each file until we got to the one that had the hard coded Infura key, replaced the key with our own and uploaded the entire file structure to private services to re-serve it to our app. 43 | 44 | ## Accomplishments that we're proud of 45 | 1. Built it from scratch and launched on mainnet! 46 | 2. Created an innovative solution of decentralized interest rate swaps for DeFi. 47 | 3. Aligned a global team from 3 continents. We met at EthBerlin, brainstormed, built the project and launched it together in less than 30 hours. 48 | 49 | ## What's next for LSDai 50 | We plan to fix up the frontend bug and roll out a new version based on the updates in the rDai 2.0 contract in September. And — drumroll, please — a truly **stable-revenue-stable-value synthetic token** is coming! Stay tuned and have a nice trip! 51 | 52 | ## Updates!!! 53 | LSDai.Market creates a unique mechanism to tokenize on-chain variable rates, which allows the market to take leveraged long and short positions against the movement of variable rates without borrowing. Simultaneously, it also enables market makers — who seed liquidity to the system — to earn interest on collateral, in addition to spreads. We start with the variable Dai interest rate, a financial primitive currently most common in the Ethereum DeFi space. This way, we’re creating the first tokenized Eurodollar-style futures on the Dai interest rate. Positions are represented by the LongDi and ShortDi tokens (Long and Short Dai interest). Establishing a liquid market for these is significant for the DeFi space beyond trading or hedging: it can inform the market of the expectations about the future interest rate. For example, in MakerDAO’s case, it can serve as a signal to the MKR governance (who set the stability fee) and Dai users (who are affected by the peg). In the future, we will extend our market to interest rates beyond stablecoins, creating long/short token pairs for indices of other crypto-native variable rates (e.g. variable staking rewards). 54 | 55 | DApp Interface: www.lsdai.market 56 | Documentation (working draft): https://github.com/carboclan/pm/blob/master/research/LSDai.md 57 | GitHub repos: https://github.com/carboclan/LSDai-dapp https://github.com/carboclan/LSDi-airswap-bot 58 | 59 | As a next step, we plan on offering structured products such as tokenized fixed rates and term-limited lending and borrowing, while leveraging the liquidity of existing variable rate DeFi lending products. We are currently designing a stable-revenue-stable-interest rate token, the LSDai token. This will be backed by a rate insurance pool called the LSDao, with a simple interface and ease of UX, similar to that of a certificate of deposit that may be redeemed at any time or traded on secondary markets. LSDao members will seed the liquidity of LSDai tokens and earn the best available variable interest on their collateral, along with a spread (insurance premium). When LSDai holders redeem their tokens, the LSDao will automatically buy them back. Essentially, these tokens behave as puttable bonds. The fixed interest rate of newly issued LSDai tokens and the LSDao insurance premium can be algorithmically priced and dynamically adjusted. These values are functions of the capital supply in the LSDao collateral pool and the fixed-rate lending pool. 60 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /research/LSDao.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # LSDai Fixed Interest Rate Token: a puttable bond issued by LSDao 2 | Working Draft as of 2019.09.05 3 | 4 | 5 | ## Background 6 | 7 | We are creating a system that will automatically determine a fixed interest rate that we provide to lenders based on variable Compound Rate, and the overall performance of the existing loans outstanding. 8 | The Fixed Rate will be priced by following a wave pattern (similar to a SIN wave): the wave is essentially determined by the rate we are providing the Insurance Pool above the Compound variable rate. The higher the rate we provide beyond the Compound rate, the closer the Fixed Rate to new lenders relative to variable Compound Rate for new positions opened. The lower that rate is, the wider the spread will be. At no time the spread will be less than 1% or more than the 4% (guesstimate of people will not entering if spread is beyond). If stays within bounds, yield will heal when we have loans entering the system with higher spread. If go out of bounds, people will not go into the system because spread is too high. 9 | Targeting an insurance premium of 1-3%. 10 | Initialization parameter, the insurance pool starts at 2% (median to the bounds, rounded to no decimals in percentage. 11 | Gain from of total number of cDai between the last price check and the current price check should be 12 | 13 | ## Opening a Fixed Interest Loan 14 | 15 | Lender place in their collateral, Insurance Pool will match the collateral with the total amount of interest to be paid out during the term. Both sides of the collateral will be denominated in the same currency, cDai. 16 | Three way swap: Lender’s Dai comes in and swaps into cDai, and cDai will be paired with cDai from Insurance Pool that will cover the interest payment over the entire duration of the loan as if the loan has matured, in other words, we are fully collateralizing the entire duration of the loan. The combined amount of cDai locked in MARKET PROTOCOL collateral pool will be used to mint position tokens for the Insurance Pool (Long Token, long on Compound variable rate) and the position tokens for the Lenders (Short Token, short on Compound variable rate). 17 | The short position token provides the collateral backing for the LSDai (fixed interest rate token) minted. 18 | Thus, the lenders will receive 1 LSDai token in their wallet for exactly 1 Dai they locked up. LSDai represents the position in the LSDai lending pool that the Lender has. 19 | Full collateralization of the loans will mean that there will be no need for additional margin deposit over the duration of the loan. 20 | 21 | ## At Contract Duration 22 | 23 | At contract duration, the price of Short Token denominated in cDai is based on the actual Compound variable interest rate the cDai is gaining relative to the fixed rate the Short Token represents. 24 | The price of Short Token denominated in cDai = Number of cDai represented by Short Token / (1+ Accumulated Variable Compound Interest Rate at t* (1+ Fixed Rate of the LSDai)) 25 | The Long Token is worth the total value of the whole (Short Token plus Long Token) minus the value of the Short Token, denominated in number of cDai. 26 | 27 | ## At Maturity 28 | 29 | At Maturity Date the loan will cease to gain fixed interest for the lenders. Instead the Insurance Pool retains the future Compound variable interest generated with the underlying cDai, until the lender redeems their LSDai for Dai. 30 | The value of the interest accrued to Insurance Pool after maturity and prior to user redemption of the LSDai denominated in number of cDai = Amount in Dai worth at Maturity / price of cDai 31 | 32 | LSDai positions are ERC20 tokens, and can be traded on any compatible protocol. At all time, the holder of the LSDai token will receive any interest due. 33 | 34 | ## Lender Redemption 35 | The Lender has the right to redeem part or all of their loans any time. 36 | If Lender redeems LSDai and receives corresponding amount of Dai, all cDai locked in position tokens returned into Insurance Pool. 37 | At redemption, the cDai locked in the Long and Short Position Tokens are redeemed, the portion of cDai locked in Short Token is redeemed into Dai through Compound, and returned to Lenders in exchange for their LSDai tokens. 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指数必须具有一个明确的实际意义 23 | - 为了方便预测，指数应当只与挖矿难度相关 24 | - 指数应该方便矿工进行挖矿对冲。矿工应该可以通过进入合约头寸对冲一段时间内的难度波动引起的风险 25 | - 指数应该与一个被人们熟知的数据具有可比性，比如btc.com中的某一数据 26 | 27 | ##### 命名 28 | 本合约使用的指数称为：比特币算力收益指数，缩写为_BME{N}_ ,N表示指数天数, 例如 BME28, BME84等等 29 | 30 | ##### 含义 31 | 比特币算力收益指数 _BME_ 表示: **1T算力在过去N天内的平均日BTC收益** 32 | 33 | 1T = 1012 34 | 35 | ##### 公式 36 | _BME_ 用以下公式计算: 37 | 38 | 39 | 40 | 其中: 41 | - **_T_** 表示N天内的挖矿难度调整次数. **令T=N/14** 42 | - **_Difficultyi_** 表示最近倒数第i次难度调整后的难度值 43 | - **_Ki_** 是一个缩放系数，由以下公式计算: 44 | 45 | 46 | 47 | 参数 | 取值 | 备注 48 | ------| -----|------- 49 | _HashrateUnit_ | 10 12 Hash/s | 1T 算力 | 50 | _TargetBlockTime_ | 600 s | 比特币预期出块时间，10分钟 51 | _Coinbasei_ | 12.5 BTC | 区块挖矿收益，每21,000区块收益减半 52 | _NBlock_ | 144 | 每天的区块数 53 | **_Ki_**| **251457095** | 随 _Coinbasei_ 减半而减半 54 | 55 | ##### 其他要点 56 | - 因为比特币挖矿难度每2016个区块调整一次（大约相当于14天），所以指数中的天数N一般设置为14的整数倍。 57 | - 在挖矿减半之前，指数只会在每次挖矿难度调整的时候变化。 58 | - 指数和btc.com的“每T收益”数据在同一量级，事实上，BME14指数应该与btc.com的“每T收益”数据相等。 59 | 60 | ##### 例子 61 | 区块高度| 时间 | 难度 | BME14 | BME28 | BME84 62 | --------| --------------------|-------------------|-----------|-----------|-------- 63 | 572,544 | 2019-04-21 09:54:28 | 6,353,030,562,983 | 3.958E-05 |   |   64 | 574,560 | 2019-05-04 16:32:13 | 6,702,169,884,349 | 3.752E-05 | 3.855E-05 |   65 | 576,576 | 2019-05-18 16:31:36 | 6,704,632,680,587 | 3.750E-05 | 3.751E-05 |   66 | 578,592 | 2019-05-31 06:43:04 | 7,459,680,720,542 | 3.371E-05 | 3.561E-05 |   67 | 580,608 | 2019-06-14 09:03:50 | 7,409,399,249,090 | 3.394E-05 | 3.382E-05 |   68 | 582,624 | 2019-06-27 10:59:30 | 7,934,713,219,630 | 3.169E-05 | 3.281E-05 | 3.566E-05 69 | 584,640 | 2019-07-09 17:17:48 | 9,064,159,826,491 | 2.774E-05 | 2.972E-05 | 3.368E-05 70 | 71 | 更多的[BME数据](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/blob/master/research/BME.md) 72 | 73 | #### 2.1.2 指数范围 74 | 75 | 按照Market Protocol的设计要求，每份比特币算力收益合约都会设置指数的有效范围，用 _Cap_ 表示指数上限，用 _Floor_ 表示指数下限。当指数达到上下限的时候会触发合约交割。 76 | 77 | 在设置合约的指数范围时需考虑如下两个原则： 78 | - 为了减少对保证金的需求、提高杠杆，会尽量设置较小的指数范围 79 | - 另一方面，为了防止因指数达到上下限而触发合约提前交割，会设置相对安全(较宽)的指数范围 80 | 81 | 82 | #### 2.1.3 合约大小 83 | 84 | 每份合约的价值 = 合约乘数 * 指数 85 | 86 | 合约乘数 = _Multiplier_ = 106 WBTC 87 | 88 | #### 2.1.4 到期时间 89 | 90 | 每份比特币算力收益合约都会设置一个到期日。合约在格林尼治时间到期日的02:00点到期。为了避免出块时间波动的影响，到期时间通常设置在某次难度调整预期时间之后的7天。根据Market Protocol的要求，合约在到期1天后可以进行交割。 91 | 92 | #### 2.1.5 交割 93 | 94 | 合约发生交割时，Market智能合约将会向合约头寸持有人发送WBTC。每份合约多头将收到 ( _BMI_ - _Floor_ ) * _Multiplier_ 个WBTC，每份合约空头将收到 ( _Cap_ - _BMI_ ) * _Multiplier_ 个 WBTC。 95 | 96 | #### 2.1.6 保证金 97 | 98 | 合约发行人向Market智能合约抵押（ _Cap_ - _Floor_ ) * _Multiplier_ 个WBTC以铸造合约头寸代币。合约的头寸是完全抵押的，合约在交割前不需要补充保证金。 99 | 100 | #### 2.1.7 头寸代币命名 101 | 102 | \BME\-\-\-\ 103 | 104 | - L: 多头头寸 105 | - S: 空头头寸 106 | - N: 指数天数 107 | - Floor: 指数下限，单位是1E-7 108 | - Cap: 指数上限，单位是1E-7 109 | - Height: 交割区块高度 110 | - YYMMDD: 到期日 111 | 112 | 113 | 例： SBME84-250-300-190718表示指数范围在[2.50E-5,3.00E-5]于2019年7月18日02:00:00(UTC)到期的84天比特币算力收益合约空头。 114 | 115 | ## 3. 智能合约栈 116 | 117 | 基于以太坊上的智能合约实现对算力收益合约的发行、交易、保证金管理、交割等生命期管理。这个过程可以实现信任最小化，降低了交易门槛，为流动提供保障。 118 | 119 | ### 3.1 合约代币化 120 | 121 | 基于[Market Protocol智能合约](https://marketprotocol.io) 可以方便实现建立算力收益合约的头寸。同时，Market Protocol的合约头寸都是标准的ERC20代币，从而很容易的可以通过链下交易所或链上去中化协议交易这些头寸。 122 | 123 | 市场上流通的合约头寸代币需要由发行人铸造（mint）。合约发行人通过向Market Protocol智能合约抵押资产铸造头寸代币。发行人在完成代币铸造后，将同时持有合约的多头代币和空头代币，其净头寸为0。因为铸造的多头代币总是等于空头代币，所以称为代币对。此后，如果发行人希望进入合约多头，则可以在市场上将空头代币卖出，以达到持有多头的目标；反之，如果发行人希望进入合约空头，则可以卖出多头代币。 124 | 125 | 交易员也可以在市场上直接购买合约代币实现持有合约头寸的目的，而不必在Market Protocol智能合约中铸造头寸代币。任何时候，头寸代币持有人只需要在市场上卖出持有的头寸代币就可以实现平仓，从而不必等待合约交割就可以实现头寸盈亏。 126 | 127 | 由于算力合约的指数具有上下的范围限制，且发行人已经在创建头寸时为指数范围内的合约价值支付了完全的保证金，所以合约头寸是完全抵押的，在指数范围内没有爆仓的风险。由于算力合约会被用于对冲挖矿风险，而挖矿是一个长期的过程，所以必须尽量避免因为指数到达上下限而造成的合约提前交割的情况。为此，设置指数上下限时需要根据历史数据，设置相对宽松的指数范围，以求覆盖指数波动。 128 | 129 | 虽然合约头寸是完全抵押的，但指数的范围设置，依旧提供了对指数的杠杆作用。即当指数波动时，合约头寸价值的变化率通常会大于指数的变化率。 130 | 131 | 例1，Carboclan社区在设置了一个84天后到期的比特币挖矿算力合约。此时BME84指数为5.52E-5。设置算力收益合约的参数如下： 132 | - 指数上限：6.00E-5 133 | - 指数下限：4.50E-5 134 | - 到期时间：2019-05-11 02:00:00 UTC 135 | 136 | Alice希望创建1.0个合约代币对，为此她向Market智能合约质押了(6E-5 - 4.5E-5) * 1E6 * 1.0 = 15 WBTC，从而铸造了1.0个合约多头代币和1.0个合约空头代币。此时，按指数计算的每个合约多头代币价值为(5.52E-5 - 4.50E-5) * 1E6 = 10.2 WBTC，每个合约空头代币价值为(6.00E-5 - 5.52E-5) * 1E6 = 4.8 WBTC。 137 | 138 | 之后，指数下降到5.50E-5，此时，按指数计算的每个合约多头代币价值为(5.50E-5 - 4.50E-5) * 1E6 = 10 WBTC，每个合约空头代币价值为(6.00E-5 - 5.50E-5) * 1E6 = 5 WBTC。Alice希望进入合约空头，于是她在交易所中挂单出售1.0个多头代币。Bob恰好希望进入合约多头，最终Bob向Alice购买了合约多头币，成交价9.8 WBTC。Bob向Alice支付9.8 WBTC，Alice向Bob支付1.0个多头代币。 139 | 140 | 这里在市场上头寸代币成交价（9.8 WBTC）低于了按指数计算的价值（10 WBTC），这是由于人们对到期日指数会进一步下降的预期造成的。另一方面，我们可以看到，指数下降了(5.52E-5 - 5.50E-5) / 5.52E-5 = 0.36%，但多头头寸按指数计算的价格却下降了(10.2 - 10) / 10.2 = 1.9%，这就是指数下限造成的5.28倍杠杆作用。 141 | 142 | 当UTC时间2019年5月11日02点合约到期。又过了1天，合约进行交割。此时合约指数为5.25E-5。Market智能合约向多头持有方Bob支付（5.25E-5 - 4.50E-5) * 1E6 * 1.0 = 7.5 WBTC, 向空头持有方Alice支付(6.00E-5 - 5.25E-5) * 1E6 * 1.0 = 7.5 WBTC。最终Alice的盈亏为：-15 + 9.8 + 7.5 = 2.3 WBTC，Bob的盈亏为: -9.8 + 7.5 = -2.3 WBTC。 143 | 144 | ### 3.2 预言机 145 | 146 | Market Protocol依赖预言机提供指数。预言机是整套系统的相对中心化的部分。 147 | 148 | 比特币算力收益合约的预言机依赖以太坊链外数据。需要由外部权威机构提供比特币区块难度信息，提交到预言机智能合约实现。好在比特币区块难度信息的变化很缓慢，平均14天变化一次，且这一信息由于记录在比特币区块链上，全世界任何人都可以对这一数据的真实性进行检验。 149 | 150 | ### 3.3 交易层 151 | 152 | 因为基于Market Protocol发行的算力收益合约头寸代币背后是完全抵押的合约头寸，且头寸代币符合ERC20规范，所以头寸代币可以通过任何支持ERC20的线下中心化交易所（例如币安、bitstamp等）或链上去中化的智能合约（例如0x，Uniswap等）交易。这一特性，使得交易算力收益合约变得非常简单。并不需要开发新的交易技术或基础设施就可以进行交易。 153 | 154 | ### 3.4 浮动保证金层 155 | 156 | 在3.1中我们已经分析了使用Market Protocol本身存在对指数的杠杆作用。然而，当指数波动较大时，为了防止指数触达上下限而引发合约交割，需要设置较大范围的指数上下限，进而造成抵押保证金上升，并降低整体杠杆率。 157 | 158 | 在算力收益合约中，对于相对近期的合约（比如30天)，指数波动不大，此时设置的指数上下限范围相对较小，仅仅使用Market Protocol就提供了相对足够的杠杆率。但对于相对远期的算力合约（比如180天），指数波动可能达到100%，此时Market Protocol的完全抵押保证金的方式会造成交易成本过高。 159 | 160 | 为此，可以在头寸代币基础上，引入一种浮动保证金层。浮动保证金层的特点是，保证金不是完全抵押的，而是按照头寸市场价设置一个保证金比例，保证金只要能覆盖短期内的价格波动。当头寸价格发生变化造成保证金率下降时，可以向保证金不足的交易方发起追加保证金请求（margin call），从而提高保证金以覆盖波动。另一方面，由于指数波动，当浮盈头寸的保证金率超过了必要比例时，超出的保证金可以从保证金账户中取出，使得头寸持有者实现盈利。这种浮动保证金机制降低了保证金要求，提高了交易双方的资金利用率。 161 | 162 | 已经有一些Defi的协议实现了浮动保证金功能。[dydx protocol](https://dydx.exchange)是其中的代表。dydx平台提供了融币的功能。一方面，出借方将代币A存到智能合约的资金池中，贷方抵押代币B创建保证金账户，并从资金池中贷出代币A。贷出的代币A可以在交易市场上卖出以获得代币B，卖出获得代币B再次作为抵押进入保证金账户，从而又可以贷出更多代币A用于卖出，最终达到了杠杆做空代币A的目的。相反的，出借方将代币B存到智能合约的资金池中，贷方抵押代币A创建保证金账户，并从资金池中贷出代币B。贷出的基础代币B可以在交易市场上买入更多代币A，获得的代币A再次作为抵押进入保证金账户，从而又可以贷出更多代币B用于买入代币A，最终达到了杠杆做多代币A目的。dydx支持最大4倍杠杆。当抵押的代币相对于贷出的代币的价格下降时，会造成保证金不足，如果贷币方不能及时补充抵押物，会引发强行平仓，从而实现浮动保证金的功能。 163 | 164 | 目前，dydx还不完全支持直接交易Market的头寸代币，还有一些适配工作需要完成，但应该不会是主要障碍。 165 | 166 | ## 4. 使用场景 167 | 168 | 算力收益合约可以用于多种业务场景。 169 | 170 | ### 4.1 风险揭示 171 | 172 | 投资人在购买矿机开始挖矿前，需要预估投入产出比(ROI)。投资人购买矿机是一次性投入，未来挖矿需要付出的电费也是固定值，即投资挖矿的投入是确定的。影响挖矿产出的因素就是币价和挖矿难度。已经有大量金融产品（期货、期权、永续合约等）可以揭示或对冲币价波动的风险。挖矿收益合约市场向投资人进一步揭示了因难度波动带来的风险敞口。当投资挖矿前，投资人可以观察近期及远期的算力收益合约的成交价，合约的成交价反应了市场对于挖矿收益的真实估计。 173 | 174 | 例，在2019年5月1日时，BMI14指数为3.95E-5, 市场中比特币挖矿收益合约的成交价情况如下： 175 | 176 | 合约头寸代币 | 预计到期日 | 市场价 | 隐含挖矿收益 177 | ------| -----|-----|--- 178 | LBME28-300-500-190526 | 19-05-26 | 8 WBTC | 3.8E-5 BTC / 1T\*24H 179 | SBME28-300-500-190526 | 19-05-26 | 12 WBTC | 3.8E-5 BTC / 1T\*24H 180 | LBME84-200-400-190716 | 19-07-16 | 12 WBTC | 3.2E-5 BTC / 1T\*24H 181 | SBME84-200-400-190716 | 19-07-16 | 8 WBTC | 3.2E-5 BTC / 1T\*24H 182 | 183 | 合约多头代币的成交价反应了市场对合约到期前N天的每T算力平均每日预期挖矿收益的判断。用(多头成交价 / _Multiplier_ + 指数下限)就可以得到成交价隐含的预期挖矿收益。从成交价看，市场认为同等算力挖矿收益将逐渐下降。投资人从上述成交价洞察出预期挖矿收益的下降，从而对挖矿ROI做出更理性的预估。 184 | 185 | ### 4.2 对冲风险 186 | 187 | 算力收益合约在揭示挖矿风险的基础上，还可以进一步对冲挖矿风险。同样的，这里的讨论忽略币价的波动，因为有大量的衍生品可以对冲币价波动。投资人在购买矿机挖矿的同时，进入算力收益合约空头，对难度引起的挖矿收益波动进行对冲。当挖矿难度上升，挖矿收益下降时，合约空头的利润将抵消真实矿机挖矿收益下降的部分；当挖矿难度下降，挖矿收益上升时，合约空头的亏损将被真实矿机挖矿收益上升的部分抵消。上述对冲操作相当于提前锁定了挖矿收益，锁定的收益为（合约指数上限 * _Multiplier_ - 进入头寸价格）。 188 | 189 | 例，Alice在2019年5月1日，购买了一批具有100T Hash/s的矿机，她希望锁定未来6个难度周期（大约84天，从2019-5-4到2019-7-27）。于是Alice在市场上买入100 * 84 / 1E6 = 0.0084 个算力收益合约空头代币SBME84-200-400-190716。以下是到期交割时Alice的盈亏情况： 190 | 191 | 头寸代币 | 进入价格 | 交割指数 | 每代币盈亏 | 头寸盈亏 | 挖矿收入 | 综合收入 192 | ----------------------|:--------:|:--------:|:----------:|:--------:|:--------:|:------- 193 | SBME84-200-400-190716 | 8 | 3.36E-5 | -1.6 | -0.01344 | 0.28224 | 0.26880 194 | SBME84-200-400-190716 | 8 | 2.86E-5 | 3.4 | 0.02856 | 0.24024 | 0.26880 195 | 196 | _\* 上表中货币单位为WBTC_ 197 | 198 | ### 4.3 固收投资 199 | 200 | 算力收益合约剥离了挖矿中因挖矿难度变化而带来的风险，从而提出了一种固定收益的投资模式。投资人可以购买（或租赁）实体矿机并在矿场挖矿，同时进入算力收益合约空头对冲掉挖矿难度上升带来的风险。如果是法币本位投资者，还可以进入币价的空头对冲掉币价下跌的风险。通过上述方法，组合出一个无风险的固定收益投资品。无风险固收投资者为整个挖矿产业生态提供了资金。无风险固收投资者需要管理实体矿机矿场确保挖矿生产，提供了在虚拟挖矿衍生品和实体矿机挖矿中的桥梁作用。 201 | 202 | ### 4.4 融资租赁 203 | 204 | 矿场经营者的痛点是缺乏资金，无法加杠杆扩大生产。由于挖矿的风险不可控，没有人敢给挖矿行业贷款。矿场经营者可以将矿机按时间出租给无风险固收投资者或抵押给融资租赁的资金提供方，从而获得一笔现金流用于增加杠杆扩大生产规模。当把矿机抵押给融资租赁的资金提供方时，资金提供方可以要求融资方进入算力收益合约空头和币价空头，从而增加贷款人的偿债能力。 205 | 206 | ### 4.5 云挖矿 207 | 利用算力收益智能合约之上，可以很容易的构建一个虚拟云挖矿业务。虚拟云挖矿业务面向已经理解云挖业务的用户。 208 | 209 | 传统投资云算力是这样一个经济模型：用户在初期投入一部分资金用于购买云算力，并在之后一段连续时间内陆续获得一系列挖矿收益。用户希望获得挖矿的总收益最终可以大于购买云算力的投入。不考虑币价波动的情况(或者对币价做完全对冲)，云算力投入的回报只和挖矿难度相关。 210 | 211 | 可以很容易的利用算力收益智能合约模拟上述过程：用户在市场上进入一组大小相同的连续交割的算力收益合约多头，这些算力收益合约的指数下限都是0，这一过程类似于投资云算力。之后用户会不断收到头寸代币交割后返还的资金，收到资金的过程类似挖矿收益。用户购买的云算力的算力大小即是头寸大小对应的合约指数的算力大小。例如比特币挖矿合约指数使用1T Hash/s作为算力单位，则购买(1 / _Multiplier_)个多头代币就相当于购买了1T Hash/s的云算力。由于这些算力收益合约的指数下限都是0，所以多头永远没有爆仓问题，非常类似于挖矿。 212 | 213 | ### 4.6 投机 214 | 215 | 算力收益合约构建了一个双边市场。在这一市场中，可以做多或做空算力收益。投资者可以出于投机目的进入合约多头，成为挖矿对冲者的对手方。只要能建立挖矿难度增长的准确估计，就可以通过为挖矿承担风险的方式投机获利。 216 | 217 | ### 4.7 为杠杆交易配资 218 | 219 | 对于远期交割的算力收益合约，由于指数波动较大，为了防止指数触达合约上下限，往往需要设置较大范围指数上下限，这样设置合约，会使得无论合约空头代币还是多头代币都需要在Market Protocol中质押相对多的保证金，进而表现为空头和多头代币价格都很高，从而减少了资金利用率。尤其是当用于挖矿对冲的时候，投资人已经花费大量资金在购买矿机上，如果对冲远期风险还需要占用大量资金，则会大大减低投资人的对冲欲望。为此，我们也引入了浮动保证金机制（例如dydx）。 220 | 221 | 在浮动保证金机制下，出现了一种专门为杠杆交易配资以赚取无风险利息收益的业务模式。投资人在Market Protocol中创建合约代币对，但投资人不在市场上交易这些头寸代币，而是始终维持净头寸为0。配资投资人把多头代币和空头代币都出借到dydx等融资平台的资金池中。当需要浮动保证金杠杆交易的交易员从dydx中贷出多头代币或空头代币时，配资投资人可以获得利息收益。 222 | 223 | ### 4.8 做市商 224 | 任何双边市场都可以存在做市商。做市商通过为市场提供流动性并承担做市风险而获利。由于头寸代币是标准的ERC20代币，所有现有的加密货币做市商机制都可以引入进来。做市商可以通过观察订单薄进行低卖高卖的策略做市获利，也可以通过创建头寸代币对，并质押到Uniswap等自动化做市合约中做市获利。 225 | 226 | ## 5. 定价 227 | 算力收益合约是一种全新的算力衍生品，对其进行定价的方式尚待探索。这里介绍几种简单的技术指标。希望这些指标有助于交易方对合约定价。 228 | 229 | ### 5.1 隐含难度 230 | 每个合约的价格都隐含了一个预期的1T算力日均挖矿收益。隐含挖矿收益(Implied Earnings)可以由以下两个公式计算： 231 | 232 | 233 | 234 | 235 | 236 | 从隐含挖矿收益可以计算出对应的隐含挖矿难度。隐含挖矿难度（Implied Difficulty）由以下公式计算： 237 | 238 | 239 | 240 | 其中，_K_ 是2.1.1中指数公式使用的 _K_ 值。 241 | 242 | 例子：引用4.1中的例子，在2019年5月1日时，难度为6.35T对应的BMI14指数为3.95E-5, 补充隐含难度和隐含难度增长率（见5.2） 243 | 244 | 合约头寸代币 | 市场价 | 隐含挖矿收益 | 隐含难度 | 隐含难度增长率 245 | ----------------------|---------|------------------|----------|---------------- 246 | LBME28-300-500-190526 | 8 WBTC | 38 BTC / 1T\*24H | 6.62T | 2.82% 247 | SBME28-300-500-190526 | 12 WBTC | 38 BTC / 1T\*24H | 6.62T | 2.82% 248 | LBME84-200-400-190716 | 12 WBTC | 32 BTC / 1T\*24H | 7.86T | 6.46% 249 | SBME84-200-400-190716 | 8 WBTC | 32 BTC / 1T\*24H | 7.86T | 6.46% 250 | 251 | 交易员可以对未来一段时间的难度变化进行预测，并给出一个隐含难度的推断值，从而倒推出自己的对应出价。 252 | 253 | ### 5.2 隐含难度增长率 254 | 算力收益指数中引用了一组连续的难度数据，而难度总在变化。合约的市场价也反应了对这种变化的预测。隐含难度增长率（Implied Difficulty Growth Rate, 简写为IDGR）是从合约价格反推出的每次难度调整后难度的平均增长率。隐含难度增长率与隐含挖矿收益之间具有以下关系： 255 | 256 | 257 | 258 | 其中， 259 | - _K_ 和 _T_ 都是2.1.1中指数公式使用的值 260 | - _Difficulty0_ 是合约到期前倒数第T+1次难度调整后的难度 261 | 262 | 将上式代入隐含难度公式可以得到隐含难度和隐含难度增长率之间的关系为： 263 | 264 | 265 | 266 | 当T较大时，无法从隐含难度轻易求出隐含难度增长率的解析解，此时可以通过牛顿迭代法求其数值解。 267 | 268 | 示例见5.1中的例子。 269 | 270 | 交易员可以通过预测一个合理的隐含难度增长率进而计算出相应的合约价格。 271 | 272 | ### 5.3 分解定价法 273 | 由于合约的指数只与难度相关，通过逐个预测未知的难度周期的挖矿难度，可以推算出相应的交割指数，从而对头寸代币进行定价。 274 | 275 | 通过一个例子来说明这一方法。在2019年5月20日，用分解定价法对LBME84-200-400-190716进行定价。注意此时该合约周期内有6次难度调整，在5月20日已经进行过2次难度调整，我们通过分别预测另外4次难度调整对该合约定价。下表给出了几个不同的预测数据及对应的代币价格： 276 | 277 | 278 | 难度1|难度2|预测难度3|预测难度4|预测难度5|预测难度6|预测交割指数|代币价格 279 | -----|-----|---------|---------|---------|---------|------------|-------- 280 | 6.7|6.7|6.9|7.1|7.3|7.9|3.55E-05|15.5 281 | 6.7|6.7|7.4|7.6|7.9|8.3|3.40E-05|14.0 282 | 6.7|6.7|6.5|6.4|6.3|6.2|3.89E-05|18.9 283 | 284 | _上表中难度单位为T_ 285 | 286 | 287 | 288 | ## 6. 社区介绍 289 | 290 | ## 7. 致谢 291 | 292 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /research/hashrate-derivative-en.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | **Open request for comments. Please refer to [Issues](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues) for most updated discussions, and post your questions and comments as an Issue. You may follow the best practice set by reviewer @anthonyleezhang in this brilliant thread of dicussion on Issue #39 [Thoughts on MARKET vs UMA protocols](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/39) .** 2 | 3 | # Tokenized Synthetic PoW Mining Contract 4 | 5 | ## 1. Motivation 6 | 7 | Crypto mining has become a sizable market. In 2018, a total of over US$ 9 billion worth of Proof-of-Work coins/tokens were distributed to miners as block rewards and transaction fees. Crypto mining often requires upfront capex investment to purchase hardware in order to receive certain amount of cryptocurrency as reward. There is significant risk involved in mining investment. Aside from operational risk in the construction and maintenance of mining and power facility, adverse weather condition and policy risks, there are two major risks associated with crypto mining: market price of cryptocurrencies and the fluctuation of network mining difficulties. 8 | 9 | There are financial instruments readily available to hedge against the market price movements of cryptocurrencies, such as the CME Bitcoin futures. Our goal is to provide miners and other market participants instruments with exposure to the volatility of mining difficulties, enabling them to hedge against the underlying risks. 10 | 11 | In Proof-of-Work mining, block rewards are specified by the protocol, and the total amount can be considered as fixed over a period of time. More miners joining the network will drive up the network hashrate, leading to a higher difficulty level of mining, which would in turn reduce the economic return of mining investment. 12 | 13 | The current crypto mining market is inefficient. Absence of instruments to express forward-looking views without direct exposure, investors have only two choices: 1. Taking an illiquid long position via invest in mining hardware or mining operation; 2. Choose to sit out by not investing. 14 | 15 | Miners sometimes resort to selling "cloud mining" contracts as an imperfect hedge against both difficulty and price movements. Typical cloud mining contracts require investors to pay to the issuer (cloud mining platform or a miner) in full upfront and receive a stream of cashflow over an indefinite period of time. It is a proxy for non-miners to gain indirect exposure to mining cashflow, while miners can offload some of the systematic risks. However, this instrument subjects investors to significant counterparty risks, and has been hotbed for scams. 16 | 17 | Lack of effective instrument leaves miners unhedged in the wild swings in mining return. Miners tend to rush to market as coin price rises, driving up network difficulty which in turn results in less coins mined; as cryptocurrency prices fall, declining mining revenue may not cover the operational costs denominated in fiat, and the already illiquid mining assets becomes even harder to liquidate, leaving miners with little downside protection. 18 | 19 | We hereby propose the Tokenized Synthetic PoW Mining Contract, which offers token holders synthetic exposure to mining payoff. Through trading this instrument, miners can hedge against difficulty, investors can be rewarded for bearing the risk. By filling in a market void via decoupling risks associated with network difficulty from that of market price of cryptocurrency, POW Mining Contract Tokens enable a more efficient mining market, and unlock possibilities of creating more crypto-native financial products that serve the blockchain infrastructure. 20 | 21 | 22 | ## 2. Contract Specification 23 | 24 | After analysis across DeFi stack, and considering the various stages of development of existing derivatives protocols, the following contract is designed based upon [Market Protocol](https://marketprotocol.io). 25 | 26 | ### 2.1 Synthetic BTC Mining Contract 27 | #### 2.1.1 Index 28 | 29 | ##### Design Considerations 30 | - The index MUST has a clear physical meaning. 31 | - The index SHOULD be relative to the mining difficulty only, which makes the index easy to predict. 32 | - The index SHOULD make the contract easy for miners(hedgers) to trade. Thus, the miners could hedge the mining risk of a period of time by entering a position of this contract. 33 | - The index SHOULD be comparable with some well-known number, such as the numbers in btc.com 34 | 35 | ##### Naming 36 | The index names "BTC Mining Earnings N days Index", shorts for _BME{N}_, for example BME28, BME84 and so on. 37 | 38 | ##### Meaning 39 | The BTC Mining Earnings Index (_BME_) represents **average daily bitcoins mined with 1T/s hashrate over the last N days**. 40 | 41 | 1T = 1012 42 | 43 | ##### Formula 44 | _BME_ is calculated as following: 45 | 46 | 47 | 48 | Where: 49 | - **_T_** represents the number of difficulty adjustments during N days. **Let T=N/14** 50 | - **_Difficultyi_** represents the value of difficulty after the i-th last difficulty adjustment 51 | - **_Ki_** is a scaling factor calculated as below: 52 | 53 | 54 | 55 | Parameter | Value | Note 56 | ------| -----|------- 57 | _HashrateUnit_ | 10 12 Hash/s | 1T hash | 58 | _TargetBlockTime_ | 600 s | Target block time for bitcoin is fixed at 10 minutes 59 | _Coinbasei_ | 12.5 BTC per Block | The block reward at i-th last mining difficulty adjustment.
Block reward halves every 21,000 blocks. 60 | _NBlock_ | 144 | Number of blocks per day 61 | **_Ki_**| **251457095** | havles as _Coinbasei_ halves 62 | 63 | ##### Notes 64 | - As the difficulty adjusts every 2016 blocks, which is roughly 14 days, the N of the index is set to be a multiple of 14. 65 | - The index is changed whenever the difficulty adjusts before next block reward halves. 66 | - The index is comparable with the "mining earnings" of btc.com. Especially, BME14 should be the same with the "mining earnings" of btc.com 67 | 68 | ##### Examples 69 | Height | Time | Difficulty | BME14 | BME28 | BME84 70 | --------| --------------------|-------------------|-----------|-----------|-------- 71 | 572,544 | 2019-04-21 09:54:28 | 6,353,030,562,983 | 3.958E-05 |   |   72 | 574,560 | 2019-05-04 16:32:13 | 6,702,169,884,349 | 3.752E-05 | 3.855E-05 |   73 | 576,576 | 2019-05-18 16:31:36 | 6,704,632,680,587 | 3.750E-05 | 3.751E-05 |   74 | 578,592 | 2019-05-31 06:43:04 | 7,459,680,720,542 | 3.371E-05 | 3.561E-05 |   75 | 580,608 | 2019-06-14 09:03:50 | 7,409,399,249,090 | 3.394E-05 | 3.382E-05 |   76 | 582,624 | 2019-06-27 10:59:30 | 7,934,713,219,630 | 3.169E-05 | 3.281E-05 | 3.566E-05 77 | 584,640 | 2019-07-09 17:17:48 | 9,064,159,826,491 | 2.774E-05 | 2.972E-05 | 3.368E-05 78 | 79 | More [BME Data](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/blob/master/research/BME.md) 80 | 81 | #### 2.1.2 Index Cap & Floor 82 | 83 | According to Market Protocol's design, each Synthetic BTC Mining Contract will specify its valid range, _Cap_ represents the upper bound, and _Floor_ represents the lower bound. Index reaching the upper or lower bound prior to expiration will trigger contract settlement. 84 | 85 | Two principles to consider when setting the index range: 86 | - In order to reduce the demand for margin and increase leverage, a smaller index range is preferred. 87 | - On the other hand, a relatively safe (wide) index range will be set to prevent the early settelment triggered if the index reaches the bounds early. 88 | 89 | #### 2.1.3 Contract Size 90 | 91 | The value of one contract = Multiplier * The index value 92 | 93 | Multiplier = 106 WBTC 94 | 95 | #### 2.1.4 Expiration 96 | 97 | Each Synthetic BTC Mining Contract will specify an expiration date. The contract expires at 02:00:00 (UTC) on the expiration date. In order to avoid the impact of block time volatility, the expiration time is usually choosen to be 7 days after the estimated time of a difficulty adjustment. According to the requirement of Market Protocol, the expired contract can be settled one day after expiration. 98 | 99 | #### 2.1.5 Settlement 100 | 101 | At settlement, Market Protocol smart contract will send WBTC to addresses that hold contract position tokens. Long token holder will receive ( _BME_ - _Floor_ ) * _Multiplier_ in WBTC per Contract, short token holder will receive ( _Cap_ - _BME_ ) * _Multiplier_ in WBTC per Contract. 102 | 103 | #### 2.1.6 Margin 104 | 105 | Issuer of the Tokenized Synthetic BTC Mining Contract needs to send ( _Cap_ - _Floor_ ) * _Multiplier_ amount in WBTC to the Market Protocol smart contract as collateral in order to mint contract position tokens. Contract positions are fully collateralized with no need to top up margins prior to settlement. 106 | 107 | #### 2.1.7 Naming Convention for Contract Position Tokens 108 | 109 | \BME\-\-\-\ 110 | 111 | - L: long position 112 | - S: short position 113 | - N: N days of the index 114 | - Floor: index lower bound, in the unit of 1E-7 115 | - Cap: index upper bound, in the unit of 1E-7 116 | - YYMMDD: Date of exiration 117 | 118 | Example: SBME84-250-300-190718 token corresponds to a short position on a Synthetic BTC Mining Contract with BME84 Index valid range of [2.50E-5, 3.00E-5], expires on 02:00:00(UTC) at 2019/07/18. 119 | 120 | ## 3. Smart Contract Stack 121 | 122 | Synthetic PoW Mining Contract token issuance, trading, on-chain collateralization, and settlement are executed via smart contracts enforced by ethereum blockchain consensus. Trust is minimized in the process, which lowers the entry barrier for trading and improves liquidity. 123 | 124 | ### 3.1 Tokenization Layer 125 | 126 | Issuers can easily issue Synthetic PoW Mining Contract by minting position tokens via [Market Protocol](https://marketprotocol.io) and traders can easily build up long or short positions by buying these position tokens, which are standard ERC20s that can be stored off-exchange in user wallets and are tradeable on both centralized and decentralized exchanges. 127 | 128 | Contract issuers mint sets of long and short position tokens pairs by sending collateral to Market Protocol smart contracts according to contract specifications. Once minted, contract issuers is market neutral by holding both long and short position tokens. For each contract, the outstanding long position tokens will be equal to short position tokens, as in pairs. Issuer wishing to enter into long position can sell its short position tokens, and vice versa. 129 | 130 | Traders can buy position tokens to gain long or short exposure without becoming an issuer. Holders of position tokens can close the position and take profit any time by selling the tokens in the market without having to wait till settlement at contract expiration. 131 | 132 | The contract specifications pre-define the cap and floor of the Index, and issuer pays full collateral according to the position ranges, there will be no liquidation prior to expiration as long as the Index falls within the ranges. To provide effective hedges for actual mining, miners would prefer not to face arbitrary liquidation prior to expiration. Position ranges in contract specifications must be defined wide enough to cover volatility in difficulty. 133 | 134 | Although contracts are fully collateralized upon issuance, the position range specification provides implicit leverage. When Index fluctuates, the rate of change in contract positions often will exceed that of the Index. The amount of leverage depends on the width of the position ranges relative to the Index, and the price of the position relative to the price range. 135 | 136 | Example 1. The BME84 Index is at 5.52E-5 now, Carboclan Community specifies a new Synthetic BTC Mining Contract will expire in 84 days later. The contract specifications are as follow: 137 | - Cap: 6.00E-5 138 | - Floor: 4.50E-5 139 | - Expiration: 2019-05-11 02:00:00 UTC 140 | 141 | Alice would like to mint 1.0 units of contract position token pair. She sends (6E-5 - 4.5E-5) * 1E6 * 1.0 = 15WBTC to the Market smart contract as collateral, and minted 1.0 long position token and 1.0 short position token. A long token is worth (5.52E-5 - 4.50E-5) * 1e6 = 10.2 WBTC, a short token is worth (6.00E-5 - 5.52E-5) * 1e6 = 4.8 WBTC. 142 | 143 | Later on, the Index falls to 5.50E-5, a long token is worth (5.50E-5 - 4.50E-5) * 1E6 = 10 WBTC, a short token is worth (6.00E-5 - 5.50E-5) * 1E6 = 5 WBTC. Alice would like to enter into a short position, so she lists her 1.0 long position in the market. Bob would like to enter into a long position, so he bought the 1.0 long position token, at a price of 9.8 WBTC. Bob paid to Alice 9.8 WBTC and received 1.0 long token. 144 | 145 | While the actual price of the position token may be above or below the Index, in this example actual price of the long position token (9.8 WBTC) may be priced below the theoretical price (10 WBTC) calculated from the current Index, which may be caused by market expectation that the Index may drop further by expiration. On the other hand, while Index drops (5.52E-5 - 5.50E-5) / 5.52E-5 = 0.36%, but theoretical price for the long position token calculated from the Index drops (10.2 - 10) / 10.2 = 1.9%, which reflects 5.28 implicit leverage from the Index floor. 146 | 147 | The contract expires on 2019-05-11 02:00:00 UTC and can be settled 1 day later. The Index is at 5.25E-5. Market Protocol smart contract pays Bob (5.25E-5 - 4.50E-5) * 1E6 * 1.0 = 7.5 WBTC, and (6.00E-5 - 5.25E-5) * 1E6 * 1.0 = 7.5 WBTC to short position token owner Alice. Alice's earnings: -15 + 9.8 + 7.5 = 2.3 WBTC, Bob's earnings: -9.8 + 7.5 = -2.3 WBTC. 148 | 149 | ### 3.2 Oracle 150 | Market Protocol relies on oracle to provide the Index for settlement. Oracle is the only part in the entire system that is not completely decentralized. 151 | 152 | Calculating BME requires off-chain data. Bitcoin mining difficulty data needs to be obtained from third party provider. The difficulty data is then processed by the oracle smart contract. The good news is that bitcoin mining difficulty only change every 14 days on average. Since the difficulty data is recorded on the bitcoin chain, all people can validate the authenticity of the data. 153 | 154 | ### 3.3 Trading Layer 155 | 156 | Since the position tokens issued by Market Protocol are fully collateralized and fit ERC-20 standard, the position tokens can be traded on any centralized exchange (i.e. Binance and Bitstamp), and decentralized exchanges (i.e. 0x and Uniswap). Thus, tokenized Synthetic PoW Mining Contract is readily tradeable without having to develop new infrastructure or technology. 157 | 158 | ### 3.4 Variable Margin Layer 159 | 160 | In 3.1 we’ve already analyzed the implicit leverage of the Market Protocol. However, when the Index fluctuates significantly, in order for the Index not to touch the cap or floor, the Index range needs to be set wider, which leads to a higher collateral ratio and lower leverage (capital utilization rate). 161 | 162 | Short-term mining contracts (i.e 30 days) have less fluctuation. Therefore, the Index range is narrow and Market Protocol itself enables enough implicit leverage. However, long-term mining contracts (i.e 180 days) could fluctuate more than 100%, the fully collateralized method of Market Protocol will be capital inefficient. 163 | 164 | Therefore, a variable margin layer could be introduced on top of the position token. The variable margin layer has such characteristic that a certain margin ratio is set according to the market price of the position. Margins only need to cover fluctuation in the short run and cannot cover the entire position. When the margin ratio drops due to market price change, margin calls can be issued to the party lacking margin to cover further market movement. On the other hand, if the margin ratio increases to more than necessary, the excess margin can be withdrawn from the margin account to realize the profit. Such a variable margin system lowers the margin requirement and increase capital efficiency. 165 | 166 | A few DeFi protocols (i.e. dydx, bzx) can enable variable margin function. User can borrow token from dydx. Lender can deposit token A to the token pool of the smart contract. Borrower mortgages token B to create margin account and borrow token A from the token pool. The token A he borrowed is sold for token B. The token B he bought is again mortgaged into the margin account so that he can borrow more token A to be sold. The leveraged short on token A is now complete. 167 | 168 | On the contrary, lender could deposit Token B to the token pool of the smart contract. Borrower mortgage Token A to create margin account and borrow Token B from the token pool. The Token B he borrowed is sold for Token A. Token A he bought is again mortgaged into the margin account so that he can borrow more Token B and exchange for Token A. A leveraged long postion on Token A is now complete. 169 | 170 | Dydx supports a maximum leverage of 4x. When the price of the mortgaged token drops relative to the borrowed token, margin could drop to an insufficient amount. If the borrower cannot deposit enough collateral to meet the margin requirement in time, forced liquidation could occur. Variable margin is thus functional. 171 | 172 | At the moment, dydx or bzx do not fully support position tokens from Market Protocol, more integration work still needs to be done. 173 | 174 | 175 | ## 4. Use Cases 176 | 177 | Tokenized Synthetic PoW Mining Contract has multiple use cases. 178 | 179 | ### 4.1 Risk Exposure 180 | 181 | Before purchasing mining rigs and start mining, investors need to estimate ROI. Purchasing mining rigs is a onetime investment. Electricity cost for mining is relatively stable as well. Therefore, investment for mining can be considered fixed over some period of time. The only factors affecting mining return is the price movement of the underlying coin(s) mined and their mining difficulties. Various financial product (futures, perpetual swaps and options) can be utilized to hedge against price fluctuation. Synthetic POW Mining Contract fills the market void by providing a financial instrument with exposure to risks associated with mining difficulty fluctuation. Investors could observe the market price for mining contract of various terms, reflecting market’s collective projection on mining earnings, similar to that of the term structure of interest rates or that of the volatility surface of options. 182 | 183 | i.e On May 1st, 2019, BME14 Index is 3.95E-5. The following table indicates the market price for Tokenized Synthetic PoW Mining Contracts in various terms. 184 | 185 | Contract position token | Expiration date | Market price | Implied mining earnings 186 | ------------------------|-----------------|---------------|----- 187 | LBME28-300-500-190526 | 19-05-26 | 8 WBTC | 3.8E-5 BTC / 1T\*24H 188 | SBME28-300-500-190526 | 19-05-26 | 12 WBTC | 3.8E-5 BTC / 1T\*24H 189 | LBME84-200-400-190716 | 19-07-16 | 12 WBTC | 3.2E-5 BTC / 1T\*24H 190 | SBME84-200-400-190716 | 19-07-16 | 8 WBTC | 3.2E-5 BTC / 1T\*24H 191 | 192 | Long position token prices reflect market view on expected average daily mining earnings within 1T hash/s during N days before the contract expires. The implied mining earnings = the market price of the long position token / _Multiplier_ + the floor of the index. 193 | The market believes that under same amount of hashrate, the mining earnings will gradually decrease. Investors could figure out that expected mining earnings gradually decreases, thereby estimating their own mining ROI more rationally. 194 | 195 | ### 4.2 Hedging 196 | 197 | The synthetic POW mining contract can hedge mining risks in addition to revealing them. Similarly, we set aside the cryptocurrency price movement here, since there already exist derivatives for price hedges. Investors could enter a short position in said contract to hedge difficulty related risks when mining. When difficulty goes up, mining earnings goes down, the profit on the short position could negate the decrease in actual mining earnings. When difficulty goes down, mining earnings goes up, the loss on the short position could negate the increase in actual mining earnings. The hedging process thus locked in mining earnings. The earnings is (cap of the Index * _Multiplier_ - the price when entering the position). 198 | 199 | For example, on May 1st, 2019, Alice purchased a batch of mining rigs that clocks 100T hash/s. She wanted to lock in mining earnings for the next 6 mining difficulty adjustment cycles (about 84 days, from 2019-5-4 to 2019-7-27). Therefore, Alice purchased 100 * 84 / 1E6 = 0.0084 short position tokens of SBME84-200-400-190716. The following table reflects her P&L. 200 | 201 | Position Token | Entry Price | Index when settled | P&L / Token | Position P&L | Mining income | Comprehensive income 202 | ---------------------|:-----------:|:------------------:|:------------:|:--------------:|:-------------:|:-------------------: 203 | SBME84-200-400-190716| 8 | 3.36E-5 | -1.6 | -0.01344 | 0.28224 | 0.26880 204 | SBME84-200-400-190716| 8 | 2.86E-5 | 3.4 | 0.02856 | 0.24024 | 0.26880 205 | 206 | _\* Currency in above table is WBTC_ 207 | 208 | ### 4.3 Fixed-income Investment 209 | 210 | The Synthetic POW Mining Contract decouples risks from mining difficulty fluctuation and risks from underlying price movements, thereby enabling new financial instruments such as fixed income products. Investors can at the same time purchase or lease physical mining rigs and start mining, and entering short positions to hedge risks regarding difficulty. If the investor’s base currency is USD, then he could also enter a short position in futures to hedge away exchange rate risk. The above-mentioned portfolio could be structured into a fixed income product with streams of cashflows, which would allow for major capital injection into the mining space. Fixed-income investors are required to manage the mining farm and mining rigs so that the mining operation runs smoothly. Their role is pivotal in connecting the synthetic mining derivatives and physical mining operations. 211 | 212 | ### 4.4 Finance Leasing 213 | 214 | The major pain point for miners has been the lack of capital for expansion. Due to the difficulty of hedging mining risk, there is little incentive for lenders to provide capital to miners. Miners now can lease mining capacity to risk-free fixed income investors on demand, or mortgage the rigs to lenders so that they can receive cashflow and expand. Capital provider could require the borrowers to enter short position in both mining contract and token exchange rate, thereby stabilize their projected cashflows and increase their ability to repay loans. 215 | 216 | ### 4.5 Cloud Mining 217 | 218 | A synthetic cloud mining service can be easily built upon the mining contract. The synthetic cloud mining service targets users who already understand how cloud mining works. 219 | 220 | Traditionally, investing in cloud mining has the following economic model: User invests a certain amount of money to purchase cloud mining capacity and receives mining earnings (netted of maintainence fees) daily in the period following the investment. The investor hopes that the total return would be greater than the initial investment. Disregarding token exchange rate fluctuation (or fully hedging exchange rate), cloud mining return only depends on mining difficulty. 221 | 222 | Mining contract can easily realize the above process: User purchases an array of same-sized long positions of mining contract that settle in chronological order, with the lower bound of the Index being 0. This process is very similar to cloud mining. The user will receive settlement amount from the mining contract in chronological order. The process of receiving the earnings mimics mining cashflow. The amount of hashrate user purchased corresponds to the long position of the Index. For example, the bitcoin mining contract use 1T hash/s as the basic unit. Therefore, purchasing (1 / _Multiplier_) long position tokens is equivalent to purchasing 1T hash/s of cloud mining capacity. Since the lower bound of the Index is 0, long position will never be liquidated, which is similar to mining. 223 | 224 | 225 | ### 4.6 Speculation 226 | 227 | Synthetic PoW Mining Contract forms a two-sided market. In this market, an investor could long or short PoW Mining Index. If the investor chooses to enter into a long position, then he/she effectively becomes the counterparty of the hedging miner, and should be rewarded for bearing mining difficulty risks. 228 | 229 | ### 4.7 Margin Funding 230 | 231 | For longer-term mining contracts, the Index could fluctuate in a wider range. In order for the Index not to touch the boundaries, the boundaries need to be set to a wider range. Thus, more collateral is needed in the Market Protocol smart contract for both long and short tokens, and drives up both tokens’ price, in turn reducing capital efficiency. The market for hedging could also go down if both fixed investment for mining rigs and hedging require large amount of capital commitment. Therefore, we introduce variable margin via margin protocols such as dydx's. 232 | 233 | Under variable margin, a new business model arises. Lenders can fund margin traders and gain risk free earnings. Investors or market makers create long/short token pairs via Market Protocol smart contract. They do not trade the tokens but maintain net position neutral. Margin funding lenders can lend both long and short tokens to the liquidity pool of financing platform like dydx. When margin traders borrow long or short token from dydx, margin funding lenders can gain risk-free interests. 234 | 235 | ### 4.8 Market Maker 236 | 237 | Market maker exists in all two-sided markets. Market maker makes profit by providing liquidity and bear market making risks. Since position tokens are all standard ERC-20 tokens. All market making mechanisms in the crypto world could be recalibrated to be utilized in this market. Market makers can follow the traditional buy-low, sell-high strategy by observing the orderbook. They can also profit from creating position token pairs and lend it to automatic liquidity pool like Uniswap. 238 | 239 | ## 5. Pricing 240 | Synthetic PoW Mining Contract is a new hashrate derivative, and the way to price it remains to be explored. Here are a few simple technical indicators. It is hoped that these indicators will help the counterparty to price the contract. 241 | 242 | ### 5.1 Implied Difficulty 243 | The price of each contract implies an expected daily average mining earnings within 1T/s hashrate. Implied Earnings can be calculated by the following two formulas: 244 | 245 | 246 | 247 | 248 | 249 | From the implied earnings, the corresponding implied difficulty can be calculated. The implied difficulty is calculated by the following formula: 250 | 251 | 252 | 253 | Where _K_ is the _K_ used by the formula in 2.1.1. 254 | 255 | Example: Referring to the example in 4.1, on May 1, 2019, the difficulty is 6.35T and the BMI14 index corresponding is 3.95E-5. The table below shows the implied difficulty and implied difficulty growth rate (IDGR, see 5.2). 256 | 257 | Position Token | Market Price | Implied Earnings | Implied Difficulty | IDGR 258 | ----------------------|--------------|------------------|--------------------|-------- 259 | LBME28-300-500-190526 | 8 WBTC | 38 BTC / 1T\*24H | 6.62T | 2.82% 260 | SBME28-300-500-190526 | 12 WBTC | 38 BTC / 1T\*24H | 6.62T | 2.82% 261 | LBME84-200-400-190716 | 12 WBTC | 32 BTC / 1T\*24H | 7.86T | 6.46% 262 | SBME84-200-400-190716 | 8 WBTC | 32 BTC / 1T\*24H | 7.86T | 6.46% 263 | 264 | Traders can predict the change of difficulty over time and give an predicted value of the implied difficulty, thus launching their corresponding bid. 265 | 266 | ### 5.2 Implied Difficulty Growth Rate 267 | The calculation of the BME index refers to a set of continuous difficulty data. The market price of the contract also reflects the prediction of the change of difficulty. Implied Difficulty Growth Rate (IDGR) is the average growth rate of difficulty after each difficulty adjustment implied from the contract price. The relationship between implied difficulty growth rate and implied mining earnings has the following relationship: 268 | 269 | 270 | 271 | Where, 272 | - _K_ and _T_ are the values used by the formula in 2.1.1 273 | - _Difficulty0_ is the difficulty after the T+1th last difficulty adjustment before the contract expires 274 | 275 | Substituting the above formula into the implicit difficulty formula can give the relationship between the implied difficulty and the implied difficulty growth rate as: 276 | 277 | 278 | 279 | When T is large, the analytical solution of the implied difficulty growth rate cannot be easily obtained from the implicit difficulty. At this time, the numerical solution can be obtained by Newton iteration method. 280 | 281 | See the example in 5.1 for an example. 282 | 283 | Traders can calculate the corresponding contract price by predicting a reasonable implied difficulty growth rate. 284 | 285 | ### 5.3 Decomposition pricing 286 | Since the index of the contract is only related to the difficulty, by predicting the mining difficulties of the feture difficulty cycles one by one, the corresponding predicted settlement index can be derived to price the position token. 287 | 288 | An example is used to illustrate this method. On May 20, 2019, LBME84-200-400-190716 is priced using a decomposition pricing method. Note that there are 6 difficulty adjustments in the contract period at this time, and 2 difficulty adjustments have been made before May 20th. We will price the contract by separately predicting another 4 difficulty adjustments. The table below gives several different forecast data and corresponding token prices: 289 | 290 | 291 | Difficulty 1|Difficulty 2|Predicted Difficulty 3|Predicted Difficulty 4|Predicted Difficulty 5|Predicted Difficulty 6|Predicted Settlement Index|Price 292 | ----|-----|--------|---------|--------|--------|-----------|-------- 293 | 6.7|6.7|6.9|7.1|7.3|7.9|3.55E-05|15.5 294 | 6.7|6.7|7.4|7.6|7.9|8.3|3.40E-05|14.0 295 | 6.7|6.7|6.5|6.4|6.3|6.2|3.89E-05|18.9 296 | 297 | _The difficulty unit in the above table is T (1012)_ 298 | 299 | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------