├── README.md ├── etc ├── L3X_SAST_Report.html ├── L3X_SAST_Report_Rust.html ├── Solidity-Ethereum_L3X_SAST_Report.html ├── de.png ├── exec.png ├── patterns-eth-solidity.md ├── patterns-rust.md ├── patterns-sol.md └── report.gif └── l3x ├── .gitignore ├── Cargo.toml └── src ├── gpt_validator.rs ├── main.rs ├── report_generator.rs └── vulnerability_checks.rs /README.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # L3X - AI-driven Static Analyzer 2 | 3 | L3X detects vulnerabilities in Rust and Solidity code based on patterns and AI code analysis. Various LLMs act as validators for vulnerabilities detected by patterns and validate each other's results in AI code analysis. Vulnerabilities are confirmed when they receive confirmation from a majority of validators. As a result, a report with validated vulnerabilities and detected safe patterns is generated. 4 | 5 | ## Supported Languages and Smart Contracts: 6 | 7 | - General Rust code 8 | - Rust-based Solana smart contracts 9 | - Solidity-based Ethereum smart contracts 10 | 11 | ## Design 12 | 13 |  14 | 15 | ## How It Works 16 | 17 | - **Vulnerability Patterns Code Analysis:** Check the rules: 18 | - [Rust-General](etc/patterns-rust.md) 19 | - [Rust-Solana](etc/patterns-sol.md) 20 | - [Solidity-Ethereum](etc/patterns-eth-solidity.md) 21 | - **AI Code Analysis:** Analysis of smart contract code for vulnerabilities using Language Model validators (LLMs). 22 | - **LLM Validators:** Potential vulnerabilities detected are passed on to multiple LLM validators for confirmation. Three different models are utilized: GPT-4, Gemini, and Claude 2. 23 | - **Validation Process:** Each validator independently assesses potential vulnerabilities. Detected vulnerabilities undergo a validation check. 24 | - **Decision Making:** 25 | - **Valid:** A vulnerability is confirmed as valid when at least two LLM validators agree. 26 | - **False Positive:** A finding is marked as a false positive when identified as such by at least two validators. 27 | - **Cross-Validation:** Each LLM performs a cross-validation check during the AI Code Analysis phase. 28 | - **Report Generation:** A report is generated that compiles all confirmed vulnerabilities, with duplicates removed. 29 | 30 | ## Current limitations 31 | 32 | > Currently it's MVP 33 | 34 | 1. Vulnerabilities detects only based on vuln patterns 35 | 2. GPT-3.5/4 act as validators for vulnerabilities detected by patterns 36 | 37 | ## LLM supported 38 | 39 | - GPT-3.5 40 | - GPT-4 41 | - Claude (Soon) 42 | - Gemini (Planned) 43 | 44 | ## Set API Keys 45 | 46 | Set the openai api key as an environment variable OPENAI_KEY in your operating system 47 | 48 | Linux/Mac 49 | 50 | ```bash 51 | export OPENAI_KEY=sk-ApiKeyExample 52 | ``` 53 | 54 | Windows 55 | 56 | ```bash 57 | set OPENAI_KEY=sk-ApiKeyExample 58 | ``` 59 | 60 | If you want to specify particular OpenAI org or project, set up `OPENAI_ORG_ID` and `OPENAI_PROJECT_ID` environment variables. 61 | 62 | ## How to Use ❓ 63 | 64 | 1. Build 65 | ```bash 66 | cargo build 67 | ``` 68 | 2. Compile 69 | ```bash 70 | cargo run 71 | ``` 72 | 3. Run 73 | 74 | - By default, only critical and high severity findings are validated. To validate all findings, use the ```--all-severities``` flag. 75 | - To skip vulnerability validation and generate the report without validation, use the ```--no-validation``` flag. 76 | - To specify the OpenAI model to use for vulnerability validation (default is gpt-3.5-turbo), use the ```--model``` flag followed by the model name (e.g., --model=gpt-4). 77 | 78 | ```bash 79 | l3x smart-contracts-folder-to-analyse [--all-severities] [--no-validation] [--model=MODEL] 80 | ``` 81 | 82 | ## Usage Example 🏁 83 | 84 |  85 | 86 |  87 | 88 | [Report example - Rust](https://github.com/VulnPlanet/l3x/blob/main/etc/L3X_SAST_Report_Rust.html) 89 | 90 | [Report example - Solana](https://github.com/VulnPlanet/l3x/blob/main/etc/L3X_SAST_Report.html) 91 | 92 | [Report example - Ethereum](https://github.com/VulnPlanet/l3x/blob/main/etc/Solidity-Ethereum_L3X_SAST_Report.html) 93 | 94 | ## Roadmap 🗓️ 95 | 96 | - ~~Design~~ 97 | - ~~MVP concept~~ 98 | - ~~Rust support~~ 99 | - ~~Solana support~~ 100 | - ~~Solidity support~~ 101 | - ~~GPT-4 Integration~~ 102 | - Claude Integration 🔜 103 | - Gemini Integration 104 | - AI Code Analysis 105 | - AI Code Analysis - Cross-Validation 106 | - Refactor 107 | - Accuracy Comparison 108 | 109 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /etc/L3X_SAST_Report.html: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | 2 | 3 |
4 | 5 | 6 |Technology: Solana
Languange: Rust
Check more on: VulnPlanet
Contribute: GitHub
🟢 GPT 3.5 - Valid or Not possible to determine
62 |🔴 GPT 3.5 - False Positive
63 |ID | 66 |Title | 67 |Status | 68 |Severity | 69 |File | 70 |Description | 71 |Details | 72 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
VULN008 | 75 |Account Signer Check | 76 |🟢 GPT 3.5 | 77 |High | 78 |test-code2/program/src/lib.rs | 79 |Ensure the expected signer account has actually signed to prevent unauthorized account modifications. | 80 |The vulnerability titled 'Account Signer Check' flagged at line number 36 is valid. 81 | 82 | In the provided code, the function `next_account_info` is used to obtain the next account from the iterator `accounts_iter`. However, the function does not verify if the obtained account is signed by the caller. It is crucial to ensure that the account is signed by the caller to prevent unauthorized modifications to the account's data. 83 | 84 | To fix this vulnerability, you should add a signer check for the obtained account. This can be done by modifying the code as follows: 85 | 86 | ```rust 87 | // Get the account that stores greeting count information. 88 | let accounts_iter = &mut accounts.iter(); 89 | let account = next_account_info(accounts_iter)?; 90 | 91 | // Check if the account is signed by the caller 92 | if !account.is_signer { 93 | return Err(ProgramError::MissingRequiredSignature); 94 | } 95 | ``` 96 | 97 | By adding the `if !account.is_signer` check, the program will verify that the obtained account is signed by the caller. If the account is not signed, the function will return `Err(ProgramError::MissingRequiredSignature)`. 98 | 99 | With this fix, the vulnerability will be mitigated, ensuring that only signed accounts can be modified by the program. | 100 |
VULN010 | 102 |Account Owner or Program ID Check | 103 |🟢 GPT 3.5 | 104 |High | 105 |test-code2/program/src/lib.rs | 106 |Verify the owner of state accounts to prevent fake data injection by malicious programs. | 107 |The vulnerability flagged by the SAST tool is valid. 108 | 109 | The flagged line of code is `next_account_info(accounts_iter)?;`. 110 | 111 | The vulnerability is titled 'Account Owner or Program ID Check'. The severity is 'High'. This vulnerability occurs when the program assumes that the next account info in the iterator belongs to the program itself. This assumption is incorrect because the program does not verify the owner of the next account info before accessing it. 112 | 113 | To fix this vulnerability, the program should explicitly check if the next account info belongs to the program or not. This can be done by comparing the owner of the account with the program ID using the `AccountInfo::is_program` method. The fixed code would look like: 114 | 115 | ```rust 116 | let accounts_iter = &mut accounts.iter(); 117 | let account = next_account_info(accounts_iter)?; 118 | 119 | // The account must be owned by the program in order for the 120 | // program to write to it. If that is not the case then the 121 | // program has been invoked incorrectly and we report as much. 122 | if !account.is_program(program_id) { 123 | return Err(ProgramError::IncorrectProgramId); 124 | } 125 | ``` 126 | 127 | By adding the `if !account.is_program(program_id)` check, the program ensures that it only accesses and modifies accounts that are owned by the program itself, avoiding any potential security vulnerabilities. | 128 |
VULN011 | 130 |Account Initialized Check | 131 |🟢 GPT 3.5 | 132 |High | 133 |test-code2/program/src/lib.rs | 134 |Prevent re-initialization of already initialized accounts. | 135 |Based on the provided code and information, it is not possible to determine the validity of the detected vulnerability without additional information about the specific rule or analyzer used by the Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tool. 136 | 137 | However, considering the flagged line of code `try_from_slice(`, it is possible that the SAST tool is highlighting the potential vulnerability related to the deserialization of data using the `try_from_slice` method from the `GreetingAccount` struct. 138 | 139 | To validate the vulnerability, it would be helpful to understand the rule or analyzer used by the SAST tool and the specific reasoning behind flagging this line of code. For example, the tool might be warning about potential buffer overflows or insufficient bounds checking when deserializing the account data. 140 | 141 | To suggest a possible fix, you can ensure that the deserialization process is done safely and with proper bounds checking. Here are some steps you can take to address this: 142 | 143 | 1. Validate the length of the input data before deserialization to avoid potential buffer overflows. 144 | 2. Implement proper error handling and validation when deserializing the data to handle any potential failures. 145 | 3. Consider using a more secure deserialization method, such as using libraries or functions with built-in safety checks, to prevent vulnerabilities like deserialization attacks. 146 | 147 | It is recommended to consult the documentation of the `borsh` library being used for deserialization to ensure the safe usage of the `try_from_slice` method and to understand any specific security considerations or best practices. | 148 |
VULN002 | 150 |Loss of Precision | 151 |🟢 GPT 3.5 | 152 |High | 153 |test-code2/program/src/checked.rs | 154 |The use of try_round_u64() for rounding up may lead to loss of precision. | 155 |Based on the information provided, the vulnerability labeled 'Loss of Precision' with severity 'High' at line number 25 is valid. 156 | 157 | The vulnerability occurs at the following line of code: 158 | 159 | ```rust 160 | let rounded_price = price.try_round_u64().unwrap(); // Loss of precision 161 | ``` 162 | 163 | The try_round_u64() method attempts to round the floating-point number 'price' to an unsigned 64-bit integer. However, this conversion may result in loss of precision, as the floating-point number may have decimal places that cannot be accurately represented in an integer. 164 | 165 | To fix this vulnerability, you can use a different approach for converting the floating-point number to an integer based on your specific requirements. Some possible solutions include: 166 | 167 | 1. Truncation: Use the `as u64` cast to truncate the floating-point number to a 64-bit integer without rounding, if rounding is not important in your context. For example: 168 | 169 | ```rust 170 | let rounded_price = price as u64; 171 | ``` 172 | 173 | 2. Rounding: If you need to round the number, consider using a proper rounding algorithm or library (e.g., the `round` method from the `num` crate) to ensure accurate rounding. For example: 174 | 175 | ```rust 176 | let rounded_price = price.round() as u64; 177 | ``` 178 | 179 | It's important to assess the specific requirements and potential implications of rounding or truncating the value to choose the appropriate approach for your use case. | 180 |
VULN006 | 182 |Error Not Handled | 183 |🟢 GPT 3.5 | 184 |High | 185 |test-code2/program/src/checked.rs | 186 |Function calls that might return `Err` are not checked for errors. | 187 |Based on the provided information and code context, the reported vulnerability titled 'Error Not Handled' at line number 32 is valid. The vulnerability refers to the fact that the error returned by the `transfer` function from the `"spl_token"` crate is not being properly handled. This can lead to unexpected behavior or crashes if the transfer fails. 188 | 189 | To fix this vulnerability, it is necessary to properly handle the potential error returned by the `transfer` function. One possible fix is to use the `?` operator to propagate the error up the call stack and handle it in the caller function. This can be done by changing the code as follows: 190 | 191 | ```rust 192 | let transfer_instruction = spl_token::instruction::transfer( 193 | _program_id, 194 | account.key, 195 | account.key, 196 | &account.key, 197 | &[], 198 | 1000, 199 | )?; // Now propagating the error using the `?` operator 200 | ``` 201 | 202 | By using the `?` operator, the error will be returned as a `ProgramResult` and can be handled appropriately in the `process_instruction` function or any parent function that calls it. 203 | 204 | Please note that there might be other error handling strategies depending on the specific requirements of your application. | 205 |
VULN008 | 207 |Account Signer Check | 208 |🟢 GPT 3.5 | 209 |High | 210 |test-code2/program/src/checked.rs | 211 |Ensure the expected signer account has actually signed to prevent unauthorized account modifications. | 212 |Based on the provided information, the flagged vulnerability titled 'Account Signer Check' at line number 29 appears to be valid and not a false positive. 213 | 214 | The vulnerability arises from the use of the `next_account_info` function without performing a signer check. In Solana, it is important to verify that the account being accessed or manipulated is signed by the appropriate authority. Failing to do so may lead to unauthorized or malicious actions. 215 | 216 | To fix this vulnerability, you should add a signer check before using the account information. Here's an example of how it can be done: 217 | 218 | ```rust 219 | let account_info_iter = &mut accounts.iter(); 220 | let account = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?; 221 | if !account.is_signer { 222 | return Err(ProgramError::MissingRequiredSignature); 223 | } 224 | ``` 225 | 226 | This code first checks if the `account` is a signer by accessing the `is_signer` field. If it is not a signer, an `Err` is returned with the appropriate error code (`MissingRequiredSignature`). Adjust the error code based on your specific needs. 227 | 228 | By incorporating this fix, you ensure that the account being accessed has proper authorization, mitigating the vulnerability. | 229 |
VULN009 | 231 |Account Writable Check | 232 |🟢 GPT 3.5 | 233 |High | 234 |test-code2/program/src/checked.rs | 235 |Ensure state accounts are checked as writable to prevent unauthorized modifications. | 236 |Based on the information provided and the full code context, the flagged vulnerability titled 'Account Writable Check' with severity 'High' at line number 29 in the Rust code file appears to be a valid vulnerability. 237 | 238 | The vulnerability is related to the lack of a signer check for the account obtained from `next_account_info` function. The code does not verify whether the account is signed by a valid signer, which can be a security risk. It is important to ensure that the account being accessed, modified, or used for any critical operations is properly authenticated. 239 | 240 | To fix this vulnerability, you should add a signer check before using the account obtained from `next_account_info`. This can be done using the `is_signer` method available on the `AccountInfo` struct. 241 | 242 | Here's an example of how you can add the signer check: 243 | 244 | ```rust 245 | let account_info_iter = &mut accounts.iter(); 246 | let account = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?; 247 | if !account.is_signer { 248 | return Err(ProgramError::MissingRequiredSignature); 249 | } 250 | // Rest of the code 251 | ``` 252 | 253 | In this example, the code checks if the `account` is a signer by accessing the `is_signer` field of `AccountInfo`. If it is not a signer, the code returns an error (in this case, `ProgramError::MissingRequiredSignature`). Otherwise, the code can proceed with the rest of the operations. 254 | 255 | Adding this signer check ensures that only authorized accounts are used, thereby mitigating potential security risks. | 256 |
VULN010 | 258 |Account Owner or Program ID Check | 259 |🟢 GPT 3.5 | 260 |High | 261 |test-code2/program/src/checked.rs | 262 |Verify the owner of state accounts to prevent fake data injection by malicious programs. | 263 |Based on the provided information and code context, the vulnerability flagged by the SAST tool for the line: 264 | 265 | next_account_info(account_info_iter)? 266 | 267 | appears to be valid. The vulnerability is labeled as 'Account Owner or Program ID Check' with severity 'High'. 268 | 269 | In the given code, the "next_account_info" function is called without checking whether the account is signed, which could lead to security issues. It is essential to verify the signer of the account to ensure that the instructions modifying the account are authorized by the owner. 270 | 271 | To fix this vulnerability, you should add a signer check before using the account. You can modify the code as follows: 272 | 273 | ```rust 274 | let account_info_iter = &mut accounts.iter(); 275 | let account = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?; 276 | if !account.is_signer { 277 | return Err(ProgramError::MissingRequiredSignature); 278 | } 279 | ``` 280 | 281 | This code checks whether the account is a signer, and if not, it returns a `ProgramError::MissingRequiredSignature`. This ensures that only signed accounts are used for modifying account data, preventing unauthorized modifications. | 282 |
VULN022 | 284 |Arbitrary CPI - Anchor | 285 |🟢 GPT 3.5 | 286 |High | 287 |test-code2/program/src/checked.rs | 288 |Unverified target program id in CPI can lead to arbitrary code execution. | 289 |Based on the information provided, the vulnerability titled 'Arbitrary CPI - Anchor' at line number 43 in the Rust code file is valid. The line of code flagged: `solana_program::program::invoke(&transfer_instruction, accounts);` is a potential security issue. 290 | 291 | To fix this vulnerability, you should ensure that the `invoke` function is used with caution and that the external program being invoked is trusted and the call is properly validated and sanitized. Additionally, you should implement appropriate error handling and handle any potential errors returned from the `invoke` function. | 292 |
RUST001 | 294 |Misuse of Unsafe Code | 295 |🟢 GPT 3.5 | 296 |High | 297 |test-code2/program/src/checked.rs | 298 |Unsafe blocks may lead to undefined behavior and memory safety violations if not used carefully. Ensure justification and proper auditing. | 299 |Based on the information provided and the full code context, the flagged vulnerability titled 'Misuse of Unsafe Code' at line number 46 is valid. 300 | 301 | The vulnerability arises from using unsafe code to dereference a raw pointer without proper validation or handling. Dereferencing a raw pointer can lead to undefined behavior, such as accessing invalid memory or causing segmentation faults. 302 | 303 | To fix this vulnerability, it is recommended to avoid using unsafe code when possible and use safe alternatives provided by the Rust language. If there is a legitimate need for using unsafe code, it should be accompanied by rigorous validation and proper error handling to prevent any potential issues. | 304 |
VULN001 | 306 |Integer Overflow or Underflow | 307 |🟢 GPT 3.5 | 308 |High | 309 |test-code2/client/src/client.rs | 310 |Performing arithmetic operation without checking for overflow or underflow. | 311 |The potential vulnerability flagged by the SAST tool appears to be valid. 312 | 313 | The flagged line of code is: 314 | 315 | ```rust 316 | let transaction_fee = fee_calculator.lamports_per_signature * 100; 317 | ``` 318 | 319 | This line of code performs a multiplication operation between `fee_calculator.lamports_per_signature` and the constant value `100`. The potential issue here is that if `fee_calculator.lamports_per_signature` is a large value, the result of the multiplication operation could overflow the maximum value that the data type can hold. 320 | 321 | To fix this vulnerability, you can use checked arithmetic to ensure that the multiplication operation does not result in an overflow. The `checked_mul` function can be used for this purpose. Here's an example of how to fix the code: 322 | 323 | ```rust 324 | let transaction_fee = fee_calculator.lamports_per_signature.checked_mul(100) 325 | .ok_or_else(|| Error::OverflowError)?; 326 | ``` 327 | 328 | In this code, `checked_mul` returns an `Option` that either contains the result of the multiplication or `None` if an overflow occurs. Using `.ok_or_else(|| Error::OverflowError)?` converts the `Option` into a `Result` and raises an `OverflowError` if an overflow occurs. 329 | 330 | By using checked arithmetic, you can prevent potential integer overflow or underflow vulnerabilities in your code. | 331 |
VULN003 | 333 |Inaccurate Calculation Results | 334 |🟢 GPT 3.5 | 335 |High | 336 |test-code2/client/src/utils.rs | 337 |Reliance on saturating arithmetic operations without considering precision loss. | 338 |Based on the information provided, it is not clear if the flagged vulnerability is valid or a false positive. The code snippet `let over_fee = paid_amount.saturating_sub(actual_amount);` appears to calculate the difference between `paid_amount` and `actual_amount` using the `saturating_sub` method. However, without understanding the context and the values of `paid_amount` and `actual_amount`, it is difficult to determine if there is an issue with inaccurate calculation results. 339 | 340 | To validate the vulnerability, you would need to analyze the values assigned to `paid_amount` and `actual_amount` and review the rest of the code to see if there are any potential issues with the calculation, data types, or input values. 341 | 342 | If the vulnerability is confirmed to be valid, a possible fix would depend on the desired behavior of the calculation. You may need to review the logic and ensure that the calculation accurately represents the expected result. | 343 |
VULN011 | 345 |Account Initialized Check | 346 |🟢 GPT 3.5 | 347 |High | 348 |test-code2/client/src/utils.rs | 349 |Prevent re-initialization of already initialized accounts. | 350 |Based on the information provided, it is difficult to determine whether the identified vulnerability is valid or a false positive. To make a more accurate assessment, the code block containing the `try_from_slice()` function needs to be analyzed in more detail. 351 | 352 | However, assuming that the SAST tool has correctly identified the potential vulnerability, the possible fix would depend on the specific issue being flagged. Without further details about the vulnerability, it is challenging to provide an appropriate fix. 353 | 354 | To validate the vulnerability and suggest a fix, further information about the specific issue detected by the SAST tool is required. | 355 |
RUST002 | 357 |Improper Error Handling | 358 |🟢 GPT 3.5 | 359 |Medium | 360 |test-code2/program/src/checked.rs | 361 |Overuse of `unwrap()` or `expect()` can lead to panics. Prefer using error handling mechanisms like `match` or `if let`. | 362 |Based on the provided code and context, the flagged vulnerability titled 'Improper Error Handling' at line number 25 is valid. The use of the `.unwrap()` method can result in a panic if an error occurs. This can lead to unexpected program termination and potential security risks. 363 | 364 | To fix this vulnerability, you should handle the error appropriately instead of relying on the `.unwrap()` method. There are several ways to handle errors in Rust, including using `match` expressions and `Result` values. Here's an example of handling the error using a `match` expression: 365 | 366 | ```rust 367 | let account = match next_account_info(account_info_iter) { 368 | Ok(account) => account, 369 | Err(err) => return Err(err.into()), // Handle the error here 370 | }; 371 | ``` 372 | 373 | In this example, the `next_account_info` function returns a `Result` value. By using a `match` expression, the error is properly handled, and you can return the error from the function if necessary. 374 | 375 | By replacing `.unwrap()` with proper error handling, you ensure that the program handles errors gracefully and avoids unexpected termination or security vulnerabilities. | 376 |
RUST007 | 378 |Missing Boundary Checks | 379 |🟢 GPT 3.5 | 380 |Medium | 381 |test-code2/client/src/client.rs | 382 |Accessing arrays or vectors without boundary checks can lead to panics or buffer overflows. | 383 |Based on the provided code, it is not possible to determine whether the flagged vulnerability "Missing Boundary Checks" is valid or a false positive without additional information. The code snippet for line number 28 is not included, so it is not possible to analyze the context and identify the potential boundary check issue. 384 | 385 | To validate the vulnerability, please provide the code snippet for line number 28. | 386 |
RUST007 | 388 |Missing Boundary Checks | 389 |🟢 GPT 3.5 | 390 |Medium | 391 |test-code2/client/src/lib.rs | 392 |Accessing arrays or vectors without boundary checks can lead to panics or buffer overflows. | 393 |Based on the provided information and the full code context, it appears that the flagged vulnerability "Missing Boundary Checks" at line number 11 is valid.
394 |
395 | The code in question is the `collateral_to_liquidity` function, which takes a `u64` value `collateral_amount` and attempts to perform a division operation on it. However, there are no boundary checks implemented to handle potential division by zero scenarios.
396 |
397 | A possible fix to address this vulnerability would be to add a check before performing the division operation to ensure that the divisor (`self.0`) is not zero. If the divisor is zero, the function could return an appropriate error or handle the scenario in a way that aligns with the desired behavior of the application.
398 |
399 | Here's an example of how the code could be modified to include the boundary check:
400 |
401 | ```rust
402 | pub fn collateral_to_liquidity(&self, collateral_amount: u64) -> Result |
415 |
RUST002 | 417 |Improper Error Handling | 418 |🟢 GPT 3.5 | 419 |Medium | 420 |test-code2/client/src/main.rs | 421 |Overuse of `unwrap()` or `expect()` can lead to panics. Prefer using error handling mechanisms like `match` or `if let`. | 422 |The flagged vulnerability, 'Improper Error Handling', likely refers to the use of the `.unwrap()` method in the Rust code. This method panics and potentially crashes the program if an error occurs. The severity of this vulnerability is rated as 'Medium'.
423 |
424 | To confirm if this vulnerability is valid or a false positive, we need to consider the specific context and requirements of the code. In this case, it depends on the expected behavior of the program when an error occurs.
425 |
426 | If the program is intended to handle errors gracefully and continue execution, then the use of `.unwrap()` is indeed an improper error handling practice. In such cases, it is recommended to use proper error handling techniques such as `match` or `Result` to handle potential errors and provide appropriate fallback actions.
427 |
428 | On the other hand, if the program expects an error at this specific point to be fatal, crashing the program might be an intentional behavior. In such cases, the use of `.unwrap()` could be considered appropriate.
429 |
430 | To suggest a possible fix, assuming that the goal is to handle errors gracefully and continue execution, you can replace the `.unwrap()` calls with proper error handling code. For example, you can use `match` or `Result` to handle the returned `Result` values and handle the potential errors based on your program's requirements.
431 |
432 | Here's an example of how you can modify the code to use `match` for error handling:
433 |
434 | ```rust
435 | use zeke_contract as zc;
436 |
437 | fn main() {
438 | let args = std::env::args().collect:: |
472 |
RUST007 | 474 |Missing Boundary Checks | 475 |🟢 GPT 3.5 | 476 |Medium | 477 |test-code2/client/src/main.rs | 478 |Accessing arrays or vectors without boundary checks can lead to panics or buffer overflows. | 479 |Based on the information provided, it is not possible to accurately determine whether the flagged vulnerability is valid or a false positive. To determine the validity of the vulnerability, more information about the specific SAST tool, its rule set, and the context in which the code is being used is needed. 480 | 481 | In general, a "Missing Boundary Checks" vulnerability refers to situations where input data is not properly validated or sanitized, potentially leading to buffer overflow or other memory-related vulnerabilities. To address this type of vulnerability, it is important to ensure that any user-controlled input is properly validated and that boundaries are checked to prevent access beyond the allocated memory. 482 | 483 | To validate this specific vulnerability, you should review the SAST tool's documentation or rule set to understand the specific criteria that led to the detection. You can also review the code and analyze whether there are any potential risks of buffer overflow or memory access violations at line number 8 or any other relevant parts of the code. 484 | 485 | If the vulnerability is confirmed to be valid, a possible fix would involve implementing proper boundary checks and input validation to ensure that the code does not access memory outside the allowed range. The specific fix will depend on the context and intended behavior of the code. 486 | 487 | It is also recommended to consult with experienced developers or conduct a thorough code review to ensure the security of the application. | 488 |
VULN009 | 490 |Account Writable Check | 491 |🔴 GPT 3.5 | 492 |High | 493 |test-code2/program/src/lib.rs | 494 |Ensure state accounts are checked as writable to prevent unauthorized modifications. | 495 |The vulnerability flagged by the Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tool appears to be a false positive in this case. 496 | 497 | The flagged line of code `next_account_info(` is part of the Solana SDK library, and it is used to retrieve the next account info from the iterator `accounts_iter`. It is not inherently vulnerable itself, but rather a utility function implementing safe iteration over account information. 498 | 499 | Since the provided code does not demonstrate any direct security vulnerability or insecure coding practice, the flagged vulnerability can be ignored. 500 | 501 | No fix is required for this false positive. | 502 |
RUST004 | 504 |Concurrency Issues and Data Races | 505 |🔴 GPT 3.5 | 506 |High | 507 |test-code2/program/src/checked.rs | 508 |Improper handling of threads and synchronization can lead to data races, deadlocks, and other concurrency issues. | 509 |The vulnerability flagged by the SAST tool as 'Concurrency Issues and Data Races' at line number 56 is indeed a false positive. The line of code `std::thread::spawn(move || { ... })` represents a simple threading example and does not introduce any real concurrency issues or data races. 510 | 511 | The code snippet creates a new thread that executes the provided closure. The closure passed to `std::thread::spawn` is an anonymous function that contains a print statement. This usage of threading does not involve any shared mutable state, synchronized access, or any other code that could potentially introduce concurrency issues or data races. 512 | 513 | Since this is a false positive, no fix is required for this particular vulnerability. | 514 |
RUST007 | 516 |Missing Boundary Checks | 517 |🔴 GPT 3.5 | 518 |Medium | 519 |test-code2/program/src/lib.rs | 520 |Accessing arrays or vectors without boundary checks can lead to panics or buffer overflows. | 521 |The flagged vulnerability of 'Missing Boundary Checks' at line number 31 is a false positive. The line of code `[AccountInfo]` is not a vulnerability, but rather a comment indicating the type of the `accounts` parameter. 522 | 523 | There is no vulnerability in the provided code. | 524 |
SOL030 | 526 |Log Injection | 527 |🔴 GPT 3.5 | 528 |Medium | 529 |test-code2/program/src/checked.rs | 530 |Injection vulnerabilities in program logs can lead to misleading or harmful information being logged. | 531 |The detected vulnerability titled 'Log Injection' with severity 'Medium' in the Rust code is a false positive. The line of code flagged is `msg!("{}", user_input)`. However, this line of code is not vulnerable to log injection because the `user_input` variable is a controlled input and does not originate from an untrusted source. Therefore, it does not pose a risk of log injection vulnerability. 532 | 533 | No fix is required for this false positive. | 534 |
RUST007 | 536 |Missing Boundary Checks | 537 |🔴 GPT 3.5 | 538 |Medium | 539 |test-code2/program/src/checked.rs | 540 |Accessing arrays or vectors without boundary checks can lead to panics or buffer overflows. | 541 |The flagged vulnerability 'Missing Boundary Checks' at line number 14 is a false positive. The line of code ` [AccountInfo]` is not a vulnerability, but rather a section header in the code file used to import the `AccountInfo` struct from the `solana_program` library. 542 | 543 | Therefore, no fix is required for this false positive vulnerability. | 544 |
RUST007 | 546 |Missing Boundary Checks | 547 |🔴 GPT 3.5 | 548 |Medium | 549 |test-code2/client/src/utils.rs | 550 |Accessing arrays or vectors without boundary checks can lead to panics or buffer overflows. | 551 |Based on the information provided, the flagged line of code "[u8]" does not pose a vulnerability. It is a type annotation indicating that a variable or function is expected to return a slice of u8 (bytes). 552 | 553 | Therefore, the flagged vulnerability is a false positive, and no fix is required for the code snippet provided. | 554 |
RUST009 | 556 |Blocking I/O in Asynchronous Code | 557 |🔴 GPT 3.5 | 558 |Medium | 559 |test-code2/client/src/utils.rs | 560 |Performing blocking I/O operations in async contexts can lead to thread starvation and reduced scalability. | 561 |Based on the provided information and code context, the vulnerability titled 'Blocking I/O in Asynchronous Code' at line number 30 (`std::fs`) appears to be a false positive. 562 | 563 | In the given code, the `std::fs` module is not used for performing blocking I/O operations. Instead, it is used in the function `get_config()` to read the Solana yaml config file synchronously. Since blocking I/O operations are acceptable in this scenario, the flagged vulnerability is not valid. 564 | 565 | No fix is necessary for this false positive. However, it is always recommended to review the code and ensure that blocking I/O operations are used appropriately in asynchronous code when avoidable. | 566 |
Pattern ID | 574 |Title | 575 |Safe Pattern | 576 |
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VULN010 | 579 |Account Owner or Program ID Check | 580 |if\s+\w+\.owner\s*!= | 581 |
VULN002 | 583 |Loss of Precision | 584 |\.try_floor_u64\(\s*\) | 585 |
Technology: Rust
46 |Check more on: VulnPlanet
Contribute: GitHub
🟢 GPT 3.5 - Valid or Not possible to determine
62 |🔴 GPT 3.5 - False Positive
63 |ID | 66 |Title | 67 |Status | 68 |Severity | 69 |File | 70 |Description | 71 |Details | 72 |
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RUST012 | 75 |[Rust-General] Integer Overflow | 76 |🟢 GPT 3.5 | 77 |High | 78 |testcode/test.rs | 79 |Arithmetic operations that may overflow, leading to incorrect calculations or vulnerabilities. | 80 |This is a valid vulnerability. The flagged code `c = a + b;` performs an addition operation without checking for integer overflow. In Rust, integer overflow is handled differently in debug and release modes. In debug mode, an overflow will cause a panic, whereas in release mode, the result will wrap around. 81 | 82 | To fix this vulnerability, you can use the checked arithmetic operations provided by Rust. The checked addition operation returns an `Option` that contains the sum if no overflow occurs, or `None` if an overflow occurs. You can use pattern matching to handle the result of the addition operation. Here's an example fix: 83 | 84 | ```rust 85 | fn arithmetic_overflow_examples() { 86 | let a: u8 = 255; 87 | let b: u8 = 1; 88 | let c = a.checked_add(b); 89 | 90 | match c { 91 | Some(result) => println!("No overflow: {}", result), 92 | None => println!("Overflow occurred"), 93 | } 94 | 95 | let large_num = std::u32::MAX; 96 | let another_large_num = 1; 97 | let result = large_num.checked_mul(another_large_num); 98 | 99 | match result { 100 | Some(result) => println!("No overflow: {}", result), 101 | None => println!("Overflow occurred"), 102 | } 103 | } 104 | ``` 105 | 106 | By using the checked addition and checked multiplication operations, you can detect overflow and handle it accordingly. | 107 |
RUST020 | 109 |[Rust-General] Unsafe Dereferencing | 110 |🟢 GPT 3.5 | 111 |High | 112 |testcode/test.rs | 113 |Dereferencing pointers without ensuring they point to valid memory, leading to potential segmentation faults or undefined behavior. | 114 |This is a valid vulnerability detected by the SAST tool. The vulnerability is titled '[Rust-General] Unsafe Dereferencing' and has a severity level of 'High'. 115 | 116 | The line of code flagged is: 117 | 118 | ```rust 119 | println!("Dereferencing a raw pointer: {}", *y); 120 | ``` 121 | 122 | This vulnerability occurs because `y` is a dangling pointer, which means it refers to memory that has been deallocated. Dereferencing such a pointer can lead to undefined behavior, potentially causing crashes or security vulnerabilities. 123 | 124 | To fix this vulnerability, you can avoid dereferencing the dangling pointer. You should make sure that the pointer is pointing to a valid memory location before dereferencing it. One way to ensure this is by using `std::ptr::null` or `std::ptr::null_mut` to represent a null pointer in situations where the value may become deallocated. Then, before dereferencing the pointer, you can check if it is null using an `if` statement to avoid undefined behavior. 125 | 126 | Here's an example of how you can modify the code to avoid the vulnerability: 127 | 128 | ```rust 129 | // RUST020 - Unsafe Dereferencing 130 | if !y.is_null() { 131 | println!("Dereferencing a raw pointer: {}", *y); 132 | } 133 | ``` 134 | 135 | By performing the null check, you prevent the program from attempting to dereference a dangling pointer and avoid the potential vulnerability. | 136 |
RUST006 | 138 |[Rust-General] Memory Leaks | 139 |🟢 GPT 3.5 | 140 |Medium | 141 |testcode/test.rs | 142 |Improper use of memory allocation that could result in memory leaks. | 143 |This is a valid vulnerability. The potential Rust vulnerability titled '[Rust-General] Memory Leaks' flagged by the SAST tool is valid because it identifies a memory leak issue. 144 | 145 | The flagged line of code is: 146 | ``` 147 | Box::new( 148 | ``` 149 | The potential memory leak occurs when a Box is created but not assigned to any variable. This results in a memory allocation that is never freed. To fix this issue, you should assign the Box to a variable or drop it immediately if it is not needed. 150 | 151 | Here's an updated version of the code with the fix: 152 | ```rust 153 | use std::mem; 154 | use std::ptr; 155 | 156 | fn main() { 157 | unsafe_code_examples(); 158 | arithmetic_overflow_examples(); 159 | } 160 | 161 | unsafe fn unsafe_code_examples() { 162 | // RUST011 - Use After Free 163 | let x = Box::new(42); 164 | let y = Box::into_raw(x); // Allocation is freed here, y is now a dangling pointer 165 | drop(Box::from_raw(y)); // Use after free 166 | 167 | // RUST020 - Unsafe Dereferencing 168 | println!("Dereferencing a raw pointer: {}", *y); 169 | 170 | // RUST003 - Dangling Pointers 171 | let z: *const i32; 172 | { 173 | let temp_var = 33; 174 | z = &temp_var as *const i32; // z becomes a dangling pointer here 175 | } 176 | println!("Dangling pointer access: {:?}", z); 177 | 178 | // Directly manipulating memory without proper checks can lead to undefined behavior 179 | let mut array = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]; 180 | let array_ptr: *mut i32 = array.as_mut_ptr(); 181 | ptr::write(array_ptr.offset(5), 999); // RUST004 - Buffer Overflows 182 | } 183 | 184 | fn arithmetic_overflow_examples() { 185 | // RUST012 - Integer Overflow 186 | let a: u8 = 255; 187 | let b: u8 = 1; 188 | let c = a + b; // This will overflow in debug mode, or wrap in release mode 189 | println!("Overflow example: {}", c); 190 | 191 | // Demonstrating unchecked arithmetic operations 192 | let large_num = std::u32::MAX; 193 | let another_large_num = 1; 194 | let result = large_num * another_large_num; // Potential for RUST012 - Integer Overflow 195 | println!("Unchecked multiplication might overflow: {}", result); 196 | } 197 | ``` 198 | 199 | In this fix, the Box is assigned to the variable `x` to ensure ownership and proper memory management. | 200 |
Pattern ID | 208 |Title | 209 |Safe Pattern | 210 |
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Technology: Solidity-Ethereum
46 |Check more on: VulnPlanet
Contribute: GitHub
🟢 GPT 3.5 - Valid or Not possible to determine
62 |🔴 GPT 3.5 - False Positive
63 |ID | 66 |Title | 67 |Status | 68 |Severity | 69 |File | 70 |Description | 71 |Details | 72 |
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SOLIDITY023 | 75 |Reentrancy Vulnerabilities | 76 |🟢 GPT 3.5 | 77 |High | 78 |/Users/ym/Downloads/not-so-smart-contracts-master/reentrancy/Reentrancy.sol | 79 |Detection of the reentrancy bug involving Ether. | 80 |This is a valid vulnerability known as a reentrancy vulnerability. In the "withdrawBalance" function, the line of code flagged is `if( ! (msg.sender.call.value(userBalance[msg.sender])() ) )`. This line of code allows for a potential attack where an attacker can repeatedly call the "withdrawBalance" function before the state variable `userBalance[msg.sender]` is updated, causing the attacker to receive multiple withdrawals from the contract. 81 | 82 | To fix this vulnerability, you can follow the approach used in the "withdrawBalance_fixed" function. The fix involves changing the state variable `userBalance[msg.sender]` before making the external call. Here's the modified code: 83 | 84 | ```solidity 85 | function withdrawBalance(){ 86 | uint amount = userBalance[msg.sender]; 87 | userBalance[msg.sender] = 0; 88 | if( ! (msg.sender.call.value(amount)() ) ){ 89 | throw; 90 | } 91 | } 92 | ``` 93 | 94 | By changing the state variable before the external call, you prevent the reentrancy attack by ensuring that subsequent calls to the "withdrawBalance" function will only withdraw zero balances. | 95 |
SOLIDITY026 | 97 |Unchecked Transfer | 98 |🟢 GPT 3.5 | 99 |High | 100 |/Users/ym/Downloads/not-so-smart-contracts-master/reentrancy/Reentrancy.sol | 101 |The return value of an external transfer/transferFrom call is not checked. | 102 |This is a valid vulnerability known as "Unchecked Transfer" in Solidity. The vulnerability occurs at line number 38, which is: 103 | 104 | .transfer(userBalance[msg.sender]); 105 | 106 | The problem with this line is that it uses the .transfer() function, which is prone to reentrancy attacks. An attacker may call a malicious contract's fallback function repeatedly, causing the transfer to be executed multiple times and potentially draining the contract's balance. 107 | 108 | To fix this vulnerability, you should consider using the recommended withdrawal pattern. One possible fix is shown in the code below: 109 | 110 | function withdrawBalance_fixed() { 111 | uint amount = userBalance[msg.sender]; 112 | require(amount > 0); // Check if the user has a positive balance 113 | userBalance[msg.sender] = 0; 114 | msg.sender.transfer(amount); 115 | } 116 | 117 | In this fix, we first check if the user has a positive balance before proceeding with the transfer. This prevents the reentrancy attack since the user's balance is set to zero before the transfer occurs. Additionally, we use the .transfer() function instead of .call.value() to avoid potential reentrancy. 118 | 119 | By making this change, you can mitigate the potential vulnerability and ensure that withdrawals are done securely. | 120 |
SOLIDITY023 | 122 |Reentrancy Vulnerabilities | 123 |🟢 GPT 3.5 | 124 |High | 125 |/Users/ym/Downloads/not-so-smart-contracts-master/reentrancy/ReentrancyExploit.sol | 126 |Detection of the reentrancy bug involving Ether. | 127 |This is a valid vulnerability known as "Reentrancy Vulnerabilities." The vulnerability allows an attacker to maliciously re-enter a function before the previous execution is completed, leading to unexpected behavior and potential security breaches. 128 | 129 | To fix this vulnerability, you should implement the "checks-effects-interactions" pattern. In the susceptible code, the line flagged is: 130 | 131 | ``` 132 | require(vulnerable_contract.call.value(msg.value)(bytes4(sha3("addToBalance()")))); 133 | ``` 134 | 135 | To address this vulnerability, move the interaction with the vulnerable contract to the end of the function after all checks have been performed. Here's an updated version: 136 | 137 | ``` 138 | function deposit(address _vulnerable_contract) public payable { 139 | vulnerable_contract = _vulnerable_contract; 140 | // perform necessary checks first 141 | require(vulnerable_contract.call.value(msg.value)(bytes4(sha3("addToBalance()")))); 142 | } 143 | ``` 144 | 145 | By rearranging the code in this way, you ensure that the vulnerable contract is called after all other operations are completed, minimizing the risk of reentrancy attacks. | 146 |
SOLIDITY045 | 148 |Unchecked Send | 149 |🟢 GPT 3.5 | 150 |Medium | 151 |/Users/ym/Downloads/not-so-smart-contracts-master/reentrancy/theRun.sol | 152 |The return value of a send is not checked. | 153 |This is a valid vulnerability. 154 | 155 | The code uses the `.send()` method to transfer Ether to addresses stored in the `players` array without checking the return value. This can lead to potential vulnerabilities because the `.send()` method does not throw an exception when the transfer fails and instead returns a boolean value indicating success or failure. 156 | 157 | To fix this vulnerability, you should use the `.transfer()` method instead of `.send()`. The `.transfer()` method is a safeguarded way to transfer Ether that automatically throws an exception if the transfer fails, reverting any changes made during the execution of the contract. You should replace the line of code flagged (`players[Payout_id].addr.send(Last_Payout);`) with `players[Payout_id].addr.transfer(Last_Payout);`. 158 | 159 | Here is the updated line of code: 160 | 161 | ``` 162 | players[Payout_id].addr.transfer(Last_Payout); 163 | ``` 164 | 165 | By using `.transfer()` instead of `.send()`, you ensure that any failed transfers will be immediately reverted, preventing potential vulnerabilities. | 166 |
SOLIDITY034 | 168 |Contracts that Lock Ether | 169 |🟢 GPT 3.5 | 170 |Medium | 171 |/Users/ym/Downloads/not-so-smart-contracts-master/reentrancy/Reentrancy.sol | 172 |Contract with a payable function, but without a withdrawal capacity. | 173 |This is a valid vulnerability in the given code. 174 | 175 | The issue is that the function `addToBalance()` allows Ether to be added to a user's balance without any limit. This can be problematic if an external attacker or malicious contract repeatedly calls this function to lock up the contract's balance. This vulnerability is commonly referred to as the "Contracts that Lock Ether" vulnerability. 176 | 177 | To fix this vulnerability, you should implement a check within the `addToBalance()` function to limit the amount of Ether that can be added per transaction. For example, you can add a modifier that checks the value of `msg.value` and throws an exception if it exceeds a certain limit: 178 | 179 | ```solidity 180 | function addToBalance() payable { 181 | require(msg.value <= 1 ether); // Limit the amount of Ether that can be added 182 | userBalance[msg.sender] += msg.value; 183 | } 184 | ``` 185 | 186 | By limiting the amount of Ether that can be added, you prevent the contract's balance from being locked up by an attacker. | 187 |
Pattern ID | 195 |Title | 196 |Safe Pattern | 197 |
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Technology: {language}
156 |Validation model: {report_model}
157 |Check more on: VulnPlanet
Contribute: GitHub
🟢 GPT 3.5/4.0 - Valid or Not possible to determine
173 |🔴 GPT 3.5/4.0 - False Positive
174 |- - No validation
175 |ID | 178 |Title | 179 |Status | 180 |Severity | 181 |File | 182 |Line number | 183 |Description | 184 |Details | 185 |
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Pattern ID | 194 |Title | 195 |Safe Pattern | 196 |
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