├── .gitattributes ├── branch-images ├── 01-branch.png ├── 02-branch.png ├── 03-branch.png ├── 04-branch.png ├── 05-branch.png ├── 06-branch.png ├── 07-branch.png └── 08-branch.png ├── full-tree ├── full-example-sce-tree.png └── full-example-sce-tree.dot ├── README.md ├── branch-dot-files ├── 01-branch.dot ├── 02-branch.dot ├── 03-branch.dot ├── 04-branch.dot ├── 05-branch.dot ├── 06-branch.dot ├── 07-branch.dot └── 08-branch.dot ├── drawing-the-owl-dot.dot └── LICENSE /.gitattributes: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Auto detect text files and perform LF normalization 2 | * text=auto 3 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /branch-images/01-branch.png: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/swagitda/security-decision-trees-graphviz/HEAD/branch-images/01-branch.png -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /branch-images/02-branch.png: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/swagitda/security-decision-trees-graphviz/HEAD/branch-images/02-branch.png -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /branch-images/03-branch.png: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/swagitda/security-decision-trees-graphviz/HEAD/branch-images/03-branch.png -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /branch-images/04-branch.png: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/swagitda/security-decision-trees-graphviz/HEAD/branch-images/04-branch.png -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/swagitda/security-decision-trees-graphviz/HEAD/branch-images/08-branch.png -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /full-tree/full-example-sce-tree.png: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/swagitda/security-decision-trees-graphviz/HEAD/full-tree/full-example-sce-tree.png -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /README.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Creating Security Decision Trees with Graphviz 2 | This is the companion repo to my blog post on [Creating Security Decision Trees with Graphviz](https://swagitda.com/blog/posts/security-decision-trees-with-graphviz/), based on _Chapter 2: Decision Trees — Making Attacker Math Work for You_ in [the Security Chaos Engineering e-book](https://www.verica.io/sce-book/). 3 | 4 | There are [.dot files](/branch-dot-files) and their [output graphs](/branch-images) as a reference for each branch of the example tree. 5 | 6 | There is also the .dot file and graph image for the [completed example tree](/full-tree). 7 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /branch-dot-files/01-branch.dot: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | digraph { 2 | // Base Styling 3 | rankdir="TB"; 4 | splines=true; 5 | overlap=false; 6 | nodesep="0.2"; 7 | ranksep="0.4"; 8 | label="Attack Tree - Branch 01"; 9 | labelloc="t"; 10 | fontname="Lato"; 11 | node [ shape="plaintext" style="filled, rounded" fontname="Lato" margin=0.2 ] 12 | edge [ fontname="Lato" color="#2B303A" ] 13 | 14 | // List of Nodes 15 | 16 | // base nodes 17 | reality [ label="Reality" fillcolor="#2B303A" fontcolor="#ffffff" ] 18 | attack_win [ label="Access video\nrecordings in\nS3 bucket\n(attackers win)" fillcolor="#DB2955" fontcolor="#ffffff" ] 19 | 20 | // attack nodes 21 | node [ color="#ED96AC" ] 22 | attack_1 [ label="API cache\n(e.g. Wayback\nMachine)" color="#C6CCD2" ] 23 | 24 | // defense nodes 25 | node [ color="#ABD2FA" ] 26 | 27 | // List of Edges 28 | 29 | // branch 1 edges 30 | // this starts from the reality node and connects with the first "attack", 31 | // which is really just taking advantage of #yolosec (big oof) 32 | reality -> attack_1 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 33 | attack_1 -> attack_win 34 | 35 | } -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /branch-dot-files/02-branch.dot: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | digraph { 2 | // Base Styling 3 | rankdir="TB"; 4 | splines=true; 5 | overlap=false; 6 | nodesep="0.2"; 7 | ranksep="0.4"; 8 | label="Attack Tree - Branch 02"; 9 | labelloc="t"; 10 | fontname="Lato"; 11 | node [ shape="plaintext" style="filled, rounded" fontname="Lato" margin=0.2 ] 12 | edge [ fontname="Lato" color="#2B303A" ] 13 | 14 | // List of Nodes 15 | 16 | // base nodes 17 | reality [ label="Reality" fillcolor="#2B303A" fontcolor="#ffffff" ] 18 | attack_win [ label="Access video\nrecordings in\nS3 bucket\n(attackers win)" fillcolor="#DB2955" fontcolor="#ffffff" ] 19 | 20 | // attack nodes 21 | node [ color="#ED96AC" ] 22 | attack_1 [ label="API cache\n(e.g. Wayback\nMachine)" color="#C6CCD2" ] 23 | attack_2 [ label="AWS public\nbuckets search" ] 24 | attack_3 [ label="S3 bucket\nset to public" color="#C6CCD2" ] 25 | 26 | // defense nodes 27 | node [ color="#ABD2FA" ] 28 | defense_1 [ label="Disallow\ncrawling\non site maps" ] 29 | 30 | // List of Edges 31 | 32 | // branch 1 edges 33 | // this starts from the reality node and connects with the first "attack", 34 | // which is really just taking advantage of #yolosec (big oof) 35 | reality -> attack_1 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 36 | attack_1 -> attack_win 37 | 38 | // branch 2 edges 39 | // this connects the reality node to the first mitigation, 40 | // which helps avoid the #yolosec path from branch 1 41 | reality -> defense_1 42 | defense_1 -> attack_2 43 | attack_2 -> attack_3 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 44 | attack_3 -> attack_win 45 | 46 | 47 | } -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /branch-dot-files/03-branch.dot: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | digraph { 2 | // Base Styling 3 | rankdir="TB"; 4 | splines=true; 5 | overlap=false; 6 | nodesep="0.2"; 7 | ranksep="0.4"; 8 | label="Attack Tree - Branch 03"; 9 | labelloc="t"; 10 | fontname="Lato"; 11 | node [ shape="plaintext" style="filled, rounded" fontname="Lato" margin=0.2 ] 12 | edge [ fontname="Lato" color="#2B303A" ] 13 | 14 | // List of Nodes 15 | 16 | // base nodes 17 | reality [ label="Reality" fillcolor="#2B303A" fontcolor="#ffffff" ] 18 | attack_win [ label="Access video\nrecordings in\nS3 bucket\n(attackers win)" fillcolor="#DB2955" fontcolor="#ffffff" ] 19 | 20 | // attack nodes 21 | node [ color="#ED96AC" ] 22 | attack_1 [ label="API cache\n(e.g. Wayback\nMachine)" color="#C6CCD2" ] 23 | attack_2 [ label="AWS public\nbuckets search" ] 24 | attack_3 [ label="S3 bucket\nset to public" color="#C6CCD2" ] 25 | attack_4 [ label="Brute force" ] 26 | attack_5 [ label="Phishing" ] 27 | attack_6 [ label="Compromise\nuser credentials" ] 28 | attack_7 [ label="Subsystem with\naccess to\nbucket data" color="#C6CCD2" ] 29 | attack_8 [ label="Manually analyze\nweb client for access\ncontrol misconfig" ] 30 | 31 | // defense nodes 32 | node [ color="#ABD2FA" ] 33 | defense_1 [ label="Disallow\ncrawling\non site maps" ] 34 | defense_2 [ label="Auth required / ACLs\n(private bucket)" ] 35 | defense_3 [ label="Lock down\nweb client with\ncreds / ACLs" ] 36 | defense_4 [ label="Perform all access\ncontrol server-side" ] 37 | 38 | // List of Edges 39 | 40 | // branch 1 edges 41 | // this starts from the reality node and connects with the first "attack", 42 | // which is really just taking advantage of #yolosec (big oof) 43 | reality -> attack_1 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 44 | attack_1 -> attack_win 45 | 46 | // branch 2 edges 47 | // this connects the reality node to the first mitigation, 48 | // which helps avoid the #yolosec path from branch 1 49 | reality -> defense_1 50 | defense_1 -> attack_2 51 | attack_2 -> attack_3 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 52 | attack_3 -> attack_win 53 | 54 | // branch 3 edges 55 | // this connects the reality node to another mitigation, 56 | // which helps avoid the #yolosec path from branch 2 57 | reality -> defense_2 58 | defense_2 -> attack_4 59 | defense_2 -> attack_5 60 | attack_4 -> attack_6 61 | attack_5 -> attack_6 62 | attack_6 -> attack_7 63 | attack_7 -> attack_win 64 | // potential mitigation path 65 | attack_7 -> defense_3 66 | defense_3 -> attack_8 67 | attack_8 -> attack_win 68 | // potential mitigation path 69 | attack_8 -> defense_4 70 | defense_4 -> attack_5 [ style="dashed" color="#7692FF" ] 71 | 72 | // Subgraphs / Clusters 73 | 74 | // these clusters enforce the correct hierarchies 75 | subgraph initialstates { 76 | rank=same; 77 | attack_1; 78 | defense_1; 79 | defense_2; 80 | } 81 | subgraph authrequired { 82 | rank=same; 83 | attack_4; 84 | attack_5; 85 | } 86 | 87 | } -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /drawing-the-owl-dot.dot: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | digraph { 2 | // base nodes 3 | reality [ label="Reality" color="#2B303A" ] 4 | attack_win [ label="Access video recordings in S3 bucket (attackers win)" color="#DB2955" ] 5 | 6 | // attack nodes 7 | node [ color="#ED96AC" ] 8 | attack_1 [ label="API cache (e.g. Wayback Machine)" color="#C6CCD2" ] 9 | attack_2 [ label="AWS public buckets search" ] 10 | attack_3 [ label="S3 bucket set to public" color="#C6CCD2" ] 11 | attack_4 [ label="Brute force" ] 12 | attack_5 [ label="Phishing" ] 13 | attack_6 [ label="Compromise user credentials" ] 14 | attack_7 [ label="Subsystem with access to bucket data" color="#C6CCD2" ] 15 | attack_8 [ label="Manually analyze web client for access control misconfig" ] 16 | attack_9 [ label="Compromise admin creds" ] 17 | attack_10 [ label="Intercept 2FA" ] 18 | attack_11 [ label="SSH to an accessible machine" ] 19 | attack_12 [ label="Lateral movement to machine with access to target bucket" ] 20 | attack_13 [ label="Compromise AWS admin creds" ] 21 | attack_14 [ label="Compromise presigned URLs" ] 22 | attack_15 [ label="Compromise URL within N time period" ] 23 | attack_16 [ label="Recon on S3 buckets" ] 24 | attack_17 [ label="Find systems with R/W access to target bucket" ] 25 | attack_18 [ label="Exploit known 3rd party library vulns" ] 26 | 27 | // defense nodes 28 | node [ color="#ABD2FA" ] 29 | defense_1 [ label="Disallow crawling on site maps" ] 30 | defense_2 [ label="Auth required / ACLs (private bucket)" ] 31 | defense_3 [ label="Lock down web client with creds / ACLs" ] 32 | defense_4 [ label="Perform all access control server-side" ] 33 | defense_5 [ label="2FA" ] 34 | defense_6 [ label="IP allowlist for SSH" ] 35 | defense_7 [ label="Make URL short lived" ] 36 | defense_8 [ label="Disallow the use of URLs to access buckets" ] 37 | defense_9 [ label="No public system has R/W access (internal only)" ] 38 | defense_10 [ label="3rd party library checking / vuln scanning" ] 39 | 40 | // branch 1 edges 41 | reality -> attack_1 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 42 | attack_1 -> attack_win 43 | 44 | // branch 2 edges 45 | reality -> defense_1 46 | defense_1 -> attack_2 47 | attack_2 -> attack_3 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 48 | attack_3 -> attack_win 49 | 50 | // branch 3 edges 51 | reality -> defense_2 52 | defense_2 -> attack_4 53 | defense_2 -> attack_5 54 | attack_4 -> attack_6 55 | attack_5 -> attack_6 56 | attack_6 -> attack_7 57 | attack_7 -> attack_win 58 | // potential mitigation path 59 | attack_7 -> defense_3 60 | defense_3 -> attack_8 61 | attack_8 -> attack_win 62 | // potential mitigation path 63 | attack_8 -> defense_4 64 | defense_4 -> attack_5 [ style="dashed" color="#7692FF" ] 65 | 66 | // branch 4 edges 67 | attack_5 -> attack_9 68 | attack_9 -> attack_11 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 69 | // potential mitigation path 70 | attack_9 -> defense_5 71 | defense_5 -> attack_10 72 | attack_10 -> attack_11 73 | // potential mitigation path 74 | attack_11 -> defense_6 75 | defense_6 -> attack_12 76 | attack_12 -> attack_win 77 | 78 | // branch 5 edges 79 | attack_5 -> attack_13 80 | attack_13 -> attack_11 81 | attack_13 -> defense_5 82 | 83 | // branch 6 edges 84 | attack_5 -> attack_14 85 | attack_14 -> attack_win 86 | attack_14 -> attack_15 87 | // potential mitigation path 88 | attack_14 -> defense_7 89 | defense_7 -> attack_15 90 | attack_15 -> attack_win 91 | // potential mitigation path 92 | attack_15 -> defense_8 93 | 94 | // branch 7 edges 95 | defense_2 -> attack_16 96 | defense_5 -> attack_16 [ style="dashed" color="#7692FF" ] 97 | defense_8 -> attack_16 [ style="dashed" color="#7692FF" ] 98 | attack_16 -> attack_17 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 99 | // potential mitigation path 100 | attack_17 -> defense_9 101 | defense_9 -> attack_5 [ style="dashed" color="#7692FF" ] 102 | attack_17 -> attack_18 103 | // potential mitigation path 104 | attack_18 -> defense_10 105 | 106 | } -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /branch-dot-files/04-branch.dot: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | // Branch 4 Commentary 2 | // Since we sent the attackers back to the phishing step with our last mitigation in the third branch, 3 | // this branch will start at the "Phishing" node rather than the "Reality" node. 4 | // Attackers will now have to try something a bit harder -- phishing admin credentials (attack_6). 5 | // But that can potentially be obstructed by two-factor authentication ("2FA") (defense_5), 6 | // which will force attackers to try to intercept 2FA (attack_10). 7 | // Attackers can then SSH to an accessible machine (attack_11), which can be countered with 8 | // IP allowlists (defense_6). In response, attackers can perform lateral movement to a machine 9 | // with access to the target bucket (attack_12). 10 | 11 | digraph { 12 | // Base Styling 13 | rankdir="TB"; 14 | splines=true; 15 | overlap=false; 16 | nodesep="0.2"; 17 | ranksep="0.4"; 18 | label="Attack Tree - Branch 04"; 19 | labelloc="t"; 20 | fontname="Lato"; 21 | node [ shape="plaintext" style="filled, rounded" fontname="Lato" margin=0.2 ] 22 | edge [ fontname="Lato" color="#2B303A" ] 23 | 24 | // List of Nodes 25 | 26 | // base nodes 27 | reality [ label="Reality" fillcolor="#2B303A" fontcolor="#ffffff" ] 28 | attack_win [ label="Access video\nrecordings in\nS3 bucket\n(attackers win)" fillcolor="#DB2955" fontcolor="#ffffff" ] 29 | 30 | // attack nodes 31 | node [ color="#ED96AC" ] 32 | attack_1 [ label="API cache\n(e.g. Wayback\nMachine)" color="#C6CCD2" ] 33 | attack_2 [ label="AWS public\nbuckets search" ] 34 | attack_3 [ label="S3 bucket\nset to public" color="#C6CCD2" ] 35 | attack_4 [ label="Brute force" ] 36 | attack_5 [ label="Phishing" ] 37 | attack_6 [ label="Compromise\nuser credentials" ] 38 | attack_7 [ label="Subsystem with\naccess to\nbucket data" color="#C6CCD2" ] 39 | attack_8 [ label="Manually analyze\nweb client for access\ncontrol misconfig" ] 40 | attack_9 [ label="Compromise\nadmin creds" ] 41 | attack_10 [ label="Intercept 2FA" ] 42 | attack_11 [ label="SSH to an\naccessible\nmachine" ] 43 | attack_12 [ label="Lateral movement to\nmachine with access\nto target bucket" ] 44 | 45 | // defense nodes 46 | node [ color="#ABD2FA" ] 47 | defense_1 [ label="Disallow\ncrawling\non site maps" ] 48 | defense_2 [ label="Auth required / ACLs\n(private bucket)" ] 49 | defense_3 [ label="Lock down\nweb client with\ncreds / ACLs" ] 50 | defense_4 [ label="Perform all access\ncontrol server-side" ] 51 | defense_5 [ label="2FA" ] 52 | defense_6 [ label="IP allowlist for SSH" ] 53 | 54 | // List of Edges 55 | 56 | // branch 1 edges 57 | // this starts from the reality node and connects with the first "attack", 58 | // which is really just taking advantage of #yolosec (big oof) 59 | reality -> attack_1 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 60 | attack_1 -> attack_win 61 | 62 | // branch 2 edges 63 | // this connects the reality node to the first mitigation, 64 | // which helps avoid the #yolosec path from branch 1 65 | reality -> defense_1 66 | defense_1 -> attack_2 67 | attack_2 -> attack_3 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 68 | attack_3 -> attack_win 69 | 70 | // branch 3 edges 71 | // this connects the reality node to another mitigation, 72 | // which helps avoid the #yolosec path from branch 2 73 | reality -> defense_2 74 | defense_2 -> attack_4 75 | defense_2 -> attack_5 76 | attack_4 -> attack_6 77 | attack_5 -> attack_6 78 | attack_6 -> attack_7 79 | attack_7 -> attack_win 80 | // potential mitigation path 81 | attack_7 -> defense_3 82 | defense_3 -> attack_8 83 | attack_8 -> attack_win 84 | // potential mitigation path 85 | attack_8 -> defense_4 86 | defense_4 -> attack_5 [ style="dashed" color="#7692FF" ] 87 | 88 | // branch 4 edges 89 | // this starts from the last mitigation loop vs. the reality node 90 | attack_5 -> attack_9 91 | attack_9 -> attack_11 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 92 | // potential mitigation path 93 | attack_9 -> defense_5 94 | defense_5 -> attack_10 95 | attack_10 -> attack_11 96 | // potential mitigation path 97 | attack_11 -> defense_6 98 | defense_6 -> attack_12 99 | attack_12 -> attack_win 100 | 101 | 102 | // Subgraphs / Clusters 103 | 104 | // these clusters enforce the correct hierarchies 105 | subgraph initialstates { 106 | rank=same; 107 | attack_1; 108 | defense_1; 109 | defense_2; 110 | } 111 | subgraph authrequired { 112 | rank=same; 113 | attack_4; 114 | attack_5; 115 | } 116 | subgraph phishcluster { 117 | rank=same; 118 | attack_6; 119 | attack_9; 120 | } 121 | // these invisible edges are to enforce the correct left-to-right order 122 | // based on the level of attack difficulty 123 | attack_6 -> attack_9 [ style="invis" ] 124 | } -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /branch-dot-files/05-branch.dot: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | // Branch 5 Commentary 2 | // Attackers can also try the even harder option of compromising admin credentials in AWS specifically. 3 | // With 2FA as a potential mitigation again, this short branch intersects back with branch 4 pretty quickly. 4 | // We only add one new attack node in this branch (attack_13). 5 | 6 | digraph { 7 | // Base Styling 8 | rankdir="TB"; 9 | splines=true; 10 | overlap=false; 11 | nodesep="0.2"; 12 | ranksep="0.4"; 13 | label="Attack Tree - Branch 05"; 14 | labelloc="t"; 15 | fontname="Lato"; 16 | node [ shape="plaintext" style="filled, rounded" fontname="Lato" margin=0.2 ] 17 | edge [ fontname="Lato" color="#2B303A" ] 18 | 19 | // List of Nodes 20 | 21 | // base nodes 22 | reality [ label="Reality" fillcolor="#2B303A" fontcolor="#ffffff" ] 23 | attack_win [ label="Access video\nrecordings in\nS3 bucket\n(attackers win)" fillcolor="#DB2955" fontcolor="#ffffff" ] 24 | 25 | // attack nodes 26 | node [ color="#ED96AC" ] 27 | attack_1 [ label="API cache\n(e.g. Wayback\nMachine)" color="#C6CCD2" ] 28 | attack_2 [ label="AWS public\nbuckets search" ] 29 | attack_3 [ label="S3 bucket\nset to public" color="#C6CCD2" ] 30 | attack_4 [ label="Brute force" ] 31 | attack_5 [ label="Phishing" ] 32 | attack_6 [ label="Compromise\nuser credentials" ] 33 | attack_7 [ label="Subsystem with\naccess to\nbucket data" color="#C6CCD2" ] 34 | attack_8 [ label="Manually analyze\nweb client for access\ncontrol misconfig" ] 35 | attack_9 [ label="Compromise\nadmin creds" ] 36 | attack_10 [ label="Intercept 2FA" ] 37 | attack_11 [ label="SSH to an\naccessible\nmachine" ] 38 | attack_12 [ label="Lateral movement to\nmachine with access\nto target bucket" ] 39 | attack_13 [ label="Compromise\nAWS admin creds" ] 40 | 41 | // defense nodes 42 | node [ color="#ABD2FA" ] 43 | defense_1 [ label="Disallow\ncrawling\non site maps" ] 44 | defense_2 [ label="Auth required / ACLs\n(private bucket)" ] 45 | defense_3 [ label="Lock down\nweb client with\ncreds / ACLs" ] 46 | defense_4 [ label="Perform all access\ncontrol server-side" ] 47 | defense_5 [ label="2FA" ] 48 | defense_6 [ label="IP allowlist for SSH" ] 49 | 50 | // List of Edges 51 | 52 | // branch 1 edges 53 | // this starts from the reality node and connects with the first "attack", 54 | // which is really just taking advantage of #yolosec (big oof) 55 | reality -> attack_1 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 56 | attack_1 -> attack_win 57 | 58 | // branch 2 edges 59 | // this connects the reality node to the first mitigation, 60 | // which helps avoid the #yolosec path from branch 1 61 | reality -> defense_1 62 | defense_1 -> attack_2 63 | attack_2 -> attack_3 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 64 | attack_3 -> attack_win 65 | 66 | // branch 3 edges 67 | // this connects the reality node to another mitigation, 68 | // which helps avoid the #yolosec path from branch 2 69 | reality -> defense_2 70 | defense_2 -> attack_4 71 | defense_2 -> attack_5 72 | attack_4 -> attack_6 73 | attack_5 -> attack_6 74 | attack_6 -> attack_7 75 | attack_7 -> attack_win 76 | // potential mitigation path 77 | attack_7 -> defense_3 78 | defense_3 -> attack_8 79 | attack_8 -> attack_win 80 | // potential mitigation path 81 | attack_8 -> defense_4 82 | defense_4 -> attack_5 [ style="dashed" color="#7692FF" ] 83 | 84 | // branch 4 edges 85 | // this starts from the last mitigation loop vs. the reality node 86 | attack_5 -> attack_9 87 | attack_9 -> attack_11 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 88 | // potential mitigation path 89 | attack_9 -> defense_5 90 | defense_5 -> attack_10 91 | attack_10 -> attack_11 92 | // potential mitigation path 93 | attack_11 -> defense_6 94 | defense_6 -> attack_12 95 | attack_12 -> attack_win 96 | 97 | // branch 5 edges 98 | // this also represents a branch from the prior mitigation loop 99 | // but it is more difficult than branch 4, hence comes after 100 | // the new attack step allows attackers to skip some steps on branch 4 101 | // so it links back to branch 4, whose edges are already defined 102 | attack_5 -> attack_13 103 | attack_13 -> attack_11 104 | attack_13 -> defense_5 105 | 106 | // Subgraphs / Clusters 107 | 108 | // these clusters enforce the correct hierarchies 109 | subgraph initialstates { 110 | rank=same; 111 | attack_1; 112 | defense_1; 113 | defense_2; 114 | } 115 | subgraph authrequired { 116 | rank=same; 117 | attack_4; 118 | attack_5; 119 | } 120 | subgraph phishcluster { 121 | rank=same; 122 | attack_6; 123 | attack_9; 124 | attack_13; 125 | } 126 | // these invisible edges are to enforce the correct left-to-right order 127 | // based on the level of attack difficulty 128 | attack_6 -> attack_9 -> attack_13 [ style="invis" ] 129 | } -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /branch-dot-files/06-branch.dot: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | // Branch 6 Commentary 2 | // If admin creds or AWS admin creds don't work, attackers can next try to compromise presigned URLs 3 | // (learn more here: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/dev/ShareObjectPreSignedURL.html) 4 | // This branch includes a few different decision forks depending on the mitigations in place. 5 | // Our new attack node for compromising presigned URLs (attack_14) is met with the mitigation of making the URL short lived (defense_7). 6 | // This mitigation is met with the attacker response of compromising the URL within a certain time period (attack_15), 7 | // which can be mitigated by disallowing the use of URLs to access buckets (defense_8). 8 | 9 | digraph { 10 | // Base Styling 11 | rankdir="TB"; 12 | splines=true; 13 | overlap=false; 14 | nodesep="0.2"; 15 | ranksep="0.4"; 16 | label="Attack Tree - Branch 06"; 17 | labelloc="t"; 18 | fontname="Lato"; 19 | node [ shape="plaintext" style="filled, rounded" fontname="Lato" margin=0.2 ] 20 | edge [ fontname="Lato" color="#2B303A" ] 21 | 22 | // List of Nodes 23 | 24 | // base nodes 25 | reality [ label="Reality" fillcolor="#2B303A" fontcolor="#ffffff" ] 26 | attack_win [ label="Access video\nrecordings in\nS3 bucket\n(attackers win)" fillcolor="#DB2955" fontcolor="#ffffff" ] 27 | 28 | // attack nodes 29 | node [ color="#ED96AC" ] 30 | attack_1 [ label="API cache\n(e.g. Wayback\nMachine)" color="#C6CCD2" ] 31 | attack_2 [ label="AWS public\nbuckets search" ] 32 | attack_3 [ label="S3 bucket\nset to public" color="#C6CCD2" ] 33 | attack_4 [ label="Brute force" ] 34 | attack_5 [ label="Phishing" ] 35 | attack_6 [ label="Compromise\nuser credentials" ] 36 | attack_7 [ label="Subsystem with\naccess to\nbucket data" color="#C6CCD2" ] 37 | attack_8 [ label="Manually analyze\nweb client for access\ncontrol misconfig" ] 38 | attack_9 [ label="Compromise\nadmin creds" ] 39 | attack_10 [ label="Intercept 2FA" ] 40 | attack_11 [ label="SSH to an\naccessible\nmachine" ] 41 | attack_12 [ label="Lateral movement to\nmachine with access\nto target bucket" ] 42 | attack_13 [ label="Compromise\nAWS admin creds" ] 43 | attack_14 [ label="Compromise\npresigned URLs" ] 44 | attack_15 [ label="Compromise\nURL within N\ntime period" ] 45 | 46 | // defense nodes 47 | node [ color="#ABD2FA" ] 48 | defense_1 [ label="Disallow\ncrawling\non site maps" ] 49 | defense_2 [ label="Auth required / ACLs\n(private bucket)" ] 50 | defense_3 [ label="Lock down\nweb client with\ncreds / ACLs" ] 51 | defense_4 [ label="Perform all access\ncontrol server-side" ] 52 | defense_5 [ label="2FA" ] 53 | defense_6 [ label="IP allowlist for SSH" ] 54 | defense_7 [ label="Make URL\nshort lived" ] 55 | defense_8 [ label="Disallow the use\nof URLs to\naccess buckets" ] 56 | 57 | // List of Edges 58 | 59 | // branch 1 edges 60 | // this starts from the reality node and connects with the first "attack", 61 | // which is really just taking advantage of #yolosec (big oof) 62 | reality -> attack_1 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 63 | attack_1 -> attack_win 64 | 65 | // branch 2 edges 66 | // this connects the reality node to the first mitigation, 67 | // which helps avoid the #yolosec path from branch 1 68 | reality -> defense_1 69 | defense_1 -> attack_2 70 | attack_2 -> attack_3 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 71 | attack_3 -> attack_win 72 | 73 | // branch 3 edges 74 | // this connects the reality node to another mitigation, 75 | // which helps avoid the #yolosec path from branch 2 76 | reality -> defense_2 77 | defense_2 -> attack_4 78 | defense_2 -> attack_5 79 | attack_4 -> attack_6 80 | attack_5 -> attack_6 81 | attack_6 -> attack_7 82 | attack_7 -> attack_win 83 | // potential mitigation path 84 | attack_7 -> defense_3 85 | defense_3 -> attack_8 86 | attack_8 -> attack_win 87 | // potential mitigation path 88 | attack_8 -> defense_4 89 | defense_4 -> attack_5 [ style="dashed" color="#7692FF" ] 90 | 91 | // branch 4 edges 92 | // this starts from the last mitigation loop vs. the reality node 93 | attack_5 -> attack_9 94 | attack_9 -> attack_11 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 95 | // potential mitigation path 96 | attack_9 -> defense_5 97 | defense_5 -> attack_10 98 | attack_10 -> attack_11 99 | // potential mitigation path 100 | attack_11 -> defense_6 101 | defense_6 -> attack_12 102 | attack_12 -> attack_win 103 | 104 | // branch 5 edges 105 | // this also represents a branch from the prior mitigation loop 106 | // but it is more difficult than branch 4, hence comes after 107 | // the new attack step allows attackers to skip some steps on branch 4 108 | // so it links back to branch 4, whose edges are already defined 109 | attack_5 -> attack_13 110 | attack_13 -> attack_11 111 | attack_13 -> defense_5 112 | 113 | // branch 6 edges 114 | // depending on the mitigations, the initial node allows for different outcomes 115 | // this also represents a branch from the prior mitigation loop 116 | // it is more difficult than branch 4 and branch 5, hence comes after 117 | attack_5 -> attack_14 118 | attack_14 -> attack_win 119 | attack_14 -> attack_15 120 | // potential mitigation path 121 | attack_14 -> defense_7 122 | defense_7 -> attack_15 123 | attack_15 -> attack_win 124 | // potential mitigation path 125 | attack_15 -> defense_8 126 | 127 | 128 | // Subgraphs / Clusters 129 | 130 | // these clusters enforce the correct hierarchies 131 | subgraph initialstates { 132 | rank=same; 133 | attack_1; 134 | defense_1; 135 | defense_2; 136 | } 137 | subgraph authrequired { 138 | rank=same; 139 | attack_4; 140 | attack_5; 141 | } 142 | subgraph phishcluster { 143 | rank=same; 144 | attack_6; 145 | attack_9; 146 | attack_13; 147 | attack_14; 148 | } 149 | // these invisible edges are to enforce the correct left-to-right order 150 | // based on the level of attack difficulty 151 | attack_6 -> attack_9 -> attack_13 -> attack_14 [ style="invis" ] 152 | } -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /branch-dot-files/07-branch.dot: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | // Branch 7 Commentary 2 | // The prior branch (branch 6) leads to a dead end with the mitigation of disallowing the use of URLs to access buckets. 3 | // In reality, attackers won't stop there. 4 | // Most likely, they will try to perform reconnaissance on your S3 footprint (attack_16) 5 | // to find systems with read or write access to your target bucket (attack_17). 6 | // In fact, the defense node representing 2FA on branch 4 also links to the attack node of performing S3 bucket recon, 7 | // as it reflects a likely attacker response to encountering 2FA. 8 | // We can potentially mitigate this new attack path by disallowing read / write ("R/W") access 9 | // to our target bucket from any public system (defense_9). 10 | // In response, attackers may either try to phish more creds or escalate to the easiest exploitation option: 11 | // exploiting a known vulnerability ("vuln") in a third party library (attack_18). 12 | // But, we can potentially mitigate that action by performing code checking or vuln scanning 13 | // on our third party components (defense_10). 14 | 15 | digraph { 16 | // Base Styling 17 | rankdir="TB"; 18 | splines=true; 19 | overlap=false; 20 | nodesep="0.2"; 21 | ranksep="0.4"; 22 | label="Attack Tree - Branch 07"; 23 | labelloc="t"; 24 | fontname="Lato"; 25 | node [ shape="plaintext" style="filled, rounded" fontname="Lato" margin=0.2 ] 26 | edge [ fontname="Lato" color="#2B303A" ] 27 | 28 | // List of Nodes 29 | 30 | // base nodes 31 | reality [ label="Reality" fillcolor="#2B303A" fontcolor="#ffffff" ] 32 | attack_win [ label="Access video\nrecordings in\nS3 bucket\n(attackers win)" fillcolor="#DB2955" fontcolor="#ffffff" ] 33 | 34 | // attack nodes 35 | node [ color="#ED96AC" ] 36 | attack_1 [ label="API cache\n(e.g. Wayback\nMachine)" color="#C6CCD2" ] 37 | attack_2 [ label="AWS public\nbuckets search" ] 38 | attack_3 [ label="S3 bucket\nset to public" color="#C6CCD2" ] 39 | attack_4 [ label="Brute force" ] 40 | attack_5 [ label="Phishing" ] 41 | attack_6 [ label="Compromise\nuser credentials" ] 42 | attack_7 [ label="Subsystem with\naccess to\nbucket data" color="#C6CCD2" ] 43 | attack_8 [ label="Manually analyze\nweb client for access\ncontrol misconfig" ] 44 | attack_9 [ label="Compromise\nadmin creds" ] 45 | attack_10 [ label="Intercept 2FA" ] 46 | attack_11 [ label="SSH to an\naccessible\nmachine" ] 47 | attack_12 [ label="Lateral movement to\nmachine with access\nto target bucket" ] 48 | attack_13 [ label="Compromise\nAWS admin creds" ] 49 | attack_14 [ label="Compromise\npresigned URLs" ] 50 | attack_15 [ label="Compromise\nURL within N\ntime period" ] 51 | attack_16 [ label="Recon on S3 buckets" ] 52 | attack_17 [ label="Find systems with\nR/W access to\ntarget bucket" ] 53 | attack_18 [ label="Exploit known 3rd\nparty library vulns" ] 54 | 55 | // defense nodes 56 | node [ color="#ABD2FA" ] 57 | defense_1 [ label="Disallow\ncrawling\non site maps" ] 58 | defense_2 [ label="Auth required / ACLs\n(private bucket)" ] 59 | defense_3 [ label="Lock down\nweb client with\ncreds / ACLs" ] 60 | defense_4 [ label="Perform all access\ncontrol server-side" ] 61 | defense_5 [ label="2FA" ] 62 | defense_6 [ label="IP allowlist for SSH" ] 63 | defense_7 [ label="Make URL\nshort lived" ] 64 | defense_8 [ label="Disallow the use\nof URLs to\naccess buckets" ] 65 | defense_9 [ label="No public system\nhas R/W access\n(internal only)" ] 66 | defense_10 [ label="3rd party library\nchecking / vuln\nscanning" ] 67 | 68 | // List of Edges 69 | 70 | // branch 1 edges 71 | // this starts from the reality node and connects with the first "attack", 72 | // which is really just taking advantage of #yolosec (big oof) 73 | reality -> attack_1 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 74 | attack_1 -> attack_win 75 | 76 | // branch 2 edges 77 | // this connects the reality node to the first mitigation, 78 | // which helps avoid the #yolosec path from branch 1 79 | reality -> defense_1 80 | defense_1 -> attack_2 81 | attack_2 -> attack_3 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 82 | attack_3 -> attack_win 83 | 84 | // branch 3 edges 85 | // this connects the reality node to another mitigation, 86 | // which helps avoid the #yolosec path from branch 2 87 | reality -> defense_2 88 | defense_2 -> attack_4 89 | defense_2 -> attack_5 90 | attack_4 -> attack_6 91 | attack_5 -> attack_6 92 | attack_6 -> attack_7 93 | attack_7 -> attack_win 94 | // potential mitigation path 95 | attack_7 -> defense_3 96 | defense_3 -> attack_8 97 | attack_8 -> attack_win 98 | // potential mitigation path 99 | attack_8 -> defense_4 100 | defense_4 -> attack_5 [ style="dashed" color="#7692FF" ] 101 | 102 | // branch 4 edges 103 | // this starts from the last mitigation loop vs. the reality node 104 | attack_5 -> attack_9 105 | attack_9 -> attack_11 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 106 | // potential mitigation path 107 | attack_9 -> defense_5 108 | defense_5 -> attack_10 109 | attack_10 -> attack_11 110 | // potential mitigation path 111 | attack_11 -> defense_6 112 | defense_6 -> attack_12 113 | attack_12 -> attack_win 114 | 115 | // branch 5 edges 116 | // this also represents a branch from the prior mitigation loop 117 | // but it is more difficult than branch 4, hence comes after 118 | // the new attack step allows attackers to skip some steps on branch 4 119 | // so it links back to branch 4, whose edges are already defined 120 | attack_5 -> attack_13 121 | attack_13 -> attack_11 122 | attack_13 -> defense_5 123 | 124 | // branch 6 edges 125 | // depending on the mitigations, the initial node allows for different outcomes 126 | // this also represents a branch from the prior mitigation loop 127 | // it is more difficult than branch 4 and branch 5, hence comes after 128 | attack_5 -> attack_14 129 | attack_14 -> attack_win 130 | attack_14 -> attack_15 131 | // potential mitigation path 132 | attack_14 -> defense_7 133 | defense_7 -> attack_15 134 | attack_15 -> attack_win 135 | // potential mitigation path 136 | attack_15 -> defense_8 137 | 138 | // branch 7 edges 139 | // a new loop is born! 140 | // the first edges tie prior mitigations to the new attack step 141 | defense_2 -> attack_16 142 | defense_5 -> attack_16 [ style="dashed" color="#7692FF" ] 143 | defense_8 -> attack_16 [ style="dashed" color="#7692FF" ] 144 | attack_16 -> attack_17 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 145 | // potential mitigation path 146 | attack_17 -> defense_9 147 | defense_9 -> attack_5 [ style="dashed" color="#7692FF" ] 148 | attack_17 -> attack_18 149 | // potential mitigation path 150 | attack_18 -> defense_10 151 | 152 | // Subgraphs / Clusters 153 | 154 | // these clusters enforce the correct hierarchies 155 | subgraph initialstates { 156 | rank=same; 157 | attack_1; 158 | defense_1; 159 | defense_2; 160 | } 161 | subgraph authrequired { 162 | rank=same; 163 | attack_4; 164 | attack_5; 165 | attack_16; 166 | } 167 | subgraph phishcluster { 168 | rank=same; 169 | attack_6; 170 | attack_9; 171 | attack_13; 172 | attack_14; 173 | } 174 | // these invisible edges are to enforce the correct left-to-right order 175 | // based on the level of attack difficulty 176 | attack_6 -> attack_9 -> attack_13 -> attack_14 [ style="invis" ] 177 | } -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /branch-dot-files/08-branch.dot: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | digraph { 2 | // Base Styling 3 | rankdir="TB"; 4 | splines=true; 5 | overlap=false; 6 | nodesep="0.2"; 7 | ranksep="0.4"; 8 | label="Attack Tree - Branch 08 (Final Branch)"; 9 | labelloc="t"; 10 | fontname="Lato"; 11 | node [ shape="plaintext" style="filled, rounded" fontname="Lato" margin=0.2 ] 12 | edge [ fontname="Lato" color="#2B303A" ] 13 | 14 | // List of Nodes 15 | 16 | // base nodes 17 | reality [ label="Reality" fillcolor="#2B303A" fontcolor="#ffffff" ] 18 | attack_win [ label="Access video\nrecordings in\nS3 bucket\n(attackers win)" fillcolor="#DB2955" fontcolor="#ffffff" ] 19 | 20 | // attack nodes 21 | node [ color="#ED96AC" ] 22 | attack_1 [ label="API cache\n(e.g. Wayback\nMachine)" color="#C6CCD2" ] 23 | attack_2 [ label="AWS public\nbuckets search" ] 24 | attack_3 [ label="S3 bucket\nset to public" color="#C6CCD2" ] 25 | attack_4 [ label="Brute force" ] 26 | attack_5 [ label="Phishing" ] 27 | attack_6 [ label="Compromise\nuser credentials" ] 28 | attack_7 [ label="Subsystem with\naccess to\nbucket data" color="#C6CCD2" ] 29 | attack_8 [ label="Manually analyze\nweb client for access\ncontrol misconfig" ] 30 | attack_9 [ label="Compromise\nadmin creds" ] 31 | attack_10 [ label="Intercept 2FA" ] 32 | attack_11 [ label="SSH to an\naccessible\nmachine" ] 33 | attack_12 [ label="Lateral movement to\nmachine with access\nto target bucket" ] 34 | attack_13 [ label="Compromise\nAWS admin creds" ] 35 | attack_14 [ label="Compromise\npresigned URLs" ] 36 | attack_15 [ label="Compromise\nURL within N\ntime period" ] 37 | attack_16 [ label="Recon on S3 buckets" ] 38 | attack_17 [ label="Find systems with\nR/W access to\ntarget bucket" ] 39 | attack_18 [ label="Exploit known 3rd\nparty library vulns" ] 40 | attack_19 [ label="Manual discovery\nof 0day" ] 41 | attack_20 [ label="Buy 0day" ] 42 | attack_21 [ label="Exploit vulns" ] 43 | attack_22 [ label="0day in AWS\nmultitenant systems" ] 44 | attack_23 [ label="Supply chain\ncompromise\n(backdoor)" ] 45 | 46 | // defense nodes 47 | node [ color="#ABD2FA" ] 48 | defense_1 [ label="Disallow\ncrawling\non site maps" ] 49 | defense_2 [ label="Auth required / ACLs\n(private bucket)" ] 50 | defense_3 [ label="Lock down\nweb client with\ncreds / ACLs" ] 51 | defense_4 [ label="Perform all access\ncontrol server-side" ] 52 | defense_5 [ label="2FA" ] 53 | defense_6 [ label="IP allowlist for SSH" ] 54 | defense_7 [ label="Make URL\nshort lived" ] 55 | defense_8 [ label="Disallow the use\nof URLs to\naccess buckets" ] 56 | defense_9 [ label="No public system\nhas R/W access\n(internal only)" ] 57 | defense_10 [ label="3rd party library\nchecking / vuln\nscanning" ] 58 | defense_11 [ label="Exploit prevention\n/ detection" ] 59 | defense_12 [ label="Use single tenant\nAWS HSM" ] 60 | 61 | // List of Edges 62 | 63 | // branch 1 edges 64 | // this starts from the reality node and connects with the first "attack", 65 | // which is really just taking advantage of #yolosec (big oof) 66 | reality -> attack_1 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 67 | attack_1 -> attack_win 68 | 69 | // branch 2 edges 70 | // this connects the reality node to the first mitigation, 71 | // which helps avoid the #yolosec path from branch 1 72 | reality -> defense_1 73 | defense_1 -> attack_2 74 | attack_2 -> attack_3 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 75 | attack_3 -> attack_win 76 | 77 | // branch 3 edges 78 | // this connects the reality node to another mitigation, 79 | // which helps avoid the #yolosec path from branch 2 80 | reality -> defense_2 81 | defense_2 -> attack_4 82 | defense_2 -> attack_5 83 | attack_4 -> attack_6 84 | attack_5 -> attack_6 85 | attack_6 -> attack_7 86 | attack_7 -> attack_win 87 | // potential mitigation path 88 | attack_7 -> defense_3 89 | defense_3 -> attack_8 90 | attack_8 -> attack_win 91 | // potential mitigation path 92 | attack_8 -> defense_4 93 | defense_4 -> attack_5 [ style="dashed" color="#7692FF" ] 94 | 95 | // branch 4 edges 96 | // this starts from the last mitigation loop vs. the reality node 97 | attack_5 -> attack_9 98 | attack_9 -> attack_11 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 99 | // potential mitigation path 100 | attack_9 -> defense_5 101 | defense_5 -> attack_10 102 | attack_10 -> attack_11 103 | // potential mitigation path 104 | attack_11 -> defense_6 105 | defense_6 -> attack_12 106 | attack_12 -> attack_win 107 | 108 | // branch 5 edges 109 | // this also represents a branch from the prior mitigation loop 110 | // but it is more difficult than branch 4, hence comes after 111 | // the new attack step allows attackers to skip some steps on branch 4 112 | // so it links back to branch 4, whose edges are already defined 113 | attack_5 -> attack_13 114 | attack_13 -> attack_11 115 | attack_13 -> defense_5 116 | 117 | // branch 6 edges 118 | // depending on the mitigations, the initial node allows for different outcomes 119 | // this also represents a branch from the prior mitigation loop 120 | // it is more difficult than branch 4 and branch 5, hence comes after 121 | attack_5 -> attack_14 122 | attack_14 -> attack_win 123 | attack_14 -> attack_15 124 | // potential mitigation path 125 | attack_14 -> defense_7 126 | defense_7 -> attack_15 127 | attack_15 -> attack_win 128 | // potential mitigation path 129 | attack_15 -> defense_8 130 | 131 | // branch 7 edges 132 | // a new loop is born! 133 | // the first edges tie prior mitigations to the new attack step 134 | defense_2 -> attack_16 135 | defense_5 -> attack_16 [ style="dashed" color="#7692FF" ] 136 | defense_8 -> attack_16 [ style="dashed" color="#7692FF" ] 137 | attack_16 -> attack_17 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 138 | // potential mitigation path 139 | attack_17 -> defense_9 140 | defense_9 -> attack_5 [ style="dashed" color="#7692FF" ] 141 | attack_17 -> attack_18 142 | // potential mitigation path 143 | attack_18 -> defense_10 144 | 145 | // branch 8 edges 146 | // we've reached the last path! 147 | // this is the most expensive one for attackers. 148 | // these attacks are definitely uncommon... 149 | // ...because attackers will be cheap / lazy if they can be. 150 | // these edges start from the last mitigation from branch 7 151 | defense_10 -> attack_19 152 | defense_10 -> attack_20 153 | attack_19 -> attack_21 154 | attack_20 -> attack_21 155 | attack_21 -> attack_win 156 | // potential mitigation path 157 | attack_21 -> defense_11 158 | defense_11 -> attack_22 159 | attack_22 -> attack_win 160 | // potential mitigation path 161 | // for the purposes of illustration, this path represents a mitigation 162 | // that isn't actually implemented yet -- hence a dotted edge 163 | attack_22 -> defense_12 [ style="dotted" ] 164 | defense_12 -> attack_23 165 | attack_23 -> attack_win 166 | 167 | // Subgraphs / Clusters 168 | 169 | // these clusters enforce the correct hierarchies 170 | subgraph initialstates { 171 | rank=same; 172 | attack_1; 173 | defense_1; 174 | defense_2; 175 | } 176 | subgraph authrequired { 177 | rank=same; 178 | attack_4; 179 | attack_5; 180 | attack_16; 181 | } 182 | subgraph phishcluster { 183 | rank=same; 184 | attack_6; 185 | attack_9; 186 | attack_13; 187 | attack_14; 188 | } 189 | // these invisible edges are to enforce the correct left-to-right order 190 | // based on the level of attack difficulty 191 | attack_6 -> attack_9 -> attack_13 -> attack_14 [ style="invis" ] 192 | } -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /full-tree/full-example-sce-tree.dot: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | digraph { 2 | // Base Styling 3 | rankdir="TB"; 4 | splines=true; 5 | overlap=false; 6 | nodesep="0.2"; 7 | ranksep="0.4"; 8 | label="Attack Tree for S3 Bucket with Video Recordings"; 9 | labelloc="t"; 10 | fontname="Lato"; 11 | node [ shape="plaintext" style="filled, rounded" fontname="Lato" margin=0.2 ] 12 | edge [ fontname="Lato" color="#2B303A" ] 13 | 14 | // List of Nodes 15 | 16 | // base nodes 17 | reality [ label="Reality" fillcolor="#2B303A" fontcolor="#ffffff" ] 18 | attack_win [ label="Access video\nrecordings in\nS3 bucket\n(attackers win)" fillcolor="#DB2955" fontcolor="#ffffff" ] 19 | 20 | // attack nodes 21 | node [ color="#ED96AC" ] 22 | attack_1 [ label="API cache\n(e.g. Wayback\nMachine)" color="#C6CCD2" ] 23 | attack_2 [ label="AWS public\nbuckets search" ] 24 | attack_3 [ label="S3 bucket\nset to public" color="#C6CCD2" ] 25 | attack_4 [ label="Brute force" ] 26 | attack_5 [ label="Phishing" ] 27 | attack_6 [ label="Compromise\nuser credentials" ] 28 | attack_7 [ label="Subsystem with\naccess to\nbucket data" color="#C6CCD2" ] 29 | attack_8 [ label="Manually analyze\nweb client for access\ncontrol misconfig" ] 30 | attack_9 [ label="Compromise\nadmin creds" ] 31 | attack_10 [ label="Intercept 2FA" ] 32 | attack_11 [ label="SSH to an\naccessible\nmachine" ] 33 | attack_12 [ label="Lateral movement to\nmachine with access\nto target bucket" ] 34 | attack_13 [ label="Compromise\nAWS admin creds" ] 35 | attack_14 [ label="Compromise\npresigned URLs" ] 36 | attack_15 [ label="Compromise\nURL within N\ntime period" ] 37 | attack_16 [ label="Recon on S3 buckets" ] 38 | attack_17 [ label="Find systems with\nR/W access to\ntarget bucket" ] 39 | attack_18 [ label="Exploit known 3rd\nparty library vulns" ] 40 | attack_19 [ label="Manual discovery\nof 0day" ] 41 | attack_20 [ label="Buy 0day" ] 42 | attack_21 [ label="Exploit vulns" ] 43 | attack_22 [ label="0day in AWS\nmultitenant systems" ] 44 | attack_23 [ label="Supply chain\ncompromise\n(backdoor)" ] 45 | 46 | // defense nodes 47 | node [ color="#ABD2FA" ] 48 | defense_1 [ label="Disallow\ncrawling\non site maps" ] 49 | defense_2 [ label="Auth required / ACLs\n(private bucket)" ] 50 | defense_3 [ label="Lock down\nweb client with\ncreds / ACLs" ] 51 | defense_4 [ label="Perform all access\ncontrol server-side" ] 52 | defense_5 [ label="2FA" ] 53 | defense_6 [ label="IP allowlist for SSH" ] 54 | defense_7 [ label="Make URL\nshort lived" ] 55 | defense_8 [ label="Disallow the use\nof URLs to\naccess buckets" ] 56 | defense_9 [ label="No public system\nhas R/W access\n(internal only)" ] 57 | defense_10 [ label="3rd party library\nchecking / vuln\nscanning" ] 58 | defense_11 [ label="Exploit prevention\n/ detection" ] 59 | defense_12 [ label="Use single tenant\nAWS HSM" ] 60 | 61 | // List of Edges 62 | 63 | // branch 1 edges 64 | // this starts from the reality node and connects with the first "attack", 65 | // which is really just taking advantage of #yolosec (big oof) 66 | reality -> attack_1 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 67 | attack_1 -> attack_win 68 | 69 | // branch 2 edges 70 | // this connects the reality node to the first mitigation, 71 | // which helps avoid the #yolosec path from branch 1 72 | reality -> defense_1 73 | defense_1 -> attack_2 74 | attack_2 -> attack_3 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 75 | attack_3 -> attack_win 76 | 77 | // branch 3 edges 78 | // this connects the reality node to another mitigation, 79 | // which helps avoid the #yolosec path from branch 2 80 | reality -> defense_2 81 | defense_2 -> attack_4 82 | defense_2 -> attack_5 83 | attack_4 -> attack_6 84 | attack_5 -> attack_6 85 | attack_6 -> attack_7 86 | attack_7 -> attack_win 87 | // potential mitigation path 88 | attack_7 -> defense_3 89 | defense_3 -> attack_8 90 | attack_8 -> attack_win 91 | // potential mitigation path 92 | attack_8 -> defense_4 93 | defense_4 -> attack_5 [ style="dashed" color="#7692FF" ] 94 | 95 | // branch 4 edges 96 | // this starts from the last mitigation loop vs. the reality node 97 | attack_5 -> attack_9 98 | attack_9 -> attack_11 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 99 | // potential mitigation path 100 | attack_9 -> defense_5 101 | defense_5 -> attack_10 102 | attack_10 -> attack_11 103 | // potential mitigation path 104 | attack_11 -> defense_6 105 | defense_6 -> attack_12 106 | attack_12 -> attack_win 107 | 108 | // branch 5 edges 109 | // this also represents a branch from the prior mitigation loop 110 | // but it is more difficult than branch 4, hence comes after 111 | // the new attack step allows attackers to skip some steps on branch 4 112 | // so it links back to branch 4, whose edges are already defined 113 | attack_5 -> attack_13 114 | attack_13 -> attack_11 115 | attack_13 -> defense_5 116 | 117 | // branch 6 edges 118 | // depending on the mitigations, the initial node allows for different outcomes 119 | // this also represents a branch from the prior mitigation loop 120 | // it is more difficult than branch 4 and branch 5, hence comes after 121 | attack_5 -> attack_14 122 | attack_14 -> attack_win 123 | attack_14 -> attack_15 124 | // potential mitigation path 125 | attack_14 -> defense_7 126 | defense_7 -> attack_15 127 | attack_15 -> attack_win 128 | // potential mitigation path 129 | attack_15 -> defense_8 130 | 131 | // branch 7 edges 132 | // a new loop is born! 133 | // the first edges tie prior mitigations to the new attack step 134 | defense_2 -> attack_16 135 | defense_5 -> attack_16 [ style="dashed" color="#7692FF" ] 136 | defense_8 -> attack_16 [ style="dashed" color="#7692FF" ] 137 | attack_16 -> attack_17 [ xlabel="#yolosec" fontcolor="#DB2955" ] 138 | // potential mitigation path 139 | attack_17 -> defense_9 140 | defense_9 -> attack_5 [ style="dashed" color="#7692FF" ] 141 | attack_17 -> attack_18 142 | // potential mitigation path 143 | attack_18 -> defense_10 144 | 145 | // branch 8 edges 146 | // we've reached the last path! 147 | // this is the most expensive one for attackers. 148 | // these attacks are definitely uncommon... 149 | // ...because attackers will be cheap / lazy if they can be. 150 | // these edges start from the last mitigation from branch 7 151 | defense_10 -> attack_19 152 | defense_10 -> attack_20 153 | attack_19 -> attack_21 154 | attack_20 -> attack_21 155 | attack_21 -> attack_win 156 | // potential mitigation path 157 | attack_21 -> defense_11 158 | defense_11 -> attack_22 159 | attack_22 -> attack_win 160 | // potential mitigation path 161 | // for the purposes of illustration, this path represents a mitigation 162 | // that isn't actually implemented yet -- hence a dotted edge 163 | attack_22 -> defense_12 [ style="dotted" ] 164 | defense_12 -> attack_23 165 | attack_23 -> attack_win 166 | 167 | // Subgraphs / Clusters 168 | 169 | // these clusters enforce the correct hierarchies 170 | subgraph initialstates { 171 | rank=same; 172 | attack_1; 173 | defense_1; 174 | defense_2; 175 | } 176 | subgraph authrequired { 177 | rank=same; 178 | attack_4; 179 | attack_5; 180 | attack_16; 181 | } 182 | subgraph phishcluster { 183 | rank=same; 184 | attack_6; 185 | attack_9; 186 | attack_13; 187 | attack_14; 188 | } 189 | // these invisible edges are to enforce the correct left-to-right order 190 | // based on the level of attack difficulty 191 | attack_6 -> attack_9 -> attack_13 -> attack_14 [ style="invis" ] 192 | } -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /LICENSE: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE 2 | Version 3, 29 June 2007 3 | 4 | Copyright (C) 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc. 5 | Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies 6 | of this license document, but changing it is not allowed. 7 | 8 | Preamble 9 | 10 | The GNU General Public License is a free, copyleft license for 11 | software and other kinds of works. 12 | 13 | The licenses for most software and other practical works are designed 14 | to take away your freedom to share and change the works. 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Interpretation of Sections 15 and 16. 613 | 614 | If the disclaimer of warranty and limitation of liability provided 615 | above cannot be given local legal effect according to their terms, 616 | reviewing courts shall apply local law that most closely approximates 617 | an absolute waiver of all civil liability in connection with the 618 | Program, unless a warranty or assumption of liability accompanies a 619 | copy of the Program in return for a fee. 620 | 621 | END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS 622 | 623 | How to Apply These Terms to Your New Programs 624 | 625 | If you develop a new program, and you want it to be of the greatest 626 | possible use to the public, the best way to achieve this is to make it 627 | free software which everyone can redistribute and change under these terms. 628 | 629 | To do so, attach the following notices to the program. It is safest 630 | to attach them to the start of each source file to most effectively 631 | state the exclusion of warranty; and each file should have at least 632 | the "copyright" line and a pointer to where the full notice is found. 633 | 634 | 635 | Copyright (C) 636 | 637 | This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify 638 | it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by 639 | the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or 640 | (at your option) any later version. 641 | 642 | This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, 643 | but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of 644 | MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the 645 | GNU General Public License for more details. 646 | 647 | You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License 648 | along with this program. If not, see . 649 | 650 | Also add information on how to contact you by electronic and paper mail. 651 | 652 | If the program does terminal interaction, make it output a short 653 | notice like this when it starts in an interactive mode: 654 | 655 | Copyright (C) 656 | This program comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY; for details type `show w'. 657 | This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it 658 | under certain conditions; type `show c' for details. 659 | 660 | The hypothetical commands `show w' and `show c' should show the appropriate 661 | parts of the General Public License. Of course, your program's commands 662 | might be different; for a GUI interface, you would use an "about box". 663 | 664 | You should also get your employer (if you work as a programmer) or school, 665 | if any, to sign a "copyright disclaimer" for the program, if necessary. 666 | For more information on this, and how to apply and follow the GNU GPL, see 667 | . 668 | 669 | The GNU General Public License does not permit incorporating your program 670 | into proprietary programs. If your program is a subroutine library, you 671 | may consider it more useful to permit linking proprietary applications with 672 | the library. If this is what you want to do, use the GNU Lesser General 673 | Public License instead of this License. But first, please read 674 | . 675 | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------