├── .gitignore ├── LICENSE ├── LOL_BINs ├── proc_creation_windows_Dumpbin_LoLBin.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_MSTeams_side-loading.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_VSDiagnostics_LoLBin.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_Wermgr_injection.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_appcmd.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_cmstp_fake_profiles.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_devdrv_bypass_fsutil.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_errorhandler_persistence.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_setup_pythonw.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_udl_exec.yml └── registry_set_devdrv_bypass_registry.yml ├── MISC ├── proc_creation_windows_AMSI_Bypass.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_AlltTheEmojis.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_DisableRestrictedAdmin.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_Powershell_downloader_cradle.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_explorer_shell_execute.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_hh_LOLBA.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_pythonfunctionwarnings_disabled.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_reg_enabling_rdp.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_registry_hide_user.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_schtask_enc-psh.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_schtasks_win-def-removal.yml └── proc_creation_windows_win-lazagne.yml ├── README.md ├── Threat Hunting Queries ├── README.md ├── proc_creation_windows_Action1_RMM.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_Anyviewer.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_MOVEit_exploitation.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_ammyy_admin.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_exec_script_from_zip.yml └── proc_creation_windows_meshagent.yml ├── check_required_fields.py ├── id_generation.py ├── malware ├── proc_creation_windows_ChromeLoader.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_Emotet_04_22.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_Explorer_NOUACCHECK.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_GuLoader_08_07.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_OneNote_Execution.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_Raspberry_Robin_mal-exec.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_Raspberry_Robin_usb-exec.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_Serpent_payload_exec.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_SocGholish_FakeUpdates.yml └── proc_creation_windows_Ursnif_cmd_redirection.yml ├── renaming.py ├── vulnerability_exploitation ├── proc_creation_windows_7z_CVE-2022-29072.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_VMWare_CVE-2022-22954.yml └── proc_creation_windows_VMware_Horizon_LOG4J.yml └── windows_exploitation ├── net_connection_windows_ADWS_abuse.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_SOAPHound.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_WSUS_abuse.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_ms-msdt_exploitation.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_sdiagnhost-ms-msdt_exploitation.yml ├── proc_creation_windows_zero_exe.yml ├── win_security_DC_Impersonation.yml ├── win_security_KrbRelayUp.yml ├── win_security_LAPS_CredDumping.yml └── win_security_kerberoasting_activity.yml /.gitignore: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | .cache/ 2 | .replit 3 | .vscode/ 4 | replit.nix 5 | .DS_Store 6 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /LICENSE: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE 2 | Version 3, 29 June 2007 3 | 4 | Copyright (C) 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc. 5 | Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies 6 | of this license document, but changing it is not allowed. 7 | 8 | Preamble 9 | 10 | The GNU General Public License is a free, copyleft license for 11 | software and other kinds of works. 12 | 13 | The licenses for most software and other practical works are designed 14 | to take away your freedom to share and change the works. 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EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT 593 | HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY 594 | OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, 595 | THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 596 | PURPOSE. THE ENTIRE RISK AS TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM 597 | IS WITH YOU. SHOULD THE PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF 598 | ALL NECESSARY SERVICING, REPAIR OR CORRECTION. 599 | 600 | 16. Limitation of Liability. 601 | 602 | IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING 603 | WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MODIFIES AND/OR CONVEYS 604 | THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES, INCLUDING ANY 605 | GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THE 606 | USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO LOSS OF 607 | DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY YOU OR THIRD 608 | PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER PROGRAMS), 609 | EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 610 | SUCH DAMAGES. 611 | 612 | 17. Interpretation of Sections 15 and 16. 613 | 614 | If the disclaimer of warranty and limitation of liability provided 615 | above cannot be given local legal effect according to their terms, 616 | reviewing courts shall apply local law that most closely approximates 617 | an absolute waiver of all civil liability in connection with the 618 | Program, unless a warranty or assumption of liability accompanies a 619 | copy of the Program in return for a fee. 620 | 621 | END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS 622 | 623 | How to Apply These Terms to Your New Programs 624 | 625 | If you develop a new program, and you want it to be of the greatest 626 | possible use to the public, the best way to achieve this is to make it 627 | free software which everyone can redistribute and change under these terms. 628 | 629 | To do so, attach the following notices to the program. It is safest 630 | to attach them to the start of each source file to most effectively 631 | state the exclusion of warranty; and each file should have at least 632 | the "copyright" line and a pointer to where the full notice is found. 633 | 634 | 635 | Copyright (C) 636 | 637 | This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify 638 | it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by 639 | the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or 640 | (at your option) any later version. 641 | 642 | This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, 643 | but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of 644 | MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the 645 | GNU General Public License for more details. 646 | 647 | You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License 648 | along with this program. If not, see . 649 | 650 | Also add information on how to contact you by electronic and paper mail. 651 | 652 | If the program does terminal interaction, make it output a short 653 | notice like this when it starts in an interactive mode: 654 | 655 | Copyright (C) 656 | This program comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY; for details type `show w'. 657 | This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it 658 | under certain conditions; type `show c' for details. 659 | 660 | The hypothetical commands `show w' and `show c' should show the appropriate 661 | parts of the General Public License. Of course, your program's commands 662 | might be different; for a GUI interface, you would use an "about box". 663 | 664 | You should also get your employer (if you work as a programmer) or school, 665 | if any, to sign a "copyright disclaimer" for the program, if necessary. 666 | For more information on this, and how to apply and follow the GNU GPL, see 667 | . 668 | 669 | The GNU General Public License does not permit incorporating your program 670 | into proprietary programs. If your program is a subroutine library, you 671 | may consider it more useful to permit linking proprietary applications with 672 | the library. If this is what you want to do, use the GNU Lesser General 673 | Public License instead of this License. But first, please read 674 | . 675 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /LOL_BINs/proc_creation_windows_Dumpbin_LoLBin.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Dumpbin LOLBin use for proxying execution via link.exe 2 | id: c8cf90cc-61ac-4c59-ba8d-739ca0d4f392 3 | description: Using dumpbin.exe, a windows binary that is installed along side visual studio versions. When dumbin.exe is executed, 4 | it is calling link.exe without checking the legitimacy of the link.exe named binary in the same directory. 5 | status: experimental 6 | date: 2022/08/25 7 | author: \@kostastsale 8 | references: 9 | - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1560732860935729152 10 | logsource: 11 | category: process_creation 12 | product: windows 13 | detection: 14 | selection1: 15 | Image|endswith: 16 | - '\link.exe' 17 | ParentImage|endswith: 18 | - '\dumpbin.exe' 19 | filter: 20 | Image|endswith: 21 | - '\bin\hostx64\x64\link.exe' 22 | - '\bin\hostx86\x86\link.exe' 23 | ParentImage|endswith: 24 | - '\bin\hostx64\x64\dumpbin.exe' 25 | - '\bin\hostx86\x86\dumpbin.exe' 26 | condition: selection1 and not filter 27 | falsepositives: 28 | - Unlikely 29 | level: high 30 | tags: 31 | - attack.Defense Evasion 32 | - attack.T1218 33 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /LOL_BINs/proc_creation_windows_MSTeams_side-loading.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: MSTeams exe side-loading - Update.exe 2 | id: dafa6fd4-dcda-4ef2-81c9-4bf33ce4c299 3 | description: Detects execution of side-loaded executable via the update.exe, part microsoft teams' application binary. 4 | status: experimental 5 | date: 2022/01/12 6 | author: \@kostastsale 7 | references: 8 | - https://twitter.com/misconfig/status/1481198346379436035 9 | - https://twitter.com/Kostastsale/status/1481438427878858755 10 | - https://github.com/Squirrel/Squirrel.Windows/blob/0d1250aa6f0c25fe22e92add78af327d1277d97d/src/Update/Program.cs#L123 11 | logsource: 12 | category: process_creation 13 | product: windows 14 | detection: 15 | selection1: 16 | ParentCommandLine|contains|all: 17 | - 'AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\Update.exe' 18 | - '--processStart *.exe' 19 | ParentImage|endswith: 20 | - 'update.exe' 21 | filter: 22 | Image|endswith: 23 | - 'Teams.exe' 24 | condition: selection1 and not filter 25 | falsepositives: 26 | - Unlikely 27 | level: high 28 | tags: 29 | - attack.Defense Evasion 30 | - attack.T1218 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /LOL_BINs/proc_creation_windows_VSDiagnostics_LoLBin.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: VSDiagnostics used for proxying execution malicious binaries 2 | id: 81d761c8-ed08-4421-8206-8ff516e453bf 3 | description: > 4 | Detects the subvert execution of malicious payloads using vsdiagnostics.exe. VSDiagnostics.exe is an executable part of the Microsoft Visual Studio. 5 | Threat actors can use the start to start a new session in combination with the /launch and /launchargs parameters to execute a malicious payload on disk. 6 | status: experimental 7 | date: 2023/07/12 8 | author: '@kostastsale' 9 | references: 10 | - https://twitter.com/0xboku/status/1679200664013135872?s=61&t=6z39HX6rrsHrDBR6CqH8DQ 11 | logsource: 12 | category: process_creation 13 | product: windows 14 | detection: 15 | selection1: 16 | ParentImage|endswith: 17 | - '\VSDiagnostics.exe' 18 | ParentCommandLine|contains|all: 19 | - ' start ' 20 | - ' /launch:' 21 | condition: selection1 22 | falsepositives: 23 | - Uknown 24 | level: medium 25 | tags: 26 | - attack.defense_evasion 27 | - attack.T1218 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /LOL_BINs/proc_creation_windows_Wermgr_injection.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Wermgr.exe spawning without command line arguments 2 | id: 735e43b1-8533-4b37-91a6-5bf89a671884 3 | description: Wermgr.exe should not spawn without any command line arguments. Sometimes malware are using process injection to masquerade their malicious activities and evade detection. 4 | references: 5 | - https://x.com/Kostastsale/status/1570178125400776705 6 | status: experimental 7 | date: 2022/09/14 8 | author: '@kostastsale' 9 | logsource: 10 | category: process_creation 11 | product: windows 12 | detection: 13 | selection1: 14 | Image|endswith: 15 | - '\wermgr.exe' 16 | CommandLine|endswith: 17 | - '\wermgr.exe' 18 | condition: selection1 19 | falsepositives: 20 | - Unlikely 21 | level: high 22 | tags: 23 | - attack.Defense Evasion 24 | - attack.T1218 25 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /LOL_BINs/proc_creation_windows_appcmd.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Extract Credentials From IIS Application Pool Configuration Files 2 | id: cf6cd798-1933-4eb1-9ab7-2c9acc237104 3 | description: Detects the execution of appcmd.exe that is used to extract credentials from configuration files. IIS application pools can run as different users for security and isolation purposes. When a user is specified for the application pool, their credentials are stored in plaintext in the configuration file. 4 | status: experimental 5 | date: 2023/09/04 6 | author: \@kostastsale 7 | references: 8 | - https://github.com/mpgn/CrackMapExec/pull/62 9 | logsource: 10 | category: process_creation 11 | product: windows 12 | detection: 13 | selection1: 14 | Image|endswith: 15 | - '\appcmd.exe' 16 | ParentImage|endswith: 17 | - '\powershell.exe' 18 | - '\cmd.exe' 19 | CommandLine|contains|all: 20 | - ' list ' 21 | - ' apppool ' 22 | - '/@t*:' 23 | condition: selection1 24 | falsepositives: 25 | - Unlikely 26 | level: high 27 | tags: 28 | - attack.CredentialAccess 29 | - attack.T1552.001 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /LOL_BINs/proc_creation_windows_cmstp_fake_profiles.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: CMSTP installation of malicious code 2 | id: 64a31e54-0cf3-4130-84c0-4ea972b88628 3 | description: Detects the execution of CMSTP that is used install fake Connection Manager Profiles via contains via .INF files that resign on a temp location on disk and contains instructions for how the Connection Manager should install the profile. The .INF files could contain malicious code under the section RunPreSetupCommandsSection which is the commands to run before setup. 4 | status: experimental 5 | date: 2023/08/10 6 | author: \@kostastsale 7 | references: 8 | - 9 | logsource: 10 | category: process_creation 11 | product: windows 12 | detection: 13 | selection1: 14 | Image|endswith: 15 | - '\cmstp.exe' 16 | CommandLine|contains|all: 17 | - ' /au ' 18 | - '\AppData\Local\Temp\' 19 | CommandLine|endswith: 20 | - '.inf' 21 | condition: selection1 22 | falsepositives: 23 | - Unlikely 24 | level: high 25 | tags: 26 | - attack.Defense Evasion 27 | - attack.T1218 28 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /LOL_BINs/proc_creation_windows_devdrv_bypass_fsutil.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Enabling Dev Drive With Disabled AV 2 | id: 53394955-c956-4e36-8fa6-24c8d8b3dbaf 3 | description: Detects the execution of fsutil.exe to enable a Dev Drive with an argument that disables the AV on the created drive. This technique is available starting with Windows 11. 4 | status: experimental 5 | date: 2023/11/05 6 | author: \@kostastsale 7 | references: 8 | - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1720419490519752955 9 | logsource: 10 | category: process_creation 11 | product: windows 12 | detection: 13 | selection1: 14 | Image|endswith: 15 | - '\fsutil.exe' 16 | CommandLine|contains|all: 17 | - ' devdrv' 18 | - ' enable' 19 | - ' /disallowAv' 20 | condition: selection1 21 | falsepositives: 22 | - Unlikely 23 | level: high 24 | tags: 25 | - attack.defense.evasion 26 | - attack.T1562.001 27 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /LOL_BINs/proc_creation_windows_errorhandler_persistence.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Detection of Suspicious triggering of ErrorHandler.cmd Execution 2 | id: 26421df5-d394-4226-bcc5-0e846636acec 3 | status: experimental 4 | description: Detects the persistence mechanism of triggering ErrorHandler.cmd execution upon the execution of specific binaries inside the oobe directory. 5 | references: 6 | - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2022/01/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-135/ 7 | author: '@kostastsale' 8 | date: 2024/08/02 9 | tags: 10 | - attack.execution 11 | - attack.persistence 12 | logsource: 13 | category: process_creation 14 | product: windows 15 | detection: 16 | selection: 17 | CommandLine|endswith: 18 | - 'ErrorHandler.cmd' 19 | ParentImage|endswith: 20 | - '\System32\oobe\*.exe' 21 | condition: selection 22 | falsepositives: 23 | - Uknown 24 | level: high -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /LOL_BINs/proc_creation_windows_setup_pythonw.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Execute Python Scripts via Python Installer Binary 2 | id: 6c6b0b7a-481d-4aca-84be-963e6cd2e302 3 | description: Detects the execution of malicious Python scripts from the AppData directory after the execution of the setup.exe installation package. Some installation packages allow for post-installation scripts to be run. A malicious actor could modify these scripts or add their own to execute malicious actions after the legitimate software is installed. 4 | status: experimental 5 | date: 2023/10/26 6 | author: '@kostastsale' 7 | references: 8 | - https://twitter.com/xorJosh/status/1717504124764233944 9 | logsource: 10 | category: process_creation 11 | product: windows 12 | detection: 13 | selection1: 14 | Image|endswith: 15 | - '\pythonw.exe' 16 | ParentImage|endswith: 17 | - '\setup.exe' 18 | CommandLine|contains|all: 19 | - '\AppData\' 20 | selection2: 21 | CommandLine|endswith: 22 | - '.py' 23 | condition: selection1 and selection2 24 | falsepositives: 25 | - Unlikely 26 | level: high 27 | tags: 28 | - attack.Defense.Evasion 29 | - attack.T1202 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /LOL_BINs/proc_creation_windows_udl_exec.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Suspicious Rundll32 Execution of UDL File 2 | id: 0ea52357-cd59-4340-9981-c46c7e900428 3 | status: experimental 4 | description: Detects the execution of rundll32.exe with the oledb32.dll library to open a UDL file. Threat actors can abuse the technique as a phishing vector to capture authentication credentials or other sensitive data. 5 | author: '@kostastsale' 6 | date: 2024-08-16 7 | references: 8 | - https://trustedsec.com/blog/oops-i-udld-it-again 9 | tags: 10 | - attack.execution 11 | - attack.t1218.011 12 | - attack.t1071 13 | logsource: 14 | category: process_creation 15 | product: windows 16 | detection: 17 | selection1: 18 | ParentImage|endswith: 19 | - '\explorer.exe' 20 | Image|endswith: 21 | - '\rundll32.exe' 22 | CommandLine|contains|all: 23 | - 'oledb32.dll' 24 | - ',OpenDSLFile ' 25 | - '\\Users\\*\\Downloads\\' # you can adjust the path to the download directory or other directories accroding to your environment 26 | selection2: 27 | CommandLine|endswith: 28 | - '.udl' 29 | condition: selection1 and selection2 30 | falsepositives: 31 | - UDL files serve as a convenient and flexible tool for managing and testing database connections in various development and administrative scenarios 32 | level: medium 33 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /LOL_BINs/registry_set_devdrv_bypass_registry.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Disabled AV On Dev Drive via Registry 2 | id: 31e124fb-5dc4-42a0-83b3-44a69c77b271 3 | description: Detects the execution registry change that enables a Dev Drive without allowing AV to access the created drive. This technique is available starting with Windows 11. 4 | status: experimental 5 | date: 2023/11/05 6 | author: \@kostastsale 7 | references: 8 | - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1720419490519752955 9 | logsource: 10 | category: registry_set 11 | product: windows 12 | detection: 13 | selection1: 14 | TargetObject|contains: 15 | - '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\' 16 | TargetObject|endswith: 17 | - 'FltmgrDevDriveAllowAntivirusFilter' 18 | Details|endswith: '0' 19 | condition: selection1 20 | falsepositives: 21 | - Unlikely 22 | level: high 23 | tags: 24 | - attack.defense.evasion 25 | - attack.T1562.001 26 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /MISC/proc_creation_windows_AMSI_Bypass.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: PowerShell AMSI Bypass Pattern 2 | id: 4f7f3162-d6e7-48f7-bbf9-2a56eb6a1ff2 3 | status: experimental 4 | description: Detects attempts to disable AMSI in the commandline. It is possible to bypass AMSI by disabling it before loading the main payload. 5 | author: '@Kostastsale' 6 | references: 7 | - https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2018/06/exploring-powershell-amsi-and-logging-evasion/ 8 | date: 2022/11/04 9 | tags: 10 | - attack.defense_evasion 11 | - attack.t1562.001 12 | - attack.execution 13 | logsource: 14 | product: windows 15 | category: process_creation 16 | detection: 17 | selection1: 18 | Image|endswith: 19 | - '\powershell.exe' 20 | - '\pwsh.exe' 21 | - '\powershell_ise.exe' 22 | CommandLine|contains|all: 23 | - '[Ref].Assembly.GetType' 24 | - 'SetValue($null,$true)' 25 | - 'NonPublic,Static' 26 | condition: selection1 27 | falsepositives: 28 | - Unknown 29 | level: high 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /MISC/proc_creation_windows_AlltTheEmojis.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Using Emojis to evade detection 2 | id: 4a30ac0c-b9d6-4e01-b71a-5f851bbf4259 3 | status: Experimental (depending how many more emojis are out there) 4 | description: Detects emojis in the command line 5 | author: \@Kostastsale, \@TheDFIRReport 6 | references: 7 | - TheDFIRReport 8 | date: 2022/12/05 9 | logsource: 10 | product: windows 11 | category: process_creation 12 | detection: 13 | selection1: 14 | CommandLine|contains: 15 | - '😀' 16 | - '😃' 17 | - '😄' 18 | - '😁' 19 | - '😆' 20 | - '😅' 21 | - '😂' 22 | - '🤣' 23 | - '🥲' 24 | - '🥹' 25 | - '☺️' 26 | - '😊' 27 | - '😇' 28 | - '🙂' 29 | - '🙃' 30 | - '😉' 31 | - '😌' 32 | - '😍' 33 | - '🥰' 34 | - '😘' 35 | - '😗' 36 | - '😙' 37 | - '😚' 38 | - '😋' 39 | - '😛' 40 | - '😝' 41 | - '😜' 42 | - '🤪' 43 | - '🤨' 44 | - '🧐' 45 | - '🤓' 46 | - '😎' 47 | - '🥸' 48 | - '🤩' 49 | - '🥳' 50 | - '😏' 51 | - '😒' 52 | - '😞' 53 | - '😔' 54 | - '😟' 55 | - '😕' 56 | - '🙁' 57 | - '☹️' 58 | - '😣' 59 | - '😖' 60 | - '😫' 61 | - '😩' 62 | - '🥺' 63 | - '😢' 64 | - '😭' 65 | - '😮‍💨' 66 | - '😤' 67 | - '😠' 68 | - '😡' 69 | - '🤬' 70 | - '🤯' 71 | - '😳' 72 | - '🥵' 73 | - '🥶' 74 | - '😱' 75 | - '😨' 76 | - '😰' 77 | - '😥' 78 | - '😓' 79 | - '🫣' 80 | - '🤗' 81 | - '🫡' 82 | - '🤔' 83 | - '🫢' 84 | - '🤭' 85 | - '🤫' 86 | - '🤥' 87 | - '😶' 88 | - '😶‍🌫️' 89 | - '😐' 90 | - '😑' 91 | - '😬' 92 | - '🫠' 93 | - '🙄' 94 | - '😯' 95 | - '😦' 96 | - '😧' 97 | - '😮' 98 | - '😲' 99 | - '🥱' 100 | - '😴' 101 | - '🤤' 102 | - '😪' 103 | - '😵' 104 | - '😵‍💫' 105 | - '🫥' 106 | - '🤐' 107 | - '🥴' 108 | - '🤢' 109 | - '🤮' 110 | - '🤧' 111 | - '😷' 112 | - '🤒' 113 | - '🤕' 114 | - '🤑' 115 | - '🤠' 116 | - '😈' 117 | - '👿' 118 | - '👹' 119 | - '👺' 120 | - '🤡' 121 | - '💩' 122 | - '👻' 123 | - '💀' 124 | - '☠️' 125 | - '👽' 126 | - '👾' 127 | - '🤖' 128 | - '🎃' 129 | - '😺' 130 | - '😸' 131 | - '😹' 132 | - '😻' 133 | - '😼' 134 | - '😽' 135 | - '🙀' 136 | - '😿' 137 | - '😾' 138 | - '👋' 139 | - '🤚' 140 | - '🖐' 141 | - '✋' 142 | - '🖖' 143 | - '👌' 144 | - '🤌' 145 | - '🤏' 146 | - '✌️' 147 | - '🤞' 148 | - '🫰' 149 | - '🤟' 150 | - '🤘' 151 | - '🤙' 152 | - '🫵' 153 | - '🫱' 154 | - '🫲' 155 | - '🫳' 156 | - '🫴' 157 | - '👈' 158 | - '👉' 159 | - '👆' 160 | - '🖕' 161 | - '👇' 162 | - '☝️' 163 | - '👍' 164 | - '👎' 165 | - '✊' 166 | - '👊' 167 | - '🤛' 168 | - '🤜' 169 | - '👏' 170 | - '🫶' 171 | - '🙌' 172 | - '👐' 173 | - '🤲' 174 | - '🤝' 175 | - '🙏' 176 | - '✍️' 177 | - '💅' 178 | - '🤳' 179 | - '💪' 180 | - '🦾' 181 | - '🦵' 182 | - '🦿' 183 | - '🦶' 184 | - '👣' 185 | - '👂' 186 | - '🦻' 187 | - '👃' 188 | - '🫀' 189 | - '🫁' 190 | - '🧠' 191 | - '🦷' 192 | - '🦴' 193 | - '👀' 194 | - '👁' 195 | - '👅' 196 | - '👄' 197 | - '🫦' 198 | - '💋' 199 | - '🩸' 200 | - '👶' 201 | - '👧' 202 | - '🧒' 203 | - '👦' 204 | - '👩' 205 | - '🧑' 206 | - '👨' 207 | - '👩‍🦱' 208 | - '🧑‍🦱' 209 | - '👨‍🦱' 210 | - '👩‍🦰' 211 | - '🧑‍🦰' 212 | - '👨‍🦰' 213 | - '👱‍♀️' 214 | - '👱' 215 | - '👱‍♂️' 216 | - '👩‍🦳' 217 | - '🧑‍🦳' 218 | - '👨‍🦳' 219 | - '👩‍🦲' 220 | - '🧑‍🦲' 221 | - '👨‍🦲' 222 | - '🧔‍♀️' 223 | - '🧔' 224 | - '🧔‍♂️' 225 | - '👵' 226 | - '🧓' 227 | - '👴' 228 | - '👲' 229 | - '👳‍♀️' 230 | - '👳' 231 | - '👳‍♂️' 232 | - '🧕' 233 | - '👮‍♀️' 234 | - '👮' 235 | - '👮‍♂️' 236 | - '👷‍♀️' 237 | - '👷' 238 | - '👷‍♂️' 239 | - '💂‍♀️' 240 | - '💂' 241 | - '💂‍♂️' 242 | - '🕵️‍♀️' 243 | - '🕵️' 244 | - '🕵️‍♂️' 245 | - '👩‍⚕️' 246 | - '🧑‍⚕️' 247 | - '👨‍⚕️' 248 | - '👩‍🌾' 249 | - '🧑‍🌾' 250 | - '👨‍🌾' 251 | - '👩‍🍳' 252 | - '🧑‍🍳' 253 | - '👨‍🍳' 254 | - '👩‍🎓' 255 | - '🧑‍🎓' 256 | - '👨‍🎓' 257 | - '👩‍🎤' 258 | - '🧑‍🎤' 259 | - '👨‍🎤' 260 | - '👩‍🏫' 261 | - '🧑‍🏫' 262 | - '👨‍🏫' 263 | - '👩‍🏭' 264 | - '🧑‍🏭' 265 | - '👨‍🏭' 266 | - '👩‍💻' 267 | - '🧑‍💻' 268 | - '👨‍💻' 269 | - '👩‍💼' 270 | - '🧑‍💼' 271 | - '👨‍💼' 272 | - '👩‍🔧' 273 | - '🧑‍🔧' 274 | - '👨‍🔧' 275 | - '👩‍🔬' 276 | - '🧑‍🔬' 277 | - '👨‍🔬' 278 | - '👩‍🎨' 279 | - '🧑‍🎨' 280 | - '👨‍🎨' 281 | - '👩‍🚒' 282 | - '🧑‍🚒' 283 | - '👨‍🚒' 284 | - '👩‍✈️' 285 | - '🧑‍✈️' 286 | - '👨‍✈️' 287 | - '👩‍🚀' 288 | - '🧑‍🚀' 289 | - '👨‍🚀' 290 | - '👩‍⚖️' 291 | - '🧑‍⚖️' 292 | - '👨‍⚖️' 293 | - '👰‍♀️' 294 | - '👰' 295 | - '👰‍♂️' 296 | - '🤵‍♀️' 297 | - '🤵' 298 | - '🤵‍♂️' 299 | - '👸' 300 | - '🫅' 301 | - '🤴' 302 | - '🥷' 303 | - '🦸‍♀️' 304 | - '🦸' 305 | - '🦸‍♂️' 306 | - '🦹‍♀️' 307 | - '🦹' 308 | - '🦹‍♂️' 309 | - '🤶' 310 | - '🧑‍🎄' 311 | - '🎅' 312 | - '🧙‍♀️' 313 | - '🧙' 314 | - '🧙‍♂️' 315 | - '🧝‍♀️' 316 | - '🧝' 317 | - '🧝‍♂️' 318 | - '🧛‍♀️' 319 | - '🧛' 320 | - '🧛‍♂️' 321 | - '🧟‍♀️' 322 | - '🧟' 323 | - '🧟‍♂️' 324 | - '🧞‍♀️' 325 | - '🧞' 326 | - '🧞‍♂️' 327 | - '🧜‍♀️' 328 | - '🧜' 329 | - '🧜‍♂️' 330 | - '🧚‍♀️' 331 | - '🧚' 332 | - '🧚‍♂️' 333 | - '🧌' 334 | - '👼' 335 | - '🤰' 336 | - '🫄' 337 | - '🫃' 338 | - '🤱' 339 | - '👩‍🍼' 340 | - '🧑‍🍼' 341 | - '👨‍🍼' 342 | - '🙇‍♀️' 343 | - '🙇' 344 | - '🙇‍♂️' 345 | - '💁‍♀️' 346 | - '💁' 347 | - '💁‍♂️' 348 | - '🙅‍♀️' 349 | - '🙅' 350 | - '🙅‍♂️' 351 | - '🙆‍♀️' 352 | - '🙆' 353 | - '🙆‍♂️' 354 | - '🙋‍♀️' 355 | - '🙋' 356 | - '🙋‍♂️' 357 | - '🧏‍♀️' 358 | - '🧏' 359 | - '🧏‍♂️' 360 | - '🤦‍♀️' 361 | - '🤦' 362 | - '🤦‍♂️' 363 | - '🤷‍♀️' 364 | - '🤷' 365 | - '🤷‍♂️' 366 | - '🙎‍♀️' 367 | - '🙎' 368 | - '🙎‍♂️' 369 | - '🙍‍♀️' 370 | - '🙍' 371 | - '🙍‍♂️' 372 | - '💇‍♀️' 373 | - '💇' 374 | - '💇‍♂️' 375 | - '💆‍♀️' 376 | - '💆' 377 | - '💆‍♂️' 378 | - '🧖‍♀️' 379 | - '🧖' 380 | - '🧖‍♂️' 381 | - '💅' 382 | - '🤳' 383 | - '💃' 384 | - '🕺' 385 | - '👯‍♀️' 386 | - '👯' 387 | - '👯‍♂️' 388 | - '🕴' 389 | - '👩‍🦽' 390 | - '🧑‍🦽' 391 | - '👨‍🦽' 392 | - '👩‍🦼' 393 | - '🧑‍🦼' 394 | - '👨‍🦼' 395 | - '🚶‍♀️' 396 | - '🚶' 397 | - '🚶‍♂️' 398 | - '👩‍🦯' 399 | - '🧑‍🦯' 400 | - '👨‍🦯' 401 | - '🧎‍♀️' 402 | - '🧎' 403 | - '🧎‍♂️' 404 | - '🏃‍♀️' 405 | - '🏃' 406 | - '🏃‍♂️' 407 | - '🧍‍♀️' 408 | - '🧍' 409 | - '🧍‍♂️' 410 | - '👭' 411 | - '🧑‍🤝‍🧑' 412 | - '👬' 413 | - '👫' 414 | - '👩‍❤️‍👩' 415 | - '💑' 416 | - '👨‍❤️‍👨' 417 | - '👩‍❤️‍👨' 418 | - '👩‍❤️‍💋‍👩' 419 | - '💏' 420 | - '👨‍❤️‍💋‍👨' 421 | - '👩‍❤️‍💋‍👨' 422 | - '👪' 423 | - '👨‍👩‍👦' 424 | - '👨‍👩‍👧' 425 | - '👨‍👩‍👧‍👦' 426 | - '👨‍👩‍👦‍👦' 427 | - '👨‍👩‍👧‍👧' 428 | - '👨‍👨‍👦' 429 | - '👨‍👨‍👧' 430 | - '👨‍👨‍👧‍👦' 431 | - '👨‍👨‍👦‍👦' 432 | - '👨‍👨‍👧‍👧' 433 | - '👩‍👩‍👦' 434 | - '👩‍👩‍👧' 435 | - '👩‍👩‍👧‍👦' 436 | - '👩‍👩‍👦‍👦' 437 | - '👩‍👩‍👧‍👧' 438 | - '👨‍👦' 439 | - '👨‍👦‍👦' 440 | - '👨‍👧' 441 | - '👨‍👧‍👦' 442 | - '👨‍👧‍👧' 443 | - '👩‍👦' 444 | - '👩‍👦‍👦' 445 | - '👩‍👧' 446 | - '👩‍👧‍👦' 447 | - '👩‍👧‍👧' 448 | - '🗣' 449 | - '👤' 450 | - '👥' 451 | - '🫂' 452 | - '🧳' 453 | - '🌂' 454 | - '☂️' 455 | - '🧵' 456 | - '🪡' 457 | - '🪢' 458 | - '🧶' 459 | - '👓' 460 | - '🕶' 461 | - '🥽' 462 | - '🥼' 463 | - '🦺' 464 | - '👔' 465 | - '👕' 466 | - '👖' 467 | - '🧣' 468 | - '🧤' 469 | - '🧥' 470 | - '🧦' 471 | - '👗' 472 | - '👘' 473 | - '🥻' 474 | - '🩴' 475 | - '🩱' 476 | - '🩲' 477 | - '🩳' 478 | - '👙' 479 | - '👚' 480 | - '👛' 481 | - '👜' 482 | - '👝' 483 | - '🎒' 484 | - '👞' 485 | - '👟' 486 | - '🥾' 487 | - '🥿' 488 | - '👠' 489 | - '👡' 490 | - '🩰' 491 | - '👢' 492 | - '👑' 493 | - '👒' 494 | - '🎩' 495 | - '🎓' 496 | - '🧢' 497 | - '⛑' 498 | - '🪖' 499 | - '💄' 500 | - '💍' 501 | - '💼' 502 | - '👋🏻' 503 | - '🤚🏻' 504 | - '🖐🏻' 505 | - '✋🏻' 506 | - '🖖🏻' 507 | - '👌🏻' 508 | - '🤌🏻' 509 | - '🤏🏻' 510 | - '✌🏻' 511 | - '🤞🏻' 512 | - '🫰🏻' 513 | - '🤟🏻' 514 | - '🤘🏻' 515 | - '🤙🏻' 516 | - '🫵🏻' 517 | - '🫱🏻' 518 | - '🫲🏻' 519 | - '🫳🏻' 520 | - '🫴🏻' 521 | - '👈🏻' 522 | - '👉🏻' 523 | - '👆🏻' 524 | - '🖕🏻' 525 | - '👇🏻' 526 | - '☝🏻' 527 | - '👍🏻' 528 | - '👎🏻' 529 | - '✊🏻' 530 | - '👊🏻' 531 | - '🤛🏻' 532 | - '🤜🏻' 533 | - '👏🏻' 534 | - '🫶🏻' 535 | - '🙌🏻' 536 | - '👐🏻' 537 | - '🤲🏻' 538 | - '🙏🏻' 539 | - '✍🏻' 540 | - '💅🏻' 541 | - '🤳🏻' 542 | - '💪🏻' 543 | - '🦵🏻' 544 | - '🦶🏻' 545 | - '👂🏻' 546 | - '🦻🏻' 547 | - '👃🏻' 548 | - '👶🏻' 549 | - '👧🏻' 550 | - '🧒🏻' 551 | - '👦🏻' 552 | - '👩🏻' 553 | - '🧑🏻' 554 | - '👨🏻' 555 | - '👩🏻‍🦱' 556 | - '🧑🏻‍🦱' 557 | - '👨🏻‍🦱' 558 | - '👩🏻‍🦰' 559 | - '🧑🏻‍🦰' 560 | - '👨🏻‍🦰' 561 | - '👱🏻‍♀️' 562 | - '👱🏻' 563 | - '👱🏻‍♂️' 564 | - '👩🏻‍🦳' 565 | - '🧑🏻‍🦳' 566 | - '👨🏻‍🦳' 567 | - '👩🏻‍🦲' 568 | - '🧑🏻‍🦲' 569 | - '👨🏻‍🦲' 570 | - '🧔🏻‍♀️' 571 | - '🧔🏻' 572 | - '🧔🏻‍♂️' 573 | - '👵🏻' 574 | - '🧓🏻' 575 | - '👴🏻' 576 | - '👲🏻' 577 | - '👳🏻‍♀️' 578 | - '👳🏻' 579 | - '👳🏻‍♂️' 580 | - '🧕🏻' 581 | - '👮🏻‍♀️' 582 | - '👮🏻' 583 | - '👮🏻‍♂️' 584 | - '👷🏻‍♀️' 585 | - '👷🏻' 586 | - '👷🏻‍♂️' 587 | - '💂🏻‍♀️' 588 | - '💂🏻' 589 | - '💂🏻‍♂️' 590 | - '🕵🏻‍♀️' 591 | - '🕵🏻' 592 | - '🕵🏻‍♂️' 593 | - '👩🏻‍⚕️' 594 | - '🧑🏻‍⚕️' 595 | - '👨🏻‍⚕️' 596 | - '👩🏻‍🌾' 597 | - '🧑🏻‍🌾' 598 | - '👨🏻‍🌾' 599 | - '👩🏻‍🍳' 600 | - '🧑🏻‍🍳' 601 | - '👨🏻‍🍳' 602 | - '👩🏻‍🎓' 603 | - '🧑🏻‍🎓' 604 | - '👨🏻‍🎓' 605 | - '👩🏻‍🎤' 606 | - '🧑🏻‍🎤' 607 | - '👨🏻‍🎤' 608 | - '👩🏻‍🏫' 609 | - '🧑🏻‍🏫' 610 | - '👨🏻‍🏫' 611 | - '👩🏻‍🏭' 612 | - '🧑🏻‍🏭' 613 | - '👨🏻‍🏭' 614 | - '👩🏻‍💻' 615 | - '🧑🏻‍💻' 616 | - '👨🏻‍💻' 617 | - '👩🏻‍💼' 618 | - '🧑🏻‍💼' 619 | - '👨🏻‍💼' 620 | - '👩🏻‍🔧' 621 | - '🧑🏻‍🔧' 622 | - '👨🏻‍🔧' 623 | - '👩🏻‍🔬' 624 | - '🧑🏻‍🔬' 625 | - '👨🏻‍🔬' 626 | - '👩🏻‍🎨' 627 | - '🧑🏻‍🎨' 628 | - '👨🏻‍🎨' 629 | - '👩🏻‍🚒' 630 | - '🧑🏻‍🚒' 631 | - '👨🏻‍🚒' 632 | - '👩🏻‍✈️' 633 | - '🧑🏻‍✈️' 634 | - '👨🏻‍✈️' 635 | - '👩🏻‍🚀' 636 | - '🧑🏻‍🚀' 637 | - '👨🏻‍🚀' 638 | - '👩🏻‍⚖️' 639 | - '🧑🏻‍⚖️' 640 | - '👨🏻‍⚖️' 641 | - '👰🏻‍♀️' 642 | - '👰🏻' 643 | - '👰🏻‍♂️' 644 | - '🤵🏻‍♀️' 645 | - '🤵🏻' 646 | - '🤵🏻‍♂️' 647 | - '👸🏻' 648 | - '🫅🏻' 649 | - '🤴🏻' 650 | - '🥷🏻' 651 | - '🦸🏻‍♀️' 652 | - '🦸🏻' 653 | - '🦸🏻‍♂️' 654 | - '🦹🏻‍♀️' 655 | - '🦹🏻' 656 | - '🦹🏻‍♂️' 657 | - '🤶🏻' 658 | - '🧑🏻‍🎄' 659 | - '🎅🏻' 660 | - '🧙🏻‍♀️' 661 | - '🧙🏻' 662 | - '🧙🏻‍♂️' 663 | - '🧝🏻‍♀️' 664 | - '🧝🏻' 665 | - '🧝🏻‍♂️' 666 | - '🧛🏻‍♀️' 667 | - '🧛🏻' 668 | - '🧛🏻‍♂️' 669 | - '🧜🏻‍♀️' 670 | - '🧜🏻' 671 | - '🧜🏻‍♂️' 672 | - '🧚🏻‍♀️' 673 | - '🧚🏻' 674 | - '🧚🏻‍♂️' 675 | - '👼🏻' 676 | - '🤰🏻' 677 | - '🫄🏻' 678 | - '🫃🏻' 679 | - '🤱🏻' 680 | - '👩🏻‍🍼' 681 | - '🧑🏻‍🍼' 682 | - '👨🏻‍🍼' 683 | - '🙇🏻‍♀️' 684 | - '🙇🏻' 685 | - '🙇🏻‍♂️' 686 | - '💁🏻‍♀️' 687 | - '💁🏻' 688 | - '💁🏻‍♂️' 689 | - '🙅🏻‍♀️' 690 | - '🙅🏻' 691 | - '🙅🏻‍♂️' 692 | - '🙆🏻‍♀️' 693 | - '🙆🏻' 694 | - '🙆🏻‍♂️' 695 | - '🙋🏻‍♀️' 696 | - '🙋🏻' 697 | - '🙋🏻‍♂️' 698 | - '🧏🏻‍♀️' 699 | - '🧏🏻' 700 | - '🧏🏻‍♂️' 701 | - '🤦🏻‍♀️' 702 | - '🤦🏻' 703 | - '🤦🏻‍♂️' 704 | - '🤷🏻‍♀️' 705 | - '🤷🏻' 706 | - '🤷🏻‍♂️' 707 | - '🙎🏻‍♀️' 708 | - '🙎🏻' 709 | - '🙎🏻‍♂️' 710 | - '🙍🏻‍♀️' 711 | - '🙍🏻' 712 | - '🙍🏻‍♂️' 713 | - '💇🏻‍♀️' 714 | - '💇🏻' 715 | - '💇🏻‍♂️' 716 | - '💆🏻‍♀️' 717 | - '💆🏻' 718 | - '💆🏻‍♂️' 719 | - '🧖🏻‍♀️' 720 | - '🧖🏻' 721 | - '🧖🏻‍♂️' 722 | - '💃🏻' 723 | - '🕺🏻' 724 | - '🕴🏻' 725 | - '👩🏻‍🦽' 726 | - '🧑🏻‍🦽' 727 | - '👨🏻‍🦽' 728 | - '👩🏻‍🦼' 729 | - '🧑🏻‍🦼' 730 | - '👨🏻‍🦼' 731 | - '🚶🏻‍♀️' 732 | - '🚶🏻' 733 | - '🚶🏻‍♂️' 734 | - '👩🏻‍🦯' 735 | - '🧑🏻‍🦯' 736 | - '👨🏻‍🦯' 737 | - '🧎🏻‍♀️' 738 | - '🧎🏻' 739 | - '🧎🏻‍♂️' 740 | - '🏃🏻‍♀️' 741 | - '🏃🏻' 742 | - '🏃🏻‍♂️' 743 | - '🧍🏻‍♀️' 744 | - '🧍🏻' 745 | - '🧍🏻‍♂️' 746 | - '👭🏻' 747 | - '🧑🏻‍🤝‍🧑🏻' 748 | - '👬🏻' 749 | - '👫🏻' 750 | - '🧗🏻‍♀️' 751 | - '🧗🏻' 752 | - '🧗🏻‍♂️' 753 | - '🏇🏻' 754 | - '🏂🏻' 755 | - '🏌🏻‍♀️' 756 | - '🏌🏻' 757 | - '🏌🏻‍♂️' 758 | - '🏄🏻‍♀️' 759 | - '🏄🏻' 760 | - '🏄🏻‍♂️' 761 | - '🚣🏻‍♀️' 762 | - '🚣🏻' 763 | - '🚣🏻‍♂️' 764 | - '🏊🏻‍♀️' 765 | - '🏊🏻' 766 | - '🏊🏻‍♂️' 767 | - '⛹🏻‍♀️' 768 | - '⛹🏻' 769 | - '⛹🏻‍♂️' 770 | - '🏋🏻‍♀️' 771 | - '🏋🏻' 772 | - '🏋🏻‍♂️' 773 | - '🚴🏻‍♀️' 774 | - '🚴🏻' 775 | - '🚴🏻‍♂️' 776 | - '🚵🏻‍♀️' 777 | - '🚵🏻' 778 | - '🚵🏻‍♂️' 779 | - '🤸🏻‍♀️' 780 | - '🤸🏻' 781 | - '🤸🏻‍♂️' 782 | - '🤽🏻‍♀️' 783 | - '🤽🏻' 784 | - '🤽🏻‍♂️' 785 | - '🤾🏻‍♀️' 786 | - '🤾🏻' 787 | - '🤾🏻‍♂️' 788 | - '🤹🏻‍♀️' 789 | - '🤹🏻' 790 | - '🤹🏻‍♂️' 791 | - '🧘🏻‍♀️' 792 | - '🧘🏻' 793 | - '🧘🏻‍♂️' 794 | - '🛀🏻' 795 | - '🛌🏻' 796 | - '👋🏼' 797 | - '🤚🏼' 798 | - '🖐🏼' 799 | - '✋🏼' 800 | - '🖖🏼' 801 | - '👌🏼' 802 | - '🤌🏼' 803 | - '🤏🏼' 804 | - '✌🏼' 805 | - '🤞🏼' 806 | - '🫰🏼' 807 | - '🤟🏼' 808 | - '🤘🏼' 809 | - '🤙🏼' 810 | - '🫵🏼' 811 | - '🫱🏼' 812 | - '🫲🏼' 813 | - '🫳🏼' 814 | - '🫴🏼' 815 | - '👈🏼' 816 | - '👉🏼' 817 | - '👆🏼' 818 | - '🖕🏼' 819 | - '👇🏼' 820 | - '☝🏼' 821 | - '👍🏼' 822 | - '👎🏼' 823 | - '✊🏼' 824 | - '👊🏼' 825 | - '🤛🏼' 826 | - '🤜🏼' 827 | - '👏🏼' 828 | - '🫶🏼' 829 | - '🙌🏼' 830 | - '👐🏼' 831 | - '🤲🏼' 832 | - '🙏🏼' 833 | - '✍🏼' 834 | - '💅🏼' 835 | - '🤳🏼' 836 | - '💪🏼' 837 | - '🦵🏼' 838 | - '🦶🏼' 839 | - '👂🏼' 840 | - '🦻🏼' 841 | - '👃🏼' 842 | - '👶🏼' 843 | - '👧🏼' 844 | - '🧒🏼' 845 | - '👦🏼' 846 | - '👩🏼' 847 | - '🧑🏼' 848 | - '👨🏼' 849 | - '👩🏼‍🦱' 850 | - '🧑🏼‍🦱' 851 | - '👨🏼‍🦱' 852 | - '👩🏼‍🦰' 853 | - '🧑🏼‍🦰' 854 | - '👨🏼‍🦰' 855 | - '👱🏼‍♀️' 856 | - '👱🏼' 857 | - '👱🏼‍♂️' 858 | - '👩🏼‍🦳' 859 | - '🧑🏼‍🦳' 860 | - '👨🏼‍🦳' 861 | - '👩🏼‍🦲' 862 | - '🧑🏼‍🦲' 863 | - '👨🏼‍🦲' 864 | - '🧔🏼‍♀️' 865 | - '🧔🏼' 866 | - '🧔🏼‍♂️' 867 | - '👵🏼' 868 | - '🧓🏼' 869 | - '👴🏼' 870 | - '👲🏼' 871 | - '👳🏼‍♀️' 872 | - '👳🏼' 873 | - '👳🏼‍♂️' 874 | - '🧕🏼' 875 | - '👮🏼‍♀️' 876 | - '👮🏼' 877 | - '👮🏼‍♂️' 878 | - '👷🏼‍♀️' 879 | - '👷🏼' 880 | - '👷🏼‍♂️' 881 | - '💂🏼‍♀️' 882 | - '💂🏼' 883 | - '💂🏼‍♂️' 884 | - '🕵🏼‍♀️' 885 | - '🕵🏼' 886 | - '🕵🏼‍♂️' 887 | - '👩🏼‍⚕️' 888 | - '🧑🏼‍⚕️' 889 | - '👨🏼‍⚕️' 890 | - '👩🏼‍🌾' 891 | - '🧑🏼‍🌾' 892 | - '👨🏼‍🌾' 893 | - '👩🏼‍🍳' 894 | - '🧑🏼‍🍳' 895 | - '👨🏼‍🍳' 896 | - '👩🏼‍🎓' 897 | - '🧑🏼‍🎓' 898 | - '👨🏼‍🎓' 899 | - '👩🏼‍🎤' 900 | - '🧑🏼‍🎤' 901 | - '👨🏼‍🎤' 902 | - '👩🏼‍🏫' 903 | - '🧑🏼‍🏫' 904 | - '👨🏼‍🏫' 905 | - '👩🏼‍🏭' 906 | - '🧑🏼‍🏭' 907 | - '👨🏼‍🏭' 908 | - '👩🏼‍💻' 909 | - '🧑🏼‍💻' 910 | - '👨🏼‍💻' 911 | - '👩🏼‍💼' 912 | - '🧑🏼‍💼' 913 | - '👨🏼‍💼' 914 | - '👩🏼‍🔧' 915 | - '🧑🏼‍🔧' 916 | - '👨🏼‍🔧' 917 | - '👩🏼‍🔬' 918 | - '🧑🏼‍🔬' 919 | - '👨🏼‍🔬' 920 | - '👩🏼‍🎨' 921 | - '🧑🏼‍🎨' 922 | - '👨🏼‍🎨' 923 | - '👩🏼‍🚒' 924 | - '🧑🏼‍🚒' 925 | - '👨🏼‍🚒' 926 | - '👩🏼‍✈️' 927 | - '🧑🏼‍✈️' 928 | - '👨🏼‍✈️' 929 | - '👩🏼‍🚀' 930 | - '🧑🏼‍🚀' 931 | - '👨🏼‍🚀' 932 | - '👩🏼‍⚖️' 933 | - '🧑🏼‍⚖️' 934 | - '👨🏼‍⚖️' 935 | - '👰🏼‍♀️' 936 | - '👰🏼' 937 | - '👰🏼‍♂️' 938 | - '🤵🏼‍♀️' 939 | - '🤵🏼' 940 | - '🤵🏼‍♂️' 941 | - '👸🏼' 942 | - '🫅🏼' 943 | - '🤴🏼' 944 | - '🥷🏼' 945 | - '🦸🏼‍♀️' 946 | - '🦸🏼' 947 | - '🦸🏼‍♂️' 948 | - '🦹🏼‍♀️' 949 | - '🦹🏼' 950 | - '🦹🏼‍♂️' 951 | - '🤶🏼' 952 | - '🧑🏼‍🎄' 953 | - '🎅🏼' 954 | - '🧙🏼‍♀️' 955 | - '🧙🏼' 956 | - '🧙🏼‍♂️' 957 | - '🧝🏼‍♀️' 958 | - '🧝🏼' 959 | - '🧝🏼‍♂️' 960 | - '🧛🏼‍♀️' 961 | - '🧛🏼' 962 | - '🧛🏼‍♂️' 963 | - '🧜🏼‍♀️' 964 | - '🧜🏼' 965 | - '🧜🏼‍♂️' 966 | - '🧚🏼‍♀️' 967 | - '🧚🏼' 968 | - '🧚🏼‍♂️' 969 | - '👼🏼' 970 | - '🤰🏼' 971 | - '🫄🏼' 972 | - '🫃🏼' 973 | - '🤱🏼' 974 | - '👩🏼‍🍼' 975 | - '🧑🏼‍🍼' 976 | - '👨🏼‍🍼' 977 | - '🙇🏼‍♀️' 978 | - '🙇🏼' 979 | - '🙇🏼‍♂️' 980 | - '💁🏼‍♀️' 981 | - '💁🏼' 982 | - '💁🏼‍♂️' 983 | - '🙅🏼‍♀️' 984 | - '🙅🏼' 985 | - '🙅🏼‍♂️' 986 | - '🙆🏼‍♀️' 987 | - '🙆🏼' 988 | - '🙆🏼‍♂️' 989 | - '🙋🏼‍♀️' 990 | - '🙋🏼' 991 | - '🙋🏼‍♂️' 992 | - '🧏🏼‍♀️' 993 | - '🧏🏼' 994 | - '🧏🏼‍♂️' 995 | - '🤦🏼‍♀️' 996 | - '🤦🏼' 997 | - '🤦🏼‍♂️' 998 | - '🤷🏼‍♀️' 999 | - '🤷🏼' 1000 | - '🤷🏼‍♂️' 1001 | - '🙎🏼‍♀️' 1002 | - '🙎🏼' 1003 | - '🙎🏼‍♂️' 1004 | - '🙍🏼‍♀️' 1005 | - '🙍🏼' 1006 | - '🙍🏼‍♂️' 1007 | - '💇🏼‍♀️' 1008 | - '💇🏼' 1009 | - '💇🏼‍♂️' 1010 | - '💆🏼‍♀️' 1011 | - '💆🏼' 1012 | - '💆🏼‍♂️' 1013 | - '🧖🏼‍♀️' 1014 | - '🧖🏼' 1015 | - '🧖🏼‍♂️' 1016 | - '💃🏼' 1017 | - '🕺🏼' 1018 | - '🕴🏼' 1019 | - '👩🏼‍🦽' 1020 | - '🧑🏼‍🦽' 1021 | - '👨🏼‍🦽' 1022 | - '👩🏼‍🦼' 1023 | - '🧑🏼‍🦼' 1024 | - '👨🏼‍🦼' 1025 | - '🚶🏼‍♀️' 1026 | - '🚶🏼' 1027 | - '🚶🏼‍♂️' 1028 | - '👩🏼‍🦯' 1029 | - '🧑🏼‍🦯' 1030 | - '👨🏼‍🦯' 1031 | - '🧎🏼‍♀️' 1032 | - '🧎🏼' 1033 | - '🧎🏼‍♂️' 1034 | - '🏃🏼‍♀️' 1035 | - '🏃🏼' 1036 | - '🏃🏼‍♂️' 1037 | - '🧍🏼‍♀️' 1038 | - '🧍🏼' 1039 | - '🧍🏼‍♂️' 1040 | - '👭🏼' 1041 | - '🧑🏼‍🤝‍🧑🏼' 1042 | - '👬🏼' 1043 | - '👫🏼' 1044 | - '🧗🏼‍♀️' 1045 | - '🧗🏼' 1046 | - '🧗🏼‍♂️' 1047 | - '🏇🏼' 1048 | - '🏂🏼' 1049 | - '🏌🏼‍♀️' 1050 | - '🏌🏼' 1051 | - '🏌🏼‍♂️' 1052 | - '🏄🏼‍♀️' 1053 | - '🏄🏼' 1054 | - '🏄🏼‍♂️' 1055 | - '🚣🏼‍♀️' 1056 | - '🚣🏼' 1057 | - '🚣🏼‍♂️' 1058 | - '🏊🏼‍♀️' 1059 | - '🏊🏼' 1060 | - '🏊🏼‍♂️' 1061 | - '⛹🏼‍♀️' 1062 | - '⛹🏼' 1063 | - '⛹🏼‍♂️' 1064 | - '🏋🏼‍♀️' 1065 | - '🏋🏼' 1066 | - '🏋🏼‍♂️' 1067 | - '🚴🏼‍♀️' 1068 | - '🚴🏼' 1069 | - '🚴🏼‍♂️' 1070 | - '🚵🏼‍♀️' 1071 | - '🚵🏼' 1072 | - '🚵🏼‍♂️' 1073 | - '🤸🏼‍♀️' 1074 | - '🤸🏼' 1075 | - '🤸🏼‍♂️' 1076 | - '🤽🏼‍♀️' 1077 | - '🤽🏼' 1078 | - '🤽🏼‍♂️' 1079 | - '🤾🏼‍♀️' 1080 | - '🤾🏼' 1081 | - '🤾🏼‍♂️' 1082 | - '🤹🏼‍♀️' 1083 | - '🤹🏼' 1084 | - '🤹🏼‍♂️' 1085 | - '🧘🏼‍♀️' 1086 | - '🧘🏼' 1087 | - '🧘🏼‍♂️' 1088 | - '🛀🏼' 1089 | - '🛌🏼' 1090 | - '👋🏽' 1091 | - '🤚🏽' 1092 | - '🖐🏽' 1093 | - '✋🏽' 1094 | - '🖖🏽' 1095 | - '👌🏽' 1096 | - '🤌🏽' 1097 | - '🤏🏽' 1098 | - '✌🏽' 1099 | - '🤞🏽' 1100 | - '🫰🏽' 1101 | - '🤟🏽' 1102 | - '🤘🏽' 1103 | - '🤙🏽' 1104 | - '🫵🏽' 1105 | - '🫱🏽' 1106 | - '🫲🏽' 1107 | - '🫳🏽' 1108 | - '🫴🏽' 1109 | - '👈🏽' 1110 | - '👉🏽' 1111 | - '👆🏽' 1112 | - '🖕🏽' 1113 | - '👇🏽' 1114 | - '☝🏽' 1115 | - '👍🏽' 1116 | - '👎🏽' 1117 | - '✊🏽' 1118 | - '👊🏽' 1119 | - '🤛🏽' 1120 | - '🤜🏽' 1121 | - '👏🏽' 1122 | - '🫶🏽' 1123 | - '🙌🏽' 1124 | - '👐🏽' 1125 | - '🤲🏽' 1126 | - '🙏🏽' 1127 | - '✍🏽' 1128 | - '💅🏽' 1129 | - '🤳🏽' 1130 | - '💪🏽' 1131 | - '🦵🏽' 1132 | - '🦶🏽' 1133 | - '👂🏽' 1134 | - '🦻🏽' 1135 | - '👃🏽' 1136 | - '👶🏽' 1137 | - '👧🏽' 1138 | - '🧒🏽' 1139 | - '👦🏽' 1140 | - '👩🏽' 1141 | - '🧑🏽' 1142 | - '👨🏽' 1143 | - '👩🏽‍🦱' 1144 | - '🧑🏽‍🦱' 1145 | - '👨🏽‍🦱' 1146 | - '👩🏽‍🦰' 1147 | - '🧑🏽‍🦰' 1148 | - '👨🏽‍🦰' 1149 | - '👱🏽‍♀️' 1150 | - '👱🏽' 1151 | - '👱🏽‍♂️' 1152 | - '👩🏽‍🦳' 1153 | - '🧑🏽‍🦳' 1154 | - '👨🏽‍🦳' 1155 | - '👩🏽‍🦲' 1156 | - '🧑🏽‍🦲' 1157 | - '👨🏽‍🦲' 1158 | - '🧔🏽‍♀️' 1159 | - '🧔🏽' 1160 | - '🧔🏽‍♂️' 1161 | - '👵🏽' 1162 | - '🧓🏽' 1163 | - '👴🏽' 1164 | - '👲🏽' 1165 | - '👳🏽‍♀️' 1166 | - '👳🏽' 1167 | - '👳🏽‍♂️' 1168 | - '🧕🏽' 1169 | - '👮🏽‍♀️' 1170 | - '👮🏽' 1171 | - '👮🏽‍♂️' 1172 | - '👷🏽‍♀️' 1173 | - '👷🏽' 1174 | - '👷🏽‍♂️' 1175 | - '💂🏽‍♀️' 1176 | - '💂🏽' 1177 | - '💂🏽‍♂️' 1178 | - '🕵🏽‍♀️' 1179 | - '🕵🏽' 1180 | - '🕵🏽‍♂️' 1181 | - '👩🏽‍⚕️' 1182 | - '🧑🏽‍⚕️' 1183 | - '👨🏽‍⚕️' 1184 | - '👩🏽‍🌾' 1185 | - '🧑🏽‍🌾' 1186 | - '👨🏽‍🌾' 1187 | - '👩🏽‍🍳' 1188 | - '🧑🏽‍🍳' 1189 | - '👨🏽‍🍳' 1190 | - '👩🏽‍🎓' 1191 | - '🧑🏽‍🎓' 1192 | - '👨🏽‍🎓' 1193 | - '👩🏽‍🎤' 1194 | - '🧑🏽‍🎤' 1195 | - '👨🏽‍🎤' 1196 | - '👩🏽‍🏫' 1197 | - '🧑🏽‍🏫' 1198 | - '👨🏽‍🏫' 1199 | - '👩🏽‍🏭' 1200 | - '🧑🏽‍🏭' 1201 | - '👨🏽‍🏭' 1202 | - '👩🏽‍💻' 1203 | - '🧑🏽‍💻' 1204 | - '👨🏽‍💻' 1205 | - '👩🏽‍💼' 1206 | - '🧑🏽‍💼' 1207 | - '👨🏽‍💼' 1208 | - '👩🏽‍🔧' 1209 | - '🧑🏽‍🔧' 1210 | - '👨🏽‍🔧' 1211 | - '👩🏽‍🔬' 1212 | - '🧑🏽‍🔬' 1213 | - '👨🏽‍🔬' 1214 | - '👩🏽‍🎨' 1215 | - '🧑🏽‍🎨' 1216 | - '👨🏽‍🎨' 1217 | - '👩🏽‍🚒' 1218 | - '🧑🏽‍🚒' 1219 | - '👨🏽‍🚒' 1220 | - '👩🏽‍✈️' 1221 | - '🧑🏽‍✈️' 1222 | - '👨🏽‍✈️' 1223 | - '👩🏽‍🚀' 1224 | - '🧑🏽‍🚀' 1225 | - '👨🏽‍🚀' 1226 | - '👩🏽‍⚖️' 1227 | - '🧑🏽‍⚖️' 1228 | - '👨🏽‍⚖️' 1229 | - '👰🏽‍♀️' 1230 | - '👰🏽' 1231 | - '👰🏽‍♂️' 1232 | - '🤵🏽‍♀️' 1233 | - '🤵🏽' 1234 | - '🤵🏽‍♂️' 1235 | - '👸🏽' 1236 | - '🫅🏽' 1237 | - '🤴🏽' 1238 | - '🥷🏽' 1239 | - '🦸🏽‍♀️' 1240 | - '🦸🏽' 1241 | - '🦸🏽‍♂️' 1242 | - '🦹🏽‍♀️' 1243 | - '🦹🏽' 1244 | - '🦹🏽‍♂️' 1245 | - '🤶🏽' 1246 | - '🧑🏽‍🎄' 1247 | - '🎅🏽' 1248 | - '🧙🏽‍♀️' 1249 | - '🧙🏽' 1250 | - '🧙🏽‍♂️' 1251 | - '🧝🏽‍♀️' 1252 | - '🧝🏽' 1253 | - '🧝🏽‍♂️' 1254 | - '🧛🏽‍♀️' 1255 | - '🧛🏽' 1256 | - '🧛🏽‍♂️' 1257 | - '🧜🏽‍♀️' 1258 | - '🧜🏽' 1259 | - '🧜🏽‍♂️' 1260 | - '🧚🏽‍♀️' 1261 | - '🧚🏽' 1262 | - '🧚🏽‍♂️' 1263 | - '👼🏽' 1264 | - '🤰🏽' 1265 | - '🫄🏽' 1266 | - '🫃🏽' 1267 | - '🤱🏽' 1268 | - '👩🏽‍🍼' 1269 | - '🧑🏽‍🍼' 1270 | - '👨🏽‍🍼' 1271 | - '🙇🏽‍♀️' 1272 | - '🙇🏽' 1273 | - '🙇🏽‍♂️' 1274 | - '💁🏽‍♀️' 1275 | - '💁🏽' 1276 | - '💁🏽‍♂️' 1277 | - '🙅🏽‍♀️' 1278 | - '🙅🏽' 1279 | - '🙅🏽‍♂️' 1280 | - '🙆🏽‍♀️' 1281 | - '🙆🏽' 1282 | - '🙆🏽‍♂️' 1283 | - '🙋🏽‍♀️' 1284 | - '🙋🏽' 1285 | - '🙋🏽‍♂️' 1286 | - '🧏🏽‍♀️' 1287 | - '🧏🏽' 1288 | - '🧏🏽‍♂️' 1289 | - '🤦🏽‍♀️' 1290 | - '🤦🏽' 1291 | - '🤦🏽‍♂️' 1292 | - '🤷🏽‍♀️' 1293 | - '🤷🏽' 1294 | - '🤷🏽‍♂️' 1295 | - '🙎🏽‍♀️' 1296 | - '🙎🏽' 1297 | - '🙎🏽‍♂️' 1298 | - '🙍🏽‍♀️' 1299 | - '🙍🏽' 1300 | - '🙍🏽‍♂️' 1301 | - '💇🏽‍♀️' 1302 | - '💇🏽' 1303 | - '💇🏽‍♂️' 1304 | - '💆🏽‍♀️' 1305 | - '💆🏽' 1306 | - '💆🏽‍♂️' 1307 | - '🧖🏽‍♀️' 1308 | - '🧖🏽' 1309 | - '🧖🏽‍♂️' 1310 | - '💃🏽' 1311 | - '🕺🏽' 1312 | - '🕴🏽' 1313 | - '👩🏽‍🦽' 1314 | - '🧑🏽‍🦽' 1315 | - '👨🏽‍🦽' 1316 | - '👩🏽‍🦼' 1317 | - '🧑🏽‍🦼' 1318 | - '👨🏽‍🦼' 1319 | - '🚶🏽‍♀️' 1320 | - '🚶🏽' 1321 | - '🚶🏽‍♂️' 1322 | - '👩🏽‍🦯' 1323 | - '🧑🏽‍🦯' 1324 | - '👨🏽‍🦯' 1325 | - '🧎🏽‍♀️' 1326 | - '🧎🏽' 1327 | - '🧎🏽‍♂️' 1328 | - '🏃🏽‍♀️' 1329 | - '🏃🏽' 1330 | - '🏃🏽‍♂️' 1331 | - '🧍🏽‍♀️' 1332 | - '🧍🏽' 1333 | - '🧍🏽‍♂️' 1334 | - '👭🏽' 1335 | - '🧑🏽‍🤝‍🧑🏽' 1336 | - '👬🏽' 1337 | - '👫🏽' 1338 | - '🧗🏽‍♀️' 1339 | - '🧗🏽' 1340 | - '🧗🏽‍♂️' 1341 | - '🏇🏽' 1342 | - '🏂🏽' 1343 | - '🏌🏽‍♀️' 1344 | - '🏌🏽' 1345 | - '🏌🏽‍♂️' 1346 | - '🏄🏽‍♀️' 1347 | - '🏄🏽' 1348 | - '🏄🏽‍♂️' 1349 | - '🚣🏽‍♀️' 1350 | - '🚣🏽' 1351 | - '🚣🏽‍♂️' 1352 | - '🏊🏽‍♀️' 1353 | - '🏊🏽' 1354 | - '🏊🏽‍♂️' 1355 | - '⛹🏽‍♀️' 1356 | - '⛹🏽' 1357 | - '⛹🏽‍♂️' 1358 | - '🏋🏽‍♀️' 1359 | - '🏋🏽' 1360 | - '🏋🏽‍♂️' 1361 | - '🚴🏽‍♀️' 1362 | - '🚴🏽' 1363 | - '🚴🏽‍♂️' 1364 | - '🚵🏽‍♀️' 1365 | - '🚵🏽' 1366 | - '🚵🏽‍♂️' 1367 | - '🤸🏽‍♀️' 1368 | - '🤸🏽' 1369 | - '🤸🏽‍♂️' 1370 | - '🤽🏽‍♀️' 1371 | - '🤽🏽' 1372 | - '🤽🏽‍♂️' 1373 | - '🤾🏽‍♀️' 1374 | - '🤾🏽' 1375 | - '🤾🏽‍♂️' 1376 | - '🤹🏽‍♀️' 1377 | - '🤹🏽' 1378 | - '🤹🏽‍♂️' 1379 | - '🧘🏽‍♀️' 1380 | - '🧘🏽' 1381 | - '🧘🏽‍♂️' 1382 | - '🛀🏽' 1383 | - '🛌🏽' 1384 | - '👋🏾' 1385 | - '🤚🏾' 1386 | - '🖐🏾' 1387 | - '✋🏾' 1388 | - '🖖🏾' 1389 | - '👌🏾' 1390 | - '🤌🏾' 1391 | - '🤏🏾' 1392 | - '✌🏾' 1393 | - '🤞🏾' 1394 | - '🫰🏾' 1395 | - '🤟🏾' 1396 | - '🤘🏾' 1397 | - '🤙🏾' 1398 | - '🫵🏾' 1399 | - '🫱🏾' 1400 | - '🫲🏾' 1401 | - '🫳🏾' 1402 | - '🫴🏾' 1403 | - '👈🏾' 1404 | - '👉🏾' 1405 | - '👆🏾' 1406 | - '🖕🏾' 1407 | - '👇🏾' 1408 | - '☝🏾' 1409 | - '👍🏾' 1410 | - '👎🏾' 1411 | - '✊🏾' 1412 | - '👊🏾' 1413 | - '🤛🏾' 1414 | - '🤜🏾' 1415 | - '👏🏾' 1416 | - '🫶🏾' 1417 | - '🙌🏾' 1418 | - '👐🏾' 1419 | - '🤲🏾' 1420 | - '🙏🏾' 1421 | - '✍🏾' 1422 | - '💅🏾' 1423 | - '🤳🏾' 1424 | - '💪🏾' 1425 | - '🦵🏾' 1426 | - '🦶🏾' 1427 | - '👂🏾' 1428 | - '🦻🏾' 1429 | - '👃🏾' 1430 | - '👶🏾' 1431 | - '👧🏾' 1432 | - '🧒🏾' 1433 | - '👦🏾' 1434 | - '👩🏾' 1435 | - '🧑🏾' 1436 | - '👨🏾' 1437 | - '👩🏾‍🦱' 1438 | - '🧑🏾‍🦱' 1439 | - '👨🏾‍🦱' 1440 | - '👩🏾‍🦰' 1441 | - '🧑🏾‍🦰' 1442 | - '👨🏾‍🦰' 1443 | - '👱🏾‍♀️' 1444 | - '👱🏾' 1445 | - '👱🏾‍♂️' 1446 | - '👩🏾‍🦳' 1447 | - '🧑🏾‍🦳' 1448 | - '👨🏾‍🦳' 1449 | - '👩🏾‍🦲' 1450 | - '🧑🏾‍🦲' 1451 | - '👨🏾‍🦲' 1452 | - '🧔🏾‍♀️' 1453 | - '🧔🏾' 1454 | - '🧔🏾‍♂️' 1455 | - '👵🏾' 1456 | - '🧓🏾' 1457 | - '👴🏾' 1458 | - '👲🏾' 1459 | - '👳🏾‍♀️' 1460 | - '👳🏾' 1461 | - '👳🏾‍♂️' 1462 | - '🧕🏾' 1463 | - '👮🏾‍♀️' 1464 | - '👮🏾' 1465 | - '👮🏾‍♂️' 1466 | - '👷🏾‍♀️' 1467 | - '👷🏾' 1468 | - '👷🏾‍♂️' 1469 | - '💂🏾‍♀️' 1470 | - '💂🏾' 1471 | - '💂🏾‍♂️' 1472 | - '🕵🏾‍♀️' 1473 | - '🕵🏾' 1474 | - '🕵🏾‍♂️' 1475 | - '👩🏾‍⚕️' 1476 | - '🧑🏾‍⚕️' 1477 | - '👨🏾‍⚕️' 1478 | - '👩🏾‍🌾' 1479 | - '🧑🏾‍🌾' 1480 | - '👨🏾‍🌾' 1481 | - '👩🏾‍🍳' 1482 | - '🧑🏾‍🍳' 1483 | - '👨🏾‍🍳' 1484 | - '👩🏾‍🎓' 1485 | - '🧑🏾‍🎓' 1486 | - '👨🏾‍🎓' 1487 | - '👩🏾‍🎤' 1488 | - '🧑🏾‍🎤' 1489 | - '👨🏾‍🎤' 1490 | - '👩🏾‍🏫' 1491 | - '🧑🏾‍🏫' 1492 | - '👨🏾‍🏫' 1493 | - '👩🏾‍🏭' 1494 | - '🧑🏾‍🏭' 1495 | - '👨🏾‍🏭' 1496 | - '👩🏾‍💻' 1497 | - '🧑🏾‍💻' 1498 | - '👨🏾‍💻' 1499 | - '👩🏾‍💼' 1500 | - '🧑🏾‍💼' 1501 | - '👨🏾‍💼' 1502 | - '👩🏾‍🔧' 1503 | - '🧑🏾‍🔧' 1504 | - '👨🏾‍🔧' 1505 | - '👩🏾‍🔬' 1506 | - '🧑🏾‍🔬' 1507 | - '👨🏾‍🔬' 1508 | - '👩🏾‍🎨' 1509 | - '🧑🏾‍🎨' 1510 | - '👨🏾‍🎨' 1511 | - '👩🏾‍🚒' 1512 | - '🧑🏾‍🚒' 1513 | - '👨🏾‍🚒' 1514 | - '👩🏾‍✈️' 1515 | - '🧑🏾‍✈️' 1516 | - '👨🏾‍✈️' 1517 | - '👩🏾‍🚀' 1518 | - '🧑🏾‍🚀' 1519 | - '👨🏾‍🚀' 1520 | - '👩🏾‍⚖️' 1521 | - '🧑🏾‍⚖️' 1522 | - '👨🏾‍⚖️' 1523 | - '👰🏾‍♀️' 1524 | - '👰🏾' 1525 | - '👰🏾‍♂️' 1526 | - '🤵🏾‍♀️' 1527 | - '🤵🏾' 1528 | - '🤵🏾‍♂️' 1529 | - '👸🏾' 1530 | - '🫅🏾' 1531 | - '🤴🏾' 1532 | - '🥷🏾' 1533 | - '🦸🏾‍♀️' 1534 | - '🦸🏾' 1535 | - '🦸🏾‍♂️' 1536 | - '🦹🏾‍♀️' 1537 | - '🦹🏾' 1538 | - '🦹🏾‍♂️' 1539 | - '🤶🏾' 1540 | - '🧑🏾‍🎄' 1541 | - '🎅🏾' 1542 | - '🧙🏾‍♀️' 1543 | - '🧙🏾' 1544 | - '🧙🏾‍♂️' 1545 | - '🧝🏾‍♀️' 1546 | - '🧝🏾' 1547 | - '🧝🏾‍♂️' 1548 | - '🧛🏾‍♀️' 1549 | - '🧛🏾' 1550 | - '🧛🏾‍♂️' 1551 | - '🧜🏾‍♀️' 1552 | - '🧜🏾' 1553 | - '🧜🏾‍♂️' 1554 | - '🧚🏾‍♀️' 1555 | - '🧚🏾' 1556 | - '🧚🏾‍♂️' 1557 | - '👼🏾' 1558 | - '🤰🏾' 1559 | - '🫄🏾' 1560 | - '🫃🏾' 1561 | - '🤱🏾' 1562 | - '👩🏾‍🍼' 1563 | - '🧑🏾‍🍼' 1564 | - '👨🏾‍🍼' 1565 | - '🙇🏾‍♀️' 1566 | - '🙇🏾' 1567 | - '🙇🏾‍♂️' 1568 | - '💁🏾‍♀️' 1569 | - '💁🏾' 1570 | - '💁🏾‍♂️' 1571 | - '🙅🏾‍♀️' 1572 | - '🙅🏾' 1573 | - '🙅🏾‍♂️' 1574 | - '🙆🏾‍♀️' 1575 | - '🙆🏾' 1576 | - '🙆🏾‍♂️' 1577 | - '🙋🏾‍♀️' 1578 | - '🙋🏾' 1579 | - '🙋🏾‍♂️' 1580 | - '🧏🏾‍♀️' 1581 | - '🧏🏾' 1582 | - '🧏🏾‍♂️' 1583 | - '🤦🏾‍♀️' 1584 | - '🤦🏾' 1585 | - '🤦🏾‍♂️' 1586 | - '🤷🏾‍♀️' 1587 | - '🤷🏾' 1588 | - '🤷🏾‍♂️' 1589 | - '🙎🏾‍♀️' 1590 | - '🙎🏾' 1591 | - '🙎🏾‍♂️' 1592 | - '🙍🏾‍♀️' 1593 | - '🙍🏾' 1594 | - '🙍🏾‍♂️' 1595 | - '💇🏾‍♀️' 1596 | - '💇🏾' 1597 | - '💇🏾‍♂️' 1598 | - '💆🏾‍♀️' 1599 | - '💆🏾' 1600 | - '💆🏾‍♂️' 1601 | - '🧖🏾‍♀️' 1602 | - '🧖🏾' 1603 | - '🧖🏾‍♂️' 1604 | - '💃🏾' 1605 | - '🕺🏾' 1606 | - '🕴🏿' 1607 | - '👩🏾‍🦽' 1608 | - '🧑🏾‍🦽' 1609 | - '👨🏾‍🦽' 1610 | - '👩🏾‍🦼' 1611 | - '🧑🏾‍🦼' 1612 | - '👨🏾‍🦼' 1613 | - '🚶🏾‍♀️' 1614 | - '🚶🏾' 1615 | - '🚶🏾‍♂️' 1616 | - '👩🏾‍🦯' 1617 | - '🧑🏾‍🦯' 1618 | - '👨🏾‍🦯' 1619 | - '🧎🏾‍♀️' 1620 | - '🧎🏾' 1621 | - '🧎🏾‍♂️' 1622 | - '🏃🏾‍♀️' 1623 | - '🏃🏾' 1624 | - '🏃🏾‍♂️' 1625 | - '🧍🏾‍♀️' 1626 | - '🧍🏾' 1627 | - '🧍🏾‍♂️' 1628 | - '👭🏾' 1629 | - '🧑🏾‍🤝‍🧑🏾' 1630 | - '👬🏾' 1631 | - '👫🏾' 1632 | - '🧗🏾‍♀️' 1633 | - '🧗🏾' 1634 | - '🧗🏾‍♂️' 1635 | - '🏇🏾' 1636 | - '🏂🏾' 1637 | - '🏌🏾‍♀️' 1638 | - '🏌🏾' 1639 | - '🏌🏾‍♂️' 1640 | - '🏄🏾‍♀️' 1641 | - '🏄🏾' 1642 | - '🏄🏾‍♂️' 1643 | - '🚣🏾‍♀️' 1644 | - '🚣🏾' 1645 | - '🚣🏾‍♂️' 1646 | - '🏊🏾‍♀️' 1647 | - '🏊🏾' 1648 | - '🏊🏾‍♂️' 1649 | - '⛹🏾‍♀️' 1650 | - '⛹🏾' 1651 | - '⛹🏾‍♂️' 1652 | - '🏋🏾‍♀️' 1653 | - '🏋🏾' 1654 | - '🏋🏾‍♂️' 1655 | - '🚴🏾‍♀️' 1656 | - '🚴🏾' 1657 | - '🚴🏾‍♂️' 1658 | - '🚵🏾‍♀️' 1659 | - '🚵🏾' 1660 | - '🚵🏾‍♂️' 1661 | - '🤸🏾‍♀️' 1662 | - '🤸🏾' 1663 | - '🤸🏾‍♂️' 1664 | - '🤽🏾‍♀️' 1665 | - '🤽🏾' 1666 | - '🤽🏾‍♂️' 1667 | - '🤾🏾‍♀️' 1668 | - '🤾🏾' 1669 | - '🤾🏾‍♂️' 1670 | - '🤹🏾‍♀️' 1671 | - '🤹🏾' 1672 | - '🤹🏾‍♂️' 1673 | - '🧘🏾‍♀️' 1674 | - '🧘🏾' 1675 | - '🧘🏾‍♂️' 1676 | - '🛀🏾' 1677 | - '🛌🏾' 1678 | - '👋🏿' 1679 | - '🤚🏿' 1680 | - '🖐🏿' 1681 | - '✋🏿' 1682 | - '🖖🏿' 1683 | - '👌🏿' 1684 | - '🤌🏿' 1685 | - '🤏🏿' 1686 | - '✌🏿' 1687 | - '🤞🏿' 1688 | - '🫰🏿' 1689 | - '🤟🏿' 1690 | - '🤘🏿' 1691 | - '🤙🏿' 1692 | - '🫵🏿' 1693 | - '🫱🏿' 1694 | - '🫲🏿' 1695 | - '🫳🏿' 1696 | - '🫴🏿' 1697 | - '👈🏿' 1698 | - '👉🏿' 1699 | - '👆🏿' 1700 | - '🖕🏿' 1701 | - '👇🏿' 1702 | - '☝🏿' 1703 | - '👍🏿' 1704 | - '👎🏿' 1705 | - '✊🏿' 1706 | - '👊🏿' 1707 | - '🤛🏿' 1708 | - '🤜🏿' 1709 | - '👏🏿' 1710 | - '🫶🏿' 1711 | - '🙌🏿' 1712 | - '👐🏿' 1713 | - '🤲🏿' 1714 | - '🙏🏿' 1715 | - '✍🏿' 1716 | - '💅🏿' 1717 | - '🤳🏿' 1718 | - '💪🏿' 1719 | - '🦵🏿' 1720 | - '🦶🏿' 1721 | - '👂🏿' 1722 | - '🦻🏿' 1723 | - '👃🏿' 1724 | - '👶🏿' 1725 | - '👧🏿' 1726 | - '🧒🏿' 1727 | - '👦🏿' 1728 | - '👩🏿' 1729 | - '🧑🏿' 1730 | - '👨🏿' 1731 | - '👩🏿‍🦱' 1732 | - '🧑🏿‍🦱' 1733 | - '👨🏿‍🦱' 1734 | - '👩🏿‍🦰' 1735 | - '🧑🏿‍🦰' 1736 | - '👨🏿‍🦰' 1737 | - '👱🏿‍♀️' 1738 | - '👱🏿' 1739 | - '👱🏿‍♂️' 1740 | - '👩🏿‍🦳' 1741 | - '🧑🏿‍🦳' 1742 | - '👨🏿‍🦳' 1743 | - '👩🏿‍🦲' 1744 | - '🧑🏿‍🦲' 1745 | - '👨🏿‍🦲' 1746 | - '🧔🏿‍♀️' 1747 | - '🧔🏿' 1748 | - '🧔🏿‍♂️' 1749 | - '👵🏿' 1750 | - '🧓🏿' 1751 | - '👴🏿' 1752 | - '👲🏿' 1753 | - '👳🏿‍♀️' 1754 | - '👳🏿' 1755 | - '👳🏿‍♂️' 1756 | - '🧕🏿' 1757 | - '👮🏿‍♀️' 1758 | - '👮🏿' 1759 | - '👮🏿‍♂️' 1760 | - '👷🏿‍♀️' 1761 | - '👷🏿' 1762 | - '👷🏿‍♂️' 1763 | - '💂🏿‍♀️' 1764 | - '💂🏿' 1765 | - '💂🏿‍♂️' 1766 | - '🕵🏿‍♀️' 1767 | - '🕵🏿' 1768 | - '🕵🏿‍♂️' 1769 | - '👩🏿‍⚕️' 1770 | - '🧑🏿‍⚕️' 1771 | - '👨🏿‍⚕️' 1772 | - '👩🏿‍🌾' 1773 | - '🧑🏿‍🌾' 1774 | - '👨🏿‍🌾' 1775 | - '👩🏿‍🍳' 1776 | - '🧑🏿‍🍳' 1777 | - '👨🏿‍🍳' 1778 | - '👩🏿‍🎓' 1779 | - '🧑🏿‍🎓' 1780 | - '👨🏿‍🎓' 1781 | - '👩🏿‍🎤' 1782 | - '🧑🏿‍🎤' 1783 | - '👨🏿‍🎤' 1784 | - '👩🏿‍🏫' 1785 | - '🧑🏿‍🏫' 1786 | - '👨🏿‍🏫' 1787 | - '👩🏿‍🏭' 1788 | - '🧑🏿‍🏭' 1789 | - '👨🏿‍🏭' 1790 | - '👩🏿‍💻' 1791 | - '🧑🏿‍💻' 1792 | - '👨🏿‍💻' 1793 | - '👩🏿‍💼' 1794 | - '🧑🏿‍💼' 1795 | - '👨🏿‍💼' 1796 | - '👩🏿‍🔧' 1797 | - '🧑🏿‍🔧' 1798 | - '👨🏿‍🔧' 1799 | - '👩🏿‍🔬' 1800 | - '🧑🏿‍🔬' 1801 | - '👨🏿‍🔬' 1802 | - '👩🏿‍🎨' 1803 | - '🧑🏿‍🎨' 1804 | - '👨🏿‍🎨' 1805 | - '👩🏿‍🚒' 1806 | - '🧑🏿‍🚒' 1807 | - '👨🏿‍🚒' 1808 | - '👩🏿‍✈️' 1809 | - '🧑🏿‍✈️' 1810 | - '👨🏿‍✈️' 1811 | - '👩🏿‍🚀' 1812 | - '🧑🏿‍🚀' 1813 | - '👨🏿‍🚀' 1814 | - '👩🏿‍⚖️' 1815 | - '🧑🏿‍⚖️' 1816 | - '👨🏿‍⚖️' 1817 | - '👰🏿‍♀️' 1818 | - '👰🏿' 1819 | - '👰🏿‍♂️' 1820 | - '🤵🏿‍♀️' 1821 | - '🤵🏿' 1822 | - '🤵🏿‍♂️' 1823 | - '👸🏿' 1824 | - '🫅🏿' 1825 | - '🤴🏿' 1826 | - '🥷🏿' 1827 | - '🦸🏿‍♀️' 1828 | - '🦸🏿' 1829 | - '🦸🏿‍♂️' 1830 | - '🦹🏿‍♀️' 1831 | - '🦹🏿' 1832 | - '🦹🏿‍♂️' 1833 | - '🤶🏿' 1834 | - '🧑🏿‍🎄' 1835 | - '🎅🏿' 1836 | - '🧙🏿‍♀️' 1837 | - '🧙🏿' 1838 | - '🧙🏿‍♂️' 1839 | - '🧝🏿‍♀️' 1840 | - '🧝🏿' 1841 | - '🧝🏿‍♂️' 1842 | - '🧛🏿‍♀️' 1843 | - '🧛🏿' 1844 | - '🧛🏿‍♂️' 1845 | - '🧜🏿‍♀️' 1846 | - '🧜🏿' 1847 | - '🧜🏿‍♂️' 1848 | - '🧚🏿‍♀️' 1849 | - '🧚🏿' 1850 | - '🧚🏿‍♂️' 1851 | - '👼🏿' 1852 | - '🤰🏿' 1853 | - '🫄🏿' 1854 | - '🫃🏿' 1855 | - '🤱🏿' 1856 | - '👩🏿‍🍼' 1857 | - '🧑🏿‍🍼' 1858 | - '👨🏿‍🍼' 1859 | - '🙇🏿‍♀️' 1860 | - '🙇🏿' 1861 | - '🙇🏿‍♂️' 1862 | - '💁🏿‍♀️' 1863 | - '💁🏿' 1864 | - '💁🏿‍♂️' 1865 | - '🙅🏿‍♀️' 1866 | - '🙅🏿' 1867 | - '🙅🏿‍♂️' 1868 | - '🙆🏿‍♀️' 1869 | - '🙆🏿' 1870 | - '🙆🏿‍♂️' 1871 | - '🙋🏿‍♀️' 1872 | - '🙋🏿' 1873 | - '🙋🏿‍♂️' 1874 | - '🧏🏿‍♀️' 1875 | - '🧏🏿' 1876 | - '🧏🏿‍♂️' 1877 | - '🤦🏿‍♀️' 1878 | - '🤦🏿' 1879 | - '🤦🏿‍♂️' 1880 | - '🤷🏿‍♀️' 1881 | - '🤷🏿' 1882 | - '🤷🏿‍♂️' 1883 | - '🙎🏿‍♀️' 1884 | - '🙎🏿' 1885 | - '🙎🏿‍♂️' 1886 | - '🙍🏿‍♀️' 1887 | - '🙍🏿' 1888 | - '🙍🏿‍♂️' 1889 | - '💇🏿‍♀️' 1890 | - '💇🏿' 1891 | - '💇🏿‍♂️' 1892 | - '💆🏿‍♀️' 1893 | - '💆🏿' 1894 | - '💆🏿‍♂️' 1895 | - '🧖🏿‍♀️' 1896 | - '🧖🏿' 1897 | - '🧖🏿‍♂️' 1898 | - '💃🏿' 1899 | - '🕺🏿' 1900 | - '🕴🏿' 1901 | - '👩🏿‍🦽' 1902 | - '🧑🏿‍🦽' 1903 | - '👨🏿‍🦽' 1904 | - '👩🏿‍🦼' 1905 | - '🧑🏿‍🦼' 1906 | - '👨🏿‍🦼' 1907 | - '🚶🏿‍♀️' 1908 | - '🚶🏿' 1909 | - '🚶🏿‍♂️' 1910 | - '👩🏿‍🦯' 1911 | - '🧑🏿‍🦯' 1912 | - '👨🏿‍🦯' 1913 | - '🧎🏿‍♀️' 1914 | - '🧎🏿' 1915 | - '🧎🏿‍♂️' 1916 | - '🏃🏿‍♀️' 1917 | - '🏃🏿' 1918 | - '🏃🏿‍♂️' 1919 | - '🧍🏿‍♀️' 1920 | - '🧍🏿' 1921 | - '🧍🏿‍♂️' 1922 | - '👭🏿' 1923 | - '🧑🏿‍🤝‍🧑🏿' 1924 | - '👬🏿' 1925 | - '👫🏿' 1926 | - '🧗🏿‍♀️' 1927 | - '🧗🏿' 1928 | - '🧗🏿‍♂️' 1929 | - '🏇🏿' 1930 | - '🏂🏿' 1931 | - '🏌🏿‍♀️' 1932 | - '🏌🏿' 1933 | - '🏌🏿‍♂️' 1934 | - '🏄🏿‍♀️' 1935 | - '🏄🏿' 1936 | - '🏄🏿‍♂️' 1937 | - '🚣🏿‍♀️' 1938 | - '🚣🏿' 1939 | - '🚣🏿‍♂️' 1940 | - '🏊🏿‍♀️' 1941 | - '🏊🏿' 1942 | - '🏊🏿‍♂️' 1943 | - '⛹🏿‍♀️' 1944 | - '⛹🏿' 1945 | - '⛹🏿‍♂️' 1946 | - '🏋🏿‍♀️' 1947 | - '🏋🏿' 1948 | - '🏋🏿‍♂️' 1949 | - '🚴🏿‍♀️' 1950 | - '🚴🏿' 1951 | - '🚴🏿‍♂️' 1952 | - '🚵🏿‍♀️' 1953 | - '🚵🏿' 1954 | - '🚵🏿‍♂️' 1955 | - '🤸🏿‍♀️' 1956 | - '🤸🏿' 1957 | - '🤸🏿‍♂️' 1958 | - '🤽🏿‍♀️' 1959 | - '🤽🏿' 1960 | - '🤽🏿‍♂️' 1961 | - '🤾🏿‍♀️' 1962 | - '🤾🏿' 1963 | - '🤾🏿‍♂️' 1964 | - '🤹🏿‍♀️' 1965 | - '🤹🏿' 1966 | - '🤹🏿‍♂️' 1967 | - '🧘🏿‍♀️' 1968 | - '🧘🏿' 1969 | - '🧘🏿‍♂️' 1970 | - '🛀🏿' 1971 | - '🛌🏿' 1972 | - '🐶' 1973 | - '🐱' 1974 | - '🐭' 1975 | - '🐹' 1976 | - '🐰' 1977 | - '🦊' 1978 | - '🐻' 1979 | - '🐼' 1980 | - '🐻‍❄️' 1981 | - '🐨' 1982 | - '🐯' 1983 | - '🦁' 1984 | - '🐮' 1985 | - '🐷' 1986 | - '🐽' 1987 | - '🐸' 1988 | - '🐵' 1989 | - '🙈' 1990 | - '🙉' 1991 | - '🙊' 1992 | - '🐒' 1993 | - '🐔' 1994 | - '🐧' 1995 | - '🐦' 1996 | - '🐤' 1997 | - '🐣' 1998 | - '🐥' 1999 | - '🦆' 2000 | - '🦅' 2001 | - '🦉' 2002 | - '🦇' 2003 | - '🐺' 2004 | - '🐗' 2005 | - '🐴' 2006 | - '🦄' 2007 | - '🐝' 2008 | - '🪱' 2009 | - '🐛' 2010 | - '🦋' 2011 | - '🐌' 2012 | - '🐞' 2013 | - '🐜' 2014 | - '🪰' 2015 | - '🪲' 2016 | - '🪳' 2017 | - '🦟' 2018 | - '🦗' 2019 | - '🕷' 2020 | - '🕸' 2021 | - '🦂' 2022 | - '🐢' 2023 | - '🐍' 2024 | - '🦎' 2025 | - '🦖' 2026 | - '🦕' 2027 | - '🐙' 2028 | - '🦑' 2029 | - '🦐' 2030 | - '🦞' 2031 | - '🦀' 2032 | - '🪸' 2033 | - '🐡' 2034 | - '🐠' 2035 | - '🐟' 2036 | - '🐬' 2037 | - '🐳' 2038 | - '🐋' 2039 | - '🦈' 2040 | - '🐊' 2041 | - '🐅' 2042 | - '🐆' 2043 | - '🦓' 2044 | - '🦍' 2045 | - '🦧' 2046 | - '🦣' 2047 | - '🐘' 2048 | - '🦛' 2049 | - '🦏' 2050 | - '🐪' 2051 | - '🐫' 2052 | - '🦒' 2053 | - '🦘' 2054 | - '🦬' 2055 | - '🐃' 2056 | - '🐂' 2057 | - '🐄' 2058 | - '🐎' 2059 | - '🐖' 2060 | - '🐏' 2061 | - '🐑' 2062 | - '🦙' 2063 | - '🐐' 2064 | - '🦌' 2065 | - '🐕' 2066 | - '🐩' 2067 | - '🦮' 2068 | - '🐕‍🦺' 2069 | - '🐈' 2070 | - '🐈‍⬛' 2071 | - '🪶' 2072 | - '🐓' 2073 | - '🦃' 2074 | - '🦤' 2075 | - '🦚' 2076 | - '🦜' 2077 | - '🦢' 2078 | - '🦩' 2079 | - '🕊' 2080 | - '🐇' 2081 | - '🦝' 2082 | - '🦨' 2083 | - '🦡' 2084 | - '🦫' 2085 | - '🦦' 2086 | - '🦥' 2087 | - '🐁' 2088 | - '🐀' 2089 | - '🐿' 2090 | - '🦔' 2091 | - '🐾' 2092 | - '🐉' 2093 | - '🐲' 2094 | - '🌵' 2095 | - '🎄' 2096 | - '🌲' 2097 | - '🌳' 2098 | - '🌴' 2099 | - '🪹' 2100 | - '🪺' 2101 | - '🪵' 2102 | - '🌱' 2103 | - '🌿' 2104 | - '☘️' 2105 | - '🍀' 2106 | - '🎍' 2107 | - '🪴' 2108 | - '🎋' 2109 | - '🍃' 2110 | - '🍂' 2111 | - '🍁' 2112 | - '🍄' 2113 | - '🐚' 2114 | - '🪨' 2115 | - '🌾' 2116 | - '💐' 2117 | - '🌷' 2118 | - '🪷' 2119 | - '🌹' 2120 | - '🥀' 2121 | - '🌺' 2122 | - '🌸' 2123 | - '🌼' 2124 | - '🌻' 2125 | - '🌞' 2126 | - '🌝' 2127 | - '🌛' 2128 | - '🌜' 2129 | - '🌚' 2130 | - '🌕' 2131 | - '🌖' 2132 | - '🌗' 2133 | - '🌘' 2134 | - '🌑' 2135 | - '🌒' 2136 | - '🌓' 2137 | - '🌔' 2138 | - '🌙' 2139 | - '🌎' 2140 | - '🌍' 2141 | - '🌏' 2142 | - '🪐' 2143 | - '💫' 2144 | - '⭐️' 2145 | - '🌟' 2146 | - '✨' 2147 | - '⚡️' 2148 | - '☄️' 2149 | - '💥' 2150 | - '🔥' 2151 | - '🌪' 2152 | - '🌈' 2153 | - '☀️' 2154 | - '🌤' 2155 | - '⛅️' 2156 | - '🌥' 2157 | - '☁️' 2158 | - '🌦' 2159 | - '🌧' 2160 | - '⛈' 2161 | - '🌩' 2162 | - '🌨' 2163 | - '❄️' 2164 | - '☃️' 2165 | - '⛄️' 2166 | - '🌬' 2167 | - '💨' 2168 | - '💧' 2169 | - '💦' 2170 | - '🫧' 2171 | - '☔️' 2172 | - '☂️' 2173 | - '🌊' 2174 | - '🌫🍏' 2175 | - '🍎' 2176 | - '🍐' 2177 | - '🍊' 2178 | - '🍋' 2179 | - '🍌' 2180 | - '🍉' 2181 | - '🍇' 2182 | - '🍓' 2183 | - '🫐' 2184 | - '🍈' 2185 | - '🍒' 2186 | - '🍑' 2187 | - '🥭' 2188 | - '🍍' 2189 | - '🥥' 2190 | - '🥝' 2191 | - '🍅' 2192 | - '🍆' 2193 | - '🥑' 2194 | - '🥦' 2195 | - '🥬' 2196 | - '🥒' 2197 | - '🌶' 2198 | - '🫑' 2199 | - '🌽' 2200 | - '🥕' 2201 | - '🫒' 2202 | - '🧄' 2203 | - '🧅' 2204 | - '🥔' 2205 | - '🍠' 2206 | - '🫘' 2207 | - '🥐' 2208 | - '🥯' 2209 | - '🍞' 2210 | - '🥖' 2211 | - '🥨' 2212 | - '🧀' 2213 | - '🥚' 2214 | - '🍳' 2215 | - '🧈' 2216 | - '🥞' 2217 | - '🧇' 2218 | - '🥓' 2219 | - '🥩' 2220 | - '🍗' 2221 | - '🍖' 2222 | - '🦴' 2223 | - '🌭' 2224 | - '🍔' 2225 | - '🍟' 2226 | - '🍕' 2227 | - '🫓' 2228 | - '🥪' 2229 | - '🥙' 2230 | - '🧆' 2231 | - '🌮' 2232 | - '🌯' 2233 | - '🫔' 2234 | - '🥗' 2235 | - '🥘' 2236 | - '🫕' 2237 | - '🥫' 2238 | - '🍝' 2239 | - '🍜' 2240 | - '🍲' 2241 | - '🍛' 2242 | - '🍣' 2243 | - '🍱' 2244 | - '🥟' 2245 | - '🦪' 2246 | - '🍤' 2247 | - '🍙' 2248 | - '🍚' 2249 | - '🍘' 2250 | - '🍥' 2251 | - '🥠' 2252 | - '🥮' 2253 | - '🍢' 2254 | - '🍡' 2255 | - '🍧' 2256 | - '🍨' 2257 | - '🍦' 2258 | - '🥧' 2259 | - '🧁' 2260 | - '🍰' 2261 | - '🎂' 2262 | - '🍮' 2263 | - '🍭' 2264 | - '🍬' 2265 | - '🍫' 2266 | - '🍿' 2267 | - '🍩' 2268 | - '🍪' 2269 | - '🌰' 2270 | - '🥜' 2271 | - '🍯' 2272 | - '🥛' 2273 | - '🍼' 2274 | - '🫖' 2275 | - '☕️' 2276 | - '🍵' 2277 | - '🧃' 2278 | - '🥤' 2279 | - '🧋' 2280 | - '🫙' 2281 | - '🍶' 2282 | - '🍺' 2283 | - '🍻' 2284 | - '🥂' 2285 | - '🍷' 2286 | - '🫗' 2287 | - '🥃' 2288 | - '🍸' 2289 | - '🍹' 2290 | - '🧉' 2291 | - '🍾' 2292 | - '🧊' 2293 | - '🥄' 2294 | - '🍴' 2295 | - '🍽' 2296 | - '🥣' 2297 | - '🥡' 2298 | - '🥢' 2299 | - '🧂' 2300 | - '⚽️' 2301 | - '🏀' 2302 | - '🏈' 2303 | - '⚾️' 2304 | - '🥎' 2305 | - '🎾' 2306 | - '🏐' 2307 | - '🏉' 2308 | - '🥏' 2309 | - '🎱' 2310 | - '🪀' 2311 | - '🏓' 2312 | - '🏸' 2313 | - '🏒' 2314 | - '🏑' 2315 | - '🥍' 2316 | - '🏏' 2317 | - '🪃' 2318 | - '🥅' 2319 | - '⛳️' 2320 | - '🪁' 2321 | - '🏹' 2322 | - '🎣' 2323 | - '🤿' 2324 | - '🥊' 2325 | - '🥋' 2326 | - '🎽' 2327 | - '🛹' 2328 | - '🛼' 2329 | - '🛷' 2330 | - '⛸' 2331 | - '🥌' 2332 | - '🎿' 2333 | - '⛷' 2334 | - '🏂' 2335 | - '🪂' 2336 | - '🏋️‍♀️' 2337 | - '🏋️' 2338 | - '🏋️‍♂️' 2339 | - '🤼‍♀️' 2340 | - '🤼' 2341 | - '🤼‍♂️' 2342 | - '🤸‍♀️' 2343 | - '🤸' 2344 | - '🤸‍♂️' 2345 | - '⛹️‍♀️' 2346 | - '⛹️' 2347 | - '⛹️‍♂️' 2348 | - '🤺' 2349 | - '🤾‍♀️' 2350 | - '🤾' 2351 | - '🤾‍♂️' 2352 | - '🏌️‍♀️' 2353 | - '🏌️' 2354 | - '🏌️‍♂️' 2355 | - '🏇' 2356 | - '🧘‍♀️' 2357 | - '🧘' 2358 | - '🧘‍♂️' 2359 | - '🏄‍♀️' 2360 | - '🏄' 2361 | - '🏄‍♂️' 2362 | - '🏊‍♀️' 2363 | - '🏊' 2364 | - '🏊‍♂️' 2365 | - '🤽‍♀️' 2366 | - '🤽' 2367 | - '🤽‍♂️' 2368 | - '🚣‍♀️' 2369 | - '🚣' 2370 | - '🚣‍♂️' 2371 | - '🧗‍♀️' 2372 | - '🧗' 2373 | - '🧗‍♂️' 2374 | - '🚵‍♀️' 2375 | - '🚵' 2376 | - '🚵‍♂️' 2377 | - '🚴‍♀️' 2378 | - '🚴' 2379 | - '🚴‍♂️' 2380 | - '🏆' 2381 | - '🥇' 2382 | - '🥈' 2383 | - '🥉' 2384 | - '🏅' 2385 | - '🎖' 2386 | - '🏵' 2387 | - '🎗' 2388 | - '🎫' 2389 | - '🎟' 2390 | - '🎪' 2391 | - '🤹' 2392 | - '🤹‍♂️' 2393 | - '🤹‍♀️' 2394 | - '🎭' 2395 | - '🩰' 2396 | - '🎨' 2397 | - '🎬' 2398 | - '🎤' 2399 | - '🎧' 2400 | - '🎼' 2401 | - '🎹' 2402 | - '🥁' 2403 | - '🪘' 2404 | - '🎷' 2405 | - '🎺' 2406 | - '🪗' 2407 | - '🎸' 2408 | - '🪕' 2409 | - '🎻' 2410 | - '🎲' 2411 | - '♟' 2412 | - '🎯' 2413 | - '🎳' 2414 | - '🎮' 2415 | - '🎰' 2416 | - '🧩' 2417 | - '🚗' 2418 | - '🚕' 2419 | - '🚙' 2420 | - '🚌' 2421 | - '🚎' 2422 | - '🏎' 2423 | - '🚓' 2424 | - '🚑' 2425 | - '🚒' 2426 | - '🚐' 2427 | - '🛻' 2428 | - '🚚' 2429 | - '🚛' 2430 | - '🚜' 2431 | - '🦯' 2432 | - '🦽' 2433 | - '🦼' 2434 | - '🛴' 2435 | - '🚲' 2436 | - '🛵' 2437 | - '🏍' 2438 | - '🛺' 2439 | - '🚨' 2440 | - '🚔' 2441 | - '🚍' 2442 | - '🚘' 2443 | - '🚖' 2444 | - '🛞' 2445 | - '🚡' 2446 | - '🚠' 2447 | - '🚟' 2448 | - '🚃' 2449 | - '🚋' 2450 | - '🚞' 2451 | - '🚝' 2452 | - '🚄' 2453 | - '🚅' 2454 | - '🚈' 2455 | - '🚂' 2456 | - '🚆' 2457 | - '🚇' 2458 | - '🚊' 2459 | - '🚉' 2460 | - '✈️' 2461 | - '🛫' 2462 | - '🛬' 2463 | - '🛩' 2464 | - '💺' 2465 | - '🛰' 2466 | - '🚀' 2467 | - '🛸' 2468 | - '🚁' 2469 | - '🛶' 2470 | - '⛵️' 2471 | - '🚤' 2472 | - '🛥' 2473 | - '🛳' 2474 | - '⛴' 2475 | - '🚢' 2476 | - '⚓️' 2477 | - '🛟' 2478 | - '🪝' 2479 | - '⛽️' 2480 | - '🚧' 2481 | - '🚦' 2482 | - '🚥' 2483 | - '🚏' 2484 | - '🗺' 2485 | - '🗿' 2486 | - '🗽' 2487 | - '🗼' 2488 | - '🏰' 2489 | - '🏯' 2490 | - '🏟' 2491 | - '🎡' 2492 | - '🎢' 2493 | - '🛝' 2494 | - '🎠' 2495 | - '⛲️' 2496 | - '⛱' 2497 | - '🏖' 2498 | - '🏝' 2499 | - '🏜' 2500 | - '🌋' 2501 | - '⛰' 2502 | - '🏔' 2503 | - '🗻' 2504 | - '🏕' 2505 | - '⛺️' 2506 | - '🛖' 2507 | - '🏠' 2508 | - '🏡' 2509 | - '🏘' 2510 | - '🏚' 2511 | - '🏗' 2512 | - '🏭' 2513 | - '🏢' 2514 | - '🏬' 2515 | - '🏣' 2516 | - '🏤' 2517 | - '🏥' 2518 | - '🏦' 2519 | - '🏨' 2520 | - '🏪' 2521 | - '🏫' 2522 | - '🏩' 2523 | - '💒' 2524 | - '🏛' 2525 | - '⛪️' 2526 | - '🕌' 2527 | - '🕍' 2528 | - '🛕' 2529 | - '🕋' 2530 | - '⛩' 2531 | - '🛤' 2532 | - '🛣' 2533 | - '🗾' 2534 | - '🎑' 2535 | - '🏞' 2536 | - '🌅' 2537 | - '🌄' 2538 | - '🌠' 2539 | - '🎇' 2540 | - '🎆' 2541 | - '🌇' 2542 | - '🌆' 2543 | - '🏙' 2544 | - '🌃' 2545 | - '🌌' 2546 | - '🌉' 2547 | - '🌁' 2548 | - '⌚️' 2549 | - '📱' 2550 | - '📲' 2551 | - '💻' 2552 | - '⌨️' 2553 | - '🖥' 2554 | - '🖨' 2555 | - '🖱' 2556 | - '🖲' 2557 | - '🕹' 2558 | - '🗜' 2559 | - '💽' 2560 | - '💾' 2561 | - '💿' 2562 | - '📀' 2563 | - '📼' 2564 | - '📷' 2565 | - '📸' 2566 | - '📹' 2567 | - '🎥' 2568 | - '📽' 2569 | - '🎞' 2570 | - '📞' 2571 | - '☎️' 2572 | - '📟' 2573 | - '📠' 2574 | - '📺' 2575 | - '📻' 2576 | - '🎙' 2577 | - '🎚' 2578 | - '🎛' 2579 | - '🧭' 2580 | - '⏱' 2581 | - '⏲' 2582 | - '⏰' 2583 | - '🕰' 2584 | - '⌛️' 2585 | - '⏳' 2586 | - '📡' 2587 | - '🔋' 2588 | - '🪫' 2589 | - '🔌' 2590 | - '💡' 2591 | - '🔦' 2592 | - '🕯' 2593 | - '🪔' 2594 | - '🧯' 2595 | - '🛢' 2596 | - '💸' 2597 | - '💵' 2598 | - '💴' 2599 | - '💶' 2600 | - '💷' 2601 | - '🪙' 2602 | - '💰' 2603 | - '💳' 2604 | - '💎' 2605 | - '⚖️' 2606 | - '🪜' 2607 | - '🧰' 2608 | - '🪛' 2609 | - '🔧' 2610 | - '🔨' 2611 | - '⚒' 2612 | - '🛠' 2613 | - '⛏' 2614 | - '🪚' 2615 | - '🔩' 2616 | - '⚙️' 2617 | - '🪤' 2618 | - '🧱' 2619 | - '⛓' 2620 | - '🧲' 2621 | - '🔫' 2622 | - '💣' 2623 | - '🧨' 2624 | - '🪓' 2625 | - '🔪' 2626 | - '🗡' 2627 | - '⚔️' 2628 | - '🛡' 2629 | - '🚬' 2630 | - '⚰️' 2631 | - '🪦' 2632 | - '⚱️' 2633 | - '🏺' 2634 | - '🔮' 2635 | - '📿' 2636 | - '🧿' 2637 | - '🪬' 2638 | - '💈' 2639 | - '⚗️' 2640 | - '🔭' 2641 | - '🔬' 2642 | - '🕳' 2643 | - '🩹' 2644 | - '🩺' 2645 | - '🩻' 2646 | - '🩼' 2647 | - '💊' 2648 | - '💉' 2649 | - '🩸' 2650 | - '🧬' 2651 | - '🦠' 2652 | - '🧫' 2653 | - '🧪' 2654 | - '🌡' 2655 | - '🧹' 2656 | - '🪠' 2657 | - '🧺' 2658 | - '🧻' 2659 | - '🚽' 2660 | - '🚰' 2661 | - '🚿' 2662 | - '🛁' 2663 | - '🛀' 2664 | - '🧼' 2665 | - '🪥' 2666 | - '🪒' 2667 | - '🧽' 2668 | - '🪣' 2669 | - '🧴' 2670 | - '🛎' 2671 | - '🔑' 2672 | - '🗝' 2673 | - '🚪' 2674 | - '🪑' 2675 | - '🛋' 2676 | - '🛏' 2677 | - '🛌' 2678 | - '🧸' 2679 | - '🪆' 2680 | - '🖼' 2681 | - '🪞' 2682 | - '🪟' 2683 | - '🛍' 2684 | - '🛒' 2685 | - '🎁' 2686 | - '🎈' 2687 | - '🎏' 2688 | - '🎀' 2689 | - '🪄' 2690 | - '🪅' 2691 | - '🎊' 2692 | - '🎉' 2693 | - '🪩' 2694 | - '🎎' 2695 | - '🏮' 2696 | - '🎐' 2697 | - '🧧' 2698 | - '✉️' 2699 | - '📩' 2700 | - '📨' 2701 | - '📧' 2702 | - '💌' 2703 | - '📥' 2704 | - '📤' 2705 | - '📦' 2706 | - '🏷' 2707 | - '🪧' 2708 | - '📪' 2709 | - '📫' 2710 | - '📬' 2711 | - '📭' 2712 | - '📮' 2713 | - '📯' 2714 | - '📜' 2715 | - '📃' 2716 | - '📄' 2717 | - '📑' 2718 | - '🧾' 2719 | - '📊' 2720 | - '📈' 2721 | - '📉' 2722 | - '🗒' 2723 | - '🗓' 2724 | - '📆' 2725 | - '📅' 2726 | - '🗑' 2727 | - '🪪' 2728 | - '📇' 2729 | - '🗃' 2730 | - '🗳' 2731 | - '🗄' 2732 | - '📋' 2733 | - '📁' 2734 | - '📂' 2735 | - '🗂' 2736 | - '🗞' 2737 | - '📰' 2738 | - '📓' 2739 | - '📔' 2740 | - '📒' 2741 | - '📕' 2742 | - '📗' 2743 | - '📘' 2744 | - '📙' 2745 | - '📚' 2746 | - '📖' 2747 | - '🔖' 2748 | - '🧷' 2749 | - '🔗' 2750 | - '📎' 2751 | - '🖇' 2752 | - '📐' 2753 | - '📏' 2754 | - '🧮' 2755 | - '📌' 2756 | - '📍' 2757 | - '✂️' 2758 | - '🖊' 2759 | - '🖋' 2760 | - '✒️' 2761 | - '🖌' 2762 | - '🖍' 2763 | - '📝' 2764 | - '✏️' 2765 | - '🔍' 2766 | - '🔎' 2767 | - '🔏' 2768 | - '🔐' 2769 | - '🔒' 2770 | - '🔓❤️' 2771 | - '🧡' 2772 | - '💛' 2773 | - '💚' 2774 | - '💙' 2775 | - '💜' 2776 | - '🖤' 2777 | - '🤍' 2778 | - '🤎' 2779 | - '❤️‍🔥' 2780 | - '❤️‍🩹' 2781 | - '💔' 2782 | - '❣️' 2783 | - '💕' 2784 | - '💞' 2785 | - '💓' 2786 | - '💗' 2787 | - '💖' 2788 | - '💘' 2789 | - '💝' 2790 | - '💟' 2791 | - '☮️' 2792 | - '✝️' 2793 | - '☪️' 2794 | - '🕉' 2795 | - '☸️' 2796 | - '✡️' 2797 | - '🔯' 2798 | - '🕎' 2799 | - '☯️' 2800 | - '☦️' 2801 | - '🛐' 2802 | - '⛎' 2803 | - '♈️' 2804 | - '♉️' 2805 | - '♊️' 2806 | - '♋️' 2807 | - '♌️' 2808 | - '♍️' 2809 | - '♎️' 2810 | - '♏️' 2811 | - '♐️' 2812 | - '♑️' 2813 | - '♒️' 2814 | - '♓️' 2815 | - '🆔' 2816 | - '⚛️' 2817 | - '🉑' 2818 | - '☢️' 2819 | - '☣️' 2820 | - '📴' 2821 | - '📳' 2822 | - '🈶' 2823 | - '🈚️' 2824 | - '🈸' 2825 | - '🈺' 2826 | - '🈷️' 2827 | - '✴️' 2828 | - '🆚' 2829 | - '💮' 2830 | - '🉐' 2831 | - '㊙️' 2832 | - '㊗️' 2833 | - '🈴' 2834 | - '🈵' 2835 | - '🈹' 2836 | - '🈲' 2837 | - '🅰️' 2838 | - '🅱️' 2839 | - '🆎' 2840 | - '🆑' 2841 | - '🅾️' 2842 | - '🆘' 2843 | - '❌' 2844 | - '⭕️' 2845 | - '🛑' 2846 | - '⛔️' 2847 | - '📛' 2848 | - '🚫' 2849 | - '💯' 2850 | - '💢' 2851 | - '♨️' 2852 | - '🚷' 2853 | - '🚯' 2854 | - '🚳' 2855 | - '🚱' 2856 | - '🔞' 2857 | - '📵' 2858 | - '🚭' 2859 | - '❗️' 2860 | - '❕' 2861 | - '❓' 2862 | - '❔' 2863 | - '‼️' 2864 | - '⁉️' 2865 | - '🔅' 2866 | - '🔆' 2867 | - '〽️' 2868 | - '⚠️' 2869 | - '🚸' 2870 | - '🔱' 2871 | - '⚜️' 2872 | - '🔰' 2873 | - '♻️' 2874 | - '✅' 2875 | - '🈯️' 2876 | - '💹' 2877 | - '❇️' 2878 | - '✳️' 2879 | - '❎' 2880 | - '🌐' 2881 | - '💠' 2882 | - 'Ⓜ️' 2883 | - '🌀' 2884 | - '💤' 2885 | - '🏧' 2886 | - '🚾' 2887 | - '♿️' 2888 | - '🅿️' 2889 | - '🛗' 2890 | - '🈳' 2891 | - '🈂️' 2892 | - '🛂' 2893 | - '🛃' 2894 | - '🛄' 2895 | - '🛅' 2896 | - '🚹' 2897 | - '🚺' 2898 | - '🚼' 2899 | - '⚧' 2900 | - '🚻' 2901 | - '🚮' 2902 | - '🎦' 2903 | - '📶' 2904 | - '🈁' 2905 | - '🔣' 2906 | - 'ℹ️' 2907 | - '🔤' 2908 | - '🔡' 2909 | - '🔠' 2910 | - '🆖' 2911 | - '🆗' 2912 | - '🆙' 2913 | - '🆒' 2914 | - '🆕' 2915 | - '🆓' 2916 | - '0️⃣' 2917 | - '1️⃣' 2918 | - '2️⃣' 2919 | - '3️⃣' 2920 | - '4️⃣' 2921 | - '5️⃣' 2922 | - '6️⃣' 2923 | - '7️⃣' 2924 | - '8️⃣' 2925 | - '9️⃣' 2926 | - '🔟' 2927 | - '🔢' 2928 | - '#️⃣' 2929 | - '*️⃣' 2930 | - '⏏️' 2931 | - '▶️' 2932 | - '⏸' 2933 | - '⏯' 2934 | - '⏹' 2935 | - '⏺' 2936 | - '⏭' 2937 | - '⏮' 2938 | - '⏩' 2939 | - '⏪' 2940 | - '⏫' 2941 | - '⏬' 2942 | - '◀️' 2943 | - '🔼' 2944 | - '🔽' 2945 | - '➡️' 2946 | - '⬅️' 2947 | - '⬆️' 2948 | - '⬇️' 2949 | - '↗️' 2950 | - '↘️' 2951 | - '↙️' 2952 | - '↖️' 2953 | - '↕️' 2954 | - '↔️' 2955 | - '↪️' 2956 | - '↩️' 2957 | - '⤴️' 2958 | - '⤵️' 2959 | - '🔀' 2960 | - '🔁' 2961 | - '🔂' 2962 | - '🔄' 2963 | - '🔃' 2964 | - '🎵' 2965 | - '🎶' 2966 | - '➕' 2967 | - '➖' 2968 | - '➗' 2969 | - '✖️' 2970 | - '🟰' 2971 | - '♾' 2972 | - '💲' 2973 | - '💱' 2974 | - '™️' 2975 | - '©️' 2976 | - '®️' 2977 | - '〰️' 2978 | - '➰' 2979 | - '➿' 2980 | - '🔚' 2981 | - '🔙' 2982 | - '🔛' 2983 | - '🔝' 2984 | - '🔜' 2985 | - '✔️' 2986 | - '☑️' 2987 | - '🔘' 2988 | - '🔴' 2989 | - '🟠' 2990 | - '🟡' 2991 | - '🟢' 2992 | - '🔵' 2993 | - '🟣' 2994 | - '⚫️' 2995 | - '⚪️' 2996 | - '🟤' 2997 | - '🔺' 2998 | - '🔻' 2999 | - '🔸' 3000 | - '🔹' 3001 | - '🔶' 3002 | - '🔷' 3003 | - '🔳' 3004 | - '🔲' 3005 | - '▪️' 3006 | - '▫️' 3007 | - '◾️' 3008 | - '◽️' 3009 | - '◼️' 3010 | - '◻️' 3011 | - '🟥' 3012 | - '🟧' 3013 | - '🟨' 3014 | - '🟩' 3015 | - '🟦' 3016 | - '🟪' 3017 | - '⬛️' 3018 | - '⬜️' 3019 | - '🟫' 3020 | - '🔈' 3021 | - '🔇' 3022 | - '🔉' 3023 | - '🔊' 3024 | - '🔔' 3025 | - '🔕' 3026 | - '📣' 3027 | - '📢' 3028 | - '👁‍🗨' 3029 | - '💬' 3030 | - '💭' 3031 | - '🗯' 3032 | - '♠️' 3033 | - '♣️' 3034 | - '♥️' 3035 | - '♦️' 3036 | - '🃏' 3037 | - '🎴' 3038 | - '🀄️' 3039 | - '🕐' 3040 | - '🕑' 3041 | - '🕒' 3042 | - '🕓' 3043 | - '🕔' 3044 | - '🕕' 3045 | - '🕖' 3046 | - '🕗' 3047 | - '🕘' 3048 | - '🕙' 3049 | - '🕚' 3050 | - '🕛' 3051 | - '🕜' 3052 | - '🕝' 3053 | - '🕞' 3054 | - '🕟' 3055 | - '🕠' 3056 | - '🕡' 3057 | - '🕢' 3058 | - '🕣' 3059 | - '🕤' 3060 | - '🕥' 3061 | - '🕦' 3062 | - '🕧✢' 3063 | - '✣' 3064 | - '✤' 3065 | - '✥' 3066 | - '✦' 3067 | - '✧' 3068 | - '★' 3069 | - '☆' 3070 | - '✯' 3071 | - '✡︎' 3072 | - '✩' 3073 | - '✪' 3074 | - '✫' 3075 | - '✬' 3076 | - '✭' 3077 | - '✮' 3078 | - '✶' 3079 | - '✷' 3080 | - '✵' 3081 | - '✸' 3082 | - '✹' 3083 | - '→' 3084 | - '⇒' 3085 | - '⟹' 3086 | - '⇨' 3087 | - '⇾' 3088 | - '➾' 3089 | - '⇢' 3090 | - '☛' 3091 | - '☞' 3092 | - '➔' 3093 | - '➜' 3094 | - '➙' 3095 | - '➛' 3096 | - '➝' 3097 | - '➞' 3098 | - '♠︎' 3099 | - '♣︎' 3100 | - '♥︎' 3101 | - '♦︎' 3102 | - '♤' 3103 | - '♧' 3104 | - '♡' 3105 | - '♢' 3106 | - '♚' 3107 | - '♛' 3108 | - '♜' 3109 | - '♝' 3110 | - '♞' 3111 | - '♟' 3112 | - '♔' 3113 | - '♕' 3114 | - '♖' 3115 | - '♗' 3116 | - '♘' 3117 | - '♙' 3118 | - '⚀' 3119 | - '⚁' 3120 | - '⚂' 3121 | - '⚃' 3122 | - '⚄' 3123 | - '⚅' 3124 | - '🂠' 3125 | - '⚈' 3126 | - '⚉' 3127 | - '⚆' 3128 | - '⚇' 3129 | - '𓀀' 3130 | - '𓀁' 3131 | - '𓀂' 3132 | - '𓀃' 3133 | - '𓀄' 3134 | - '𓀅' 3135 | - '𓀆' 3136 | - '𓀇' 3137 | - '𓀈' 3138 | - '𓀉' 3139 | - '𓀊' 3140 | - '𓀋' 3141 | - '𓀌' 3142 | - '𓀍' 3143 | - '𓀎' 3144 | - '𓀏' 3145 | - '𓀐' 3146 | - '𓀑' 3147 | - '𓀒' 3148 | - '𓀓' 3149 | - '𓀔' 3150 | - '𓀕' 3151 | - '𓀖' 3152 | - '𓀗' 3153 | - '𓀘' 3154 | - '𓀙' 3155 | - '𓀚' 3156 | - '𓀛' 3157 | - '𓀜' 3158 | - '𓀝🏳️' 3159 | - '🏴' 3160 | - '🏁' 3161 | - '🚩' 3162 | - '🏳️‍🌈' 3163 | - '🏳️‍⚧️' 3164 | - '🏴‍☠️' 3165 | - '🇦🇫' 3166 | - '🇦🇽' 3167 | - '🇦🇱' 3168 | - '🇩🇿' 3169 | - '🇦🇸' 3170 | - '🇦🇩' 3171 | - '🇦🇴' 3172 | - '🇦🇮' 3173 | - '🇦🇶' 3174 | - '🇦🇬' 3175 | - '🇦🇷' 3176 | - '🇦🇲' 3177 | - '🇦🇼' 3178 | - '🇦🇺' 3179 | - '🇦🇹' 3180 | - '🇦🇿' 3181 | - '🇧🇸' 3182 | - '🇧🇭' 3183 | - '🇧🇩' 3184 | - '🇧🇧' 3185 | - '🇧🇾' 3186 | - '🇧🇪' 3187 | - '🇧🇿' 3188 | - '🇧🇯' 3189 | - '🇧🇲' 3190 | - '🇧🇹' 3191 | - '🇧🇴' 3192 | - '🇧🇦' 3193 | - '🇧🇼' 3194 | - '🇧🇷' 3195 | - '🇮🇴' 3196 | - '🇻🇬' 3197 | - '🇧🇳' 3198 | - '🇧🇬' 3199 | - '🇧🇫' 3200 | - '🇧🇮' 3201 | - '🇰🇭' 3202 | - '🇨🇲' 3203 | - '🇨🇦' 3204 | - '🇮🇨' 3205 | - '🇨🇻' 3206 | - '🇧🇶' 3207 | - '🇰🇾' 3208 | - '🇨🇫' 3209 | - '🇹🇩' 3210 | - '🇨🇱' 3211 | - '🇨🇳' 3212 | - '🇨🇽' 3213 | - '🇨🇨' 3214 | - '🇨🇴' 3215 | - '🇰🇲' 3216 | - '🇨🇬' 3217 | - '🇨🇩' 3218 | - '🇨🇰' 3219 | - '🇨🇷' 3220 | - '🇨🇮' 3221 | - '🇭🇷' 3222 | - '🇨🇺' 3223 | - '🇨🇼' 3224 | - '🇨🇾' 3225 | - '🇨🇿' 3226 | - '🇩🇰' 3227 | - '🇩🇯' 3228 | - '🇩🇲' 3229 | - '🇩🇴' 3230 | - '🇪🇨' 3231 | - '🇪🇬' 3232 | - '🇸🇻' 3233 | - '🇬🇶' 3234 | - '🇪🇷' 3235 | - '🇪🇪' 3236 | - '🇪🇹' 3237 | - '🇪🇺' 3238 | - '🇫🇰' 3239 | - '🇫🇴' 3240 | - '🇫🇯' 3241 | - '🇫🇮' 3242 | - '🇫🇷' 3243 | - '🇬🇫' 3244 | - '🇵🇫' 3245 | - '🇹🇫' 3246 | - '🇬🇦' 3247 | - '🇬🇲' 3248 | - '🇬🇪' 3249 | - '🇩🇪' 3250 | - '🇬🇭' 3251 | - '🇬🇮' 3252 | - '🇬🇷' 3253 | - '🇬🇱' 3254 | - '🇬🇩' 3255 | - '🇬🇵' 3256 | - '🇬🇺' 3257 | - '🇬🇹' 3258 | - '🇬🇬' 3259 | - '🇬🇳' 3260 | - '🇬🇼' 3261 | - '🇬🇾' 3262 | - '🇭🇹' 3263 | - '🇭🇳' 3264 | - '🇭🇰' 3265 | - '🇭🇺' 3266 | - '🇮🇸' 3267 | - '🇮🇳' 3268 | - '🇮🇩' 3269 | - '🇮🇷' 3270 | - '🇮🇶' 3271 | - '🇮🇪' 3272 | - '🇮🇲' 3273 | - '🇮🇱' 3274 | - '🇮🇹' 3275 | - '🇯🇲' 3276 | - '🇯🇵' 3277 | - '🎌' 3278 | - '🇯🇪' 3279 | - '🇯🇴' 3280 | - '🇰🇿' 3281 | - '🇰🇪' 3282 | - '🇰🇮' 3283 | - '🇽🇰' 3284 | - '🇰🇼' 3285 | - '🇰🇬' 3286 | - '🇱🇦' 3287 | - '🇱🇻' 3288 | - '🇱🇧' 3289 | - '🇱🇸' 3290 | - '🇱🇷' 3291 | - '🇱🇾' 3292 | - '🇱🇮' 3293 | - '🇱🇹' 3294 | - '🇱🇺' 3295 | - '🇲🇴' 3296 | - '🇲🇰' 3297 | - '🇲🇬' 3298 | - '🇲🇼' 3299 | - '🇲🇾' 3300 | - '🇲🇻' 3301 | - '🇲🇱' 3302 | - '🇲🇹' 3303 | - '🇲🇭' 3304 | - '🇲🇶' 3305 | - '🇲🇷' 3306 | - '🇲🇺' 3307 | - '🇾🇹' 3308 | - '🇲🇽' 3309 | - '🇫🇲' 3310 | - '🇲🇩' 3311 | - '🇲🇨' 3312 | - '🇲🇳' 3313 | - '🇲🇪' 3314 | - '🇲🇸' 3315 | - '🇲🇦' 3316 | - '🇲🇿' 3317 | - '🇲🇲' 3318 | - '🇳🇦' 3319 | - '🇳🇷' 3320 | - '🇳🇵' 3321 | - '🇳🇱' 3322 | - '🇳🇨' 3323 | - '🇳🇿' 3324 | - '🇳🇮' 3325 | - '🇳🇪' 3326 | - '🇳🇬' 3327 | - '🇳🇺' 3328 | - '🇳🇫' 3329 | - '🇰🇵' 3330 | - '🇲🇵' 3331 | - '🇳🇴' 3332 | - '🇴🇲' 3333 | - '🇵🇰' 3334 | - '🇵🇼' 3335 | - '🇵🇸' 3336 | - '🇵🇦' 3337 | - '🇵🇬' 3338 | - '🇵🇾' 3339 | - '🇵🇪' 3340 | - '🇵🇭' 3341 | - '🇵🇳' 3342 | - '🇵🇱' 3343 | - '🇵🇹' 3344 | - '🇵🇷' 3345 | - '🇶🇦' 3346 | - '🇷🇪' 3347 | - '🇷🇴' 3348 | - '🇷🇺' 3349 | - '🇷🇼' 3350 | - '🇼🇸' 3351 | - '🇸🇲' 3352 | - '🇸🇦' 3353 | - '🇸🇳' 3354 | - '🇷🇸' 3355 | - '🇸🇨' 3356 | - '🇸🇱' 3357 | - '🇸🇬' 3358 | - '🇸🇽' 3359 | - '🇸🇰' 3360 | - '🇸🇮' 3361 | - '🇬🇸' 3362 | - '🇸🇧' 3363 | - '🇸🇴' 3364 | - '🇿🇦' 3365 | - '🇰🇷' 3366 | - '🇸🇸' 3367 | - '🇪🇸' 3368 | - '🇱🇰' 3369 | - '🇧🇱' 3370 | - '🇸🇭' 3371 | - '🇰🇳' 3372 | - '🇱🇨' 3373 | - '🇵🇲' 3374 | - '🇻🇨' 3375 | - '🇸🇩' 3376 | - '🇸🇷' 3377 | - '🇸🇿' 3378 | - '🇸🇪' 3379 | - '🇨🇭' 3380 | - '🇸🇾' 3381 | - '🇹🇼' 3382 | - '🇹🇯' 3383 | - '🇹🇿' 3384 | - '🇹🇭' 3385 | - '🇹🇱' 3386 | - '🇹🇬' 3387 | - '🇹🇰' 3388 | - '🇹🇴' 3389 | - '🇹🇹' 3390 | - '🇹🇳' 3391 | - '🇹🇷' 3392 | - '🇹🇲' 3393 | - '🇹🇨' 3394 | - '🇹🇻' 3395 | - '🇻🇮' 3396 | - '🇺🇬' 3397 | - '🇺🇦' 3398 | - '🇦🇪' 3399 | - '🇬🇧' 3400 | - '🏴󠁧󠁢󠁥󠁮󠁧󠁿' 3401 | - '🏴󠁧󠁢󠁳󠁣󠁴󠁿' 3402 | - '🏴󠁧󠁢󠁷󠁬󠁳󠁿' 3403 | - '🇺🇳' 3404 | - '🇺🇸' 3405 | - '🇺🇾' 3406 | - '🇺🇿' 3407 | - '🇻🇺' 3408 | - '🇻🇦' 3409 | - '🇻🇪' 3410 | - '🇻🇳' 3411 | - '🇼🇫' 3412 | - '🇪🇭' 3413 | - '🇾🇪' 3414 | - '🇿🇲' 3415 | - '🇿🇼🫠' 3416 | - '🫢' 3417 | - '🫣' 3418 | - '🫡' 3419 | - '🫥' 3420 | - '🫤' 3421 | - '🥹' 3422 | - '🫱' 3423 | - '🫱🏻' 3424 | - '🫱🏼' 3425 | - '🫱🏽' 3426 | - '🫱🏾' 3427 | - '🫱🏿' 3428 | - '🫲' 3429 | - '🫲🏻' 3430 | - '🫲🏼' 3431 | - '🫲🏽' 3432 | - '🫲🏾' 3433 | - '🫲🏿' 3434 | - '🫳' 3435 | - '🫳🏻' 3436 | - '🫳🏼' 3437 | - '🫳🏽' 3438 | - '🫳🏾' 3439 | - '🫳🏿' 3440 | - '🫴' 3441 | - '🫴🏻' 3442 | - '🫴🏼' 3443 | - '🫴🏽' 3444 | - '🫴🏾' 3445 | - '🫴🏿' 3446 | - '🫰' 3447 | - '🫰🏻' 3448 | - '🫰🏼' 3449 | - '🫰🏽' 3450 | - '🫰🏾' 3451 | - '🫰🏿' 3452 | - '🫵' 3453 | - '🫵🏻' 3454 | - '🫵🏼' 3455 | - '🫵🏽' 3456 | - '🫵🏾' 3457 | - '🫵🏿' 3458 | - '🫶' 3459 | - '🫶🏻' 3460 | - '🫶🏼' 3461 | - '🫶🏽' 3462 | - '🫶🏾' 3463 | - '🫶🏿' 3464 | - '🤝🏻' 3465 | - '🤝🏼' 3466 | - '🤝🏽' 3467 | - '🤝🏾' 3468 | - '🤝🏿' 3469 | - '🫱🏻‍🫲🏼' 3470 | - '🫱🏻‍🫲🏽' 3471 | - '🫱🏻‍🫲🏾' 3472 | - '🫱🏻‍🫲🏿' 3473 | - '🫱🏼‍🫲🏻' 3474 | - '🫱🏼‍🫲🏽' 3475 | - '🫱🏼‍🫲🏾' 3476 | - '🫱🏼‍🫲🏿' 3477 | - '🫱🏽‍🫲🏻' 3478 | - '🫱🏽‍🫲🏼' 3479 | - '🫱🏽‍🫲🏾' 3480 | - '🫱🏽‍🫲🏿' 3481 | - '🫱🏾‍🫲🏻' 3482 | - '🫱🏾‍🫲🏼' 3483 | - '🫱🏾‍🫲🏽' 3484 | - '🫱🏾‍🫲🏿' 3485 | - '🫱🏿‍🫲🏻' 3486 | - '🫱🏿‍🫲🏼' 3487 | - '🫱🏿‍🫲🏽' 3488 | - '🫱🏿‍🫲🏾' 3489 | - '🫦' 3490 | - '🫅' 3491 | - '🫅🏻' 3492 | - '🫅🏼' 3493 | - '🫅🏽' 3494 | - '🫅🏾' 3495 | - '🫅🏿' 3496 | - '🫃' 3497 | - '🫃🏻' 3498 | - '🫃🏼' 3499 | - '🫃🏽' 3500 | - '🫃🏾' 3501 | - '🫃🏿' 3502 | - '🫄' 3503 | - '🫄🏻' 3504 | - '🫄🏼' 3505 | - '🫄🏽' 3506 | - '🫄🏾' 3507 | - '🫄🏿' 3508 | - '🧌' 3509 | - '🪸' 3510 | - '🪷' 3511 | - '🪹' 3512 | - '🪺' 3513 | - '🫘' 3514 | - '🫗' 3515 | - '🫙' 3516 | - '🛝' 3517 | - '🛞' 3518 | - '🛟' 3519 | - '🪬' 3520 | - '🪩' 3521 | - '🪫' 3522 | - '🩼' 3523 | - '🩻' 3524 | - '🫧' 3525 | - '🪪' 3526 | - '🟰' 3527 | - '😮‍💨' 3528 | - '😵‍💫' 3529 | - '😶‍🌫️' 3530 | - '❤️‍🔥' 3531 | - '❤️‍🩹' 3532 | - '🧔‍♀️' 3533 | - '🧔🏻‍♀️' 3534 | - '🧔🏼‍♀️' 3535 | - '🧔🏽‍♀️' 3536 | - '🧔🏾‍♀️' 3537 | - '🧔🏿‍♀️' 3538 | - '🧔‍♂️' 3539 | - '🧔🏻‍♂️' 3540 | - '🧔🏼‍♂️' 3541 | - '🧔🏽‍♂️' 3542 | - '🧔🏾‍♂️' 3543 | - '🧔🏿‍♂️' 3544 | - '💑🏻' 3545 | - '💑🏼' 3546 | - '💑🏽' 3547 | - '💑🏾' 3548 | - '💑🏿' 3549 | - '💏🏻' 3550 | - '💏🏼' 3551 | - '💏🏽' 3552 | - '💏🏾' 3553 | - '💏🏿' 3554 | - '👨🏻‍❤️‍👨🏻' 3555 | - '👨🏻‍❤️‍👨🏼' 3556 | - '👨🏻‍❤️‍👨🏽' 3557 | - '👨🏻‍❤️‍👨🏾' 3558 | - '👨🏻‍❤️‍👨🏿' 3559 | - '👨🏼‍❤️‍👨🏻' 3560 | - '👨🏼‍❤️‍👨🏼' 3561 | - '👨🏼‍❤️‍👨🏽' 3562 | - '👨🏼‍❤️‍👨🏾' 3563 | - '👨🏼‍❤️‍👨🏿' 3564 | - '👨🏽‍❤️‍👨🏻' 3565 | - '👨🏽‍❤️‍👨🏼' 3566 | - '👨🏽‍❤️‍👨🏽' 3567 | - '👨🏽‍❤️‍👨🏾' 3568 | - '👨🏽‍❤️‍👨🏿' 3569 | - '👨🏾‍❤️‍👨🏻' 3570 | - '👨🏾‍❤️‍👨🏼' 3571 | - '👨🏾‍❤️‍👨🏽' 3572 | - '👨🏾‍❤️‍👨🏾' 3573 | - '👨🏾‍❤️‍👨🏿' 3574 | - '👨🏿‍❤️‍👨🏻' 3575 | - '👨🏿‍❤️‍👨🏼' 3576 | - '👨🏿‍❤️‍👨🏽' 3577 | - '👨🏿‍❤️‍👨🏾' 3578 | - '👨🏿‍❤️‍👨🏿' 3579 | - '👩🏻‍❤️‍👨🏻' 3580 | - '👩🏻‍❤️‍👨🏼' 3581 | - '👩🏻‍❤️‍👨🏽' 3582 | - '👩🏻‍❤️‍👨🏾' 3583 | - '👩🏻‍❤️‍👨🏿' 3584 | - '👩🏻‍❤️‍👩🏻' 3585 | - '👩🏻‍❤️‍👩🏼' 3586 | - '👩🏻‍❤️‍👩🏽' 3587 | - '👩🏻‍❤️‍👩🏾' 3588 | - '👩🏻‍❤️‍👩🏿' 3589 | - '👩🏼‍❤️‍👨🏻' 3590 | - '👩🏼‍❤️‍👨🏼' 3591 | - '👩🏼‍❤️‍👨🏽' 3592 | - '👩🏼‍❤️‍👨🏾' 3593 | - '👩🏼‍❤️‍👨🏿' 3594 | - '👩🏼‍❤️‍👩🏻' 3595 | - '👩🏼‍❤️‍👩🏼' 3596 | - '👩🏼‍❤️‍👩🏽' 3597 | - '👩🏼‍❤️‍👩🏾' 3598 | - '👩🏼‍❤️‍👩🏿' 3599 | - '👩🏽‍❤️‍👨🏻' 3600 | - '👩🏽‍❤️‍👨🏼' 3601 | - '👩🏽‍❤️‍👨🏽' 3602 | - '👩🏽‍❤️‍👨🏾' 3603 | - '👩🏽‍❤️‍👨🏿' 3604 | - '👩🏽‍❤️‍👩🏻' 3605 | - '👩🏽‍❤️‍👩🏼' 3606 | - '👩🏽‍❤️‍👩🏽' 3607 | - '👩🏽‍❤️‍👩🏾' 3608 | - '👩🏽‍❤️‍👩🏿' 3609 | - '👩🏾‍❤️‍👨🏻' 3610 | - '👩🏾‍❤️‍👨🏼' 3611 | - '👩🏾‍❤️‍👨🏽' 3612 | - '👩🏾‍❤️‍👨🏾' 3613 | - '👩🏾‍❤️‍👨🏿' 3614 | - '👩🏾‍❤️‍👩🏻' 3615 | - '👩🏾‍❤️‍👩🏼' 3616 | - '👩🏾‍❤️‍👩🏽' 3617 | - '👩🏾‍❤️‍👩🏾' 3618 | - '👩🏾‍❤️‍👩🏿' 3619 | - '👩🏿‍❤️‍👨🏻' 3620 | - '👩🏿‍❤️‍👨🏼' 3621 | - '👩🏿‍❤️‍👨🏽' 3622 | - '👩🏿‍❤️‍👨🏾' 3623 | - '👩🏿‍❤️‍👨🏿' 3624 | - '👩🏿‍❤️‍👩🏻' 3625 | - '👩🏿‍❤️‍👩🏼' 3626 | - '👩🏿‍❤️‍👩🏽' 3627 | - '👩🏿‍❤️‍👩🏾' 3628 | - '👩🏿‍❤️‍👩🏿' 3629 | - '🧑🏻‍❤️‍🧑🏼' 3630 | - '🧑🏻‍❤️‍🧑🏽' 3631 | - '🧑🏻‍❤️‍🧑🏾' 3632 | - '🧑🏻‍❤️‍🧑🏿' 3633 | - '🧑🏼‍❤️‍🧑🏻' 3634 | - '🧑🏼‍❤️‍🧑🏽' 3635 | - '🧑🏼‍❤️‍🧑🏾' 3636 | - '🧑🏼‍❤️‍🧑🏿' 3637 | - '🧑🏽‍❤️‍🧑🏻' 3638 | - '🧑🏽‍❤️‍🧑🏼' 3639 | - '🧑🏽‍❤️‍🧑🏾' 3640 | - '🧑🏽‍❤️‍🧑🏿' 3641 | - '🧑🏾‍❤️‍🧑🏻' 3642 | - '🧑🏾‍❤️‍🧑🏼' 3643 | - '🧑🏾‍❤️‍🧑🏽' 3644 | - '🧑🏾‍❤️‍🧑🏿' 3645 | - '🧑🏿‍❤️‍🧑🏻' 3646 | - '🧑🏿‍❤️‍🧑🏼' 3647 | - '🧑🏿‍❤️‍🧑🏽' 3648 | - '🧑🏿‍❤️‍🧑🏾' 3649 | - '👨🏻‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏻' 3650 | - '👨🏻‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏼' 3651 | - '👨🏻‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏽' 3652 | - '👨🏻‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏾' 3653 | - '👨🏻‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏿' 3654 | - '👨🏼‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏻' 3655 | - '👨🏼‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏼' 3656 | - '👨🏼‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏽' 3657 | - '👨🏼‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏾' 3658 | - '👨🏼‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏿' 3659 | - '👨🏽‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏻' 3660 | - '👨🏽‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏼' 3661 | - '👨🏽‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏽' 3662 | - '👨🏽‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏾' 3663 | - '👨🏽‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏿' 3664 | - '👨🏾‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏻' 3665 | - '👨🏾‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏼' 3666 | - '👨🏾‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏽' 3667 | - '👨🏾‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏾' 3668 | - '👨🏾‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏿' 3669 | - '👨🏿‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏻' 3670 | - '👨🏿‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏼' 3671 | - '👨🏿‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏽' 3672 | - '👨🏿‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏾' 3673 | - '👨🏿‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏿' 3674 | - '👩🏻‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏻' 3675 | - '👩🏻‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏼' 3676 | - '👩🏻‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏽' 3677 | - '👩🏻‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏾' 3678 | - '👩🏻‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏿' 3679 | - '👩🏻‍❤️‍💋‍👩🏻' 3680 | - '👩🏻‍❤️‍💋‍👩🏼' 3681 | - '👩🏻‍❤️‍💋‍👩🏽' 3682 | - '👩🏻‍❤️‍💋‍👩🏾' 3683 | - '👩🏻‍❤️‍💋‍👩🏿' 3684 | - '👩🏼‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏻' 3685 | - '👩🏼‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏼' 3686 | - '👩🏼‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏽' 3687 | - '👩🏼‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏾' 3688 | - '👩🏼‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏿' 3689 | - '👩🏼‍❤️‍💋‍👩🏻' 3690 | - '👩🏼‍❤️‍💋‍👩🏼' 3691 | - '👩🏼‍❤️‍💋‍👩🏽' 3692 | - '👩🏼‍❤️‍💋‍👩🏾' 3693 | - '👩🏼‍❤️‍💋‍👩🏿' 3694 | - '👩🏽‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏻' 3695 | - '👩🏽‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏼' 3696 | - '👩🏽‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏽' 3697 | - '👩🏽‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏾' 3698 | - '👩🏽‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏿' 3699 | - '👩🏽‍❤️‍💋‍👩🏻' 3700 | - '👩🏽‍❤️‍💋‍👩🏼' 3701 | - '👩🏽‍❤️‍💋‍👩🏽' 3702 | - '👩🏽‍❤️‍💋‍👩🏾' 3703 | - '👩🏽‍❤️‍💋‍👩🏿' 3704 | - '👩🏾‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏻' 3705 | - '👩🏾‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏼' 3706 | - '👩🏾‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏽' 3707 | - '👩🏾‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏾' 3708 | - '👩🏾‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏿' 3709 | - '👩🏾‍❤️‍💋‍👩🏻' 3710 | - '👩🏾‍❤️‍💋‍👩🏼' 3711 | - '👩🏾‍❤️‍💋‍👩🏽' 3712 | - '👩🏾‍❤️‍💋‍👩🏾' 3713 | - '👩🏾‍❤️‍💋‍👩🏿' 3714 | - '👩🏿‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏻' 3715 | - '👩🏿‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏼' 3716 | - '👩🏿‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏽' 3717 | - '👩🏿‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏾' 3718 | - '👩🏿‍❤️‍💋‍👨🏿' 3719 | - '👩🏿‍❤️‍💋‍👩🏻' 3720 | - '👩🏿‍❤️‍💋‍👩🏼' 3721 | - '👩🏿‍❤️‍💋‍👩🏽' 3722 | - '👩🏿‍❤️‍💋‍👩🏾' 3723 | - '👩🏿‍❤️‍💋‍👩🏿' 3724 | - '🧑🏻‍❤️‍💋‍🧑🏼' 3725 | - '🧑🏻‍❤️‍💋‍🧑🏽' 3726 | - '🧑🏻‍❤️‍💋‍🧑🏾' 3727 | - '🧑🏻‍❤️‍💋‍🧑🏿' 3728 | - '🧑🏼‍❤️‍💋‍🧑🏻' 3729 | - '🧑🏼‍❤️‍💋‍🧑🏽' 3730 | - '🧑🏼‍❤️‍💋‍🧑🏾' 3731 | - '🧑🏼‍❤️‍💋‍🧑🏿' 3732 | - '🧑🏽‍❤️‍💋‍🧑🏻' 3733 | - '🧑🏽‍❤️‍💋‍🧑🏼' 3734 | - '🧑🏽‍❤️‍💋‍🧑🏾' 3735 | - '🧑🏽‍❤️‍💋‍🧑🏿' 3736 | - '🧑🏾‍❤️‍💋‍🧑🏻' 3737 | - '🧑🏾‍❤️‍💋‍🧑🏼' 3738 | - '🧑🏾‍❤️‍💋‍🧑🏽' 3739 | - '🧑🏾‍❤️‍💋‍🧑🏿' 3740 | - '🧑🏿‍❤️‍💋‍🧑🏻' 3741 | - '🧑🏿‍❤️‍💋‍🧑🏼' 3742 | - '🧑🏿‍❤️‍💋‍🧑🏽' 3743 | - '🧑🏿‍❤️‍💋‍🧑🏾' 3744 | condition: selection1 3745 | falsepositives: 3746 | - Uknown 3747 | level: high 3748 | tags: 3749 | - ( ͡° ͜ʖ ͡°) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /MISC/proc_creation_windows_DisableRestrictedAdmin.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Enabling restricted admin mode 2 | id: 0e6e820b-f829-472e-9e34-930939778187 3 | status: Experimental 4 | description: Detects the registry modification to enable restricted admin mode using reg.exe 5 | author: \@Kostastsale, \@TheDFIRReport 6 | references: 7 | - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/ 8 | date: 2022/05/09 9 | logsource: 10 | product: windows 11 | category: process_creation 12 | detection: 13 | selection1: 14 | Image|endswith: 15 | - '\powershell.exe' 16 | - '\reg.exe' 17 | CommandLine|contains|all: 18 | - '/add' 19 | - 'DisableRestrictedAdmin' 20 | - 'hklm\system\currentcontrolset\control\lsa' 21 | selection2: 22 | CommandLine|contains: 23 | - '-Value 0' 24 | - '/d 0' 25 | condition: selection1 and selection2 26 | falsepositives: 27 | - Uknown 28 | level: high 29 | tags: 30 | - attack.defense_evasion 31 | - attack.t1562.001 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /MISC/proc_creation_windows_Powershell_downloader_cradle.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Using powershell specific download cradle OneLiner 2 | id: 44e24481-6202-4c62-9127-5a0ae8e3fe3d 3 | status: Experimental 4 | description: Detects the execution of a specific OneLiner to download and execute powershell modules in memory. 5 | author: \@Kostastsale, \@TheDFIRReport 6 | references: 7 | - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/ 8 | - https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/3b11169ab77a7de354f4111aa2f0df38 9 | date: 2022/05/09 10 | logsource: 11 | product: windows 12 | category: process_creation 13 | detection: 14 | selection1: 15 | Image|endswith: 16 | - '\powershell.exe' 17 | CommandLine|contains|all: 18 | - 'http://127.0.0.1' 19 | - '%{(IRM $_)}' 20 | - '.SubString.ToString()[67,72,64]-Join' 21 | - 'Import-Module' 22 | condition: selection1 23 | falsepositives: 24 | - Uknown 25 | level: high 26 | tags: 27 | - attack.defense_evasion 28 | - attack.t1562.001 29 | - attack.execution 30 | - T1059.001 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /MISC/proc_creation_windows_explorer_shell_execute.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Using explorer.exe to open a file explorer folder via command prompt 2 | id: c3d76afc-93df-461e-8e67-9b2bad3f2ac4 3 | status: Experimental 4 | description: Detects the initial execution of cmd.exe which spawns explorer.exe with the appropriate command line arguments for opening the My Computer folder. 5 | author: '@Kostastsale' 6 | references: 7 | - https://x.com/Kostastsale/status/1605875345088925696 8 | date: 2022/12/22 9 | logsource: 10 | product: windows 11 | category: process_creation 12 | detection: 13 | selection1: 14 | ParentImage|endswith: 15 | - '\cmd.exe' 16 | - '\powershell.exe' 17 | selection2: 18 | Image|endswith: 19 | - '\explorer.exe' 20 | CommandLine|contains: 21 | - 'explorer.exe shell:mycomputerfolder' 22 | condition: selection1 and selection2 23 | falsepositives: 24 | - Uknown 25 | level: high 26 | tags: 27 | - attack.Discovery 28 | - attack.T1135 29 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /MISC/proc_creation_windows_hh_LOLBA.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: HH.exe LOLBA executing .chm files 2 | id: 4dd98986-86b3-44d3-9618-c58e86b5674d 3 | description: Detecting the execution of hh.exe and the follow up activity for downloading or executing 4 | second stage payloads. This is based malspam activity delivering Remote Access Trojans via initial .chm 5 | payloads. 6 | status: experimental 7 | references: 8 | - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/f0c20d4ea2e2cc1d3c9df58b1a4854f9e3b761b7cd0c26860559289c74a8d50f/behavior/C2AE 9 | - https://tria.ge/220520-cbrbasebb7/behavioral2 10 | - https://www.socinvestigation.com/threat-actors-abuse-microsofts-html-help-file-to-deliver-malware/ 11 | author: '@Kostastsale' 12 | date: 2022/05/24 13 | logsource: 14 | category: process_creation 15 | product: windows 16 | detection: 17 | selection1: 18 | ParentImage|endswith: 19 | - '\hh.exe' 20 | ParentCommandLine|endswith: 21 | - '.chm' 22 | selection2: 23 | Image|endswith: 24 | - '\cmd.exe' 25 | CommandLine|contains: 26 | - ' /c ' 27 | selection3: 28 | Image|endswith: 29 | - '\pwsh.exe' 30 | - '\powershell.exe' 31 | condition: selection1 and (selection2 or selection3) 32 | falsepositives: 33 | - Uknown 34 | level: high 35 | tags: 36 | - attack.Compiled.HTML.File 37 | - attack.T1218.001 38 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /MISC/proc_creation_windows_pythonfunctionwarnings_disabled.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Disabling Python warnings for executing untrusted code 2 | id: 023c654f-8f16-44d9-bb2b-00ff36a62af9 3 | description: Detecting the registry change that would prevent any warnings or alerts when Python functions are about to be executed. Threat actors could run malicious code through the new 4 | Microsoft Excel feature that allows Python to run within the spreadsheet. 5 | status: experimental 6 | references: 7 | - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/office/data-security-and-python-in-excel-33cc88a4-4a87-485e-9ff9-f35958278327 8 | author: '@Kostastsale' 9 | date: 2023/08/22 10 | logsource: 11 | category: process_creation 12 | product: windows 13 | detection: 14 | selection1: 15 | Image|endswith: 16 | - '\reg.exe' 17 | - '\powershell.exe' 18 | CommandLine|contains|all: 19 | - 'software\policies\microsoft\office\*\excel\security' 20 | - 'pythonfunctionwarnings*0' 21 | selection2: 22 | CommandLine|contains: 23 | - 'reg*add' 24 | - 'Set-ItemProperty' 25 | condition: selection1 and selection2 26 | falsepositives: 27 | - Uknown 28 | level: high 29 | tags: 30 | - attack.Defense-Evansion 31 | - attack.T1562.001 32 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /MISC/proc_creation_windows_reg_enabling_rdp.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Enabling RDP service via reg.exe command execution 2 | id: afed5f7a-362a-46c2-8cc3-38a2e96b07b1 3 | status: Experimental 4 | description: Detects the execution of reg.exe and subsequent command line arguments for enabling RDP service on the host 5 | author: '@Kostastsale, @TheDFIRReport' 6 | references: 7 | - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/ 8 | date: 2022/02/12 9 | logsource: 10 | product: windows 11 | category: process_creation 12 | detection: 13 | selection1: 14 | Image|endswith: 15 | - '\reg.exe' 16 | CommandLine|contains|all: 17 | - 'add' 18 | - 'HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server' 19 | - 'REG_DWORD' 20 | Winstations1: 21 | CommandLine|contains: 22 | - 'WinStations\RDP-Tcp' 23 | Winstations2: 24 | CommandLine|contains: 25 | - 'MaxInstanceCount' 26 | - 'fEnableWinStation' 27 | selection2: 28 | CommandLine|contains|all: 29 | - 'Licensing Core' 30 | - 'EnableConcurrentSessions' 31 | selection3: 32 | CommandLine|contains: 33 | - 'TSUserEnabled' 34 | - 'TSEnabled' 35 | - 'TSAppCompat' 36 | - 'IdleWinStationPoolCount' 37 | - 'TSAdvertise' 38 | - 'AllowTSConnections' 39 | - 'fSingleSessionPerUser' 40 | condition: selection1 and ((Winstations1 and Winstations2) or (selection2 or selection3)) 41 | falsepositives: 42 | - Uknown 43 | level: high 44 | tags: 45 | - attack.defense_evasion 46 | - attack.lateral_movement 47 | - attack.t1021.001 48 | - attack.t1112 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /MISC/proc_creation_windows_registry_hide_user.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Hiding local user accounts 2 | id: 9ec9fb1b-e059-4489-9642-f270c207923d 3 | description: Detects the use reg.exe to hide users from listed in the logon screen. This is possible by changing the registry key value to 0 for a specific user. 4 | status: experimental 5 | references: 6 | - 7 | author: '@Kostastsale, @TheDFIRReport' 8 | date: 2022/05/14 9 | logsource: 10 | category: process_creation 11 | product: windows 12 | detection: 13 | selection1: 14 | ParentImage|endswith: 15 | - '\cmd.exe' 16 | - '\powershell.exe' 17 | Image|endswith: 18 | - '\reg.exe' 19 | CommandLine|contains|all: 20 | - 'HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\Userlist' 21 | - 'add' 22 | - '/t' 23 | - 'REG_DWORD' 24 | - '/v' 25 | - '/d 0' 26 | condition: selection1 27 | falsepositives: 28 | - System administrator activities 29 | level: medium 30 | tags: 31 | - attack.hidden.users 32 | - attack.T1564.002 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /MISC/proc_creation_windows_schtask_enc-psh.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Scheduled task executing powershell encoded payload from registry 2 | id: 7cd354a2-92f2-4c39-85b5-6b5096366d4e 3 | status: Experimental 4 | description: Detects the creation of a schtask that executes a base64 encoded payload stored in the Windows Registry using PowerShell. 5 | author: '@Kostastsale, @TheDFIRReport' 6 | references: 7 | - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/ 8 | date: 2022/02/12 9 | logsource: 10 | product: windows 11 | category: process_creation 12 | detection: 13 | selection1: 14 | Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe' 15 | CommandLine|contains|all: 16 | - '/Create' 17 | - '/SC' 18 | selection2: 19 | CommandLine|contains|all: 20 | - 'FromBase64String' 21 | - 'powershell' 22 | - 'Get-ItemProperty' 23 | - 'HKCU:' 24 | condition: selection1 and selection2 25 | falsepositives: 26 | - Uknown 27 | level: high 28 | tags: 29 | - attack.execution 30 | - attack.persistence 31 | - attack.t1053.005 32 | - attack.t1059.001 33 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /MISC/proc_creation_windows_schtasks_win-def-removal.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Deleting Windows Defender scheduled tasks 2 | id: c0d0392c-de50-4a11-9565-a457587e0c9d 3 | status: Experimental 4 | description: Detects the deletion of scheduled tasks related to Windows Defender. 5 | author: \@Kostastsale, \@TheDFIRReport 6 | references: 7 | - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/ 8 | date: 2022/05/09 9 | logsource: 10 | product: windows 11 | category: process_creation 12 | detection: 13 | selection1: 14 | Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe' 15 | CommandLine|contains|all: 16 | - '/delete' 17 | - '/tn' 18 | - 'Windows Defender' 19 | condition: selection1 20 | falsepositives: 21 | - Uknown 22 | level: high 23 | tags: 24 | - attack.defense_evasion 25 | - attack.t1562.001 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /MISC/proc_creation_windows_win-lazagne.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Using Lazagne to dump credentials 2 | id: 29419560-7c08-46d4-bb2c-531ed2ea0383 3 | status: Experimental 4 | description: Detects the use of lazagne looking into the command line execution. 5 | author: \@Kostastsale, \@TheDFIRReport 6 | references: 7 | - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/ 8 | - https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne/blob/master/Windows/lazagne/config/execute_cmd.py 9 | date: 2022/05/09 10 | logsource: 11 | product: windows 12 | category: process_creation 13 | detection: 14 | selection1: 15 | Image|endswith: 16 | - '\cmd.exe' 17 | - '\powershell.exe' 18 | CommandLine|contains|all: 19 | - '/c' 20 | - 'reg.exe' 21 | - 'save' 22 | ParentCommandLine|contains: 23 | - 'all' 24 | selection2: 25 | ParentCommandLine|contains: 26 | - '-oN' 27 | - '-oA' 28 | - '-oJ' 29 | - '-quiet' 30 | - '-output' 31 | CommandLine|contains: 32 | - 'hklm\system' 33 | - 'hklm\security' 34 | - 'hklm\sam' 35 | modules: 36 | Image|endswith: 37 | - '\lazagne.exe' 38 | CommandLine|contains: 39 | - 'browsers' 40 | - 'chats' 41 | - 'databases' 42 | - 'games' 43 | - 'memory' 44 | - 'git' 45 | - 'maven' 46 | - 'sysadmin' 47 | - 'php' 48 | - 'svn' 49 | - 'multimedia' 50 | condition: (selection1 and selection2) or modules 51 | falsepositives: 52 | - Uknown 53 | level: high 54 | tags: 55 | - attack.credential_access 56 | - attack.t1555 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /README.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Sigma_rules 2 | Random sigma rules to share with the community 3 | 4 | **All rules are made by me. Research is referenced in the rules** 5 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Threat Hunting Queries/README.md: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | # Threat Hunting Sigma rules 2 | 3 | I love Sigma; it's amazing for sharing detection rules. Although, I thought that it could also be used to share Threat Hunting query logic. 4 | 5 | I've created this section to start sharing TH-focused sigma rules. They may have a wider scope as opposed to detection rules and thus, TH-focused sigma rules might also need tuning before they turn into a detection. I hope this effort will help people start looking at the big picture when hunting and start baselining their environment based on the query results. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Threat Hunting Queries/proc_creation_windows_Action1_RMM.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Arbitrary code execution and remote sessions via Action1 RMM 2 | id: aa3168fb-d594-4f93-a92d-7a9ba675b766 3 | hypothesis: Threat actors using Action1 to execute arbitrary code or establish a remote session 4 | description: > 5 | Action1 is a powerful Remote Monitoring and Management tool that enables users to execute commands, scripts, and binaries. Through the web interface of action1, 6 | the administrator must create a new policy or an app to establish remote execution and then points that the agent is installed. 7 | 8 | Hunting Opportunity 1- Weed Out The Noise 9 | --- 10 | When threat actors execute a script, a command, or a binary through these new policies and apps, the names of these become visible in the command line during the execution process. 11 | Below is an example of the command line that contains the deployment of a binary through a policy with name "test_app_1": 12 | 13 | ParentCommandLine: "C:\WINDOWS\Action1\action1_agent.exe schedule:Deploy_App__test_app_1_1681327673425 runaction:0" 14 | 15 | 16 | After establishing a baseline, we can split the command to extract the policy name and group all the policy names and inspect the results with a list of frequency occurrences. 17 | An example query of this in Splunk could be: 18 | 19 | Index="" source="" Image="*\action1_agent.exe" ParentCommandLine="*runaction:0" | rex field=ParentCommandLine "(?<=Deploy_App__)(?.*(?=(\_1)))" 20 | 21 | 22 | Hunting Opportunity 2 - Remote Sessions On Out Of Office Hours 23 | ---- 24 | If you have admins within your environment using remote sessions to administer 25 | endpoints, you can create a threat-hunting query and modify the time of the 26 | initiated sessions looking for abnormal activity. 27 | status: experimental 28 | date: 2023/04/13 29 | author: '@kostastsale' 30 | references: 31 | - https://twitter.com/Kostastsale/status/1646256901506605063?s=20 32 | - https://www.action1.com/documentation/ 33 | logsource: 34 | category: process_creation 35 | product: windows 36 | detection: 37 | AppDeploymentExec: 38 | Image|contains: 39 | - '\Windows\Action1\package_downloads\' 40 | ParentImage|endswith: 41 | - '\action1_agent.exe' 42 | CommandExec: 43 | ParentImage|endswith: 44 | - '\cmd.exe' 45 | - '\powershell.exe' 46 | ParentCommandLine|contains: 47 | - '\Action1\scripts\Run_Command_' 48 | - '\Action1\scripts\Run_PowerShell_' 49 | RemoteSessionInit: 50 | Image|endswith: 51 | - '\agent1_remote.exe' 52 | condition: AppDeploymentExec or CommandExec or RemoteSessionInit 53 | falsepositives: 54 | - "If Action1 is among the approved software in your environment, you might find that this is a noisy query. 55 | See description for ideas on how to alter this query and start looking for suspicious activities." 56 | level: medium 57 | tags: 58 | - attack.CommandAndControl 59 | - attack.T1219 60 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Threat Hunting Queries/proc_creation_windows_Anyviewer.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Detection of CMD Execution via AnyViewer RMM 2 | id: bc533330-fc29-44c0-b245-7dc6e5939c87 3 | status: experimental 4 | description: Detects cmd shell execution via AnyViewer RMM agent on remote management sessions. 5 | references: 6 | - https://www.anyviewer.com/help/remote-technical-support.html 7 | author: '@kostastsale' 8 | date: 2024/08/03 9 | tags: 10 | - attack.execution 11 | - attack.persistence 12 | logsource: 13 | category: process_creation 14 | product: windows 15 | detection: 16 | selection: 17 | Image|endswith: 18 | - '\cmd.exe' 19 | ParentImage|endswith: 20 | - '\AVCore.exe' 21 | ParentCommandLine|contains|all: 22 | - 'AVCore.exe" -d' 23 | condition: selection 24 | falsepositives: 25 | - Legitimate use for admin activity. 26 | level: medium -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Threat Hunting Queries/proc_creation_windows_MOVEit_exploitation.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: MOVEit exploitation 2 | id: 39ac1fb0-07f1-474b-b97e-c5c0eace0d79 3 | hypothesis: MOVEit affected hosts execute csc.exe via w3wp.exe process to dynamically compile malicious DLL file. 4 | description: > 5 | MOVEit is affected by a critical vulnerability. Exploited hosts show evidence of dynamically compliling a DLL and writing it under 6 | C:\\Windows\\Microsoft\.NET\\Framework64\\v4\.0\.30319\\Temporary ASP\.NET Files\\root\\([a-z0-9]{5,12})\\([a-z0-9]{5,12})\\App_Web_[a-z0-9]{5,12}\.dll. 7 | 8 | Hunting Opportunity 9 | --- 10 | 11 | Events from IIS dynamically compiling binaries via the csc.exe on behalf of the MOVEit application, especially since May 27th should be investigated. 12 | status: experimental 13 | date: 2023/06/01 14 | author: '@kostastsale' 15 | references: 16 | - https://www.huntress.com/blog/moveit-transfer-critical-vulnerability-rapid-response 17 | - https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/critical-vulnerability-in-progress-moveit-transfer-technical-analysis-and-recommendations/ 18 | logsource: 19 | category: process_creation 20 | product: windows 21 | detection: 22 | Selection1: 23 | Image|endswith: 24 | - '\csc.exe' 25 | ParentImage|endswith: 26 | - '\w3wp.exe' 27 | Selection2: 28 | ParentCommandLine|contains: 29 | - 'moveitdmz pool' 30 | condition: Selection1 and Selection2 31 | falsepositives: 32 | - "Initial software installation and software updates" 33 | level: medium 34 | tags: 35 | - attack.execution 36 | - attack.T1623 37 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Threat Hunting Queries/proc_creation_windows_ammyy_admin.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Detecting Ammy Admin RMM Agent Execution 2 | id: 7da7809e-f3d5-47a3-9d5d-fc9d019caf14 3 | status: experimental 4 | description: Detects the execution of the Ammy Admin RMM agent for remote management. 5 | author: '@kostastsale' 6 | references: 7 | - https://www.ammyy.com/en/admin_features.html 8 | date: 2024/08/05 9 | tags: 10 | - attack.execution 11 | - attack.persistence 12 | logsource: 13 | category: process_creation 14 | product: windows 15 | detection: 16 | selection: 17 | Image|endswith: 18 | - '\rundll32.exe' 19 | CommandLine|contains: 20 | - 'AMMYY\aa_nts.dll",run' 21 | condition: selection 22 | falsepositives: 23 | - Legitimate use of Ammy Admin RMM agent for remote management by admins. 24 | level: medium -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Threat Hunting Queries/proc_creation_windows_exec_script_from_zip.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Manual execution of scripts that exist inside a compressed file 2 | id: 95724fc1-a258-4674-97db-a30351981c5a 3 | hypothesis: User double-clicks on a malicious script inside a zip/rar file. 4 | description: > 5 | "This is a threat-hunting query to collect information related to the interactive execution of a script 6 | from inside a compressed file(zip/rar). Windows will automatically run the script using scripting interpreters such 7 | as wscript and cscript binaries. 8 | 9 | From the query below, the child process is the script interpreter that will execute the script. The script extension 10 | is also a set of standard extensions that Windows OS recognizes. Selections 1-3 contain three different 11 | execution scenarios. 12 | 1. Compressed file opened using 7zip. 13 | 2. Compressed file opened using WinRar. 14 | 3. Compressed file opened using native windows File Explorer capabilities. 15 | 16 | When the malicious script is double-clicked, it will be extracted to the respected directories as signified by the CommandLine 17 | on each of the three Selections. It will then be executed using the relevant script interpreter." 18 | status: experimental 19 | date: 2023/02/15 20 | author: '@kostastsale' 21 | references: 22 | - https://app.any.run/tasks/25970bb5-f864-4e9e-9e1b-cc8ff9e6386a (Winrar > Wscript executing .wsf) 23 | - https://app.any.run/tasks/fa99cedc-9d2f-4115-a08e-291429ce3692 (Winrar > Wscript executing .wsf) 24 | logsource: 25 | category: process_creation 26 | product: windows 27 | detection: 28 | ChildProcess: 29 | Image|endswith: 30 | - '\wscript.exe' 31 | - '\mshta.exe' 32 | - '\cscript.exe' 33 | - '\powershell.exe' 34 | ScriptExtention: 35 | CommandLine|endswith: 36 | - '.wsf' 37 | - '.hta' 38 | - '.vbs' 39 | - '.js' 40 | - '.jse' 41 | - '.wsh' 42 | - '.vbscript' 43 | - '.ps1' 44 | Selection1: 45 | ParentImage: 46 | - '*\7z*.exe' 47 | CommandLine: 48 | - '*\appdata\local\temp\7z*\*' 49 | Selection2: 50 | ParentImage|endswith: 51 | - '\winrar.exe' 52 | CommandLine: 53 | - '*\appdata\local\temp\rar*\*' 54 | Selection3: 55 | ParentImage|endswith: 56 | - '\explorer.exe' 57 | CommandLine: 58 | - '*\appdata\local\temp\*.rar\*' 59 | - '*\appdata\local\temp\*.zip\*' 60 | condition: ChildProcess and ScriptExtention and (Selection1 OR Selection2 OR Selection3) 61 | falsepositives: 62 | - "During my testing, batch files produced a lot of noise, as many applications appear to bundle them as part of their installation 63 | process. You should baseline your environment and generate a new query excluding the noisy and expected activity. Some false positives may come up depending on your environment. All results should be investigated thoroughly before 64 | filtering out results." 65 | level: medium 66 | tags: 67 | - attack.execution 68 | - attack.T1059 69 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /Threat Hunting Queries/proc_creation_windows_meshagent.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Detect MeshAgent Command Execution via MeshCentral 2 | id: 74a2b202-73e0-4693-9a3a-9d36146d0775 3 | status: Experimental 4 | description: | 5 | Detects the use of MeshAgent to execute commands on the target host, particularly when threat actors might abuse it to execute commands directly. 6 | MeshAgent can execute commands on the target host by leveraging win-console to obscure their activities and win-dispatcher to run malicious code through IPC with child processes. 7 | author: '@Kostastsale' 8 | references: 9 | - https://github.com/Ylianst/MeshAgent 10 | - https://github.com/Ylianst/MeshAgent/blob/52cf129ca43d64743181fbaf940e0b4ddb542a37/modules/win-dispatcher.js#L173 11 | - https://github.com/Ylianst/MeshAgent/blob/52cf129ca43d64743181fbaf940e0b4ddb542a37/modules/win-info.js#L55 12 | tags: 13 | - attack.command_and_control 14 | - attack.t1219 15 | date: 2024-09-20 16 | logsource: 17 | product: windows 18 | category: process_creation 19 | detection: 20 | selection_parent: 21 | ParentImage|endswith: 22 | - '\meshagent.exe' 23 | selection_child: 24 | Image|endswith: 25 | - '\cmd.exe' 26 | - '\powershell.exe' 27 | condition: selection_parent and selection_child 28 | falsepositives: 29 | - False positives can be found in environments using MessAgent for remote management, analysis should prioritize the grandparent process, MessAgent.exe, and scrutinize the resulting child processes triggered by any suspicious interactive commands directed at the target host. 30 | level: medium -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /check_required_fields.py: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | import yaml 2 | import uuid 3 | from yaml.scanner import ScannerError 4 | import csv 5 | import argparse 6 | import os 7 | 8 | # Create the argument parser 9 | parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Rename files in a directory to start with a specific prefix.") 10 | parser.add_argument("-d", "--directory_path", required=True, help="Destination directory") 11 | args = parser.parse_args() 12 | 13 | # Define the required fields 14 | required_fields = { 15 | "title": True, 16 | "id": True, 17 | "status": True, 18 | "description": True, 19 | "references": True, 20 | "author": True, 21 | "date": True, 22 | "tags": True, 23 | "logsource": { 24 | "category": False, 25 | "product": False, 26 | "service": False, 27 | "definition": False, 28 | }, 29 | "detection": { 30 | "condition": True, 31 | }, 32 | "falsepositives": True, 33 | "level": True, 34 | } 35 | 36 | def generate_lowercase_uuid(): 37 | # Generate a lowercase UUID 38 | return str(uuid.uuid4()) 39 | 40 | def check_required_fields(yaml_content, required_fields, parent_key=""): 41 | missing_fields = [] 42 | for key, required in required_fields.items(): 43 | full_key = f"{parent_key}.{key}" if parent_key else key 44 | if isinstance(required, dict): 45 | # Nested dictionary, check recursively 46 | if key in yaml_content: 47 | missing_fields.extend(check_required_fields(yaml_content[key], required, full_key)) 48 | else: 49 | missing_fields.append(full_key) 50 | else: 51 | if required and key not in yaml_content: 52 | missing_fields.append(full_key) 53 | return missing_fields 54 | 55 | def process_yaml_files(directory): 56 | missing_data = [] 57 | for root, _, files in os.walk(directory): 58 | for file in files: 59 | if file.endswith(('.yaml', '.yml')): 60 | file_path = os.path.join(root, file) 61 | try: 62 | with open(file_path, 'r') as f: 63 | lines = f.readlines() 64 | yaml_content = yaml.safe_load(''.join(lines)) 65 | 66 | # Check if 'id' field exists and add if missing 67 | if 'id' not in yaml_content: 68 | new_id = generate_lowercase_uuid() 69 | lines.insert(1, f'id: {new_id}\n') 70 | with open(file_path, 'w') as f: 71 | f.writelines(lines) 72 | print(f"Added ID to {file_path}") 73 | yaml_content['id'] = new_id # Update the yaml_content with the new ID 74 | 75 | # Check for missing required fields 76 | missing_fields = check_required_fields(yaml_content, required_fields) 77 | 78 | if missing_fields: 79 | missing_data.append({ 80 | "file": file_path, 81 | "missing_fields": ", ".join(missing_fields), 82 | "error": "None" 83 | }) 84 | print(f"File: {file_path} is missing fields: {', '.join(missing_fields)}") 85 | 86 | except ScannerError as e: 87 | # Handle YAML parsing errors 88 | missing_data.append({ 89 | "file": file_path, 90 | "missing_fields": "N/A", 91 | "error": f"ScannerError: {str(e)}" 92 | }) 93 | print(f"Error in file {file_path}: ScannerError: {str(e)}") 94 | except Exception as e: 95 | # Handle other unexpected errors 96 | missing_data.append({ 97 | "file": file_path, 98 | "missing_fields": "N/A", 99 | "error": f"Error: {str(e)}" 100 | }) 101 | print(f"Unexpected error in file {file_path}: {str(e)}") 102 | 103 | return missing_data 104 | 105 | def save_to_csv(missing_data, output_file): 106 | with open(output_file, mode='w', newline='') as file: 107 | writer = csv.DictWriter(file, fieldnames=["file", "missing_fields", "error"]) 108 | writer.writeheader() 109 | for data in missing_data: 110 | writer.writerow(data) 111 | 112 | if __name__ == "__main__": 113 | output_csv = "missing_fields_report.csv" 114 | 115 | missing_data = process_yaml_files(args.directory_path) 116 | 117 | if missing_data: 118 | save_to_csv(missing_data, output_csv) 119 | print(f"Missing fields and error report saved to {output_csv}") 120 | else: 121 | print("All YAML files contain the required fields.") -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /id_generation.py: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | import uuid 2 | import yaml 3 | import argparse 4 | import os 5 | 6 | # Create the argument parser 7 | parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Rename files in a directory to start with a specific prefix.") 8 | parser.add_argument("-d", "--directory_path", required=True, help="Destination directory") 9 | args = parser.parse_args() 10 | 11 | def generate_lowercase_uuid(): 12 | # Generate a lowercase UUID similar to `uuidgen | tr "[:upper:]" "[:lower:]"` 13 | return str(uuid.uuid4()) 14 | 15 | def process_yaml_files(directory): 16 | # Traverse the directory and find all YAML files 17 | for root, _, files in os.walk(directory): 18 | for file in files: 19 | if file.endswith(('.yaml', '.yml')): 20 | file_path = os.path.join(root, file) 21 | with open(file_path, 'r') as f: 22 | lines = f.readlines() 23 | 24 | # Check if 'id' field already exists 25 | id_exists = any(line.strip().startswith('id:') for line in lines) 26 | 27 | if not id_exists: 28 | # Generate a new UUID 29 | new_id = generate_lowercase_uuid() 30 | # Insert the ID as the second line 31 | lines.insert(1, f'id: {new_id}\n') 32 | 33 | # Write back the updated content to the file 34 | with open(file_path, 'w') as f: 35 | f.writelines(lines) 36 | print(f"Added ID to {file_path}") 37 | 38 | if __name__ == "__main__": 39 | process_yaml_files(args.directory_path) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /malware/proc_creation_windows_ChromeLoader.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: ChromeLoader Malware Detection 2 | id: 0a74c5a9-1b71-4475-9af2-7829d320d5c2 3 | description: Detects execution of ChromeLoader malware via a registered scheduled task 4 | status: experimental 5 | date: 2022/01/10 6 | author: \@kostastsale 7 | references: 8 | - https://github.com/xephora/Threat-Remediation-Scripts/tree/main/Threat-Track/CS_INSTALLER 9 | - https://twitter.com/th3_protoCOL/status/1480621526764322817 10 | - https://twitter.com/Kostastsale/status/1480716528421011458 11 | - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/ded20df574b843aaa3c8e977c2040e1498ae17c12924a19868df5b12dee6dfdd 12 | logsource: 13 | category: process_creation 14 | product: windows 15 | detection: 16 | selection1: 17 | ParentCommandLine|contains: 18 | - '-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -WindowStyle Hidden -E JAB' 19 | ParentImage|endswith: 20 | - '*\powershell.exe' 21 | selection2: 22 | CommandLine|contains: 23 | - '--load-extension="*\Appdata\local\chrome"' 24 | Image|endswith: 25 | - '*\chrome.exe' 26 | condition: selection1 and selection2 27 | falsepositives: 28 | - Unlikely 29 | level: high 30 | tags: 31 | - attack.execution 32 | - attack.T1059.001 33 | - attack.persistence 34 | - attack.T1176 35 | - attack.T1053.005 36 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /malware/proc_creation_windows_Emotet_04_22.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Emotet loader execution via .lnk file 2 | id: 1f32d820-1d5c-43fe-8fe2-feef0c952eb7 3 | description: Detects the latest emotet loader as reported by @malware_traffic. The .lnk file was delivered via phishing campaign. 4 | status: experimental 5 | date: 2022/04/22 6 | author: \@kostastsale 7 | references: 8 | - https://twitter.com/malware_traffic/status/1517622327000846338 9 | - https://twitter.com/Cryptolaemus1/status/1517634855940632576 10 | - https://tria.ge/220422-1pw1pscfdl/ 11 | - https://tria.ge/220422-1nnmyagdf2/ 12 | logsource: 13 | category: process_creation 14 | product: windows 15 | detection: 16 | selection1: 17 | ParentImage: 18 | - '*\cmd.exe' 19 | - '*\powershell.exe' 20 | - '*\explorer.exe' 21 | Image: 22 | - '*\cmd.exe' 23 | - '*\powershell.exe' 24 | CommandLine|contains|all: 25 | - 'findstr' 26 | - '.vbs' 27 | - '.lnk' 28 | condition: selection1 29 | falsepositives: 30 | - Unlikely 31 | level: high 32 | tags: 33 | - attack.execution 34 | - attack.T1059.006 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /malware/proc_creation_windows_Explorer_NOUACCHECK.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Explorer UAC Bypass Via /NOUACCHECK Parameter 2 | id: c284e98e-a2a6-4917-aeb9-7159c6283e05 3 | description: Detects possible attempt to circumvent the User Account Control (UAC) by executing Windows Explorer to spawn a command line interpreter process without triggering UAC prompts. 4 | status: experimental 5 | date: 2023/07/16 6 | author: \@kostastsale 7 | references: 8 | - 9 | logsource: 10 | category: process_creation 11 | product: windows 12 | detection: 13 | selection1: 14 | CommandLine|contains: 15 | - ' /nouaccheck ' 16 | ParentImage|endswith: 17 | - '\explorer.exe' 18 | Image|endswith: 19 | - '\powershell.exe' 20 | - '\pwsh.exe' 21 | - '\powershell_ise.exe' 22 | - '\cmd.exe' 23 | condition: selection1 24 | falsepositives: 25 | - Unlikely 26 | level: high 27 | tags: 28 | - attack.privilege_escalation 29 | - attack.T1548.002 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /malware/proc_creation_windows_GuLoader_08_07.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Injected Browser Process Spawning Rundll32 2 | id: 89e1490f-1a3e-452a-bbb8-b68a5f58072f 3 | description: Detects the execution of installed GuLoader malware on the host. GuLoader is initiating network connections via the rundll32.exe process that is spawned via a browser parent(injected) process. 4 | status: experimental 5 | date: 2023/08/07 6 | author: \@kostastsale 7 | references: 8 | - 9 | logsource: 10 | category: process_creation 11 | product: windows 12 | detection: 13 | selection1: 14 | ParentImage|endswith: 15 | - '\msedge.exe' 16 | - '\chrome.exe' 17 | - '\firefox.exe' 18 | Image|endswith: 19 | - '\rundll32.exe' 20 | CommandLine|endswith: 21 | - '\rundll32.exe' 22 | condition: selection1 23 | falsepositives: 24 | - Unlikely 25 | level: high 26 | tags: 27 | - attack.defense_evasion 28 | - attack.T1055 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /malware/proc_creation_windows_OneNote_Execution.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Onenote execution of malicious embedded scripts 2 | id: 84b1706c-932a-44c4-ae28-892b28a25b94 3 | description: Detects the execution of malicious OneNote documents that contain embedded scripts. When a user clicks on a onenote attachment and then on the malicious link inside the .one file, it exports and executes the malicious embedded script from specific directories. 4 | status: experimental 5 | date: 2023/02/02 6 | author: '@kostastsale' 7 | references: 8 | - https://bazaar.abuse.ch/browse/tag/one/ 9 | logsource: 10 | category: process_creation 11 | product: windows 12 | detection: 13 | selection1: 14 | Image|endswith: 15 | - '*\powershell.exe' 16 | - '*\pwsh.exe' 17 | - '*\wscript.exe' 18 | - '*\cscript.exe' 19 | - '*\cmd.exe' 20 | - '*\mshta.exe' 21 | ParentImage|endswith: 22 | - '*\onenote.exe' 23 | selection2: 24 | CommandLine|contains: 25 | - '\exported\' 26 | - '\onenoteofflinecache_files\' 27 | condition: selection1 and selection2 28 | falsepositives: 29 | - Unlikely 30 | level: high 31 | tags: 32 | - attack.defense_evasion 33 | - attack.T1218.001 34 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /malware/proc_creation_windows_Raspberry_Robin_mal-exec.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Raspberry Robin subsequent execution of commands 2 | id: d52d2e87-eb03-4fac-961d-eb616da79788 3 | description: Detects raspberry robin subsequent execution of commands from 4 | status: experimental 5 | date: 2022/05/06 6 | author: \@kostastsale 7 | references: 8 | - https://redcanary.com/blog/raspberry-robin/ 9 | logsource: 10 | category: process_creation 11 | product: windows 12 | detection: 13 | selection1: 14 | ParentImage|endswith: 15 | - '*\fodhelper.exe' 16 | Image|endswith: 17 | - '*\rundll32.exe' 18 | - '*\regsvr32.exe' 19 | CommandLine|contains|all: 20 | - 'shellexec_rundll' 21 | - 'regsvr' 22 | - 'odbcconf.exe' 23 | selection2: 24 | CommandLine|endswith: 25 | - '-a' 26 | - '/a' 27 | - '-f' 28 | - '/f' 29 | - '-s' 30 | - '/s' 31 | selection3: 32 | CommandLine|contains: 33 | - 'vkipdse' 34 | - 'setfiledsndir' 35 | - 'installdriver' 36 | condition: selection1 and selection2 and selection3 37 | falsepositives: 38 | - Unlikely 39 | level: high 40 | tags: 41 | - attack.execution 42 | - attack.T1059.001 43 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /malware/proc_creation_windows_Raspberry_Robin_usb-exec.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Raspberry Robin initial execution from external drive 2 | id: 2c6bea3a-ef58-4f2e-a775-4928f6b7c58a 3 | description: Detects execution from the external drive using cmd 4 | status: experimental 5 | date: 2022/05/6 6 | author: \@kostastsale 7 | references: 8 | - https://redcanary.com/blog/raspberry-robin/ 9 | logsource: 10 | category: process_creation 11 | product: windows 12 | detection: 13 | selection1: 14 | ParentImage|endswith: 15 | - '*\cmd.exe' 16 | ParentCommandLine|contains: 17 | - '/r' 18 | Image|endswith: 19 | - '*\msiexec.exe' 20 | CommandLine|contains: 21 | - '/q' 22 | - '-q' 23 | selection2: 24 | CommandLine|contains: 25 | - 'http:' 26 | - 'https:' 27 | ParentCommandLine|endswith: 28 | - '.usb' 29 | - '.ico' 30 | - '.lnk' 31 | - '.bin' 32 | - '.sv' 33 | - '.lo' 34 | condition: selection1 and selection2 35 | falsepositives: 36 | - Unlikely 37 | level: high 38 | tags: 39 | - attack.execution 40 | - attack.T1059.001 41 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /malware/proc_creation_windows_Serpent_payload_exec.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Serpent backdoor payload execution via scheduled task 2 | id: d5eb7432-fda4-4bba-a37f-ffa74d9ed639 3 | description: 4 | - Detects the new post-exploitation execution technique of the Serpent backdoor. According to Proofpoint, 5 | one of the commands that the backdoor ran was via creating a temporary scheduled task using an unusual method. It creates a fictitious 6 | windows event and a trigger in which once the event is created, it executes the payload. 7 | status: experimental 8 | date: 2022/03/21 9 | author: \@kostastsale 10 | references: 11 | - https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/serpent-no-swiping-new-backdoor-targets-french-entities-unique-attack-chain 12 | logsource: 13 | category: process_creation 14 | product: windows 15 | detection: 16 | selection1: 17 | Image: 18 | - '*\cmd.exe' 19 | - '*\powershell.exe' 20 | 21 | CommandLine|contains|all: 22 | - '/create' 23 | - '/ec' 24 | - '[System/EventID=' 25 | - '/tn run' 26 | - '/so' 27 | - '/delete' 28 | condition: selection1 29 | falsepositives: 30 | - Unlikely 31 | level: high 32 | tags: 33 | - attack.execution 34 | - attack.T1059.006 35 | - attack.persistence 36 | - attack.T1053.005 37 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /malware/proc_creation_windows_SocGholish_FakeUpdates.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: FakeUpdates/SocGholish Malware Detection 2 | id: 97805087-93ab-4203-b5cb-287cda6aecaa 3 | description: Detects initial execution of FakeUpdates/SocGholish malware via wscript that later executes commands via cmd or powershell. 4 | status: experimental 5 | date: 2022/06/16 6 | author: '@kostastsale' 7 | references: 8 | - https://twitter.com/th3_protoCOL/status/1536788652889497600 9 | - https://twitter.com/1ZRR4H/status/1537501582727778304 10 | logsource: 11 | category: process_creation 12 | product: windows 13 | detection: 14 | selection1: 15 | ParentImage|endswith: 16 | - '\wscript.exe' 17 | Image|endswith: 18 | - '\cmd.exe' 19 | CommandLine|contains: 20 | - '/c' 21 | selection2: 22 | ParentImage|endswith: 23 | - '\wscript.exe' 24 | Image|endswith: 25 | - '\powershell.exe' 26 | selection3: 27 | ParentCommandLine|contains|all: 28 | - 'Appdata\Local\Temp' 29 | - '.zip' 30 | - 'update' 31 | - '.js' 32 | selection4: 33 | ParentCommandLine|contains: 34 | - 'Chrome' 35 | - 'Edge' 36 | - 'Firefox' 37 | - 'Opera' 38 | - 'Brave' # Not seen in campaigns 39 | - 'Vivaldi' # Not seen in campaigns 40 | condition: (selection1 or selection2) and selection3 and selection4 41 | falsepositives: 42 | - Unlikely 43 | level: high 44 | tags: 45 | - attack.execution 46 | - attack.T1059.001 47 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /malware/proc_creation_windows_Ursnif_cmd_redirection.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Ursnif Redirection Of Discovery Commands 2 | id: 7aaa5739-12fc-41aa-b98b-23ec27d42bdf 3 | description: Detects the redirection of Ursnif discovery commands as part of the initial execution of the malware. 4 | status: experimental 5 | date: 2023/07/16 6 | author: \@kostastsale 7 | references: 8 | - 9 | logsource: 10 | category: process_creation 11 | product: windows 12 | detection: 13 | selection1: 14 | CommandLine|contains|all: 15 | - '/C ' 16 | - ' >> *\appdata\local\temp\*.bin' 17 | Image|endswith: 18 | - '\cmd.exe' 19 | ParentImage|endswith: 20 | - '\explorer.exe' 21 | condition: selection1 22 | falsepositives: 23 | - Unlikely 24 | level: high 25 | tags: 26 | - attack.execution 27 | - attack.T1059 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /renaming.py: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | import os 2 | import sys 3 | import argparse 4 | import os 5 | 6 | # Create the argument parser 7 | parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Rename files in a directory to start with a specific prefix.") 8 | parser.add_argument("-d", "--destination_dir", required=True, help="Destination directory") 9 | parser.add_argument("-p", "--prefix", required=True, help="Prefix") 10 | args = parser.parse_args() 11 | 12 | def rename_files(destination_dir, prefix): 13 | print(f"Renaming files in directory: {destination_dir} with prefix: {prefix}") 14 | for root, _, files in os.walk(destination_dir): 15 | for file in files: 16 | # Get the current file name 17 | current_name = os.path.join(root, file) 18 | print(f"Current file: {current_name}") 19 | 20 | # Create the new file name 21 | new_name = os.path.join(root, prefix + file) 22 | print(f"New file name: {new_name}") 23 | 24 | # Rename the file 25 | os.rename(current_name, new_name) 26 | print(f"Renamed {current_name} to {new_name}") 27 | 28 | if __name__ == "__main__": 29 | # Call the function to rename the directories 30 | rename_files(args.destination_dir, args.prefix) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /vulnerability_exploitation/proc_creation_windows_7z_CVE-2022-29072.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Exploitation of 7zip vulnerability - CVE-2022-29072 2 | id: 932ade0f-3ba6-49c4-ba78-51c5234384d5 3 | description: Detects possible exploitation vulnerability CVE-2022-29072. This vulnerability is due to 7z.dll misconfiguration. When a .7z file is placed in the Help > Contents area of the current Windows version 21.07, anyone with access to the host can elevate privileges. The command creates a child process of 7zFM.exe. 4 | status: experimental 5 | date: 2022/04/18 6 | author: \@kostastsale 7 | references: 8 | - https://github.com/kagancapar/CVE-2022-29072 9 | logsource: 10 | category: process_creation 11 | product: windows 12 | detection: 13 | selection1: 14 | Image|endswith: 15 | - 'cmd.exe' 16 | - 'powershell.exe' 17 | ParentImage|endswith: 18 | - '7zFM.exe' 19 | filter: 20 | CommandLine|endswith: 21 | - '.bat' 22 | - '.cmd' 23 | - '.ps1' 24 | condition: selection1 and not filter 25 | falsepositives: 26 | - Some false positives could exist but unlikely 27 | level: high 28 | tags: 29 | - attack.Exploitation for Privilege Escalation 30 | - attack.T1068 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /vulnerability_exploitation/proc_creation_windows_VMWare_CVE-2022-22954.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: VMWare Workspace One Access Exploitation (CVE-2022-22954) 2 | id: 5660d8db-6e25-411f-b92f-094420168a5d 3 | description: > 4 | Detects possible exploitation vulnerability CVE-2022-22954. As reported by Morphisec, part of the attack chain, 5 | threat actors used PowerShell commands that executed as a child processes of the legitimate Tomcat prunsrv.exe process application. 6 | status: experimental 7 | date: 2022/04/25 8 | author: '@kostastsale' 9 | references: 10 | - https://blog.morphisec.com/vmware-identity-manager-attack-backdoor 11 | - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-22954 12 | logsource: 13 | category: process_creation 14 | product: windows 15 | detection: 16 | selection1: 17 | ParentImage|endswith: 18 | - '\prunsrv.exe' 19 | Image|endswith: 20 | - '\powershell.exe' 21 | selection2: 22 | ParentImage|endswith: 23 | - '\prunsrv.exe' 24 | Image|endswith: 25 | - '\cmd.exe' 26 | CommandLine|contains: 27 | - 'cmd.exe /c powershell' 28 | condition: selection1 OR selection2 29 | falsepositives: 30 | - Some false positives are possible as part of a custom script implementation from admins executed with cmd.exe as the child process. 31 | level: high 32 | tags: 33 | - attack.execution 34 | - attack.T1059.006 35 | - attack.initial_access 36 | - attack.t1190 37 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /vulnerability_exploitation/proc_creation_windows_VMware_Horizon_LOG4J.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Exploitation of Vulnerable VMware Horizon to LOG4J 2 | id: 3eb91f0a-0060-424a-a676-59f5fdd75610 3 | description: Detecting initial exploitation attempt against VMware Horizon deployments running vulnerable versions of Log4j. 4 | status: experimental 5 | date: 2022/01/14 6 | author: \@kostastsale 7 | references: 8 | - https://portswigger.net/daily-swig/vmware-horizon-under-attack-as-china-based-ransomware-group-targets-log4j-vulnerability 9 | - https://twitter.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1482078434327244805 10 | - https://www.pwndefend.com/2022/01/07/log4shell-exploitation-and-hunting-on-vmware-horizon-cve-2021-44228/ 11 | logsource: 12 | category: process_creation 13 | product: windows 14 | detection: 15 | selection1: 16 | ParentImage|endswith: 17 | - '\ws_TomcatService.exe' 18 | filter: 19 | Image|endswith: 20 | - '\cmd.exe' 21 | - '\powershell.exe' 22 | condition: selection1 and filter 23 | falsepositives: 24 | - Unlikely 25 | level: high 26 | tags: 27 | - attack.initial_access 28 | - attack.t1190 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /windows_exploitation/net_connection_windows_ADWS_abuse.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Unusual Connection to Active Directory Web Services 2 | id: b3ad3c0f-c949-47a1-a30e-b0491ccae876 3 | status: experimental 4 | description: Detects unusual network connections to Active Directory Web Services (ADWS) from processes not typically associated with ADWS management. 5 | references: 6 | - https://medium.com/falconforce/soaphound-tool-to-collect-active-directory-data-via-adws-165aca78288c 7 | - https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/FalconFriday/blob/master/Discovery/ADWS_Connection_from_Unexpected_Binary-Win.md 8 | author: '@kostastsale' 9 | date: 2024/01/26 10 | tags: 11 | - attack.discovery 12 | - attack.t1087 13 | logsource: 14 | category: network_connection 15 | product: windows 16 | detection: 17 | timeframe: last 2 hours 18 | selection: 19 | Initiated: true 20 | DestinationPort: 9389 21 | filter: 22 | Image|endswith: 23 | - '\dsac.exe' 24 | - '\pwsh.exe' 25 | - 'c:\windows\system32\windowspowershell\*' 26 | - 'c:\windows\syswow64\windowspowershell\*' 27 | - 'c:\program files\microsoft monitoring agent\*' 28 | condition: selection and not filter 29 | falsepositives: 30 | - ADWS is used by a number of legitimate applications that need to interact with Active Directory. These applications should be added to the allow-listing to avoid false positives. 31 | level: medium -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /windows_exploitation/proc_creation_windows_SOAPHound.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Execution of SOAPHound Tool with Specific Arguments 2 | id: e92a4287-e072-4a40-9739-370c106bb750 3 | status: experimental 4 | description: Detects the execution of SOAPHound, a .NET tool for collecting Active Directory data, using specific command-line arguments that may indicate an attempt to extract sensitive AD information. 5 | references: 6 | - https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/SOAPHound 7 | - https://medium.com/falconforce/soaphound-tool-to-collect-active-directory-data-via-adws-165aca78288c 8 | author: '@kostastsale' 9 | date: 2024/01/26 10 | tags: 11 | - attack.discovery 12 | - attack.t1087 13 | logsource: 14 | product: windows 15 | category: process_creation 16 | detection: 17 | selection1: 18 | CommandLine|contains: 19 | - ' --buildcache ' 20 | - ' --bhdump ' 21 | - ' --certdump ' 22 | - ' --dnsdump ' 23 | selection2: 24 | CommandLine|contains: 25 | - ' -c ' 26 | - ' --cachefilename ' 27 | - ' -o ' 28 | - ' --outputdirectory' 29 | condition: selection1 and selection2 30 | falsepositives: 31 | - Unknown 32 | level: high 33 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /windows_exploitation/proc_creation_windows_WSUS_abuse.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Abuse of the Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) for lateral movement. 2 | id: b0ce780f-10bd-496d-9067-066d23dc3aa5 3 | status: Experimental 4 | description: Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) is a critical component of Windows systems and is frequently configured in a way that allows an attacker to circumvent internal networking limitations. Some tools, such as SharpWSUS and WSUSpendu, support lateral movement through WSUS.This rule covers those two main tools used for that purpose. 5 | author: \@Kostastsale 6 | references: 7 | - https://labs.nettitude.com/blog/introducing-sharpwsus/ 8 | - https://github.com/nettitude/SharpWSUS 9 | - https://github.com/AlsidOfficial/WSUSpendu/blob/master/WSUSpendu.ps1 10 | date: 2022/10/07 11 | logsource: 12 | product: windows 13 | category: process_creation 14 | detection: 15 | selection1: 16 | CommandLine|contains: 17 | - ' /payload:' 18 | - ' -PayloadArgs ' 19 | - ' /updateid:' 20 | - ' -PayloadFile ' 21 | selection2: 22 | CommandLine|contains: 23 | - ' create ' 24 | - ' check ' 25 | - ' delete ' 26 | - '-Inject' 27 | condition: selection1 and selection2 28 | falsepositives: 29 | - Uknown 30 | level: high 31 | tags: 32 | - attack.execution 33 | - attack.lateral_movement 34 | - attack.T1210 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /windows_exploitation/proc_creation_windows_ms-msdt_exploitation.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: ms-msdt for RCE CVE-2022-30190 2 | id: 5eff5816-a518-4ab8-b7e0-a776344e7d36 3 | description: Detecting the execution of weaponized maldoc or embedded link in outlook that uses ms-msdt scheme to execute code. 4 | status: experimental 5 | references: 6 | - https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2022/05/30/guidance-for-cve-2022-30190-microsoft-support-diagnostic-tool-vulnerability/ 7 | - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2022-30190 8 | - https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984 9 | - https://doublepulsar.com/follina-a-microsoft-office-code-execution-vulnerability-1a47fce5629e 10 | - https://twitter.com/secforce_ltd/status/1531987722293886978?s=21&t=f6-tesTzFEhR7TSoyTtp8Q 11 | author: '@Kostastsale' 12 | date: 2022/05/29 13 | logsource: 14 | category: process_creation 15 | product: windows 16 | detection: 17 | selection1: 18 | Image|endswith: 19 | - '\msdt.exe' 20 | CommandLine|contains|all: 21 | - 'msdt' 22 | - '/id' 23 | selection2: 24 | CommandLine|contains|all: 25 | - 'IT_BrowseForFile' 26 | - 'IT_LaunchMethod' 27 | selection3: 28 | CommandLine|contains|all: 29 | - '/af' 30 | - '.xml' 31 | condition: selection1 and (selection2 or selection3) 32 | falsepositives: 33 | - Uknown 34 | level: high 35 | tags: 36 | - attack.execution 37 | - attack.T1059.003 38 | - attack.T1204.002 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /windows_exploitation/proc_creation_windows_sdiagnhost-ms-msdt_exploitation.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: ms-msdt for RCE - sdiagnhost.exe spawning command 2 | id: 6469c7a1-8a28-40c4-a72b-5acddcfd0b0b 3 | description: Detecting sdiagnhost.exe executing the POC as a result of vulnerability based on ms-msdt. 4 | status: experimental 5 | references: 6 | - https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984 7 | - https://doublepulsar.com/follina-a-microsoft-office-code-execution-vulnerability-1a47fce5629e 8 | author: '@Kostastsale' 9 | date: 2022/05/29 10 | logsource: 11 | category: process_creation 12 | product: windows 13 | detection: 14 | selection1: 15 | ParentImage|endswith: 16 | - '\sdiagnhost.exe' 17 | Image|endswith: 18 | - '\cmd.exe' 19 | - '\powershell.exe' 20 | filter1: 21 | Image|endswith: 22 | - '\cmd.exe' 23 | CommandLine|contains: 24 | - 'bits' 25 | filter2: 26 | Image|endswith: 27 | - '\powershell.exe' 28 | CommandLine|endswith: 29 | - '-noprofile' 30 | - '-noprofile -' 31 | condition: selection1 and not (filter1 or filter2) 32 | falsepositives: 33 | - Uknown 34 | level: high 35 | tags: 36 | - attack.execution 37 | - attack.T1059.003 38 | - attack.T1204.002 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /windows_exploitation/proc_creation_windows_zero_exe.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Execution of ZeroLogon PoC executable 2 | id: dcc6a01e-9471-44a0-a699-71ea96f8ed8b 3 | status: Experimental 4 | description: Detects the execution of the commonly used ZeroLogon PoC executable. 5 | author: '@Kostastsale, @TheDFIRReport' 6 | references: 7 | - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/01/from-zero-to-domain-admin/ 8 | - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/ 9 | date: 2022/02/12 10 | logsource: 11 | product: windows 12 | category: process_creation 13 | detection: 14 | selection1: 15 | ParentImage|endswith: 16 | - '\cmd.exe' 17 | Image|endswith: 18 | - '\cool.exe' 19 | - '\zero.exe' 20 | CommandLine|contains|all: 21 | - 'Administrator' 22 | - '-c' 23 | selection2: 24 | CommandLine|contains|all: 25 | - 'taskkill' 26 | - '/f' 27 | - '/im' 28 | selection3: 29 | CommandLine|contains: 30 | - 'powershell' 31 | condition: selection1 and (selection2 or selection3) 32 | falsepositives: 33 | - Uknown 34 | level: high 35 | tags: 36 | - attack.execution 37 | - attack.lateral_movement 38 | - attack.T1210 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /windows_exploitation/win_security_DC_Impersonation.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: SamAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation 2 | id: 74256088-d35f-40e4-91e6-601cfa2e7615 3 | status: experimental 4 | author: \@kostastsale 5 | description: > 6 | 'This technique is to detect exploitation chain of CVE-2021-42287 (samAccountName Spoofing) and CVE-2021-42278 (Domain Controller Impersonation). 7 | It is looking into event 4781 for evidence of a new computer account creation and account rename that matches the name of a domain controller account without 8 | ending in "$". Computer account names always end with `$` and a change like this is highly unusual. 9 | 10 | Immediately after the 4781 event, a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) must be requested on behalf of the newly created and renamed computer account. 11 | A computer account name event will occur before this TGT request. 12 | 13 | Putting everything together, we may use events 4781 and 4768 to look for a series of events in which the new computer account on event 4781 matches 14 | the requested account on event 4768. 15 | 16 | NOTE-- On selection2, the `TargetUserName` should equal to `NewTargetUserName`. I have left it as a placeholder but this should change dependingon the backend 17 | you are translating the query to. 18 | 19 | Splunk Example-- `| eval RenamedComputerAccount = coalesce(New_Account_Name, mvindex(Account_Name,0)) 20 | | transaction RenamedComputerAccount endswith=(EventCode=4781)`' 21 | 22 | date: 2022/02/21 23 | references: 24 | - https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html 25 | - https://medium.com/@mvelazco/hunting-for-samaccountname-spoofing-cve-2021-42287-and-domain-controller-impersonation-f704513c8a45 26 | - https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/cve-2021-42278-cve-2021-42287-from-user-to-domain-admin-60-seconds 27 | logsource: 28 | product: windows 29 | service: security 30 | detection: 31 | selection1: 32 | EventID: 4781 33 | OldTargetUserName|endswith: '$' 34 | selection2: 35 | EventID: 4768 36 | TargetUserName: '%NewTargetUserName%' 37 | filter: 38 | - NewTargetUserName|endswith: '$' 39 | - TargetUserName|endswith: '$' 40 | condition: (selection1 and selection2) and not filter 41 | falsepositives: 42 | - Uknown 43 | level: High 44 | tags: 45 | - attack.privilege_escalation 46 | - attack.t1068 47 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /windows_exploitation/win_security_KrbRelayUp.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: KrbRelayUp local privilege escalation. 2 | id: 3f3e85e9-2fec-4c2f-89cd-6762b5928570 3 | description: Detecting possible successful exploitation using tools such as KrbRelayUp AD environment 4 | status: experimental 5 | date: 2022/04/26 6 | author: \@kostastsale 7 | references: 8 | - https://github.com/Dec0ne/KrbRelayUp 9 | - https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/10/using-kerberos-for-authentication-relay.html 10 | - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/fb6ee2c69864ffdfe347bf3b050cb931f53067a6/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_krbrelayup_suspicious_logon.toml 11 | logsource: 12 | product: windows 13 | service: security 14 | detection: 15 | selection1: 16 | EventID: 4624 17 | LogonType: '3' 18 | AuthenticationPackageName: 'Kerberos' 19 | IpAddress: '127.0.0.1' 20 | TargetUserSid: 'S-1-5-21-*-500' 21 | filter: 22 | IpPort: '0' 23 | condition: selection1 and not filter 24 | falsepositives: 25 | - Uknown 26 | level: High 27 | tags: 28 | - attack.privilege_escalation 29 | - attack.t1068 30 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /windows_exploitation/win_security_LAPS_CredDumping.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: LAPS Credential Dumping Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation 2 | id: b4019300-4846-4c66-9d3e-62efff5cff51 3 | status: experimental 4 | date: 2023/02/21 5 | author: '@kostastsale' 6 | description: 'Identify LAPS credential dumping by looking for users accessing objects via Event ID 4662, 7 | and login authentication events via Event ID 4624. The two events must contain the same LogonID to track 8 | the same logon session. 9 | 10 | NOTE - The TargetLogonId has to match the SubjectLogonId. Not sure how to implement the logic 11 | using sigma, so I have left it as a placeholder. Make sure to change it depending on the SIEM you are using.' 12 | references: 13 | - https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/a-lapse-in-judgement/?hss_channel=tw-403811306 (Includes Splunk Query) 14 | - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/security-assessment-laps 15 | logsource: 16 | product: windows 17 | service: security 18 | detection: 19 | selection1: 20 | EventID: 4662 21 | AccessMask: 22 | - '0x100' 23 | - '0x10' 24 | selection2: 25 | EventID: 4624 26 | TargetLogonId: '\%SubjectLogonId\%' 27 | filter: 28 | EventID: 4662 29 | SubjectUserName|endswith: 30 | - '$' 31 | SubjectUserName: 32 | - 'ANONYMOUS LOGON' 33 | - 'SYSTEM' 34 | condition: (selection1 and selection2) and not filter 35 | falsepositives: 36 | - Uknown 37 | level: High 38 | tags: 39 | - attack.credential_access 40 | - attack.T1003 41 | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /windows_exploitation/win_security_kerberoasting_activity.yml: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 | title: Kerberoasting Activity - Initial query 2 | id: d04ae2b8-ad54-4de0-bd87-4bc1da66aa59 3 | status: experimental 4 | description: This rule will collect the data needed to start looking into possible kerberoasting activity. 5 | Further analysis or computation within the query is needed focusing on requests from one specific host/IP towards 6 | multiple service names within a time period of 5 seconds. You can then set a threshold for the number of requests 7 | and time between the requests to turn this into an alert. 8 | date: 2022/01/21 9 | author: \@kostastsale 10 | references: 11 | - https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/art_of_kerberoast/ 12 | - https://adsecurity.org/?p=3513 13 | logsource: 14 | product: windows 15 | service: security 16 | detection: 17 | selection: 18 | EventID: 19 | 4769 20 | Status: 21 | '0x0' # Translated as status from failure code field. Query only for successes 22 | TicketEncryptionType: 23 | '0x17' # RC4 ticket encryption type 24 | filter: 25 | ServiceName|endswith: 26 | - 'krbtgt' # Ignore requests for the krbtgt service 27 | - '$' # Ignore requests from service names that end with $ which are associated with genuine kerberos traffic 28 | TargetUserName|contains: 29 | - '$@' # Ignore requests from machines 30 | condition: selection and not filter 31 | falsepositives: 32 | - Legacy applications 33 | level: medium 34 | tags: 35 | - attack.credential_access 36 | - attack.t1558.003 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------